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The existence of U.S. patents issued on inventions made using wildlife 
specimens presents legal, economic, policy, and resource management questions. The 
relation of patent law to wildlife conservation law is central to answering these 
questions.  
Patent law is designed to foster technological advancement, and patents are 
economic instruments intended for market-related activities. Conversely, wildlife 
conservation law is generally intended to inhibit market forces, to regulate the 
possession and use of select wildlife populations, and to sustain this public resource.  
The existence of U.S. patents on inventions from wildlife reveals a practical 
connection among market value of innovation, property law, and wildlife resources. 
Answers to fundamental questions of law and policy this connection raises require an 
understanding of the relation of patent law to wildlife conservation law. This work 
analyzes this relationship. The premise of the analysis is that the bodies of patent and 
wildlife conservation law are orthogonal. That is, these bodies of law are entirely 
separate and do not interact, except at one critical point: possession of tangible 
specimens. 
The evaluation conducted here confirms that these two bodies of law have 
evolved in entirely separate domains, are essentially independent, and are mutually 
non-contingent. They do, however, intersect at the critical point of physical possession 
of wildlife specimens. Possession of physical property in wildlife specimens is 
necessary to make patentable inventions. Furthermore, possession is the critical pivot 
in governmental control of wildlife under conservation laws. This single-point 
intersection creates an orthogonal relationship between these bodies of law that has 
legal and policy implications. For example, at these physical property intersections, 
wildlife conservation law generally fails to control patent-related market forces. 
Moreover, valid patent rights may be obtained in spite of violations of wildlife law. 
The failure to control the patenting of inventions made through the possession 
of wildlife specimens produces natural resource policy and management problems, 
including a market failure in wildlife resource maintenance, a type of tragedy of the 
commons in the new resource of biotechnological utilities from wildlife, and a failure 
of the linkage between technological value of wildlife and its sustainable conservation.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Fundamental Question 
Patents from wildlife present interesting questions and opportunities. 
Patentable, technical innovations obtained from wild animals, plants, and microbes 
offer significant social benefits. But they also raise puzzling new questions of natural 
resource economics, public policy, and law. In this work, examples of wildlife patents 
that do not benefit wildlife conservation are described and analyzed, as are cases in 
which such patents are linked to sustainable wildlife use. Contrasting and comparing 
these case examples provides insight into the answers to some of these questions.  
A variety of U.S. patents have been issued recently for inventions made using 
wildlife (see Table 1.1). The existence of these and other such patents raises a basic 
and important question: Is there a relation between patent law, which is designed to 
foster technical advancement, and biological conservation law, which has evolved to 
manage and maintain the public wildlife resource? If there is a relation, what is its 
nature, and what are the implications for society’s desire for both innovation and 
wildlife conservation? Does the relation, if any, act to symmetrically or 
asymmetrically strengthen or weaken either one or both of these bodies of law? And, 
depending on the effect of the relation on the effectiveness of these laws, what are the 
implications for fostering invention or wildlife conservation, or both? 
This work analyzes the relation of these bodies of law to determine whether 
they are entirely independent (i.e., parallel), intersecting at multiple points, or 
intersecting at a single nexus (i.e., orthogonal). This analysis requires three steps: in 
Chapter 2, an analysis of patent law that focuses on the patentability of biological 
subject matter; in Chapters 3 and 4, an analysis of wildlife conservation law that 
emphasizes activities related to invention and patenting; and, in Chapter 5, the 
2 
identification and characterization of any intersections uncovered by the analytical 
juxtaposition of these laws. 
Table 1.1. Recent U.S. Patents for Inventions from Wildlife Species. 
U.S. Patent Wildlife Species 
Number Title Species Name Common Name 
5,968,988 Methods of using Ajoene for treatment of 
shock 
Bothrops viper 
5,863,954 Contraceptive method using Ajoene Bothrops viper 
5,744,584 Anithrombosis Agents Bothrops viper 
5,705,198 Test for lupus anticoagulant Bothrops viper 
6,613,324 Adhesive for gluing biological tissues Bothrops viper 
4,731,439 Snake venom growth arresting peptide Crotalus atrox western diamondback 
rattlesnake 
5,164,196 Crotoxin complex as cytotoxic agent Crotalus durissus 
terrificus 
Cascaval rattlesnake 
5,314,899 Epibatidine and derivatives, compositions 
and methods of treating pain 
Crotalus basilicus 
basilicus 
Mexican west coast 
rattlesnake 
5,922,587 Phospholipid-dependent prothrombin 
activator obtained from snake venom 
Pseudonaja textilis Australian brown snake 
5,260,060 Fibronolytic enzymes Agkistrodon contortrix 
contortrix 
southern copperhead 
snake 
5,951,981 Thrombolytic agents with antithrombotic 
activity 
Agkistrodon contortrix 
contortrix 
southern copperhead 
snake 
5,045,462 Basic protein called phospholipase A2 
isolated from the venom of a snake of the 
family elapidae and its amino acid sequence 
Naja mozzambica 
pullida 
Mozambique red spitting 
cobra 
5,866,160 Composition of soft-shelled turtle and 
tortoise 
 turtle 
4,677,069 Clam-derived proteinases  clams 
5,912,018 Methods for treatment of muscle spasm, 
edema, and dermatological conditions using 
epidermal gel secretion from an Arabian 
Gulf Catfish 
 Arabian Gulf catfish 
5,196,204 Spider toxins and methods for their use as 
blockers of calcium channels and amino 
acid receptor function 
Agelenopsis aperta spider 
4,490,360 Firefly-derived repellent composition and 
methods of use 
Photinus firefly 
6,384,026 Macrocyclic polyamine lactones and 
derivatives thereof and their use as 
anthropod repellents 
Epilachna varivestris squash beetle 
4,112,074 Compositions comprising ovomucoid 
fraction of white of quail’s egg 
Coturnix coturnix 
japonica 
Japanese quail 
4,737,510 Bioactive metabolites from the Caribbean 
Sponge agelas coniferin 
Agelas coniferin Caribbean sponge 
5,801,020 Antibiotic producing microbe Tolypocladium  fungus 
5,395,919 PHA copolymers . . .   Pseudomonas cepacia  bacterium 
4,814,470 Taxol derivatives [anticancer drug] Taxus yew tree 
5,370,873 Therapeutic compounds Azadirachta indica neem tree 
4,853,213 Use of periwinkle in oral hygiene Vinca major periwinkle plant 
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Web-based database, available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patft/index.html 
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The characterization in Chapter 5 of the relation of these laws provides the 
basis for a discussion in Chapter 6 of the implications for the political economy of the 
wildlife resource. Chapter 7 analyzes two cases that involve patents from wildlife. 
Ethical issues raised by property in wildlife and patents are considered in Chapter 8, 
and Chapter 9 provides a summary of the findings and a conclusion. 
This analysis requires a basic appreciation for the complex interaction of 
different types of property rights that arise with patents, land, personal property, and 
wildlife law. The following hypothetical scenario illustrates a starting point for 
considering the relation of patents and wildlife: A private landowner in the United 
States holds title to land on which various species of wildlife are “fixed” (e.g., rooted 
plants), roam (e.g., locomoting animals), or otherwise reside (e.g., microbes). By 
common law and traditional practice, this landowner owns all the individuals of the 
rooted plant species “Planta hypotheticum” growing on this land, because the rooted 
plants are “fixed” to the land (“fixtures” in real estate law). The landowner’s control 
and ownership of these plants is likely to be diminished if the plants are removed from 
the land. Planta hypotheticum grows nowhere else. A previous owner of the land had 
given a scientist an unrestricted right to collect whole specimens and parts of Planta 
hypotheticum from those plants rooted on this land and to conduct unrestricted 
research on this collection. Because of the unrestricted nature of the collector’s rights 
to possess, the collected parts of hypotheticum have become the personal property of 
the collector. The scientist exercised this right of ownership through possession prior 
to the new owner’s possession of the land. While the plants were in his possession, the 
scientist discovered and (by meeting the requirements of U.S. patent law) obtained a 
patent on a gene from Planta hypotheticum. This gene confers useful traits to crop 
plants, giving it utility and a certain type of economic value. Because there were no 
restrictions on the scientist’s possession and use of the collected specimens, and 
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because the landowner is not an inventor of the sequence of the gene, the present 
landowner has no rights in the patent on the gene. Conversely, regardless of his rights 
in the patent, the scientist has no rights in the remaining plants on the land. Therefore, 
if the patent owner needs more plant specimens, he must obtain permission from the 
owner of the growing plants—the current landowner. The landowner must, in turn, 
obtain permission from the patent owner in order to make, use, or sell the isolated and 
patented gene per se. This patent does not restrict the landowner from any use of the 
plants themselves. However, if the previous landowner had, through a contract, placed 
a restriction on the scientist’s use of the plants (e.g., prohibiting commercial use 
without permission), the situation would be quite different. This scenario would be 
further complicated if Planta hypotheticum were covered by U.S. federal law (e.g., the 
Endangered Species Act) or if the species were an animal or microbe.  
If the species of wildlife is an animal, the scenario is different. In the United 
States, a landowner does not own the wild animals on his or her land (Bean and 
Rowland, 1997). Federal and state laws list certain animals that are controlled by 
government. Depending on the species, the landowner’s rights of possession and 
control of specimens or parts may be superseded by law. If so, the government may 
have rights in collected specimens or parts conveyed to the scientist-collector and, 
perhaps, in a patent obtained through possession. If the species is not controlled by 
government, the distribution of rights in the free-roaming animal and captured 
specimens and in the patent derived through possession will flow from the first 
possession and will be similar to the plant scenario above. 
Microbes exhibit some characteristics of being fixed to the land (e.g., fungal 
mycelia) and of being free-roaming (e.g., microbial spores and protozoans). Although 
state and federal law does not explicitly articulate the status of these biota (Bean and 
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Rowland, 1997), the Roman legal doctrine of ratione soli1 may provide a basis for 
establishing property in microbes. However, property in microbes is complicated by 
the existence of patents on pure microbial cultures. Such patents represent a critical 
overlap between intellectual property, chattel, and other property-like rights in 
wildlife. 
These complex scenarios are fraught with ambiguity in terrestrial biota 
property. The dynamic balance of bioproperty rights held by state and federal 
governments and private landowners further complicates. Wildlife in rivers, lakes, and 
the sea present a different bioproperty milieu. In particular, the nested sovereignties 
and overlapping jurisdictions over ocean biota depend on the type of biota, its distance 
from the coast, and its physical relation to the sea floor and tidal zones, as well as the 
overlay of international treaties (Bean and Rowland, 1997).  
1.2 Research Goal, Strategy, and Scope of Work 
The goal of this work is to determine whether the relation of patent and 
wildlife conservation law in the United States is parallel, intersecting at multiple 
points, or intersecting at one point (orthogonal). 
Evaluating the relation of patents and wildlife conservation law is conducted in 
four steps: 1) an analysis of U.S. patent law, emphasizing the patentability of 
biological subject matter; 2) an analysis of the historical evolution of property in 
wildlife in the United States; 3) an analysis of biological conservation law in the 
United States, emphasizing control of possession and use for purposes of invention; 
and 4) an analysis of the intersections of these bodies of law. Results of this evaluation 
are described in terms of their implications for the political economy of wildlife, and 
two case studies elucidate the results. 
                                                 
1 Ownership “by reason of the soil”; this pertained to ownership of bees via ownership of the land 
where they nest. 
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The scope of this research is limited to terrestrial wild (non-domesticated) 
biota (all non-human organisms, their parts, and by-products) in the United States. 
International aspects are considered only as they directly impact the United States. For 
example, international wildlife treaties such as the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act affect federal wildlife law. 
Domesticated biota, such as livestock and crops, are viewed only to the extent 
necessary to understand the biota-property milieu. Ex situ collections of wildlife are 
considered as a unique intersection of property in domesticated and wild organisms.  
In the analysis of intellectual property and biological matter, the focus is 
entirely on patents.  
In the sections on federal and state law, a summary of critical portions of 
relevant federal laws is provided, and an overview of some common themes in state 
law is described. A detailed analysis of state wildlife law is limited to New York State. 
In the section on policy analysis, the economic characteristics of biotechnological 
utilities from wildlife are summarized as a precursor to describing the political 
economy of this natural resource. 
As an epilogue, ethical questions are considered. These questions center on the 
basis of property in non-human biota and on wildlife as a public good versus a private 
right. The discussion also includes the ethics of intellectual property generally, patents 
on biological matter, and the relation of biota property to religious and environmental 
ethics. 
1.3 Background 
The age-old relation of society to natural resources is multifaceted. In general, 
societies are characterized by how they maintain, access, and use natural resources as 
well as how they resolve issues that arise from these activities. A society’s relationship 
to wildlife (i.e., all non-domesticated organisms, their parts, and by-products) is a case 
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in point. Through law and custom, societies have defined rights to control the 
possession and use of wildlife.  
Implicit in the term “wildlife resource” is the notion that wildlife is useful 
and/or desirable to humans. For some species, such as salmon and bald eagles, utility 
and/or desirability are obvious, but for others, they are less so. The exploitation and 
allocation of wildlife resources has created fundamental social, economic, and 
political tensions. It is within these tensions that U.S. wildlife conservation law and 
policy has evolved over several hundred years. 
Conversely, there are wildlife that U.S. society neither desires nor wishes to 
conserve. For example, certain invasive species, animal and plant pests, and pathogens 
are wildlife, but not a resource. The flipside of laws designed to conserve wildlife 
species deemed beneficial are laws intended to eradicate and inhibit pathogen, pest, 
and nuisance species. Various federal and state laws impose the strictest level of 
governmental control over the possession and use of many species of deleterious 
organisms, including human and animal pathogens, agricultural pests, and 
environmental invasives that include viruses, microbes, plants, and animals. Federal 
and state laws that assert governmental control over undesirable wildlife are 
widespread, enforced by various agencies, and complicated. They play an important 
role in the overall picture of property in wildlife. However, this research work focuses 
only on desirable species and does not analyze undesirables and their controlling laws.  
In the midst of traditional uses and control of wildlife, technology has created a 
“new” natural resource in wildlife. This biotechnologically based resource comprises 
biological materials such as animal cell lines, proteins and DNA fragments, microbial 
cultures, and methods, which I collectively call “biotechnological inventions.” 
Considering the effect of these utilities on the social relation to wildlife raises 
fundamental questions. These questions are made critical by the combination of the 
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rising economic importance of biotechnology, the technological creation of new 
tangible and intangible property rights from wildlife, and the apparent decline of 
biodiversity. The landscape is made even more complicated by the overlay of 
information derived from wildlife (Parry, 2004). The questions are brought into focus 
by patents on inventions made by possession and use of wildlife. Although such 
patents present unique puzzles, the relation of intellectual property and wildlife is a 
subset of larger questions surrounding the “owning” of wildlife.  
Ownership is a complex concept that comprises various components embedded 
in cultural and social contexts (Becker, 1977). It has been defined as the right to 
control the possession and disposition of things without interference from others 
(Grunebaum, 1987). Becker’s (1977) definition is more precise: Ownership is the 
aggregate holding of a “bundle” of several, distinct property rights. This “bundle of 
rights” concept of ownership is defined by Honoré (1961) as several fundamental 
rights in property including the exclusive right to physical possession, the right to use, 
and a handful of others. Such property rights originate when a society makes a 
distinction between an owner’s rights and those rights of property that derive solely 
from simple physical possession (Macpherson, 1978). 
Most important, the bundle of rights is separable (at least theoretically), with 
different rights potentially held by separate entities. For example, the right of 
possession may be separated from the right to use (i.e., bailments). Conversely, one 
may hold the right to use but not the right of exclusive possession (i.e., usufruct).  
Ownership is often an interdigitation of different rights in the same property 
held by distinct entities. Rights in the ownership bundle may be strengthened, 
weakened, or eliminated by the existence of other rights (e.g., human rights supersede 
property rights; public safety and animal cruelty laws trump use rights).  
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The concept of ownership is made more complex by the existence of different 
types of property. The ownership concepts above suggest a private-property right. But 
public-property rights also have a long history. And other property types, including 
communal property, are part of the ownership milieu. Even null property must be 
considered.  
Ownership of wildlife is not a new issue. For centuries, the power and/or right 
to control the possession and use of wildlife has been a significant political and 
cultural matter (Lund, 1980; Tober, 1981; Bean and Rowland, 1997). The idea of 
owning wildlife seems oxymoronic: How can something wild be owned? The U.S. 
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the owning of wildlife is, at most, a legal 
fiction.2 But in the same decision, the court also declared government’s responsibility 
to protect, in trust for the people, wildlife legislatively selected for governmental 
protection. This trustee’s obligation yields powers of control that exhibit some 
characteristics of ownership—the right of exclusive possession, for example. But what 
of wildlife that is not protected under federal or state law? The long-standing legal 
doctrine of acquiring private-property right through first possession (Rose, 1985; 
Dukeminier and Krier, 2000) allows personal property in wildlife to be obtained by 
various forms of capture. 
Creating intellectual property rights in a biotechnological utility from wildlife 
requires physical possession of a specimen of that biota, and possession is a basic 
element of ownership. But what underlies the right to possess a wildlife specimen? 
The ultimate right to control access, possession, and use lies in sovereignty—the 
essence of the social relation to wildlife. Who has sovereignty over wildlife in the 
United States? The federal or state governments? Private land owners? Everyone? No 
one? Understanding sovereignty in wildlife is a necessary prelude to analyzing 
                                                 
2 Justice O. W. Holmes, in the majority opinion of Missouri v. Holland, 25, U.S. 416, 1920. 
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wildlife property. Once this is clarified, questions of property rights in wildlife 
naturally follow, including personal property in captured biota specimens and 
consequent intellectual property.  
Wildlife property is fundamental to the balance of socially distributed rights in 
this natural resource. This is because property is the basic mechanism for the 
allocation of rights to possess and use, especially with natural resources. To what 
extent is wildlife a public good rather than a privatizable property? Where is the 
equilibrium in this public/private resource allocation? Is the equilibrium altered by 
tangible biotechnological utilities and/or related intellectual property? In practice, how 
do current wildlife laws affect these natural resource questions?  
Under current federal and state law, wildlife property rules variously apply to 
whole specimens (e.g., free-roaming and caged animals, and carcasses), parts (e.g., 
skins, flesh, organs), by-products (e.g., wool) and propagules (i.e., eggs and seeds) 
(Bean and Rowland, 1997). But do they similarly apply to tangible or intangible 
biotechnological inventions such as in vitro cell cultures and patentable information 
obtained from those cultures? 
Issues of property in wildlife are underlain by philosophical questions of 
owning biota. Is it ethical to own any biota? Does it depend on the kind of biota? On 
the purpose of ownership? Who should own it? What about owning intellectual 
property from wildlife? Understanding these questions provides a basis for the social 
construct of wildlife property in the United States. 
The relation between wildlife property and the balance of public good–private 
right shapes the political economy of wildlife, including the resource created by 
technology. This work provides a preliminary description of the unique economic 
character of biotechnological utilities from wildlife and creates a framework for 
analyzing this political economy. Focused analyses of property in wildlife and the 
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intersection of intellectual property and biological conservation law lead to relevant 
questions of natural resource economics and political economy. Using this framework, 
we can evaluate particular legal mechanisms and policy scenarios and explore 
prescriptions for particular outcomes (for example, optimum technological 
development and/or conservation of wildlife).  
1.3.1 Bioprospecting and the Biodiversity Convention Emphasize 
Wildlife Property 
The development of “bioprospecting” (Eisner, 1990, 1991; Reid, 1993b) set 
the stage for a new perspective and emphasis on wildlife property and its potential role 
in technology development and resource management. Bioprospecting illustrates the 
intersection of wildlife property, technology, economics, and conservation (Farrier and 
Tucker, 2001). Similarly, the global Biodiversity Convention is implicitly based on the 
concept of wildlife property. 
Bioprospecting is the systematic searching of biota for biotechnological 
utilities (Farrier and Tucker, 2001; Hamilton, 2004). In this respect, it differs little 
from the age-old practice of taking organisms from their habitat and using them with 
little regard for rights of possession, control, or use. However, traditional biota 
collecting lacks the explicit and legally binding provisions that characterize real 
bioprospecting arrangements, which establish property in biota and create obligations 
that link commercial returns to conservation. Unlike simple collecting, bioprospecting 
formally links the value of inventions from biota to financial obligations for 
conservation. An explicit allocation of rights in tangible and intangible property in 
inventions from biota is key to this linkage. 
The potential economic value of undiscovered biotechnological utilities from 
wildlife in intact habitats underlies the bioprospecting rationale. The idea that 
biotechnological utilities from wildlife are a natural resource and that economic value 
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can be ascribed to potential discoveries in wildlife in their intact ecosystems is not 
new (Sedjo, 1988, 1992). However, the concept of directly linking the economic value 
of inventions from wildlife to biological conservation was first described by Eisner 
(1990). Eisner envisioned a systematic search of wild biodiversity for useful 
chemicals, the subsequent commercialization of resultant products, and the dedication 
of a portion of the financial return to biological conservation. Wildlife property issues 
are embedded in Eisner’s concept, although he did not acknowledge this relationship. 
Later, Reid (1993a) clearly stated the critical role wildlife property plays in 
bioprospecting. 
Eisner’s idea stimulated efforts to establish bioprospecting projects. The 
Merck/INBio arrangement for bioprospecting insects from national park land in Costa 
Rica was first, and is probably best known (Reid, 1993a); others have followed. The 
idea of using contracts and business arrangements as an approach to conservation was 
mentioned in brief by others (Sedjo, 1992), but it was not until the Merck/INBio 
agreement was finalized that a prototypical bioprospecting mechanism was given form 
(Reid, 1993a). Most bioprospecting arrangements developed to date involve the 
searching for and collecting of biological samples in foreign countries, especially 
those in the tropics. In each case, legally binding contracts integrate and structure the 
intentions of technology commercialization and conservation (Cahoon, 1994).  
The bioprospecting concept has potential as a broadly applicable conservation 
instrument, but most initial efforts have focused on tropical, developing countries. 
There have been fewer efforts focused on temperate, developed countries, and 
discussions of bioprospecting (Reid, 1993a, 1993b) have largely neglected its broader 
applications. Because bioprospecting involves wildlife sovereignty and property issues 
and has focused on developing countries, the concept has been enmeshed in debates 
over the equity of North versus South technology transfer and resource exploitation. 
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The publicizing of bioprospecting deals and the increased biotechnologically based 
value of biota have stimulated a great deal of debate, often based on misconceptions 
and laden with rhetoric. Some believe that the Merck/InBio bioprospecting agreement 
would result in Merck owning intellectual property on Costa Rican wildlife that will 
prohibit Costa Rican scientists from further biological research (International Plant 
Genetics Resources Institute [IPGRI], 1994). Of course, this is wrong, given that wild 
organisms per se (with the exception of pure microbial cultures) are not patentable in 
any country. But this belief demonstrates a misconception about the relation between 
property in a wildlife specimen and a patent right. For example, the patentee of a gene 
sequence from an organism acquires no rights in the living organism by virtue of their 
patent rights (Bent et al., 1987). 
On the other hand, some economists have suggested that effecting biological 
conservation through economic incentives can be accomplished by allowing the 
“ready patenting of naturally-occurring organisms” (Swanson, 1992). However, this 
runs counter to hundreds of years of intellectual property law throughout the world, in 
which wildlife is considered the common heritage of humanity. Many statements have 
been made that suggest patents confer an unlimited, worldwide monopoly 
(Kloppenburg, 1988a; Fowler and Mooney, 1990), when, in fact, patents are territorial 
(by country) and are limited in duration. 
The collapse of some bioprospecting arrangements in developing countries has 
dampened enthusiasm for the concept (Rosenthal, 2002). But this should not diminish 
its utility as a conservation instrument—an instrument built on the creative application 
of wildlife property and the biotechnological properties it produces. Despite the 
controversies, the bioprospecting concept remains viable. McLaughlin (2003) points 
out the importance of linking the value of genetic resources to natural resources as 
well as the need for a new set of rules to govern this “new” natural resource. In 
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particular, he calls for a move away from ownership by rule of capture. Examples of 
benefits lost through a failure to make the link between wildlife property and patents 
further confirm the value of bioprospecting (Svarstad, Bugge, and Dhillion, 2000). 
Regardless of the future of bioprospecting, the concept sheds light on fundamental 
questions of wildlife property. And, regardless of the viability of bioprospecting, there 
is a clear question of linkage between wildlife access, intellectual property, and 
benefit-sharing (Brand and Gorg, 2003) and the underlying importance of property 
rights (Farrier and Tucker, 2001). 
The establishment of the International Convention on Biodiversity 
(“Biodiversity Convention”) is one of the most important events related to wildlife 
sovereignty and property. The Biodiversity Convention, ratified by over 160 
participating countries (but not the United States), provides a global-treaty basis for 
international cooperation on wildlife sovereignty and property (Coughlin, 1993). Key 
provisions of the Convention include the following: that biological resources are 
valuable both in proprietary states (e.g., patents) and in natural states (i.e., wildlife), 
and that nations will recognize this dual value; that nations may assert sovereignty 
over all biota (including domesticated and wildlife) within their borders; and that 
nations will create mechanisms to facilitate the equitable exchange of technology and 
biological resources between countries. Although the Convention has no enforcement 
mechanism, it serves as a guide for managing international wildlife property issues.3  
The impact of the U.S. failure to ratify the Biodiversity Convention is a 
question. Increasingly, public-sector and private concerns are framing discussions of 
biological resource conservation and use in terms of wildlife property defined by the 
Convention (Chandler, 1993). Although some have claimed that bioprospecting 
arrangements render the Convention superfluous (R. Stone, 1992), this treaty looms 
                                                 
3 The text of the International Convention on Biodiversity is available at http://www.biodiv.org/ 
convention/convention.shtml. 
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over the U.S. biotechnology industry as a potentially significant factor (Burk et al., 
1993); some question whether U.S. entities will have access to the wildlife of 
participating countries (Hoyle, 1994). 
Some opponents of U.S. ratification of the Convention on Biodiversity have 
claimed that personal property rights will be abrogated and subsumed under some 
supra-national body (Margolis, 1994), despite the fact that the United States signed the 
Convention with the written condition that it would not alter the domestic status quo 
of wildlife sovereignty and property in the United States (Chandler, 1993). 
Regardless of the debate over bioprospecting, the fact remains that valuable 
discoveries have been, and will continue to be, discovered in wild biota. Examples of 
this situation are implied in the patents described in Table 1.1 and by others (Svarstad 
et al., 2000). 
1.3.2 Related Issues 
Much of the international debate over rights in wildlife has focused on the 
tension between the “biodiversity-poor” but “technology-rich” industrialized countries 
of the northern hemisphere and the “biodiversity-rich,” developing countries of the 
southern. These debates are often antagonistic and rhetorical (Wiegele, 1992; Isla, 
2005), with calls of “biopiracy” (Toly, 2005). But it is clear that bioprospecting 
undertaken without the appropriate sharing of benefits with the source of the 
discoveries is biopiracy (Toly, 2005). Much of this debate has centered on the control 
of plant genetic resources, and opposing views have been polarized (Kloppenburg, 
1988b; Fowler and Mooney, 1990; National Research Council [NRC], 1993). 
Governments and private companies in industrialized countries generally advocate 
strong property rights in developed biological material, protectable through contract 
law and intellectual property, while adhering to the concept that wildlife should be a 
freely accessible common resource. Others believe this is not equitable because the 
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holder of “raw genetic resources” of wildlife typically has no proprietary rights, 
whereas technology creators can establish property from the common resource. Such 
questions of property rights in crop-related, domesticated-plant genetic resources 
remain unsettled (NRC, 1993). 
The rights of indigenous persons in discussions of property in biological 
material are another hotly debated topic (Crucible Group, 1994; Greaves, 1994), and 
some have labeled scientists involved in biological research “genetic colonialists” 
(Kahn, 1994).  
In an interesting treatise, Vogel (1994) proposes “genetic homesteading,” in 
which governments would grant landowners rights in the “genetically-coded-function” 
from wildlife on their property. Landowners would then hold the requisite rights as an 
incentive to preserve biodiversity on their land. This novel idea addresses a basic 
problem of biological conservation: creating incentives to preserve wildlife. Wildlife 
property is implicit in Vogel’s thesis. 
1.3.3 Sovereignty and Property in Wildlife 
Sovereignty is the ultimate source of property. The sovereign has the ultimate 
power to establish, grant, and enforce property rights. The question of who holds or 
should hold the ultimate right of control over wildlife has taken various forms 
throughout history. Sovereignty over wildlife has been an issue at least since the first 
tribal hunting grounds (Laveleye, 1878, Lafargue, 1894). The history of the 
international struggle to acquire and exploit plants, fish, and game revolves around 
this question (Whittle, 1988; Juma, 1989). Questions of sovereignty in wildlife have 
been the focus of international disputes over marine fisheries, endangered species, 
marine mammals, migratory birds, and wild races of crop species (Lyster, 1985; 
Meyers, 1992; Richards, 1994).  
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It is useful to begin at the national level when analyzing sovereignty in wildlife 
(Bragdon, 1992). Nations have historically asserted sovereignty over transient biota 
such as coastal fisheries. In the United States, the federal government has absolute 
sovereignty over select taxa, including marine mammals, eagles, pelagic fisheries, 
endangered species, and migratory birds (Plater, 1992). National sovereignty over 
wildlife, particularly biota that are transient across national boundaries, is a 
cornerstone of various regional and international agreements and treaties that structure 
the international control of wildlife (Lyster, 1985; Groombridge, 1992). International 
treaties prescribe national sovereignty over certain species of whales, seals, polar 
bears, and birds (Lyster, 1985). Numerous regional wildlife treaties are built on the 
national sovereignty principle. Examples include the Andean Treaty for the 
Conservation of the Vicûna, the Kuwait Regional Convention on Marine 
Environment, and the Benelux Treaty on the Protection of Birds (Groombridge, 1992).  
A review of the several international and regional wildlife treaties reveals no 
explicit treatment of biotechnological utilities or intellectual property (Lyster, 1985; 
Groombridge, 1992). 
On some occasions, nations assert sovereignty over a specific taxon. For 
example, in 1911, the first national law governing the control and use of a wild plant 
(edelweiss) was enacted by Switzerland, a country with a strong private-property 
tradition (de Klemm, 1990). Ecuador controls its living cocoa resources, and Turkey 
its tobacco; Ethiopia embargoes its coffee plants, and Brazil its rubber germplasm 
(Fowler and Mooney, 1990). Even countries with a strong private-property tradition 
have passed legislation that limits private-property rights in certain wildlife found on 
private property (Groombridge, 1992). These are relatively rare historical exceptions, 
as most of the world’s biota have been rather freely exchanged across international 
borders. Some claim, however, that such disregard for any property right in wildlife is 
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“biopiracy” and that developed countries are guilty of disregarding inherent national 
and tribal sovereignty and property in exploiting wildlife (Juma, 1989; Fowler and 
Mooney, 1990).  
Biotechnology has generated controversy over sovereignty in wildlife and its 
relation to the ownership of “genetic material” (Sedjo, 1992). This topic dominated the 
discussion and debate over the Biodiversity Convention (Burk et al., 1993; R. Stone, 
1993; Chandler, 1993; Hardy 1994).  
In the future, national sovereignty over wildlife (particularly, “genetic 
resources”) will be an increasingly critical issue (NRC, 1993) as countries assert rights 
in their wildlife as provided in the Biodiversity Convention. 
Within nations there are questions of intra-national sovereignty. For example, 
to what extent, if any, is national sovereignty over wildlife asserted and shared with 
regional governments, and, if so, how? How is sovereignty asserted in wildlife that is 
transient across jurisdictions? What are the impacts of “nested” and overlapping 
sovereignties in which the ultimate right to control wildlife is held by more than one 
entity? For example, in the United States, sovereignty over a wildlife species can be a 
complex conglomeration of federal and state jurisdictions.  
The derivation of property rights from sovereignty over wildlife involves an 
interplay of real and personal property. Whereas personal property in domesticated 
biota is an ancient and largely uncontested concept (Field, 1989), property in wildlife 
is fraught with questions—questions that revolve on the relation of land ownership to 
rights in wildlife. For example, any consideration of property in a wildlife specimen 
depends on its taxon and location: Is it free-roaming or caged, alive or dead, whole or 
a part, transient or fixed, on government-owned or private land? (Bean and Rowland, 
1997). 
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In free-market economies, property rights, held and freely exchanged by 
individuals, are essential (Demsetz, 1967). Under such regimes, the sovereign grants 
rights of possession and use of tangible and intangible property to individuals and 
other legal entities (Andrews and Hill, 1975). Tangible property includes real and 
personal property. In the United States, property rights in land extend to traditionally 
useful wildlife that are “fixed” to the land (i.e., rooted plants), for example, rights in 
valuable timber. The question of whether this tradition extends to less obvious, fixed 
and “semi-fixed” biota such as bacteria, fungi, algae, and invertebrates has been raised 
by inventions from these obscure biota. In the United States, transient wildlife do not 
automatically fall within a landowner’s real-property rights because they are not 
fixtures. This situation is confused when mobile wildlife resides permanently and 
entirely within the bounds of private, real property. Property rights in an endemic 
population entirely within a landowner’s property boundary4 are ambiguous.  
Possession is the fulcrum of the wildlife-property question. Possession is also 
necessary to create inventions. And because the law presumes that physical possession 
of personal property is ownership, personal property plays a pivotal role in resolving 
these puzzles of property in wildlife. The classic case of Pierson v. Post5 tested the 
question of establishing a personal-property right in a wild fox wounded and pursued 
by hunters. This case helped define the legal doctrine of creating private-property 
rights through first possession (Rose, 1985). How does this tradition relate to the 
acquisition of personal-property rights in free-roaming, captured, or tamed wildlife as 
constrained by biological conservation law? 
                                                 
4 For example, the desert pupfish that exists only in very small desert pools of Nevada. 
5 3 Cai. R. 175 2AM. Dec. 264. 
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1.3.4 Biological Conservation Law and Wildlife Property 
The idea that property in wildlife can be defined by land ownership, biota type, 
and first possession is confounded by a variety of laws that assert the governmental 
control of possession and use of certain wildlife. In the United States, the patchwork 
of federal and state wildlife conservation laws overlay other property considerations. 
These include federal laws that protect endangered and migratory bird species and 
state statutes that control fish and game (Lyster, 1985; Bean and Rowland, 1997). 
In the early years of the American colonies and the United States, all wildlife 
was a commons, free for the taking. Eventually, public-safety concerns, commercial 
disputes, and resource conservation led to a gradually increasing assertion of 
governmental control (Lund, 1980). The 1700s and 1800s were characterized by 
minimal assertion of state control of fish and game and the lack of a federal role. 
Throughout the 1800s, states retained almost total sovereignty over biota within their 
borders. In the 1900s, the rise of federal control of migratory birds led to significant 
questions of federal versus state sovereignty and jurisdiction over wildlife. Today 
federal and state governments control various wildlife through a labyrinth of 
conservation laws (Lund, 1980; Tober, 1981; Bean and Rowland, 1997). This mix of 
national sovereignty, state control, and private property is then overlain by 
international treaties (Lyster, 1985). 
Although the dynamic tension of state versus federal control of wildlife adds 
complexity to these issues, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the federal 
government may assert ultimate sovereignty over any wildlife species that Congress so 
selects.6 For example, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) asserts federal control over 
listed species regardless of other property considerations. Nonetheless, it is the states 
that assert governmental control over most wildlife, through a complex web of fish 
                                                 
6 Missouri v. Holland, 1920. 
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and game law, public land control, and endangered-species and related conservation 
statutes (Bean and Rowland, 1997). 
The nature of property in wildlife in the United States is confusing, even for 
traditional fish and game, well-established property institutions, and biological-
resource management laws (Bragdon, 1992). This confusion is multiplied with less 
obviously valuable biota such as microbes, invertebrates, and obscure plants. For 
example, questions have been raised over rights in discoveries of economically 
valuable microbial enzymes from Yellowstone National Park (Robbins, 1994; 
Milstein, 1994c) and microbial resources on federal lands, in general (Wolf, 1994). A 
reading of the relevant federal laws that might resolve such questions provides 
ambiguous answers.7 
These already-complex issues of sovereignty and property in wildlife and their 
parts are being made more complicated by biotechnology that is pushing the envelope 
of legal tradition, definitions, mechanisms, and policies. And where do the 
intellectual-property rights in patents on inventions made from wildlife fit in this 
context? 
1.3.5 Patents and Property in Wildlife 
The creation of inventions from wildlife establishes novel tangible and 
intangible property rights: tangible personal property in biological matter per se, and 
intangible intellectual property. Of the several forms of intellectual property, patents 
are of particular relevance to wildlife-property questions. 
Historically, patents have had little relevance to biological-resource 
management. This changed with the trend to extending patents over an increasingly 
broader range of biological subject matter (Bent et al., 1987). Biotechnology 
                                                 
7 That is, the National Park legislation includes the Organic Act 1916, Yellowstone Enabling 
Legislation of 1872, the Redwoods Act Amendment of 1978, and pertinent policies and regulations in 
the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 
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accelerated the process of developing utilities and intellectual properties from wildlife, 
driving the economic motivation to control and possess wildlife specimens. This 
pressure runs headlong into that law and policy which concerns the disposition of 
wildlife for both public good and private benefit. 
Anyone who obtains information from biological materials and/or methods that 
meets the legal criteria of patentability may be issued a patent covering that 
information. Using intellectual property law to establish patent rights from wildlife 
information has historically created both opportunity and wealth, and anger and 
confusion. But what is the relation between patents on biological subject matter 
obtained from wildlife and other forms of property in wildlife? 
Patent law is national in scope, although international treaties such as the 
Patent Convention Treaty (PCT), the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) portion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and 
regional treaties such as the European Patent Convention (EPC) act to harmonize the 
variety of national laws. Holding patent rights in one country does not grant rights in 
another country—there is no “world-wide patent.” Patents are issued only by national 
governments, and their force is limited by national boundaries. U.S. patents have no 
validity in another country, and vice versa. 
Patent laws exist to provide incentives for the creative genius of inventors. 
Such laws are based on the concept that granting limited-term, exclusive rights to 
inventors for their own inventions, in exchange for complete public disclosure, 
provides inventors the incentive to invent, thereby stimulating technological 
advancement for the general benefit of society.  
To be patentable, an invention (or “discovery”—the terms are synonymous 
under U.S. patent law) must be conceived and “reduced to practice.” Physical laws, 
mathematical formulae, methods of business, and “products of nature” are not 
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patentable in any country. The legal tradition of prohibition on “product of nature” 
patentability bars patents on wildlife species per se or their specimens. This doctrine is 
a manifestation of the “common heritage” principle that wildlife are a common 
resource of the public that may not be converted into private property. The idea that 
“living matter” may be patentable is based on the concept that the invention did not 
exist as such in nature and that significant intellectual work was required to create the 
invention. Breeding a new plant variety, sequencing a gene, and characterizing a 
biochemical all require significant ingenuity to create something that did not exist in 
nature before the invention was conceived and reduced to practice.  
A patent is essentially a limited, negative, intangible personal-property right by 
which the national government grants to the inventor a limited-term right to prohibit 
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention. In exchange for this 
grant, the inventor agrees to provide a complete, accurate, and enabling public 
disclosure of the invention. This disclosure permits the public to learn from the 
invention and provides a basis on which others may invent and patent improvements. 
Patents are the antithesis of secrets because they require full disclosure.  
Like any invention, to be patentable a biological invention must have some 
utility (particularly, of some economic relevance). It must be novel, and it must not be 
obvious to someone with “ordinary skill in the art.” An important aspect of a patent, 
established by the novelty and nonobviousness criteria, is that it must not take 
anything away from the public that the public did not have before the patent was 
issued. For example, to be patentable, a gene must not have previously existed as a 
DNA-sequenced, technologically useful entity. By isolating and characterizing the 
gene’s DNA sequence, the inventor has made the gene technologically useful, thereby 
advancing knowledge and technology, but has not taken anything from the public, 
because the patentable matter (the isolated and characterized gene) did not exist for the 
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public in its prior, unpatentable condition. This is the fundamental characteristic of 
patents that precludes inventors from inappropriate privatization of portions of the 
common good. 
Upon issuing a patent, the national government grants the patent holder the 
right, for a period of twenty years (from submission of the patent application), to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention. A patent does 
not grant the inventor the right to make, use, or sell the patented invention—only to 
prohibit others from doing so. Owning a patent on a discovery from an organism does 
not give the patentee rights to control the organism that was the source of the 
invention. 
Another form of intellectual property relevant to biota is “plant breeder’s 
rights” (PBR). The international convention known as the Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties (UPOV) gives plant breeders limited, exclusive rights to propagate and 
sell sexually propagated plant varieties made by breeding. In the United States (a 
member of the UPOV Convention), the Plant Variety Protection Act provides this 
right through a Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate. Also, since 1930, the United 
States has granted plant patents to breeders and discoverers (if the plants are 
discovered in a cultivated state, i.e., in orchards or fields) of asexually propagated, 
novel plant varieties that are uniform, distinct, and stable. PBR laws preclude property 
rights in wild flora and so are not relevant to the wildlife-property milieu. However, 
such laws do not prevent the use of wild flora in the breeding pedigree of a variety 
covered by PBR.  
Biotechnological utilities are a relatively recent phenomenon. But the 
evolution of patents in biological matter has much earlier roots (Crespi, 1982; Beier, 
Crespi, and Straws, 1985; Cooper, 2000). In the United States, the first patents on 
living subject matter were issued in 1873 to Louis Pasteur for “yeast as an article of 
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manufacture.” In Germany, patents for yeast cultures in brewing, vinegar manufacture, 
and bread making were granted soon after the enactment of the German Patent Law of 
1877 (Beier et al., 1985). In the United States, this trend continued with patents issued 
for an antitoxic serum in 1877, a bacterial vaccine in 1904, a bacterial sewage 
treatment in 1908, and a viral vaccine in 1916. The trend toward patentability 
accelerated in the 1940s and 1950s in the United States and the United Kingdom with 
patents issued on purified vitamins and antibiotics. In 1980, biotechnologists 
eventually pushed the U.S. Supreme Court to declare that the scope of patentable 
subject matter includes “anything under the sun made by man,” enabling inventors to 
obtain patents on all manner of biological subjects including genes, antibodies, and 
even whole organisms. 
The expansive view of the patentability of biological subjects is in fundamental 
tension with the traditional proscription of patents on “products of nature.” This 
tension, manifest by patents on microbial strains purified from nature but otherwise 
unaltered, impacts wildlife-property issues. What is the threshold of human endeavor 
when an unpatentable “product of nature” becomes a patentable “product from 
nature”? This threshold directly affects the wildlife-property equation.  
1.3.6 Possession, Personal Property, and Patents from Wildlife 
Specimens  
In order to invent patentable subject matter from a wildlife specimen, it is 
necessary to physically possess the specimen. In some cases, a few cells may suffice. 
A biotechnologist may require only a single cell or a strand of DNA, but, originally, 
someone had to possess an entire, intact organism. Therefore, invention requires 
physical possession of a specimen, and possession requires access.  
Physical possession is the critical event in the process of transforming access 
to wildlife into patent property. Elucidating the rights a possessor holds in a biological 
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specimen requires analysis of the extent of control over possession and use asserted by 
governmental and/or private entities, if any. 
In a clear acknowledgment of the link between possession and patent rights, it 
has been recommended that national patent offices require proof of legal possession of 
source biota as a prerequisite to patent issuance (Williams, 1997). Although this policy 
could help control “biopiracy,” it also might create administrative bottlenecks in 
already overburdened patent offices. 
1.3.7 Inventions from Wildlife: The Political Economy 
The political economy of wildlife is a complex equation defined by property 
rights, the economic value of wildlife, and the dynamic that balances the protection of 
this resource as a public good against its private exploitation. Wildlife was historically 
considered a common good like the sea, air, or sunlight (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 
1975), and conflicts over the wildlife commons typically involved game, fisheries, and 
useful plants. In the early years of the American colonies and the United States, all 
wildlife was freely accessible to all. This philosophy was based on a rejection of the 
feudal rights of kings and aristocrats in wildlife (Lund, 1980) and on resource 
abundance. Although public-safety issues led to a few early assertions of 
governmental control over wildlife, it was a growing awareness of resource scarcity 
and the importance of conservation that led to a shift away from valuable wildlife as a 
commons to a government-regulated resource (Tober, 1981). 
Long-held questions on the optimal distribution of the right of access to 
wildlife have been predicated on the economic value of useful wildlife. Tangible and 
intangible biotechnological inventions from wildlife significantly alter this situation. 
Biotechnology has created a “new” natural resource—a resource with all of the 
characteristics of traditional wildlife, but with new attributes as well. I believe one 
must understand the characteristics of biotechnological inventions, including their 
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suitability for transformation into intellectual property, before one can analyze the 
relation of patents to the political economy of wildlife. 
This new natural resource presents a new set of economic problems. Some 
species that were economically trivial in the past have acquired significant new value 
because of the inventions made with them. Previously non-scarce wildlife are now 
being transformed into scarce commodities by one technically useful discovery. 
Wildlife species that were never considered in the public-good versus private-good 
debate are now relevant. Because of invention, the traditional debate over property 
rights and the sustainable use of fugitive biological resources such as fisheries must 
now be extended to other creatures such as arthropods and protozoa.  
The issue of technologically valuable microbes from Yellowstone National 
Park raises important questions about wildlife and biological conservation. Some 
claim the microbes in Yellowstone are, like all wildlife, a common resource that 
belongs to the public (Milstein, 1993). But a publicly accessible wildlife commons 
may act against the preservation of biodiversity. Hardin (1968) describes a “tragedy of 
the commons” in which a resource, freely available to all, is valuable to individuals 
only by capture. Individuals have no incentive to conserve the resource and attempt to 
maximize their value in the resource without considering the cumulative impacts of 
other individuals who are also acquiring value through capture. The resulting 
“tragedy” is the destruction of the common resource. If wildlife is a common good not 
owned or controlled by anyone (res nullius), no one has any economic incentive to 
husband it. An assertion of property rights in wildlife populations may be necessary to 
avoid a “tragedy of the commons” of biodiversity loss and to induce investments 
needed to preserve biodiversity (Swanson, 1992). 
How should property rights in wildlife be distributed if the natural-resource 
economic equation is changing so significantly? Will the public good in wildlife be 
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optimized by strengthening or restricting private-property rights? Should governments 
assert broader or tighter control over the right to possess and use wildlife, particularly 
that wildlife which is now res nullius? Should governments allow individuals to assert 
ownership in biotechnological utilities and patents from “public” biota? Will 
technology advancement and economic development be best served if governments 
regulate the exploitation of the inventions of wildlife? Is laissez-faire government 
perhaps the best way to achieve the public good in inventions from wildlife? What 
about the sustainability of wildlife use? How could sustainability be accomplished in a 
distributive-rights scheme? And what of future generations—should their needs be 
considered when society determines the value of yet-to-be-discovered 
biotechnological utility in wildlife? Are there novel institutional mechanisms that 
could prove useful in the distributive-rights equation of wildlife? In the continuum of 
private property and free markets versus governmental control, could communal 
institutions perhaps play a role in the sustainable use of biotechnological utilities from 
wildlife? This work should provide insight into the resolution of some of these 
questions. 
1.3.8 Ethical Considerations  
The complex issues of property in wildlife described here present a number of 
ethical questions. What is the ethical basis for owning any biota? Are there differences 
between owning domesticated biota and owning wildlife? What if the owned biota is a 
whole, living specimen, or just a part? What are the ethical issues surrounding patents 
generally, and patents on biological subject matter in particular, especially from 
wildlife? What is the philosophical basis for the balance between the public good and 
private rights in wildlife? Who, if anyone, should own wildlife, or inventions made 
from it? And, if such ownership is acceptable, for what purposes is it acceptable? 
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1.4 Case Studies 
I analyze each of the following two cases in the context of the legal 
orthogonality of patents and wildlife. In each case, the physical possession of 
specimens presents a pivotal point in the relation of the value of patented invention to 
the cost of conservation. 
1.4.1 Yellowstone and Its Valuable Microbes 
Economically valuable biotechnological discoveries made by companies from 
microbes collected in Yellowstone National Park present legal and policy questions of 
the public good versus private rights in wildlife, the government’s public-trust 
responsibility, the ownership of obscure biota on federal land, and issues of the 
conservation and use of national park lands.  
The fact that neither the U.S. government nor any of its agencies (e.g., the 
Department of Interior, the National Park Service, or Yellowstone National Park) have 
received any share of the significant economic return generated by this commercial 
exploitation of discoveries from Yellowstone National Park’s biota has raised 
questions (Clifford, 1994; Milstein, 1994c). 
This case poses fundamental questions about the federal government’s public-
trustee management of the common good of wildlife resources: Does the federal 
government “own” all biota on federal lands? Does this ownership extend to all 
organisms, including microbes? Do such federal rights depend on the type of 
governmental lands (e.g., Bureau of Land Management [BLM], National Forest, 
National Park, Wildlife Refuge)? Should the federal government actively control 
access to and use of biota on federal land and, if so, to what end? What role does the 
balance of state versus federal jurisdiction play in the sovereignty over wildlife on 
federal land? Is there a significant difference between microbial biota and other biota 
in this context? Is there a significant difference between the federal government’s 
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responsibilities for wildlife on public lands versus public-trust lands? Should the 
discovery of inventions from wildlife be controlled in national parks? Should it be 
encouraged or discouraged? What about other federal lands? 
1.4.2 Bioprospecting Fungi and The Finger Lakes Land Trust 
The Finger Lakes Land Trust (FLLT) was established in 1989 as a non-profit 
corporation for the purpose of preserving unique natural habitats in the Finger Lakes 
region of upstate New York. The FLLT’s activities include inventorying natural 
resources and acquiring land, as well as owning and managing its lands to preserve 
natural resources. In 1997, the FLLT acquired the Biodiversity Preserve, a unique 
parcel of land near Ithaca, New York, valued by Cornell University researchers for its 
biodiversity. One of the reasons for acquiring the preserve was to develop its 
bioprospecting potential. A variety of taxa could have been chosen as bioprospecting 
targets. But an intriguing preliminary discovery led to the selection of fungi.  
Fungi are unique. They comprise a separate kingdom that falls outside most 
traditional legal definitions of wildlife. They are transient and fixed, depending on 
their life cycle, blurring the traditional legal distinction between plants as fixtures and 
animals as transients. Also, fungi are fixed to the soil but may also be fixed to plants 
and animals. Is a fungus fixed to the land because it is fixed to a plant that is fixed to 
the land? 
The FLLT entered into collaboration with nearby Cornell University to exploit 
the bioprospecting potential of fungi on FLLT land. This collaboration led to an 
arrangement between the FLLT, Cornell, and a commercial partner, Schering-Plough, 
in which the three parties would cooperate to find and commercialize useful 
discoveries from FLLT fungi and share in the costs and returns of commercialization. 
Unlike Yellowstone, the bioprospecting value of these biota was imagined a 
priori, and legal structures were put into place that allowed for this value to be shared. 
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This case prompts questions: What ownership rights does the FLLT, a private 
landowner, have in the fungi on its land? How far do those rights extend? And what 
roles do intellectual and personal property play in bioprospecting? 
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CHAPTER 2: 
PATENT PROPERTY IN BIOLOGICAL SUBJECT MATTER 
2.1 Introduction 
The obvious, first step in analyzing the research premise of the orthogonality 
of U.S. patent law and biological conservation law is a review of U.S. patent law as it 
relates to biological subject matter. The following review isolates aspects of U.S. 
patent law that affect the scope of patentability of biological materials and methods. A 
general overview of the philosophical and economic rationale for patents precedes a 
description of their statutory and case-law foundation. From this background, I 
analyze the history of the evolution of biological subject matter patentability, 
beginning with the first patent on a living invention: Pasteur’s Patent No. 141,072 on 
certain microbes in 1873.1 This history identifies salient and watershed legal events 
that defined the evolution of this type of patentability. All of this leads to any 
articulation of the current status of patentability of biological invention. 
Throughout this review, I emphasize those features of U.S. patent law and its 
history that I believe to be most relevant to the laws concerning biological 
conservation. In that vein, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the current state 
of the patentability of whole organisms. 
2.2 The Patent and Its Rational Basis 
Patents are a grant of limited property rights by the federal government for the 
subject claimed in the patent. They are an intangible personal-property right 
institutionalized in a body of federal statutory and case law. The philosophical 
justification for patents is based on the general social good of technological progress 
that arises when inventors have property rights in their inventions. A society, through 
                                                 
1 All U.S. patent information cited in this dissertation is from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
Web-based database, available at http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html. 
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its government, provides these limited property rights as an incentive and in exchange 
for certain social obligations. The flow of social benefits of developments that derive 
from granting exclusive property rights to creative individuals (Machlup, 1958) 
includes technological progress, civil improvement, and economic growth (Mansfield, 
1977, 1986). 
Patents have their antecedents in the western European concept of “inventor’s 
privileges,” with roots in the Merchant Guild systems of the Middle Ages (Lipscomb, 
1984). The first codified patent law was the 1623 British Statute of Monopolies. The 
role of patents in motivating the British industrial revolution may have led the drafters 
of the U.S. Constitution to include a provision in Article 1, Section 8 of that document 
(General Powers of Congress) granting individuals exclusive rights in their inventions 
and discoveries “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings 
and discoveries.”  
Walterscheid (1997) describes the legislative debate and passage of the first 
U.S. Patent Law by the U. S. Congress in 1790. 
Machlup’s (1952, 1958) economic analyses of the U.S. patent system, 
commissioned by Congress, defined the four-part basis of U.S. patent law: 1) to 
recognize the intellectual property of the inventor; 2) to reward inventors for their 
useful service as “teacher of the nation”; 3) to encourage inventors and industry to 
invent, invest, and innovate; and 4) to further the early public disclosure and 
dissemination of technical knowledge. Machlup’s analyses support the premise that 
the patent institution’s primary function is to promote the public welfare through 
technical and economic progress, a premise that underlies patent jurisprudence.  
A patent issued by the federal government grants the patent owner the right to 
stop others from making, using, selling, or importing the invention claimed in the 
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patent. It is enforceable for a period of twenty years from the date of application. As 
with all property rights, a patent is enforceable by the ultimate coercive power of the 
state (i.e., the federal government). 
In the United States, the exclusive right to a patent on an invention is based on 
the legal doctrine of property-right acquisition by first possession. This right, defined 
in Roman Law as qui prior est tempore potior est jure (“who is the first in point of 
time is stronger in right”) is the root of most property rights (Rose, 1985). Patent law 
manifests this doctrine in the patentability requirements for “novelty” and 
“nonobviousness.”  
The private appropriation of intellectual property in the midst of the public 
pool of human knowledge creates a fundamental tension between the public good and 
private rights (Boyle, 1992). This tension is manifest in the realm of patents on 
biological subject matter, particularly when derived from wildlife.  
U.S. patent law acknowledges the public good in wildlife by prohibiting 
patents on “products of nature.” The balance between the private right of a patent and 
the public good ultimately served through such right is evident in the patent law’s 
intent that patents “teach the nation,” embodied in requirements of enablement and 
candor. 
Biotechnology and the evolution of patent case law have produced a complex 
legal milieu that allows patents on some biological inventions but not on others. 
Understanding this milieu provides a basis for analyzing the relation of patents to 
wildlife. How does patent law enable the creation of private intellectual property from 
the public domain of wildlife? 
35 
2.3 U.S. Patent Law 
2.3.1 Statutory 
Utility patent law in the United States is codified in the original Patent Act of 
1790, the revised Patent Act of 1952,2 numerous Patent Act amendments, Title 35 of 
the United States Code, and the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office. The Patent Act grants patent rights as defined in U.S. 
Code, Title 35, Section 101: “whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”3 
U.S. Code, Title 35 establishes the Patent and Trademark Office and defines 
the rights conferred by a patent and procedures for patent application, examination, 
issuance, and maintenance. Its several sections define the criteria for patentability.4 
Invention: Section 100 follows the wording of the U.S. Constitution, defining 
“invention” as “invention or discovery.” Despite arguments for a difference in 
justification for a patent right in an invention versus a discovery (Hettinger, 1994), the 
Constitution and the Patent Act make no such distinction. 
Originality: Section 102 requires that a patent be issued only to the true 
inventor or inventors. 
Novelty: Section 102 requires that the invention not be publicly known (i.e., 
previously patented, documented in print, used, or sold) more than one year prior to 
the date of patent application. 
                                                 
2 Patent Act of 1952, c.950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952). 
3 Consolidated Patent Laws (January 2007), p. L-20, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ 
mpep/consolidated_laws.pdf 
4 Unless otherwise noted, all references to Title 35 of the U.S. Code, “Patents,” refer to the 2006 version 
published by Lexis Publishing, Charlottesville, VA. 
36 
Nonobviousness: Section 103 defines “invention” as a contribution to the 
useful art requiring greater ingenuity or skill . . . than that of an ordinary mechanic 
acquainted with the business.” Nonobviousness also requires that the invention go 
beyond what a person of ordinary skill in the art, as defined by all the prior art, would 
find obvious to seek and obtain.  
Diligence in Filing: Section 102 requires applicants to diligently pursue (i.e., 
in a reasonably timely manner) the perfection and filing of an application once the 
invention has been conceived. 
Priority: Section 102 provides that only the first to invent is entitled to a 
patent. 
Utility: Section 101 requires that the invention be “useful.” Section 112 
requires that the invention be capable of performing at least one beneficial function 
and that the specification disclose the “manner and process” of using the invention so 
that one of “ordinary skill in the art” may use it without undue experimentation. 
Enablement: Section 112 requires the applicant to precisely disclose how to 
make and use the “best mode” of the invention. For inventions that require a viable 
microorganism, enablement requires the deposit of the organism in a public repository. 
Distinct Claiming: Section 112 requires “well-marked boundaries” of the 
patent claims. 
Candor: Section 1.56 requires that the patent applicant disclose all “prior art” 
references believed to be relevant to the patentability of the invention (with an 
emphasis on novelty and nonobviousness). 
2.3.2 Judicial Decisions 
The federal patent statute, summarized above, is relatively spare. Case law 
provides most of the definition of patent law. Judicial patent law consists of cases 
decided by federal courts and the Patent Office Board of Appeals (POBA). 
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Summarizing the salient decisions of these courts defines the nature of the patent and 
the rights it confers.  
The intent of patent law is to promote technological advancement and to 
stimulate invention,5 and to stimulate innovation and the “progress of science and 
useful arts” while avoiding monopolies.6 Patents are issued primarily for the public 
good, and private benefits are granted as incentive to disclose so that the invention 
published as a patent adds to the sum of freely available knowledge.7,8 One purpose of 
the patent law is to ensure that the subject of a patent will ultimately be dedicated to 
the public.9 The inventor’s reward is merely a means to the main object of patents: to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts.10 A patent’s reward should go 
exclusively to the first and original inventor only as an incentive for the resulting 
public good obtained.11 Inventor’s rights are subject to the convenience of public 
policy,12 and patent law is to be construed to give effect to this intended public 
policy.13  
Courts should adhere to both the letter and spirit of patent law.14 Courts have 
interpreted Congressional intention of the Patent Act to be comprehensive and 
inclusive in patent coverage and to be liberal in protection for any invention that is 
new and useful.15 Similarly, courts believe Congress appreciates the social importance 
of patents and, therefore, expect a high level of conduct on the part of all participants: 
“Far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent give the public a 
                                                 
5 Milwaukee Rubber Works Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel Co., 210 U.S. 439 (1908). 
6 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
7 Griffith Rubber Mills v. Hoffai, 313 F.2d 1, C.A. Or. (1963). 
8 United States Plywood Corp. v. General Plywood Corp., 389 U.S. 820 (1967). 
9 International Std. Elec. Corp. v. Marzall, 184 F.2d 592, D.C. Cir. (1950). 
10 U.S. v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). 
11 James B. Clow & Sons, Inc. v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 313 F.2d 46; U.S. App. (1963). 
12 Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945). 
13 In re Flude, 34 C.C.P.A. 939; 159 F.2d 878 (1947). 
14 Howes v. Great Lakes Press Corp., 459 U.S. 1038 (1982). 
15 Dennis v. Pitner, 308 U.S. 606 (1939). 
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paramount interest in seeing the patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from 
fraud or other inequitable conduct.”16  
Invention is a mental act17—the finding out, contriving, or creating by the 
action of the intellect something not existing or not known before;18 it is not 
“susceptible of precise and vigorous definition.”19 Invention requires conception and 
reduction to practice.20 
Patents are not intended for every “trifling device” nor every “shadow of a 
shade of an idea.”21 The utility requirement dictates that a patentable invention 
practically (not speculatively) perform a beneficial function described in the patent, 
although perfection is not essential.22 Patentability requires novelty, utility, and 
nonobviousness,23 as well as a “substantial advancement in the art.”24 The inventor 
must clearly add something of value to the sum of human knowledge or make the 
world’s work easier, cheaper, or safer.25 However, patentees are not required to 
understand the scientific principles underlying their inventions.26 Liberal 
interpretations of patent law should be favorable to inventors.27 
The patentability of an invention should be construed in light of the purpose of 
promoting social welfare by stimulating discovery and invention.28 A patent must 
exhibit a public benefit. A patent may not be granted on an invention if it exhibits 
public detriment unless it also has a concomitant public benefit.29 The patent office 
                                                 
16 Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc. 433 F.2d 1034; U.S. App. (1970). 
17 Stero v. Ringold, 54 C.C.P.A. 1407; 377 F.2d 652 (1967). 
18 Koppe v. Burnstiingle, 29 F.2d 923; U.S. Dist. (1929). 
19 West Branch Novelty Co. v. Bloom, 31 F. Supp. 673; D.C. Pa. (1940). 
20 S.W. Farber, Inc. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 382 U.S. 843 (1964). 
21 Fowler v. Sponge Products Corp., 246 F.2d. 233; C.A. Mass (1957). 
22 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Comm. of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-Und-Silber Schier deanstalt Vormals Roessler, 397 F. 2d 656; 
130 U.S. App D.C. 95 (1968). 
25 In re Gibbons, 41 C.C.P.A. 788; 210 F.2d 299 (1954). 
26 In re Alfred Aufhauser, 399 F.2d 275 (1968). 
27 In re Briede, 27 App. D.C. 298 (1906). 
28 McCashen v. Watson, 131 F. Supp. 233; D.C.D.C. (1955). 
29 Beckman Instr., Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555; L.A. Tex. (1970). 
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should take safety into consideration to the extent that any invention that is so 
dangerous as to fully negate utility is unpatentable.30 A patent is not invalid if the 
invention is used for illegal purposes.31 
2.4 A History of Biological Subject Matter Patentability 
Since the passage of the U.S. Patent Act in 1790, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office has issued over seven million patents (7,213,669 as of May 1, 
2007), many of which have entailed biological subject matter in some way. The 
historic case-law pattern of biological subject matter patentability is an intellectual 
“hopscotch” of judicial patent rejection and acceptance, breadth and narrowness. 
However, the general trend of patent jurisprudence has been to widen the scope of 
patentability to potentially include any biological subject. Although courts have held 
against the patentability of “products of nature,” the trend has been to consider as 
patentable “products from nature” (i.e., biological subject matter that is purified, 
altered, or otherwise technologically improved over nature by human endeavor). 
Pasteur’s 1873 patent on yeast cultures and several pre-1900 patents on vaccines 
started a trend of patentability of biological subject matter per se, but for most of the 
18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, courts were reluctant to support patents on organisms 
or on biological compositions of matter, creating a basic tension. The rush of 
biotechnology-based invention over the past thirty years pushed the courts to resolve 
this tension. 
Appendix A summarizes salient events in the evolution of jurisprudence on 
patentability of biological subject matter. More than eighty years after the passage of 
the first patent legislation, the U.S. Patent Act of 1790, the first U.S. patent on animate 
matter was issued to L. Pasteur (U.S. Patent No. 141,072). This patent claimed “yeast, 
                                                 
30 Carter-Wallace v. Riverton Laboratories, 304 F. Supp 357, affmd. 433 F.2d 1034; D.C.N.Y. (1969). 
31 Koppe v. Burnstingle, 29 F.2d 923; D.C.R.I. (1929). 
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free from organic germs of disease as an article of manufacture.” Conversely, the 
following year, the Supreme Court rejected the patentability of purified cellulose in 
American Wood Paper Co. v. Fiber Disintegrating Co.32 Three years after this 
rejection of patentability, the first U.S. patent on lymph cells as a vaccine (U.S. Patent 
No. 197,612) was issued in 1877. Twelve years later, the Patent Commissioner 
rejected the patentability of isolated pine-needle fibers as “products of nature” in Ex 
parte Latimer.33 Five years after Latimer, the scope of patentable biological matter 
was broadened by the issuance of U.S. Patent No. 525,824, the first U.S. patent to 
claim a fungal fermentation method and composition. The trend of broadening 
patentability of biological matter continued in 1899 with U.S. Patent No. 634,423, 
issued on the “Septic Tank” method, which employed living microbial cells. The 
expanding patentability of biological matter was furthered in 1904 with the issuance of 
U.S. Patent No. 778,767, the first U.S. patent on a living attenuated bacterial cell 
vaccine. 
Courts have long held that laws of nature are not patentable subject matter34 
and that natural phenomena per se are also not patentable.35  
The patentability of natural products made by artificial synthesis was first 
tested by the Supreme Court in Cochrane v. Badisch Anilin & Soda Fabrik,36 which 
centered on the patentability of the dye alizarine, which was made from a plant. This 
court decision produced a mixed bag of biological matter patentability. It rejected the 
patentability of the purified product per se because it existed in nature, but it implied 
that the synthetic process was patentable and that, specifically, a patent claim of “an 
old product by new process” could be allowed. 
                                                 
32 American Wood Paper Co. v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566 (1874). 
33 Ex parte Latimer, 125 Comm’r Patents reprinting 46 O.G. 1638 (1889). 
34 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, (1972); in re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (1982). 
35 Perkins Glue Co. v. Crandall Panel Co., 294 F.135; D.C.N.Y. (1923). 
36 Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311-312 (1884). 
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In 1908, the patentability of living subject matter was disputed when the 
validity of the 1899 “Septic Tank” patent (U.S. Patent No. 634,423) was challenged as 
inappropriately claiming a “process of nature.” However, the Second District Court 
found that “the use of one of the agencies of nature” for a practical purpose “was 
patentable matter.”37 
The legal criteria for biological patentability has often centered on the 
“purification doctrine,” which holds that human intervention that transforms a 
naturally occurring, impure material into a pure form, which is thereby more useful for 
humans, transforms a product of nature into a patentable invention (Cooper, 2000). 
For example, in 1909 the 7th Circuit District Court found that a process for making 
acetyl-salicylic acid (aspirin), a compound derived from a naturally occurring plant 
chemical, was patentable because the invention “took a comparatively worthless 
substance and changed it into a valuable one.”38 The court held that purified aspirin 
acid was patentable because it was “therapeutically available,” unlike the naturally 
occurring substance. Similarly, in 1911, the U.S. Second Federal Circuit Court 
decided in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co. that purified adrenaline was 
“for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically. That was a 
good ground for a patent . . . the distinction is to be drawn rather from the common 
usages of men than from nice considerations of dialectic.”39 On the other hand, in the 
1928 General Electric v. De Forest case, the Third Circuit Court held purified 
tungsten unpatentable,40 and three years later, the Circuit Court of Patent Appeals 
(CCPA) found pure vanadium unpatentable.41 
                                                 
37 Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Sarasota Springs, 159 F. 453, 462; 2d Cir. (1908) 
38 Kvehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 220 U.S. 622 (1911). 
39 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496; 2d. Cir (1912). 
40 General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co. et al., 28 F.2d. 641, 643; 3rd Cir. (1928). 
41 In re Marden 47 F. 2d 958, 958; CCPA (1931). 
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In the years 1910 through 1927, the inexorable expansion of biological subject 
matter patentability proceeded, with various U.S. patents issued on vaccines and 
microbial cultures including bacteria, viruses, yeast, and fungi.42  
A watershed in biological matter patentability occurred in 1930, when the U.S. 
Plant Patent Act was enacted. This act provided the patentability of crossbred or 
cultured mutants of asexually propagated higher plants and was the first law in the 
world that explicitly allowed patents on eukaryotic organisms per se. Fowler (2000) 
describes the history behind the Plant Patent Act as a tension between the rewards due 
plant breeders (as inventors) and the protection of the public domain of plant varieties. 
Resulting compromises in the passage of the original act included patent coverage on a 
plant per se, but not its fruit, flowers, or pollen. The act prohibits patents on plants 
discovered in a wild state and excludes potato and Jerusalem artichoke, but has been 
amended to include fruit and flowers. 
An important U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1931 partially opened the door 
for patents on living subject matter beyond domesticated plant varieties. In American 
Fruit Growers v. Brogdex,43 the court majority opinion rejected the patentability of 
natural products that were simply “altered” but did not reject “living matter” as 
patentable.  
Several cases in 1932 produced mixed signals on patentability. The POBA 
upheld the patentability of a biological process (a fermentation) and its isolated 
microbes, rejecting the Patent Examiner’s argument that “fermentation is [an 
unpatentable] power of nature.”44 That same year, the 3rd Circuit Court upheld the 
patentability of a biological process (microbial production of acetone) but implied that 
                                                 
42 See for example: U.S. Patent Nos. 1,210,053 (hog cholera virus), 1,391,599 (swine pneumonia virus). 
43 American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
44 Ex parte Prescott 19 USPQ 178, 179; POBA (1932). 
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the patentability of organisms per se was prohibited.45 Also, contrary to American 
Fruit Growers, the 2nd Circuit Court found that altered natural products (i.e., 
bleached-then-dyed animal fur) were patentable,46 swayed perhaps by the significant 
increase in the economic value of the invention compared with the natural product and 
the novelty of the bleaching process (Cooper, 1998). Only nine years later, however, 
the POBA determined that deveined and beheaded shrimp were unpatentable products 
of nature.47 
In 1934, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court upheld a patent on the “Activated Sludge” 
biological wastewater treatment process, ruling that it was neither a natural process 
nor a discovery of a law of nature.48 And in 1936, the patentability of a purified 
natural substance (dextrose hydrate crystals) was upheld in International Patents 
Development Company v. Penick & Ford Ltd.49 
Despite trends of expanding patentability, several cases in the late 1930s to 
mid-1940s effectively reduced the scope of patentability of natural products. In 1938, 
the CCPA invalidated a patent claim to pure “ultramarine” as an unpatentable natural 
product.50 Similarly, in 1935, the CCPA denied a patent on pure alpha-alumina as a 
natural product,51 and in 1939, it found pure vitamin C unpatentable.52 In 1944, with 
In re Sparhawk, the POBA held as unpatentable a material extracted from muskrat 
glands.53 Similarly, in 1950, the CCPA decided in In re Mardeno54 that an antibiotic 
                                                 
45 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400, 403, 410; D. Del (1931); aff’d, 61 F. 2d 
1041 (1932). 
46 Steinfur Patents Corp. v. W. Beyer, 62 F.2d 238; 2d Cir. (1932). 
47 Ex parte Grayson, 51 USPQ 413, 414 ; POBA (1941). 
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compound extracted from ground garlic55 was unpatentable. The question of 
patentability in these cases turned on whether the purified natural product was obvious 
over the unpure natural product rather than on product-of-nature versus product-from-
nature distinctions.  
Countering this trend of retracting patentability, some courts began to consider 
germane the significant technological distinction between a naturally occurring 
substance and the made-pure product. For example, the 7th Circuit Court considered 
increased utility in its Dennis v. Pitner (1930) and Kalo v. Funk (1947) decisions, 
which held purified biological matter patentable because the unpure matter has 
undesirable properties. These decisions also considered in determining patentability 
whether those “skilled in the art” were previously unable to obtain the pure substance. 
In 1940, the CCPA limited the scope of the Plant Patent Act by excluding 
bacteria.56 
The modern era, characterized by liberal interpretation of the scope of 
patentability in biological matter, began with the 1948 Supreme Court case of Funk v. 
Kalo Inoculant.57 In this case (the first issue of patentability in biological subject 
matter to come before the Supreme Court), the court was asked to decide on the 
patentability of a unique, human-made mixture of specified, naturally occurring 
bacterial species as an inoculant for enhanced plant growth. The court rejected the 
patentability of this microbial product for obviousness and for “want of invention.” 
The obviousness of purified natural products over their naturally occurring state was 
to remain a key issue of patentability in future cases. For example, in 1955, a district 
court found a natural substance purified from its naturally occurring racemic mixture 
to be not obvious and, therefore, patentable.58 However, most important, aside from 
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the obviousness issue, in Funk the court did not explicitly exclude living organisms 
per se as patentable subject matter, which provided a basis for later arguments for 
extended patentability.  
A watershed occurred in 1958 with Merck & Co., Inc., v. Olin Mathieson 
Chemical Corp.,59 in which the 4th Circuit Court upheld the patentability of purified 
Vitamin B-12. Arguments for patentability were based on the doctrines of purification 
and utility, in which a purified natural product that exhibits greater human utility than 
the unpurified natural products is grounds for patentability. This doctrine was fleshed 
out eight years later in Graham v. John Deere: “There is nothing in the language of the 
Patent Act which precludes the issuance of a patent upon a ‘product of nature’ when it 
is a new and useful composition of matter . . . All of the tangible things with which 
man deals and for which patent protection is granted are products of nature in the 
sense that nature provides the basic source materials.”60 
In 1961, the POBA flip-flopped on the patentability of a purified substance. In 
Ex parte Reed, the POBA originally held purified alpha-lipoic acid to be obvious and 
unpatentable.61 Just several months later, it reversed this opinion, deciding that the 
purified substance did not exist in nature and that purity was necessary for utility.62 In 
1962, the POBA determined that a patent claim to concentrated streptimidone in a 
fermentation broth was not pure and, therefore, not patentable.63 Conversely, two 
years later in In re Doyle, the CCPA held “substantially purified” 6-aminopenicillonic 
acid patentable, even though the compound had previously been identified in trace 
quantities.64 The more liberal view of patentability by this court was also demonstrated 
in 1964 when, unlike the 1928 rejection of patentability of pure tungsten (General 
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Electric v. De Forest), the Court found Elements 95 (Americium) and 96 (Curium) 
patentable.65 
In 1966, the CCPA reversed the decision of the Patent Examiner and the 
POBA in upholding a patent claim to crystals of pure 2, 2-bis-(2, 3 epoxy-
propoxypheryl) propane even though the compound existed in nature in a liquid 
form.66 Conversely, a year later a district court held that “a patent may not be awarded 
for a product of nature or for a substance that is merely extracted from its parent 
material and purified.”67 
The patentability of purified substances that naturally exist in useless trace 
amounts was confirmed in the mid-1960s in Charles Pfizer & Co. v. Barry-Martin 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.68 This district court held that the prior art knowledge of 
tetracycline in trace amounts in fermentates did not render purified tetracycline 
unpatentable,69 stating that “since the prior art . . . broths and antibiotics contained 
insufficient tetracycline to be of any benefit to mankind, they do not as a matter of law 
negate the validity of [said] . . . patent claims.”70 
In the 1970 case In re Bergstrom,71 the CCPA held purified, naturally 
occurring prostaglandins as patentable, rejecting the rule that a purified natural 
substance was patentable only if it exhibited superior qualities over natural forms. It 
also held that a purified natural substance is novel even if the substance per se was 
previously known, concluding that “pure materials necessarily differ from less pure or 
impure materials and, if the latter are the only ones existing and available as a standard 
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of references, as seems to be the situation here, perforce the ‘pure’ materials are ‘new’ 
with respect to them.”72 
Cooper (1998) describes the historical pattern of discontinuities in judicial 
patentability of “altered” natural products and compares the 1931 Supreme Court’s 
holding in American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex73 with the 1932 decision of the 2nd 
Circuit Court in Steinfur Patents Corp. v. W. Beyer, Inc.74 In American Fruit Growers, 
the Supreme Court found intact oranges with rinds impregnated with borax to be 
unpatentable “products of nature”:  
Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw 
material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality or 
property. The added substance only protects the natural article against 
deterioration by inhibiting development of extraneous spores upon the rind. 
There is no change in the name, appearance, or general character of the fruit. It 
remains a fresh orange, fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.75 
Conversely, a year later, in Steinfur, bleached-then-dyed animal furs were 
found patentable by the court, which relied on the American Fruit Growers test of 
utility, stating,  
While it was true of the orange that impregnation of its rind with borax only 
protected the natural article against deterioration by mold and give it no new 
beneficial uses, the same cannot be said of impregnation of the unbleached 
skin with ferrous sulphate. By such impregnation the skin attains a new quality 
which gives it a new beneficial use . . . An orange has the same use whether or 
not impregnated with borax. A fur skin unimpregnated with ferrous sulphate 
cannot be used in the same way as one which as been so impregnated. The 
orange does not, in our opinion, require a decision that the product patent in 
suit is invalid.76 
                                                 
72 In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394; C.C.P.A. (1970). 
73 American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex, 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
74 Steinfur Patents Corp. v. W. Beyer, Inc., 62 F. 2d 238; 2d Cir. (1932). 
75 American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex, 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
76 Steinfur Patents Corp. v. W. Beyer, 62 F.2d 238; 2d Cir. (1932). 
48 
Much of the confusion over patentability criteria was eliminated in 1966 with 
the Supreme Court’s Graham v. John Deere Co. decision. The court held that 
patentability of something from nature compared with the prior art “product of nature” 
depends on novelty and rules now known as the “Graham Criteria.” These criteria 
require 1) definition of the differences between the invention and naturally occurring 
materials, and 2) determination of the obviousness of the invention’s differences, 
including the commercial success, long-felt need, and failure of others.77 
The trend toward liberal interpretation of patentability is demonstrated in 1968 
with the Texas District Court holding that inventions that are novel embodiments of 
natural laws and phenomena “in a practical mode of carrying them into useful effect” 
are patentable.78 
In the early 1970s, the scope of the patentability of biological matter was 
enhanced by In re Argoudelis,79 in which the CCPA determined that the Section 112 
enablement requirement is satisfied by the public deposit of organisms. This case also 
implicitly raised the question of the patentability of an organism per se—a question 
raised and resolved in the several Bergy decisions.  
In 1974, Bergy et al. filed a patent application with a claim to a pure culture of 
the bacterial species Streptomyces vellosus. The Patent Office Examiner rejected the 
claims as drawn to “products of nature” and, therefore, as unpatentable subject matter, 
a decision confirmed a year later by the POBA.80 The POBA viewed the Patent Act as 
precluding the patenting of living organisms and pointed to the Plant Patent Act as 
evidence that Congress created a special category for such patents because it did not 
intend to extend utility patents to living organisms per se. The majority POBA opinion 
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also expressed a fear that if a broad interpretation of patentable subject matter was to 
be used, “new types of insects such as honeybees or new varieties of animals produced 
by selective breeding or cross breeding would be patentable.”81 However, a dissenting 
member of the POBA pointed out that the Supreme Court did not reject microbial 
cultures per se as unpatentable subject matter in its previous decisions. This dissenter 
found the bacterial culture invention unpatentable because of obviousness, not because 
a bacterium is inherently not patentable subject matter.  
This dissent was prescient: Three years later the CCPA reversed the POBA’s 
Bergy decision, finding a “living organism” to be patentable subject matter.82 This 
court rejected “product of nature” arguments as not relevant and relied on the analogy 
of microbes as “living processes”: “There is nothing in the words of Sec.101 which 
excludes patents for living organisms . . . we think that the fact that microorganisms, 
as distinguished from chemical compounds, are alive is a distinction without legal 
significance.”83 
Dissenters of the CCPA Bergy decision labeled the distinction of microbes as 
categorically different from other organisms as “gratuitous” and “improper” and 
argued that under patent law there is no distinction between microorganisms and 
honeybees. The CCPA held that pure microbial cultures were patentable subject 
matter:  
processes are considered statutory subject matter not withstanding the 
employment therein of living organisms and their life processes . . . it is in the 
public interest to include microorganisms . . . it seems illogical to us to insist 
that the existence of life in a manufacture or composition of matter in the form 
of a biologically pure culture of a microorganism removes it from the category 
of subject matter that can be patented.84 
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However, the majority opinion of this court further established a distinction 
between microbes and higher organisms:  
The nature and commercial issues of biologically pure cultures of 
microorganisms like the one defined in claim 5 are much more akin to 
inanimate chemical composition such as reactants, reagents and catalysts than 
they are to horses and honeybees or raspberries and roses.85 
In a further move away from “product of nature” patent proscriptions, the 
patent claims to a purified form of 2-methyl-2 pentenoic acid (a naturally occurring 
strawberry-flavor molecule) were upheld in 1979 by the CCPA on the basis that “the 
purified chemical does not apparently occur in nature.”86 
The judicial dialectic of “products of nature” patentability was largely settled 
in the Chakrabarty case, in which the Supreme Court held that patentable subject 
matter includes “anything under the sun made by man.”87 The decisive question is the 
meaning of the phrase “made by man.” A transgenic animal is clearly made by man, 
but is a pure culture of an otherwise unaltered organism similarly made? 
Despite the dissent on the CCPA, the Bergy decisions combined to set micro-
organisms apart from other organisms as no more nature’s handiwork than chemical 
reagents. By the purification doctrine presaged by In re Bergstrom (i.e., the 
patentability of pure prostaglandins), In re Williams (i.e., purified racemic compound), 
In re Seaborg (purified Americium and Curium), Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson 
Chem Corp., and Merck & Co. v. Chase (purified vitamin B-12), the Bergy Court 
found a microbe patentable by virtue of its isolation from its natural milieu by human 
ingenuity.  
However, the simple isolating of an organism may not rise to the level of 
invention. Although Chakrabarty encompassed “anything under the sun made by 
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man” as patentable subject matter, in the same decision, the court also stated that “a 
new mineral or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable.” Mere extraction and 
purification does not necessarily rise to the level of “made by man,” according to 
Merck v. Chase and Chakrabarty, but it does in Bergy and in Katz. The Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure states that “a thing occurring in nature which is 
substantially unaltered is not a manufacture.”88 The Bergy decisions shed some light 
on this dilemma. The courts in In re Bergy decided that “any product of nature which 
is induced to possess a new characteristic, however induced, is patentable.”89 So, for 
example, in the case of a pure culture of a microbe, freed from the competition of the 
biosphere and thereby taking on a new property, the pure culture is “made by man” 
and patentable. 
In Funk Bros. v. Kalo Inoculant, the majority of the Supreme Court rejected 
the patentability of a mix of Rhizobium species, not because they were not patentable 
subject matter but because the invention was obvious and not novel over the prior art 
of the naturally occurring organisms. Cooper (2000) believes that the rejection of the 
patentability of headless/deveined shrimp (Ex parte Grayson, 1941) and pine-needle 
fibers (Ex parte Latimer, 1889) should have been based on the same obviousness 
criterion, not on the “product of nature” conundrum. The “product of nature” rejection 
of borax-impregnated oranges (American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex, 1931) and 
beheaded/deveined shrimp (Ex parte Grayson, 1941) juxtaposed with the patentability 
of bleached-then-dyed furs90 exemplifies the confusion created by the “product of 
nature” rule—a confusion appreciated by Justice Frankfurter in the Funk decision:  
it only confuses the issue, however to introduce such terms as “the work of 
nature” and the “laws of nature.” For these are vague and malleable terms 
infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens 
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may be deemed “the work of nature” and any patentable composite exemplifies 
in its properties “the laws of nature.” Arguments drawn from such terms for 
ascertaining patentability could fairly be employed to challenge almost every 
patent.91 
Moving beyond the “product of nature” criterion, the patentability of biological 
subject matter hinges on obviousness and novelty and the application of the “Graham 
criteria.” These criteria provide the basis for patents on microbes per se. The following 
exemplify the issuance of U.S. patents on pure cultures of whole organisms:  
U.S. Patent 6,033,659—Claim 1: “A biologically pure culture of a Bacillus 
cereus strain having all of the identifying characteristics of Bacillus cereus strain W35 
ATCC 202074.” 
U.S. Patent 6,190,903—Claim 1: “A biologically pure culture of a 
microorganism capable of degrading organic material designated SH2A and deposited 
under ATCC Accession No. 55924, or a mutant derived therefrom having degrading 
activity of said microorganism.” 
U.S. Patent 5,529,927—Claim 1: “A substantially biologically pure culture of 
an alga species Lobosphaera TM-33 deposited as ATCC 75630.” 
Higher organisms represent another arena of patentability. It is now well 
established that “wild” microbes are patentable per se. But is there any reason a priori 
why higher organisms per se are not patentable, other than the difficulties in satisfying 
all patentability criteria? Courts have found that plants made by breeding techniques 
are not products of nature and thus are patentable (Ex parte Hibberd, 1985).92 The 
database of issued patents reveals a large number of such patented plant varieties. The 
2001 Supreme Court case of J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer93 reinforces the 
patentability of higher plants made by breeding. Cooper (2000) points out that given 
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the patentability of higher plants made by breeding, it is illogical that animals 
similarly made would be unpatentable, although he acknowledges potential difficulties 
presented by the enablement and nonobviousness requirements. The existence of 
patents on mutant mice94 suggests that the scope of patentability includes higher 
organisms made, in some fashion, by human ingenuity. 
In 1977, the CCPA stated in In re Bergy that the Patent Act does not exclude 
living organisms. “It seems illogical to us to insist that the existence of life in a 
manufacture or composition of matter . . . removes it from the category of subject 
matter which can be patented.”95 
A year later, this liberal view was manifest when the first U.S. patent (No. 
4,070,453) on an animal cell line (embryonic porcine cells) was issued and the POBA 
considered fungi patentable under the Plant Patent Act in Ex parte Solomons.96 
The broad view of biological subject patentability created a legal tension that 
required a Supreme Court decision to resolve. The stage for this resolution was set 
when the first U.S. patent application on an engineered bacterium (i.e., inserted 
plasmids) was submitted in 1972 by A. Chakrabarty and his employer, General 
Electric. The filing of this application initiated an intellectual struggle with the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office over the patentability of a living creature, regardless of 
the level of human involvement in its creation. By 1976, the POBA had rejected the 
Chakrabarty application as being drawn to non-statutory subject matter. The POBA 
agreed that the invention was not “a product of nature,” but stated, “we do not believe 
Congress intended [the U.S. Patent Act] to encompass living organisms.”97  
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The POBA relied, in part, on the argument that Congress had found it 
necessary to enact a special plant patent act and, therefore, had implicitly excluded 
other living organisms as patentable subject matter. The CCPA reversed the POBA’s 
decision in the Chakrabarty appeal, relying on the Bergy decisions.98 
The defining moment occurred in 1980 when the Supreme Court considered 
this question raised in In re Chakrabarty. In a 5-4 decision, the court found 
Chakrabarty’s engineered organism a patentable subject. The majority opinion, written 
by Justice Burger, concisely resolved the question by deciding that “everything under 
the sun made by man is potentially patentable.”99 
Justice Burger explained that Congress had recognized that the relevant 
distinction for patentability is not between living and non-living, but between products 
of nature (living or not) and human-made inventions. It is this opinion that clearly 
defines living matter as patentable if the invention satisfies all statutory patent 
criteria.100  
The Supreme Court decision of biological patentability was followed in 1985 
by a POBA decision that higher plants produced by crossbreeding techniques fall 
within the scope of the Patent Act (Ex parte Hibberd101) and in 1987 (Ex parte 
Allen102) when it upheld the first patent on a method for making a higher organism.103 
In that same year, the Patent Office issued rules of whole-organism patentability, 
announcing that “non-naturally occurring, non-human, multicellular living organisms 
(including animals) are patentable subject matter.” 
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Underscoring this principle in 1988, the Patent Office issued U.S. Patent No. 
4,736,866 to Harvard University on the “Harvard Mouse,” the first patent on a 
transgenic, higher organism. 
2.5 The Current Status of the Patentability of Biological Subject Matter 
Since the Supreme Court’s establishment of animate subject matter as 
patentable, questions of patentability have centered on the key statutory criteria: 
novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, and utility. Whether biological subject matter 
satisfies these criteria can be seen as a tension between forces that favor private 
property in invention and those that resist privatization in favor of the public domain. 
The cases that form the legal milieu of biological patentability criteria reflect this 
private right/public good dichotomy. The case law described below demonstrates 
judiciary resistance to the granting of private rights in subject matter that ought to be 
public domain and implies that when such rights are granted, they are balanced by a 
larger public good. Legal patentability tests of enablement, nonobviousness, utility, 
best mode, and the others that underlie these cases can be seen in this light. 
The Section 112 enablement requirement ensures that the inventor fully and 
accurately teaches the invention to the public, enabling the public to reproduce the 
invention. Enablement allows other, would-be inventors to “design around” the 
invention, thus motivating general technological advancement for the public good. In 
1949, the U.S. Patent Office allowed patent applicants to make publicly available 
deposits of organisms as satisfaction of enablement. This is necessary when a written 
description is not sufficient to allow others to reproduce the invention.104 In cases 
where molecular inventions are questioned on the basis of enablement, courts have 
held the scope of patentability to be circumscribed by the ability of the application to 
                                                 
104 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731; US App. (1988). 
56 
teach how to make and use the full scope of the invention without “undue 
experimentation.”105 
Dispute over biological subject matter patentability has often revolved around 
the nature of the “conception” and “reduction to practice” of biotechnological 
inventions. The “conception of invention” is complete when an inventor’s idea is 
“definite and permanent enough” for someone with “ordinary skill-in-the-art” to 
understand and make the invention.106 Reduction to practice is the “physical act of 
producing the desired results by the means conceived by the inventor.”107 Reduction to 
practice of a composition of matter occurs when the composition is made.108 
Conception is the completion of the mental part of an invention.109 The test is whether 
one with ordinary skill in the art could understand and make the invention based on 
the written description without undue experimentation.110 Much of the legal writing on 
gene patentability requires genes to be “isolated.” What are “isolated” genes? Are they 
merely purified, or is sequencing required? In Colbert v. Lofdahl,111 the POBA 
interpreted the word “isolated” to mean disclosure of the nucleotide sequence and 
ruled that purification of a cloned gene is insufficient. In Amgen v. Chugai (1991), the 
CCPA upheld the patentability of DNA sequences isolated and purified, with the result 
that genes, if sequenced, are patentable regardless of whether they would have been 
obvious or how difficult they would have been to sequence.112 The flip-side of Amgen 
v. Chugai is that a gene invention is not “reduced to practice” unless and until the gene 
has been isolated and sequenced, and that knowing only the amino acid sequence of a 
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gene’s product does not rise to a level sufficient for invention of the gene.113 In re 
Bell114 confirmed in 1965 that knowledge of an amino acid sequence is insufficient to 
reduce a gene to practice. For some inventions, the unpredictability of results is so 
high that conception and reduction to practice must occur simultaneously.115 In 1993, 
the Federal Circuit Court applied this doctrine of simultaneous conception and 
reduction to practice to gene inventions, establishing a new standard of patentability 
for DNA inventions—a test the Federal Circuit applied in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai and 
later in the 1997 case Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly.116 The 
present standard for gene patentability requires isolation and sequencing. 
Courts have found that the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction 
to practice should be applied only to those cases where the alleged conception was 
followed by “extensive research characterized by perplexing intricate difficulties 
arising every step of the way.”117 
The first paragraph of Section 112 requires a written description of the 
invention “in such a full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled 
in the art . . . to make and use . . . [the invention] . . . and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor . . . .”  
In Amgen v. Chugai, defendants Chugai and Genetics Institute counter-claimed 
that Amgen was not the first to invent erhythropoeitin (EPO) because Chugai 
scientists had first developed a method to clone the EPO gene, even though Amgen 
had first reduced to practice by sequencing the cloned DNA of the EPO gene. The 
district court defined conception to be when “one has a mental picture of the structure 
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of the chemical or is able to define it by its method of preparation, its physical or 
chemical properties, or whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it.”118 
The court held that merely describing a method for cloning the gene was 
insufficient for conception because at the time the description was made, the EPO 
protein sequence was uncertain and the cloning method was unpredictable. In Fiers v. 
Revel (1993), the Federal Circuit Court found that conception requires definition of the 
inventive substance other than by its functionality and that the DNA sequence per se is 
required for conception. In Chiron v. Abbott Laboratories,119 the Northern California 
District Court further narrowed conception to require knowledge of the sequence per 
se. In Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly, the court held that conception 
has not occurred until the gene has been isolated, defining the “written description” 
requirement: “an adequate written description of DNA requires a precise definition 
such as by structure, formula, chemical name or physical properties, not a mere wish 
or a plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention; a description of rat insulin 
cDNA is not a description of the broad class of vertebrate or mammalian insulin 
cDNA.”120 
The University of California v. Eli Lilly case seems to argue that allelic or 
splice variants are not covered by claims to a single DNA sequence. 
Lucas (1998) points out that in biotechnology, the “state of the art” at the time 
of invention can change rapidly, which affects the standards of invention over time. 
For example, in the past, knowing an amino acid sequence was sufficient to discern 
the encoding gene sequences, but now, knowledge of introns and complexities of 
regulatory sequence regions disrupt this causal linkage. By the Merganthaler standard, 
patentability of a gene sequence depends on the test of whether “the applicant [is] able 
                                                 
118 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989). 
119 Chiron v. Abbott Laboratories, 902 F. Supp. 1103; N.D. Cal. (1995). 
120 Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly, 39 USPQ 2d 1225; S.D. Ind. (1995). 
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to distinguish the claimed DNA from all other DNA and [whether one] can . . . 
understand, make and use the invention.”121 
Since Chakrabarty, the general trend of court decisions on gene patentability 
has been to limit broad patent claims by requiring sequence data and to tighten the 
requirements of enablement and written description. Amgen v. Chugai122 limits 
inventors from claiming all species variants of a DNA sequence unless the effect of 
variants can be reliably predicted. In re Vaeck123 limits the patentability of genetic 
recombinants to that which is clearly supported by existing data. Similarly, In re 
Goodman124 and In re Wright125 limit the scope of patentability to the species in which 
the invention was actually enabled. In Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk,126 the court 
examined the patentability of “fusion proteins” and determined that although a written 
description of the invention had been made, it was not enabling because another five 
years of work (i.e., “undue experimentation”) was required to reduce it to practice. In 
Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Calgene, Inc.,127 the court used a similar “undue 
experimentation” test in rejecting the validity of patents broadly claiming any 
antisense DNA in prokaryotic or eukaryotic organisms because the patent enabled 
only E. coli. 
The combination of Amgen v. Chugai, Fiers v. Revel, and Regents of the U. of 
Calif. v. Eli Lilly produces a situation in which an invention disclosure may render an 
invention obvious but still be insufficient to satisfy the written description and 
enablement requirements. 
                                                 
121 Merganthaler v. Scudder 11 App. D.C. 264, 276; D.C. Cir. (1897). 
122 Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200; Fed. Cir. (1991), 106. 
123 In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488; US App. (1991). 
124 In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1048-49; Fed. Cir. (1993). 
125 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1559; Fed. Cir. (1993). 
126 Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361; Fed. Cir. (1997). 
127 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362; Fed. Cir. (1999). 
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Sampson (2000) argues that the court’s limitation of broad claiming maintains 
an appropriate balance between the public domain of innovation and private rights in 
real discovery. However, such limitation might also discourage investment for 
revolutionary breakthroughs and encourage a plethora of narrow patents. 
Lucas (1998) points out inconsistency in circuit court decisions concerning 
conception and reduction to practice of gene versus other biomolecule inventions. 
Whereas DNA must be claimed by its sequence rather than its function,128 antibodies 
are claimed by their function, not their structure. 
The most recent statement on the patentability of biological subject matter is 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Utility Examination Guidelines (Guidelines), 
published in the Federal Register and made effective on January 5, 2001,129 which 
superseded the Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines of December 21, 
1999.130 The Guidelines respond to a variety of public comments concerning the 
patentability of genes and take a strict constructionist approach. They confirm that 
genes are patentable inventions. The Guidelines make it clear that a gene’s genetic 
composition, isolated from nature and processed to achieve purification, is the basis 
for a patent. 
The Guidelines also clarify the utility requirement for a gene patent, stating 
that patentability criteria include a specific and credible use for the gene. 
Public comments that a gene is not a novel composition of matter because it 
pre-exists the invention in nature and is an unpatentable “product of nature” are 
refuted in the Guidelines because purified genes do not exist in nature. 
                                                 
128 Fiers v. Sugano, 984 F.2d 1164; US App. (1993). 
129 Fed. Reg./Vol. 66, No. 4, Jan. 5, 2001/Notices. 
130 Fed. Reg./Vol. 64. 
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The Guidelines refer to the Pasteur patent131 and several cases132 that support 
the purification-doctrine basis of these patentability premises. In an implicit rejection 
of vitalism, the Guidelines state that DNA molecules, like other chemical compounds, 
are eligible for patents when isolated from their natural state and purified or when 
synthesized in a laboratory from starting materials. The Guidelines also clarify that a 
patent on a purified gene sequence has no relation to and no force over the gene as it 
exists in nature. For example, patents issued on pure adrenaline are not infringed by 
normal bodily function. The Guidelines suggest that claims to a genus of DNA 
sequences could be allowable if a sufficient number of representative species are 
disclosed. The Guidelines also indicate that the current strict written-description 
requirements may be relaxed by stating that the specification must allow one to 
reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention and that 
such possession is based on the interpretation of various factors. 
The Guidelines reject a call for Congressional consideration of the gene-
patentability issue, stating that Congress and the Supreme Court have already made 
their intentions clear. 
2.6 The Scope of Patent Rights and the Patentability of Organisms per se 
It is important to understand the nature of the rights granted by a patent. U.S. 
Code, Title 35, Section 154, Chapter 10(a)(1) provides that “Every patent 
shall . . . grant to the patentee, his heirs and assigns, of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention in the U.S. or importing into 
the U.S. . . . ” 
The Guidelines clarify that a patent does not grant the patent holder the right to 
use the invention; it grants the patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, 
                                                 
131 U.S. Patent No. 141,072. 
132 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103; S.D.N.Y. (1911); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 
1394; C.C.P.A. (1970). 
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and selling the patented subject for a limited period of time. Furthermore, unlike with 
other forms of private property, it does not grant the right to possession, either 
exclusive or non-exclusive. There is a subtle but powerful distinction between a patent 
right and personal-property ownership. A patent grants limited exclusionary rights 
over a patented composition but does not grant ownership of the composition. For 
example, the owner of U.S. Patent No. 6,190,903, which claims a purified culture of 
bacteria designated “SH2B ATCC No. 202050,” has the right to stop others from 
making, using, or selling these bacteria as pure cultures but does not have the right to 
their exclusive possession. The propagation of pure cultures of the bacteria could be 
prohibited as “making,” but the patent holder cannot force a possessor to destroy the 
pure culture. However, the extraction of information on DNA sequences or novel 
proteins would be an infringing “use” and would be prohibitable. In this way, a patent 
holder could temporarily monopolize the genome and biological-discovery potential of 
a wild but purified organism. Patent claims to particular uses of an organism do not 
confer this broad right of wild genome “ownership”; nor do claims to organisms 
created by genetic engineers, because the original wild type is not claimed. 
Since the patent right on organisms per se confers such potentially broad 
ownership rights, it is important to elucidate the basis for the patentability of 
purified—but otherwise unaltered—organisms per se and to understand the limits of 
such patentability. 
The Diamond v. Chakrabarty rule that “anything under the sun made by man” 
is patentable excludes wild organisms. Except, under Bergy I and II, micro-organisms 
are patentable when made into a pure culture. This patentability is not limited to 
prokaryotes. Microbial eukaryotes (i.e., protists, algae, and fungi) are also patentable. 
For example, U.S. Patent No. 5,529,927 claims “a substantially pure culture of alga 
species Lobosphaera TM-33 deposited as ATCC 75630.” 
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Although patents on multicellular, more highly differentiated organisms are 
normally considered precluded by obviousness and novelty criteria (Rohrbaugh, 
1997), Cooper (2000) argues for the patentability of such organisms, such as unique 
livestock made through selective breeding. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
PROPERTY IN WILDLIFE 
3.1 Introduction 
Analyzing the relation of patents to wildlife conservation law requires an 
understanding of patent law and its applicability to invention. The previous chapter 
provides this understanding. Along with this, an understanding of biota property and 
wildlife property, in particular, is necessary. In the next two chapters, I describe biota 
property in two major parts. This chapter describes property rights in biota and 
wildlife, and the next chapter describes wildlife property as it derives from biological 
conservation law. 
This chapter defines an overarching theme of property-regime types and the 
fundamental notion of ownership as a bundle of distinct property rights. This provides 
a lexicon to describe the evolution of the concept of property in wildlife in the United 
States from Roman and English roots. A discussion of the development of the federal–
state balance of sovereignty over wildlife provides a basis for a larger appreciation of 
the wildlife-property situation. 
A fundamental nexus of state versus personal property in wildlife is identified, 
which leads to an articulation of the rules of personal property in biota and its relation 
to government rights in wildlife. A discussion of obscure biota, ambiguous property 
definitions, and the complex patchwork of complicated and overlapping property in 
wildlife completes the discussion. 
This framework, combined with the detailed analysis of biological 
conservation law in the next chapter, provides the basis for an analysis of the 
intersection of patent law and biological conservation law. 
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3.2 A Background in Property and Wildlife 
Possession of wildlife is a prerequisite for creating a patent from it. Analyzing 
this connection between tangible and intangible property in wildlife requires an 
understanding of the fundamental relation between property and biota, generally. 
The right to possess and use wildlife is the domain of property. Whether 
explicit or not, property in wildlife—its definition, enforcement, and use—is 
fundamental to the relationship of wildlife to human society. Lueck (1995, 1989, 
1998) has described the basic role property plays in the legal, political, and economic 
milieu of wildlife. Property also provides an effective framework for analyzing the 
political economy of wildlife, but simple views of “owning” wildlife are not 
applicable. In one of the Supreme Court’s most definitive statements on the issue, 
Chief Justice Holmes declared in Missouri v. Holland that “owning” wildlife is an 
oxymoron, and that although no one owns wildlife, the sovereign has an obligation to 
assert rights over a public good. 
A sophisticated analysis of property in wildlife encompasses biota that are 
transient and fixed, free-roaming and captured, whole specimens (living and dead), 
their parts and by-products. Then, in order to understand the relation of such wildlife 
property and intellectual property, the dichotomy of tangible versus intangible 
property must be analyzed.  
A comprehensive framework of property in wildlife is developed below. This 
framework is built on a taxonomy of the four archetypal property regimes, a definition 
of the “bundle” of distinct property rights, and the tangible/intangible property duality 
in biota. 
A discussion of the evolution of the wildlife-property regime in the United 
States, including the dialectic of state versus federal sovereignty over wildlife from the 
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colonial era to the present, provides context for the current relation of governmental 
control and private rights. 
The nature of the governmental property interest in wildlife and the 
establishment of private property in wildlife are defined. Unique rules of biota 
property that play a role in the connection between wildlife and patents are also 
described.  
3.3 Relevant Property Fundamentals 
3.3.1 A Taxonomy of Property Regimes 
A fundamental taxonomy of property regimes has emerged through a variety of 
analyses (Randall, 1987; Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Tisdell, 1991). This taxonomy 
comprises four basic regimes:  
Res nullius: null property (e.g., sunlight, air). 
Res privatae: private property (e.g., private land). 
Res publicae: governmental (“public”) property (e.g., public roads). 
Res communes: private property held by a group of owners (e.g., corporate 
assets, a condominium). 
This taxonomy allows dissection of the mixture of property rights that exist in 
any particular resource scenario. For example, property rights in water may be non-
existent (res nullius) as in clouds or the sea, private (res privatae) as in purchased 
bottled water, public (res publicae) as in a navigable river, or communal (res 
communes) as in a group-owned irrigation system.  
Free-roaming, captured, living, and dead wildlife organisms and their parts in 
the United States fall into the following property regime categories: 
Res nullius: all individuals, populations, and their parts not listed in federal or 
state law as controlled and not “fixed” (growing on or in soil) to private land. 
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Res privatae: all individuals fixed to private land; all legally-captured 
organisms and their parts. 
Res publicae: all free-roaming individuals, populations, and their parts listed 
in federal or state law as controlled. 
Res communes: all res privatae individuals managed by a group. 
3.4 The Property-Rights Bundle 
Close inspection of the property institution (Dukeminier and Krier, 1993) 
reveals that property “ownership” is defined by a “bundle” of distinct rights. For 
example, although one may own a car and hold, through title, the exclusive right of 
possession, the right to use is limited by public-safety law. If the car is leased, the 
possessor or user is not the owner. In usufruct rights, one has rights to use but not to 
own. If the car has a lien on its title, the owner’s property rights are mitigated by the 
lien-holder’s rights. 
Becker (1977) describes the following distinct property rights and liabilities as 
first defined by Honoré (1961): 
• The right to possess; exclusive physical control; the right to exclude 
others from use or benefits 
• The right to use 
• The right to manage (how and by whom a thing shall be used) 
• The right to income 
• The right to capital (the power to alienate the property; the right to 
consume, waste, modify or destroy) 
• The right to security (immunity from expropriation) 
• The right of transmission (the right to bequeath) 
• The absence of term (indeterminate length of ownership) 
• Prohibition against harmful use (to others) 
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• Liability to execution (liability to having the thing taken for repayment 
of a debt) 
• Residuary character (existence of rules governing the reversion of 
lapsed ownership rights) 
Complete or full ownership requires the holding of each of these separate 
rights and liabilities. It is rare that anyone holds all of these rights, unfettered, in any 
particular property. For example, holding title to land usually encompasses many of 
these rights, but zoning law constrains rights to use or manage. Even properties that 
appear to be unfettered (such as one’s own body) have less than a full set of the bundle 
of these rights. 
Combining the distinction of property right with the property-regime taxonomy 
provides a framework for categorizing property within the res privatae–res publicae 
continuum illustrated in Figure 3.1.   
The property continuum ranges from “most” private (res privatae), on the left, 
to “most” public (res publicae), on the right. Between these extremes lie property 
blends. Some of the blends are primarily private with some public rights (e.g., a 
private home); others are primarily public with some private rights (e.g., national 
forest campgrounds). Note that res nullius is not on this scale. There is no property in 
res nullius until capture, when it becomes res privatae. 
Wildlife property can be characterized according to this framework.  
For example, in New York, a free-roaming bear is res publicae, and the state 
prohibits res privatae possession. State law allows possession of a captured (killed, 
not caged) bear under a license. The carcass now becomes mostly res privatae. Since 
the possessor may not sell and the state retains some minimal property rights in the 
carcass, the carcass is res privatae/res publicae. 
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INCREASINGLY res privatae   INCREASINGLY res publicae 
 
 res privatae           res privatae /  res publicae /               res publicae 
                                  res publicae                       res privatae 
     clothing on   personal home,  national forest,  U.S. battleship 
     person,  weapons,  BLM lands,                 military base 
     one’s body  auto,   marine fisheries  
   business,      national parks 
   womb       national monuments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rights almost rights mostly most rights all rights rights  
entirely private private, some  governmental, governmental, totally 
 public “sticks” some private very limited governmental
 in bundle held   private 
  
Figure 3.1. Examples of Property Types Across the Property-Taxonomy Continuum. 
3.5 Antecedents of Sovereignty and Property in Wildlife in the United States 
The control of wildlife has a long history. According to Lyster (1985), forestry 
conservation laws were in place in Babylon as early as 1900 BC. In 1370 BC, 
Akhenaten, an Egyptian pharaoh, established a protected nature reserve. In the third 
century BC, the Indian emperor Ashoka asserted sovereignty and protective control 
over all parrots, mynas, arunas, wild geese, cranes, bats, queen ants, terrapins, 
boneless fish, rhinos, and all quadrupeds not edible or useful within his kingdom. 
Lafargue (1894) and Laveleye (1878) describe property concepts in early 
cultures. In many tribal cultures, private-property rights were limited to simple 
personal possessions (e.g., clothes, adornments). Less personal items (e.g., food, 
shelter) were generally available to all members of the tribe. Whereas intra-tribal 
property was typically communal, property rights between tribes were often 
vigorously defended—those associated with tribal hunting grounds, for example 
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(Johnson, 1986). In early hunter-gatherer cultures, wildlife was, like all natural 
resources, res nullius. The assertion of property rights in wildlife was not feasible 
except through the enforcement of hunting grounds and the control of hunting and 
fishing methods and seasons, which created a form of inter-tribal res communes 
(Lueck, 1995). 
While wildlife was res nullius in early human societies, the process of biota 
domestication began. Dogs, chickens, goats, cows, and crops were variously converted 
from a wild to a domesticated state, and with that conversion, a transformation of 
property took place. Although issues of property in domesticated biota lie largely 
outside the scope of this work, it is useful to understand some of the unique 
domesticated biota-property rules and customs: in particular, where the conversion of 
wild to domesticated takes place through capture1 and rules that pertain to property in 
animals, their parts, and progeny. 
3.5.1 Roman Law and Biota 
Roman law is the foundation for biota law in both England and the United 
States (Amos, 1883; Sohm, 1907). Lafargue (1894) claims that the concept of wildlife 
as a res nullius/res communes mix in early human tribal cultures was lost in the 
establishment of Roman law.  
Property in domesticated animals has evolved over hundreds of years and is 
essentially a basic personal-property right. For centuries, flocks of poultry, herds of 
goats, cows, camels, oxen, yaks, and horses have been owned, bought, sold, traded, 
and rented. A key element in the ownership of domestic biota is the property’s ability 
to reproduce. Typically, possession and contracts dictate ownership of domesticated 
biota. However, several common-law doctrines that hark back to Roman law also 
govern such ownership. For example, the owner of a mother animal normally owns the 
                                                 
1 “Capture” is a legal term that includes caging, taming, and killing. 
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progeny, and the finder of stray domesticated animals is not the owner unless the 
owner cannot be found (St. Julian, 1995). 
Roman law held that all wildlife was ferae naturae,2 a res nullius resource, not 
owned by anyone but res privatae–ownable by first possession by capture, taming, or 
killing (Thomas, 1975). Roman law did not control what animals could be possessed 
or where (Favre, 1983), and once they were possessed, did not control their use. This 
doctrine of first possession as a basis of a property right in a res nullius wildlife, and 
the rules that apply to the conversion of wild res nullius to wild res privatae, are a 
critical theme. 
Within Roman law, complex rules of property developed. Some of these rules 
apply only to biota property, while others are more general. Some of these rules may 
apply to property questions in biotechnological utilities. These include the following: 
Per industrium hominis: Property in biota confined or killed by humans. 
Per impotentium: Property in immature or disabled wildlife by virtue of their 
inability to escape. 
Ratione soli: Property in transient wildlife by way of ownership of the land 
where the biota nests (defined property in bees). 
Animus revertendi: Property in wildlife that, by its own volition, return to the 
control of an individual, and such property right is retained by that individual even 
when the biota is outside direct control. 
Accretio: The act of growing to a thing (usually applies to very gradual 
increase such as in the accumulation of land through natural causes). Sometimes used 
to define the ownership of additional animals produced in herds as a result of 
reproduction. 
                                                 
2 “Ferae” means wild or untamed, and “naturae” means of nature or natural. 
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Accessio: Personal property that is principally supplied by one party but 
altered and/or improved by the labor or materials of another, particularly when the 
alteration/improvement adds significantly to the value of the original materials. For 
example, the one who turns grass into hay owns the hay by accessio. 
Plantatio: Property in seeds or plants implanted in soil belongs to the owner of 
the land. 
Adjunctio: A species of accessio whereby two or more things belonging to 
different owners are bought into firm connection with each other: interweaving 
(intertextura), welded together (adferruminatio), soldering together (plumbatura), 
building (inaedificio), sewing (satio), or planting (plantatio). 
Confusio: The inseparable intermixing of property belonging to different 
owners (typically relates to fluid mixing). 
Commixtio: Similar to confusio, but a later separation can be made. Property 
in mixtures belongs to all owners of the starting materials. 
Res nullius naturaliter fit primi occupantes: Anything that naturally has no 
owner belongs to the first possessor. 
Bona vacantia: Property in stray biota belongs to the finder. 
Roman law also established rules for biota progeny and by-products. Without 
an agreement to the contrary, the owner of the mother also owns her progeny; 
likewise, the owner of the producer owns the produce (e.g., the chicken owner owns 
the chicken’s eggs). 
3.5.2 English Wildlife Law 
After the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 AD, the notion that the 
sovereign had exclusive authority to hunt or fish anything, anywhere, anytime was 
ascendant (Nelson, 1732; Murphy, 1968). Rights to take wildlife became an integral 
part of the patronage system in which the aristocracy acquired limited rights in fish 
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and game through sovereign grants (Bean and Rowland, 1997). Rights to possess and 
use wildlife in England and the United Kingdom followed a set of rules summarized 
as follows: 
Park: The rights to hunting “superior” game (e.g., deer, fox, martin) only on 
the grantee’s land.  
Chase: The right to hunt superior game across the lands of others. 
Freewarren: The right to hunt “inferior” game (e.g., fowl, hares) only in 
defined areas if others are actively excluded. 
Several fishery: The right to take fish in a particular body of water. 
Common piscary: The non-exclusive right to fish in a particular river or body 
of water. 
English wildlife law became a complex mix in which the sovereign and the 
landed aristocracy shared property rights in certain wildlife (Lund, 1980; Tober, 
1981). However, the idea that wildlife in England was the sovereign’s property was 
weakened by the fact that the king did not frequently or comprehensively assert a 
property interest in game (Lueck, 1989). English game laws from 1389 to 1831 were 
characterized as “qualification statutes” that restricted the possession of game to 
“qualified individuals” (landowners, aristocracy, and the wealthy) but did not 
supersede trespass law. By 1785, a hunting certificate was required. The qualification 
statutes were abolished in 1831, giving landowners explicit ownership of all wildlife 
on their land. The 1986 case of Blade v. Higgs firmly placed wildlife-property rights 
in the hands of the landowner in the United Kingdom (Lueck, 1989). 
The philosophical contest of wildlife property occurred in England around the 
time of the American Revolution. This contest was manifest in a long-running debate 
between Sir William Blackstone and Professor Edward Christian and laid the 
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foundation for the early roots of wildlife property in the new United States (Lund, 
1980). 
Blackstone, using Roman wildlife law as a basis, argued that wildlife is res 
nullius and that any property rights in land or biota are granted by the sovereign and 
are therefore res publicae (Blackstone, 1781). Christian held that property in wildlife 
was res privatae, flowing from the owner’s property rights in the land. Blackstone was 
philosophically opposed to the privileges of the landed gentry bestowed by the English 
game laws and based his arguments for res publicae wildlife on several doctrines 
(Lund, 1980). First, under feudalism, the sovereign has full access to all lands and 
game in its domain, and any wildlife are stray goods (bona vacantia), which belong to 
the sovereign. The English history of granting royal game franchises to nobles also 
supported Blackstone’s argument for the sovereign’s rights in wildlife. Christian 
argued that the primacy of rights in land ownership superseded any sovereign’s right 
in wildlife, pointing to the Case of the Swans, in which the judge, Lord Coke, implied 
that royal rights did not extend beyond a few explicitly stated game. Blackstone 
maintained that the sovereign’s rights in wildlife were tacitly based on five hundred 
years of English game law. Christian countered that no prosecution had ever been 
based on Blackstone’s theories of sovereign’s property in biota (Lund, 1980). 
Christian’s view eventually prevailed in the United Kingdom: landowners there hold a 
property interest in the wildlife on their land (Lueck, 1989).  
Early jurisprudence in the United States diverged from the U.K. position, 
instead taking the Blackstone path. Lund (1980) posits that Blackstone’s view became 
dominant in the new United States because it was more suited to frontier conditions 
and the philosophical bent of former colonists opposed to the power and privilege of 
landed aristocracy. The wildlife-property regime in the early United States was a 
frontier of res nullius in which anyone had free access to wild game and fish, 
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regardless of land ownership, allowing acquisition of res privatae by capture or killing 
(Gabrielson, 1951; Sigler, 1972). 
3.6 The Evolution of Sovereignty in Wildlife in the United States 
The property regime in wildlife in the United States has evolved on several 
fronts. The first involves the symmetry between government and an individual’s rights 
to useful wildlife. This has been a long undertaking of allocating wildlife property 
between the open access of res nullius, private rights in res privatae, and public 
control of res publicae—essentially, an evolution of the balance between the public 
good and the private right. This mix is partly defined by the distinction between 
transient and fixed biota. Another front is the dynamic of federal versus state 
sovereignty. As a result of two hundred years of evolving law, the federal/state 
balance of sovereignty in wildlife in the United States is a complexity of overlapping 
and interdigitated jurisdictions.  
In summary, property in wildlife in the United States is a story of the 
development of wildlife from frontier res nullius to increasing state and/or federal 
control over wildlife, all within a balance of private and public rights, manifest 
through capture and use. 
A basic distinction in the evolution of wildlife property is the criterion of 
mobile, transient animals versus plants fixed in place. The concept of ferae naturae, 
which is the basis of Roman res nullius and the root of U.S. law, refers to transient 
wild animals. Plants, being normally fixed, have fallen outside the traditional res 
nullius umbrella and have been considered a part of the land and its property milieu. 
Bean and Rowland (1997) note the historical conceptual distinction between animal 
wildlife and plants. 
The evolution of fish and game wildlife law represents a large portion of the 
wildlife-property question. But it ignores plants and other less obvious organisms such 
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as fungi, bacteria, algae, and viruses. Furthermore, U.S. wildlife law has encompassed 
only useful fish and game and has almost completely ignored other, traditionally less 
useful wild organisms such as arthropods and other invertebrates (Tober, 1981; Bean 
and Rowland, 1997). This inattention becomes relevant as biotechnology creates new 
utilities in such organisms. 
3.6.1 Frontier Phase: Wildlife as Res nullius 
In the early United States, an individual’s access to wild fish and game was a 
matter of survival. The English notion that property in wildlife was tied to property 
rights in land was rejected. All roaming wildlife were res nullius and became res 
privatae on capture. In these early years, an individual’s right to take and possess 
wildlife from the common res nullius pool was so strong it superseded a landowner’s 
right of exclusive access (Lund, 1980; Tober, 1981). Bean and Rowland (1997) point 
out that in the general laissez-faire attitude toward wildlife property in the early United 
States, however, some landowners did assert ownership of wildlife on their lands.  
The res nullius regime in the early United States was interspersed with a few 
early state laws regulating the taking of select wild game; for example, a 1710 
Massachusetts law limited deer hunting, and a 1741 New York law limited the 
location of certain hunts (Matthieson, 1959). By the late 1700s, a number of state 
wildlife laws controlled the season, means of taking, and type of animal (Lund, 1980; 
Tober, 1981; Bean and Rowland, 1997). In this early period, all wildlife was res 
nullius, with first possession the means of acquiring res privatae property. The 1805 
New York Supreme Court case Pierson v. Post3 revolved on the question of when and 
how first possession provided an individual res privatae in otherwise free-roaming res 
nullius wildlife. The judges in this case invoked the res nullius nature of ferae 
                                                 
3 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175; NY (1805). 
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naturae, stating that “property in such animals is acquired by occupancy only”4 and 
that under Roman law, pursuit per se did not rise to possession. However, the judges 
decided that mortal wounding deprived the animal of its natural liberty and satisfied 
the rule of capture and perfection of a res privatae property right. 
3.6.2 The Decline of Wildlife and the Rise of State Sovereignty in 
Wildlife 
In the United States of the 1800s, the dominance of res nullius and res privatae 
via capture coupled with the rise of unfettered market-hunting led to precipitous 
declines in wildlife populations and even extinctions of some species, such as the 
heath hen, passenger pigeon, Carolina parakeet, and Audubon sheep (Matthieson, 
1959; Tober, 1981; Lueck, 1989). Hanner (1981) describes how the lack of res 
publicae control of the bison was key to its near-extirpation. The pressure of obvious 
wildlife loss led to the beginnings of a conservation movement and the rise in the 
1800s of state laws and regulations controlling the taking of wild game and fish (Lund, 
1981; Tober, 1981; Bean and Rowland, 1997). For example, laws in Massachusetts 
(1855), Vermont (1850), and Connecticut (1850) provided year-round protection for 
song and insectivorous birds, although these laws did not apply to landowners (Tober, 
1981). This dichotomy of private-property rights in land versus right in wildlife is 
pivotal in the evolution of the res publicae regime in wildlife. 
State wildlife conservation laws began to appear in earnest in the 1870s. For 
example, New York passed a law controlling market-game hunting in 1871. Colorado 
(1872) and Oregon (1874) passed laws regulating the killing of big game. Maryland 
passed a law in 1872 controlling the taking of waterfowl and oysters, and in 1871, 
North Carolina passed a law mandating hunting methods and apparatus (Tober, 1981; 
Bean and Rowland, 1997). By the 1900s, most states had established strong 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
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proprietary interest in wildlife, especially by regulating hunting season period, bag 
limit, hunting methods, and access through licensing (Palmer, 1912). 
The rise of state wildlife laws led to court tests of the states’ rights to control 
the possession and use of wildlife. For example, in 1875, the New York Court of 
Appeals upheld the state’s powers to regulate the taking, sale, and possession of game 
(Tober, 1981). In 1881, in upholding a state law forbidding the marketing of quail 
during the closed season, the Illinois State Court stated, “it is accurate to say that the 
ownership of the sovereign authority is in trust for all the people of the state.”5 
In 1894, the Supreme Court of Minnesota questioned the right of the state 
legislature to declare all wild game the property of the state and found that “to be the 
correct doctrine in this country that the ownership of wild animals, so far as they are 
capable of ownership, is in the state, not as proprietor but in its sovereign capacity as 
the representative and for the benefit of all its people in common.”6 
The rise of a state property interest in wildlife was a slow process as a result, in 
part, of resentment of England’s oppressive game laws (Gabrielson, 1951; Matthieson, 
1959). The gradual assertion of state res publicae created a tension of government 
authority over a public good, which later ultimately led to Supreme Court 
confirmation of res publicae of certain wildlife. Early tests of states’ assertions of res 
publicae rights in wildlife that rose to the Supreme Court secured state sovereignty 
over wildlife. 
The first wildlife case to come before the U.S. Supreme Court was Martin v. 
Waddell, in 1842.7 This case, which involved property in oysters in tidal soils, 
confirmed the res publicae nature of these wildlife. The court8 found that the British 
king’s grant of land rights to a duke in New Jersey was superseded by the king’s 
                                                 
5 Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320; Ill. (1881). 
6 State of Minnesota v. Rodman, 58 Minn, 393 (1894 Minn). 
7 Martin v. Waddel, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
8 Chief Justice, Roger Taney. 
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public-trust responsibility and that the duke’s rights could not abrogate the “public 
common of piscary.”9 This ruling established the state’s property right in this wildlife 
through the government’s public-trust obligation. In a similar case (Smith v. 
Maryland) a few years later, the Supreme Court held that a state’s ownership of the 
soil (tidal) of state-controlled land conferred to the state the right to regulate the taking 
of oysters from that soil.10 The doctrine of state wildlife property as public trustee was 
substantiated in McCready v. Virginia, a related Supreme Court case in which the 
court found that the states owned tidewaters and the fish in them,11 a finding that 
extended the doctrine of ratione soli to transient animals. 
Any doubts that states had sovereignty over wildlife were laid to rest in 1896 
by the Supreme Court, in Geer v. Connecticut.12 With this decision, the Supreme 
Court clearly established that states held a property interest in wildlife. The court 
examined the nature of property in game and a state’s authority therein. The case 
involved the legal taking of birds in a state and the subsequent interstate shipment of 
such birds against state law. Geer v. Connecticut firmly established state rights in 
wildlife. The court affirmed a state’s right to control and regulate public property in 
game, a doctrine that would hold for the next 80 years. The court held that individual 
property rights in wildlife can only be acquired such as the sovereign may allow. 
Although this 1896 court decision solidified states’ sovereignty in wildlife, it also 
hinted at ultimate federal authority in wildlife, a prescient decision. State sovereignty 
over wildlife was further confirmed in Ward v. Racehorse (1896),13 Patsone v. 
Pennsylvania (1914),14 and New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker (1916).15 
                                                 
9 Martin v. Waddel, loc. cit. 
10 Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855). 
11 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876). 
12 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
13 163. U.S. 504, 510 (1896). 
14 232 U.S. 138, 143 (1914). 
15 241 U.S. 556, 562 (1916). 
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3.6.3 The Rise of Federal Sovereignty in Wildlife 
The beginning of federal sovereignty assertion over select wildlife was 
Manchester v. Massachusetts,16 in which the 1891 Supreme Court upheld the right of 
states to regulate the possession of oysters. But the court was ambiguous about state 
ownership in wildlife and explicitly hinted at ultimate federal authority over wildlife. 
The court also differentiated between “sedentary fish” (e.g., oysters) and “swimming 
fish,” using the long-held distinction between “fixed” and transient biota. 
Before 1894, the federal government asserted little authority over wildlife on 
its lands. President Harrison’s proclamation in 1882 reserving Alaska’s Afognak 
Island “in order that salmon fisheries in the water of the Island and salmon and other 
fish and sea animals and birds . . . may be protected and preserved unimpaired”17 
asserted federal control over the wildlife in the first federal wildlife refuge. The 
Yellowstone National Park Act of 189418 prohibited hunting in the world’s first 
national park. In 1906, the federal government prohibited the hunting of birds on “all 
lands of the U.S. which have been set apart or reserved as breeding grounds for birds 
by any law, proclamation or Executive Order.”19 
Bean and Rowland (1997) suggest that no legal challenges were mounted 
against these early assertions of federal property in wildlife on federal land since it 
was assumed that the government had the same right to control hunting on its land as 
any landowner of that time. However, states began to challenge federal authority over 
wildlife when federal activity impinged on state-controlled or private land or when 
such federal activity ran counter to state law. 
                                                 
16 139 U.S. 240 (1891). 
17 Proclamation No. 39, 27 Stat. 1052. 
18 Yellowstone National Park Act of 1894, Ch 72, 28 stat. 73. 
19 Act of June 28, 1906, Ch 3565, 34 Stat. 536. 
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In 1900, the Lacey Act,20 the first federal wildlife legislation, was passed. This 
law bolstered the states’ regulatory authority over wildlife but gave the federal 
government the power to control interstate trade in wildlife and authorized the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture to pursue the conservation of birds. 
The gradual shift of sovereignty in wildlife from states to the federal 
government was given impetus in the 1912 Abby Dodge21 case, which involved the 
regulation of taking sponges in U.S. coastal waters. In Abby Dodge, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged the federal government as the ultimate authority over select 
wildlife.  
The first statutory assertion of federal property in wildlife, the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act of 1917, and the subsequent state challenge to such federal sovereignty in 
wild birds in Missouri v. Holland in 192022 together represent a watershed in the 
dialectic of state versus federal wildlife property. 
Concern in Congress that migratory birds were in danger of extirpation and the 
realization that this transient resource could not be effectively managed by individual 
states led to the introduction of federal legislation in 1904. By 1913, a federal law 
protecting migratory birds had passed. There was significant opposition to this law, 
despite its basis in long-established state sovereignty over wildlife (Lofgren, 1975). 
The 1913 law was barely enforced by the Department of Agriculture (the responsible 
agency), and on the rare occasions on which the law was challenged, federal courts 
held that states, not the federal government, had sovereignty over game. Thus, in U.S. 
v. Shauver,23 a district court relied on Geer v. Connecticut to find that sovereignty in 
game flowed from the original colonies to the states. Similarly, in Silz v. Hesterberg,24 
                                                 
20 Lacey Act, Ch 553, 3, 31 Stat 188 (1900). 
21 Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1912). 
22 Missouri v. Holland, 263 U.S. 49 (1918). 
23 U.S. v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark, 1914). 
24 Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 311 (1908). 
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the court’s decision was contrary to federal government arguments that migratory 
birds were the public property of the United States. The assertion of federal property 
interest in wildlife encountered strong philosophical resistance. So, supporters of 
federal control pursued a surer route to federal sovereignty—the exclusive federal 
treaty power (Bean and Rowland, 1997). Subsequently, the Convention with Great 
Britain (on behalf of Canada) for the Protection of Migratory Birds was negotiated and 
signed in 1916 and ratified by Congress later that year.25 Lofgren (1975) describes the 
emergence of the two positions on state versus federal sovereignty in wildlife after 
ratification. The federal position argued that wild bird protection was a proper treaty 
subject; a treaty had supreme law status and constitutionally designated the federal 
government as the sovereign. States’ rights advocates argued that a treaty cannot 
validate unconstitutional legislation and that the courts had long held wildlife as 
falling under the states’ domain. 
The treaty’s implementing legislation, passed in 1918, declared all migratory 
birds listed in the U.S. Code and in the Protection of Migratory Birds Act “to be 
within the custody and protection of the government of the United States.”26 The act 
prohibited capturing or hunting without a federal permit. The stage was set for a 
constitutional battle, which began when the state of Missouri contended the act by 
filing a bill in equity restraining a federal game warden (Mr. Holland) from enforcing 
the federal regulations against a citizen of Missouri. By 1920, the case had reached the 
Supreme Court as Missouri v. Holland. The Supreme Court upheld the act and decided 
in a 5-4 decision that the constitutional treaty power gave the federal government 
sovereignty over this wildlife. Chief Justice Holmes wrote for the majority, 
The state . . . found its claim of exclusive authority upon an assertion of 
title . . . No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants, the State 
                                                 
25 Protection of Migratory Birds Act, 39 Stat. 1702 (1916). 
26 263 U.S. 49 (1918). 
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may regulate the killing and sale of such birds but it does not follow that its 
authority is exclusive of paramount powers . . . wild birds are not in the 
possession of anyone and possession is the true beginning of 
ownership . . . But for the treaty and the statute, there soon might be no birds 
for any owners to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that compels 
the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of 
our forests and our crops are destroyed . . . It is not sufficient to rely upon the 
states.27 
This decision ended the doctrine of absolute state sovereignty in wildlife and 
affirmed federal rights in wildlife that Congress protects as a public good. This 
decision opened the door to federal wildlife regulation (Bean and Rowland, 1997) and 
defined the government’s property interest in wildlife as parens patriae, a trustee for 
the public good, not as an owner per se.  
The issue of state versus federal property in wildlife was raised again in 1928 
in Hunt v. United States.28 The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture directed that deer 
(controlled by Arizona game law) in Kaibab National Forest be harvested to avoid 
forest damage from over-browsing and that the harvest be done without regard to state 
hunting law. The state of Arizona arrested those carrying out the secretary’s directive. 
Arizona relied on Geer v. Connecticut (1896) and other cases that supported a state’s 
rights in wildlife within its borders even when that biota is on federal land. However, 
the Supreme Court ruled that “the power of the U.S. to thus protect its lands and 
property does not admit of doubt . . . the game laws or any other statute of the state 
notwithstanding.”29 
This decision clearly stated federal sovereignty over wildlife on federal land 
due to the federal-property power even if that wildlife is transient, not explicitly 
                                                 
27 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
28 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928). 
29 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
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covered by a federal law, and otherwise controlled by state law. In 1940, this ruling 
was extended to cover acquired national forest lands in Chalk v. United States.30 
In 1940, Congress passed the Bald Eagle Protection Act,31 the first assertion of 
federal sovereignty over a particular species of wildlife. The act, which prohibited the 
taking or possession of any bald eagle, its parts, eggs, or nests, was further amended in 
1962 and 1972 to include golden eagles and exempt possession for Native American 
religious purposes. 
Although the legal basis of federal sovereignty over wildlife selected by 
Congress was settled by 1940, the next twenty years were filled with disagreement on 
the issue of federal versus state sovereignty over wildlife controlled by state law but 
located on federal land. 
In December of 1964, the Office of the Solicitor of the Department of the 
Interior issued a memorandum on federal authority to regulate hunting and fishing in 
the National Wildlife Refuge System: “ . . . the United States government has 
constitutional power to enact laws and regulations controlling and protecting . . . [its] 
lands, including the . . . resident species of wildlife situated on such lands and that this 
authority is superior to that of a State.”32 
The first federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) was passed in 1966. This act 
did not control possession, leaving such regulation entirely to the states. This first 
ESA limited its definition of wildlife to vertebrates and did not include plants. 
In 1969, the Supreme Court strengthened federal sovereignty over state-
controlled biota on federal land in New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall.33 
                                                 
30 Chalk v. United States, 114 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1940). 
31 Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1940). 
32 “Quoted in G. Swanson, Fish and Wildlife Resources in the Public Lands 15 (1969),” cited in Bean 
and Rowland, 1997, p. 20. 
33 New Mex. State Game Commission v. Hickel, 396 U.S. 961 (1969). 
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The court held that the Secretary of the Interior could authorize the harvest of state-
controlled game on federal land for research purposes regardless of state law. 
In 1971, the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act34 was enacted, 
providing federal control over the taking and possessing of these such animals on 
federal, state, and, to some extent, private land. 
The passage of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) in 197235 is a 
culmination of the shift to federal sovereignty over certain wildlife. The MMPA 
completely preempts states’ authority over marine mammals listed in the act.36 The 
MMPA is also noteworthy because it expands the meaning of the term “take” to 
include “harass and hunt,” expanding government’s property control of this biota.  
In the 1981 case Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 
the Ninth Circuit Court decided that “the importance of preserving such a national 
treasure (an endangered species) may be of such a magnitude as to rise to the level of a 
federal property interest,”37 adding more substance to the federal government’s claim 
of sovereignty over wildlife through the federal-property power. However, no decision 
was rendered because the parties settled out of court. 
The 1976 case Kleppe v. New Mexico38 further solidified federal sovereignty 
over wildlife explicitly covered in federal law. At the request of a federal grazing 
permittee, the state of New Mexico had caught (on federal land) and sold burros 
protected under the 1971 Wild Horse and Burro Act. The Bureau of Land 
Management demanded that the state recover and return the animals under this law. 
The state of New Mexico sued the Secretary of the Interior, declaring the law 
unconstitutional. A lower court decided that previous cases (e.g., Hunt v. U.S.,39 
                                                 
34 Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1971). 
35 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1362, 1371-1384 and 1401-1407 (1972). 
36 However, a stringent mechanism for states to acquire some authority is provided. 
37 Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F. 2d 495 (9th Cir 1981). 
38 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
39 Hunt v. US, 278 U.S. 96 (1928). 
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NMSGC v. Udall40) protected only lands, not biota, and that the Wild Horse and Burro 
Act therefore unlawfully protected animals.41 “The Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed the lower court,” stating that the federal government’s power over 
governmental land “necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect wildlife 
living there. . . . it is far from clear . . . that Congress cannot assert a property interest 
in the regulated horses and burros superior to that of the State.”42  
Federal sovereignty over wild biota on federal land was challenged in the 1977 
case United States v. Brown.43 The court was to decide whether the National Park 
Service prohibition against hunting on state waters that are also within national park 
boundaries was a legal assertion of federal authority. The court found that the National 
Park Service had correctly exercised the property clause of the federal government in 
asserting federal sovereignty over wildlife on federal land and waters. 
The cases described above, particularly Kleppe v. New Mexico and Missouri v. 
Holland, establish the federal-property power and treaty-making power as 
constitutional sources of federal sovereignty over wildlife. The federal power to 
regulate interstate and international commerce provides a third source of such federal 
sovereignty. 
In the 1928 case of Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,44 a lower court 
found that a state’s control over wildlife terminates once part or all of such biota enters 
commerce. As with other cases involving the regulation of commerce, courts have 
found it unnecessary that an item be actually shipped across a state boundary for it to 
enter the stream of commerce. This issue may be relevant to the question of whether 
                                                 
40 NMSGC v. Udall, 396 U.S. 961 (1969). 
41 New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237; D. New Mex. (1975). 
42 Bean and Rowland, 1997, p. 22, citing 426 U.S. at 537. 
43 552 F. 2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977). Cert. Denied 431 U.S. 949 (1977), aff’g 431 F. Supp 56 (D. Minn. 
1976). 
44 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928). 
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the filing of a patent on a biotechnological utility from res publicae wildlife is in the 
stream of commerce. 
In the 1971 case Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., the Supreme Court held 
that the federal government had the power to regulate the taking of fish in state waters 
under the commerce clause of the constitution, stating, “at earlier times in our history 
there was some doubt whether Congress had power under the commerce clause to 
regulate the taking of fish in state waters, there can be no question today that such 
power exists where there is some effect on interstate commerce.”45 Although the fish 
in question in Douglas v. Sea Coast Products were migratory, the court did not use 
this as a basis for federal authority. However, a few years later, in Andrus v. Allard, 
the Supreme Court found the Migratory Bird Treaty Act an equally valid exercise of 
federal power under the commerce clause.46 
The Ninth Circuit Court also cited the commerce clause as justification for 
federal authority over wildlife that does not move across state boundaries in Palila v. 
Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources.47 
In the 1979 case U.S. v. Helsey, the Ninth Circuit Court upheld the federal 
government’s right to control airborne hunting of wildlife under the commerce clause. 
The 1991 case Hawaii Audubon Society v. Lujan48 represents an interesting test 
of property in biota distinct from property in land. At issue was the conflict between 
res publicae property in the alala49 and the property rights of a private landowner. The 
plaintiffs sought to compel the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to enter private land 
without the landowner’s consent, if necessary, to assert the government’s biota-
property interest and to seize alala eggs and birds for the state’s endangered-species 
                                                 
45 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1971). 
46 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
47 Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resource, 639 F. 2d 495 (9th Cir. 1938). 
48 No 91-00191 D. Hawaii. 
49 Hawaiian crow listed in the Endangered Species Act. 
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propagation facility. Removal of eggs/birds from the wild to the propagation facility 
had been proposed in a 1982 State of Hawaii Recovery Plan. The plaintiffs argued that 
non-consensual entry onto private lands was permitted under section 4(f) of the 1973 
Endangered Species Act. 
Federal sovereignty over Congressionally selected wildlife has been 
established. However, this does not divest the states of their role in the regulation of 
all other wildlife or imply any preference for a particular allocation of responsibilities 
between the states and the federal government (Bean and Rowland, 1997). In fact, the 
Code of Federal Regulations requires federal land managers to cooperate and 
coordinate their wildlife management activities with relevant state wildlife agencies. 
3.7 The Current Status of Res publicae Wildlife—The Relation of Federal and 
State Jurisdiction 
The federal government asserts property control over biota in two primary 
ways: as a landowner and by federal wildlife statute. As a landowner, the federal 
government has certain rights in the biota on federal land. However, the type of land 
dictates the extent and type of federal property control. For example, federal property 
in biota on national park land is different from that in biota on land managed by the 
Bureau of Land Management. 
States may assert property control in all wildlife that is not federally controlled. 
A state has the power to impose restrictions or conditions on individuals regarding the 
taking or holding of wildlife in that state.50 Ownership of ferae naturae not in actual 
possession by private persons is in the public in their collective sovereign capacity, or 
                                                 
50 Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 US 545 (1924); Rogers v. State (Ala App) 491 So 2d 987 
(1986); Ex parte Kenneke, 136 Cal 527 (1902); Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla 255 (1909); People v. 
Bridges, 142 Ill 30 (1892); In re Schwartz, 119 La 290 (1907); State v. Snowman, 94 Me 99 (1900); 
Dapson v. Daly, 257 Mass 195 (1926); Ex parte Fritz, 86 Miss 210 (1905); State v. Wever, 205 Mo 36 
(1907); Barrett v. State, 220 NY 423 (1917); Peple v. Bootman, 180 NY 1 (1904); State v. Jim, 81 Ore. 
App. 189 (1986); Peters v. State, 96 Tenn 682 (1896); State v. Niles, 78 Vt 266 (1906); Graves v. Dunlap, 
87 Wash 648 (1915). 
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in the state as representative of all the people.51 Ownership of wild animals by the 
state is not that of proprietor but is rather that of trustee (parens patriae) for the sole 
purpose of regulation and preservation for the common use.52 Migratory or transient 
animals have been held to be a public property, which the state can regulate to protect 
the common interest.53 Because ownership of such animals is first within the people of 
the state, they may permit individuals to acquire ownership subject to conditions and 
limitations that the people through their legislative representatives may wish to 
improve.54 For example, the private ownership of game may be limited to personal 
use, denying the individual who possesses the game the right to transport or sell it to 
another.55  
In 25 states, statutes permit government to recover damages for the destruction 
or loss of government-controlled fish and wildlife (Halter and Thomas, 1982). 
The current balance of federal versus state’s rights in wildlife is articulated in 
CFR 43, Public Lands, subtitle A, Section 24.3 “General Jurisdictional Principles”:  
In general, the states possess broad trustee and police powers over fish and 
wildlife within their borders including fish and wildlife found on Federal lands 
within a state . . . In the exercise of power under the Property Clause [of the 
Constitution] Congress may choose to pre-empt state management of fish and 
wildlife on Federal lands and in circumstances where the exercise of power 
and the Commerce Clause is available, Congress may choose to establish 
restrictions on the taking of fish and wildlife whether or not the activity occurs 
on Federal lands . . . State jurisdiction remains concurrent with Federal 
authority. 
                                                 
51 North American Commercial Co. v. United States, 171 US 110 (1898); Ward v. Race Horce, 163 US 
504 (1896) (criticized but reluctantly followed by Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 866 F Supp 520 
(1994)); Ex parte Bailey, 155 Cal 472 (1909); State v. Lewis, 134 Ind 250 (1893); In re Schwartz, 119 La 
290 (1907); L. Realty Co. v. Johnson, 92 Minn 363 (1904); Schultz v. Morgan Sash & Door Co. (Okla) 
344 P2d 253 (1959); Acklen v. Thompson, 122 Tenn 43 (1908); Ex parte Blardone, 55 Tex Crim 189 (As 
to ownership of fish and game, see 35 Am Ju 2d, Fish and Game §§ 1 et seq.  Annotations: Governmental 
liability for failure to post highway deer crossing warning signs) (1909). 
52 State v. Mallory 73 Ark 236 (1904). 
53 Bayside Fish Flour Co. v Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936). 
54 Ex parte Kenneke, 136 Cal. 527 (1902); Herin v. Sotherland, 74 Mont. 587 (1925). 
55 Ex parte Keneke, 136 Cal. 527 (1902); American Express Co. v. People, 133 Ill. 649 (1890). 
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3.7.1 The Nature of Government Property in Wildlife 
There are significant differences between res privatae and res publicae 
property. Res publicae is not equivalent to private-property rights held by the 
government. Although the government’s authority over the possession and use of res 
publicae property has many of the attributes of private property, there are key 
differences. Government may have the power to exercise most, if not all, of the several 
distinct bundles of rights described by Honoré (1961), but it does not hold these rights 
as a private-right holder. The two characteristics that fundamentally distinguish res 
publicae property are the parens patriae doctrine of public trust, and immunity from 
liability (Blum and Ritchie, 2005). 
Numerous court cases that have defined the nature of res publicae in wildlife 
have tethered this definition to government’s role as trustee of the public good. 
The origin of the public-trust doctrine flows from English common law56 and 
is a binding American legal principal.57 Under English common law, the Crown held 
property in common resources by jus privatium (a right transferable by Crown or 
private persons) or jus publicum, a common public-trust right of the English people 
(Archer et al., 1994).  
Concerning res publicae in wildlife, the public-trust doctrine holds government 
as the trustee, wildlife as the corpus, and citizens (present and future) as the 
beneficiaries (Favre, 1983). Government has the parens patriae right and obligation to 
conserve the corpus for the beneficiaries (Rogers, 1977).58 A trustee is a fiduciary, 
held to a high standard of conduct and under a duty to administer the trust solely in the 
interest of the beneficiaries (Dukeminier and Krier, 1993). 
                                                 
56 See Environmental Law, 19, No. 3, 1989. 
57 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 477 (1988). 
58 See also the Symposium: “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management,” 
1980. 
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In the first Supreme Court wildlife case,59 the court speaks of the states’ public 
trust in oysters. Similarly, in McCready v. Virginia (1876), the court describes the 
appropriateness of state “regulation of the use by the people of their common 
property.”60 In Manchester v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Supreme Court 
held that a state could regulate a natural resource for a valid “public purpose . . . for 
the common benefit.”61 In its definitive confirmation of the states’ sovereignty over 
wildlife, the Supreme Court, in Geer (1896), held that “supervision of wildlife is 
exercised moreover as a trust for the people not as a prerogative for the advantage of 
the government as distinct from the people or for the benefit of private individuals as 
distinguished from public good.”62 
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the state holds its public-
trust properties “in trust for the enjoyment of certain public rights, and the state has the 
power to regulate the methods by which the public enjoys its rights.”63 
In Toomer v. Witsell, the Supreme Court wrote that the government’s right and 
duty to protect wildlife does not derive from ownership but from its duty to the people, 
stating that “the ownership language . . . must be understood as no more than a 19th 
century legal fiction expressing the importance to its people that a state have power to 
preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.”64 The opinion 
continues that states do not “own” wildlife but have a “substantial property interest” in 
it. Justice Frankfurter termed states’ property in wildlife as “technical ownership.”65 
Dozens of lower court cases have similarly held that governmental ownership 
in wildlife is not that of proprietor but that of trustee and that the res publicae property 
                                                 
59 Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
60 94 U.S. 391 (1877). 
61 Manchester v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891). 
62 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
63 Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 74 (1855). 
64 Toomer v. Witsell, 384 U.S. 385 (1948). 
65 Ibid. 
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interest lies with the people in their collective sovereign capacity or in the state as 
representative of the people (Julian, 1997; Blum and Ritchie, 2005). Clearly, the res 
publicae is not a property interest that can be sold or for which special interests may 
be granted but is solely for preservation and regulation for common use.66 Wilkinson 
(1980) points out that citizens have used the public-trust doctrine in court against the 
actions of the government. However, the state may prescribe the boundaries where res 
publicae ends and res privatae begins.67 
When confronted with the issue of whether the state or a lower government 
(e.g., a municipality) holds the people’s property interest, courts have confirmed the 
state’s supremacy68 as trustee and held that the doctrines of laches and estoppel, which 
mitigate res privatae property interests, do not apply to government.69 
The other significant character that distinguishes res publicae from res 
privatae property is government’s lack of liability. Courts have held that holding 
government liable for the conduct of res publicae wildlife would pose intractable 
problems for and intolerable risks to the government’s ability to administer its parens 
patriae trust.70 
3.7.2 Obscure Biota and Ambiguous Federal-Property Definition 
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulation, Title 50, which implements the several 
federal laws covering wildlife, defines “fish or wildlife” as  
any wild animal, whether alive or dead, including without limitation any wild 
mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, fish, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod, 
coelenterate, or other invertebrate, whether or not bred, hatched or born in 
captivity, and including any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof.  
                                                 
66 Mallory v. State, 73 Ark. 236 (1904); State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393 (1894). 
67 Kellogg v. King, 114 Cal. 378 (1896). 
68 Ex parte Bailey, 155 Cal 472, 101, p. 441 (1909). 
69 U.S. v. California and Utah Power & Light v. United States, 243. U.S. 389, 409 (1917). 
70 Metier v. Cooper Transport Co., 378 N.W.2nd 907 (1985). 
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Except for those species specifically listed as protected under federal law, federal law 
is silent on the sovereignty over non–fish or game wildlife except in the cases of 
interstate or international commerce. 
It is unclear whether unicellular eukaryotes or prokaryotic organisms (e.g., 
protozoans, bacteria) are wildlife under this definition, although they could be defined 
as “other invertebrates.” Considering viruses, mycoplasmas, and prions would seem to 
be an especially expansive definition of “invertebrate.”  
3.8 U.S. Indian Nations and Wildlife Property 
The relation of an Indian nation’s rights in wildlife on its lands to res publicae 
biota has two aspects. First, an Indian nation has the rights of a landowner. Second, 
and more significant, these “domesticated dependent nations,” as defined by Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Marshall, have a unique relationship to the states, the federal 
government, and individuals. Because of their special trust status, Indian lands are not 
federal public lands or part of the public domain and are not subject to federal public 
land law. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,71 the Supreme Court described Indian 
nations as distinct, independent political communities self-governed under a trustee 
relationship with the federal government. 
It is interesting to note that the 1874 failure to form a state out of the Indian 
Territory (i.e., now Oklahoma) was due, in large part, to the Indians’ refusal to provide 
for the division of land from communal lands to private property (Deloria and Lytle, 
1984).  
Bean and Rowland (1997) describe the wildlife rights Indian nations have vis à 
vis the federal government by virtue of their protected sovereign status. In the 1896 
case Ward v. Race Horse, the Supreme Court determined that a state (Wyoming) had 
                                                 
71 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 20 (1831). 
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the right to assert federal sovereignty over wildlife on Indian lands.72 However, in 
United States v. Winans (1905), the court decided that Indian treaty rights gave Indians 
certain sovereignty over fish and game on Indian lands.73 In 1942, the court decided in 
Tulee v. Washington that Indians did not need to obtain state fishing licenses to take 
fish on Indian lands.74  
The several Puyallup decisions involving the disposition of salmon in 
Northwest waters have resulted in a complicated patchwork of laws, regulations, and 
case law that affirm the federal government as the sovereign responsible for balancing 
the rights of Indians and non-Indian citizens with regard to wildlife that Indians have 
some claim in (Bean and Rowland, 1997). 
Several federal wildlife acts explicitly distinguish the rights of Native 
Americans in federal wildlife. The MMPA and the Eagle Protection Act provide 
exemptions for Native Americans. Under MMPA, federal control is supreme, but 
certain takings without permit are allowed by Aleuts, Eskimos, and coastal tribes for 
subsistence use or for creating authentic native articles of handcraft and clothing. 
According to the Eagle Protection Act, Native Americans may possess eagle parts for 
religious purposes. 
Under the federal Endangered Species Act, the federal government has blanket 
and absolute sovereignty over all listed species, including those on Indian lands. 
However, Indian nations have had a modicum of decision-making input in the 
implementation of the ESA on Indian lands.75 
Regarding the relation of Indian nations’ versus states’ rights in biota, the 
courts have decidedly found that the states’ governments retain sovereignty over 
                                                 
72 Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). 
73 States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
74 Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942). 
75 U.S. Department of the Interior Secretarial Order 3206. 
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wildlife, even on Indian lands. For example, in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis,76 a 
federal court found that an Indian nation does not retain treaty-based rights to hunt and 
fish on its lands, free of state regulation. Each state has its own definition of the scope 
and extent to which states have given rights to access and control of wildlife on Indian 
nation lands. In New York State, Indians are required to obey all state wildlife 
regulations.77 
3.9 Capture and Domestication: Converting Res nullius Wildlife to Res 
privatae Property 
The primary means of acquiring a res privatae right in res nullius is through 
first possession (Epstein, 1979; Blum and Ritchie, 2005). Obtaining ownership by 
being the first to possess, occupy, or capture something previously unowned is a 
widespread institution historically applied in many cultures in such varied resources as 
wildlife, satellite orbits, oil, gas and minerals, land, water rights, intellectual property, 
and the electromagnetic spectrum (Lueck, 1995). 
The capture or killing of wild animals has long been considered the paradigm 
of first possession as the source of a property right in an unowned thing. In fact, other 
fugitive resources such as minerals have been defined as ferae naturae for the purpose 
of property rules (Brown, 1978). Romans clearly defined the capturer or killer of wild 
game as the owner of that game animal (Lund, 1980). 
The classic New York Supreme Court case of Pierson v. Post,78 in 1805, 
defined the rules of capture that prescribed property in a hunted fox. The court held 
that ownership required acts that bring the fugitive animal under certain control 
(Dukeminier and Krier, 1993). The act that reduces a res nullius wildlife to res 
privatae is that which reduces the liberty of the wildlife and places it under the control 
                                                 
76 Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3rd 782 (10th Cir. 1995). 
77 NY State Law ECL-90. 
78 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (1805). 
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of the property holder. The killing of a wild animal ferae naturae gives a property 
right in the carcass to the killer (Arnold, 1921), except where the government may 
have an overriding police power. Less permanent reduction of the animal’s liberty 
results from capture, taming, or other means to bring the living animal more or less 
under human control. A related rule of caging is per impotentium, in which one may 
hold property in ferae naturae that are unable to run, fly, or swim away as a result of 
their youth or infirmity (Arnold, 1921). 
Although killing a ferae naturae creature yields a static property right in 
possession, the control of a living creature is a qualified right. That is, the property 
right created by possession evaporates upon the restoration of the wild creature’s 
natural liberty. This is clearly the case of a wild animal briefly caged and never tamed 
that returns to its natural state of liberty. A previously caged wild sea lion is res nullius 
once it has escaped to the sea (Mullet v. Bradley79). 
Degrees of qualified property can continue in ferae naturae that have been 
partly tamed or brought under some measure of control. For example, under the 
doctrine of animus revertendi, a qualified property interest can exist in a wild animal 
that, although periodically not under immediate control, returns on its own to the 
owner’s control (e.g., to a pen or land). In Hughes v. Reese80 the court found that the 
taming of a wild fox to the point where the fox would return to the tamer created a 
property right in the fox that was not diminished by temporary departure of the fox 
from the control of the owner. If the biota does not return, the right is lost. In the case 
of loose bees, the court held in Goff v. Kilts81 that the possession of bees required 
keeping the bees in sight and having the power to pursue them. 
                                                 
79 Mullet v. Bradley, 24 Misc 695 (NY, 1898). 
80 Hughes v. Reese, 144 Miss. 304 (1926). 
81 Goff v. Kilts, 15 Wend 550 (NY, 1836). 
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Courts have held that property rights in captive wildlife are strengthened by the 
acts of routine physical caging, earmarking, branding, and use in commerce (Hogan, 
1955).  
Despite this long history of ownership by capture, some question whether this 
rule may be antiquated. For example, McLaughlin (2003) argues that the rule of 
capture does not support the sustainable use of a natural resource. McLaughlin 
believes that a more cooperative approach among several interested parties is 
preferable to a single owner-by-capture approach. 
3.10 Personal Property and Biological Chattel 
Private property in biota follows rules of property in chattel. The word 
“chattel” means “personal property in tangible things other than land.” It derives from 
“cattle,” one of the most significant personal property items of early cultures 
(Dukeminier and Krier, 1993). Animals have always been handled slightly differently 
from inanimate objects with regard to property. However, several court cases have 
countered this view (Hannah, 2001). 
Personal-property rules are defined by custom and common law. Biota chattel 
or personal property in biota follow under these rules, generally with some unique 
variation caused by the unique characters of biota property (Hannah, 2001). A cow 
may be owned as chattel, just as a chair may be owned. But a chair and a cow are 
fundamentally different because of the cow’s biotic characters. That is, biota chattel is 
often “alive” with powers of auto-locomotion and auto-reproducibility.  
To understand the institution of biota personal property, it is necessary to 
define the general property rules of chattel and then, within that framework, to 
articulate the rules of biotic chattel. 
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3.10.1 Personal-Property Rules 
Movable items that are not the property of anyone may be converted into 
chattel by the act of first possession described earlier. This requires a level of physical 
possession and, in some cases, marking. In fact, the paradigm for assertion of property 
rights in something previously unowned is the capture of a wild animal (Rose, 1985). 
Tangible personal property is movable by nature. It may or may not have value 
per se (e.g., jewelry). Personal property that is affixed to realty is realty until it is 
severed from the land (Webb and Bianco, 1970). Ownership is normally confined to 
the person in actual possession. Upon the death of the owner, transfer of ownership is 
controlled by the location of the domicile of the deceased, unlike realty, for which the 
location of the property is controlling. There are two type of personal property, or 
personalty: “choses in possession” and “choses in action.” Choses in possession are 
properties in which rights are obtained by mere possession. Choses in action require 
some action such as accessing a bank savings account or a patent right. The focus here 
is on choses in possession.  
Unlike the possession of real property, the possession of personal property 
does not require a written title or contract for conveyance. The possession of personal 
property creates prima facie evidence of a property right. In the sale of personal 
property there is normally an implied warrant of title that is conveyed. The possessor 
is considered to hold title unless the possessor is not the true or original owner. Such 
instances occur in lost, mislaid, or abandoned property, and in conversions, bailments, 
accessions, and adverse possessions.  
Conversions refer to a wrongful taking of possession. No possessor of 
personal property can have rights in that property that rise higher than those of the one 
who transferred the property (Burke, 1983). Courts in the United States generally 
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protect the first possessor’s title in order to maintain an effective economy through 
fungible and negotiable transfer of title (Burke, 1983). 
Prior possession refers to property rights in personalty that arise earlier than 
another’s in the chain of possession. A prior possessor of a chattel has a right to the 
property as good as or superior to all but the true owner.  
Finder’s rights are qualified property rights held by those who find chattel. 
The “finding” of such chattel requires an intent to possess and a possessory act and 
must be done openly. A finder’s property right is superior to that of all subsequent 
finders or possessors but inferior to that of prior finders or possessors and the true 
owner. Although lost chattel found in a public place is the property of the finder, if it 
is found in a private place, the owner of the place where the property is found has 
rights superior to those of the finder. There are four types of “lost” property: 
Lost property involves an involuntary parting of the property from the true 
owner in which the owner is unlikely to find it through retracing his or her steps; the 
owner must intend to retrieve. 
Mislaid property involves a voluntary parting of the property from the owner 
but a lack of ability to retrieve it, typically due to lack of specific memory. (e.g., a 
wallet on the floor of a public place is lost; a wallet on a desk in a public place is 
mislaid). 
Abandoned property involves a voluntary parting of property from the owner 
and/or a voluntary failure to retrieve. 
Treasure trove is buried treasure. 
Finders have varying rights and obligations depending on the type of property 
loss. Finders have a general duty to find the true owner and are not entitled to 
compensation (except for those expenses caused by the finding and relocation). In the 
case of lost property, the finder must return the property to the true owner, if known, 
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or be guilty of larceny or conversion. A finder who loses the property has superior 
rights to all subsequent finders.82 A finder of lost property has the same rights and 
obligations of a gratuitous bailee, described below. 
A finder of mislaid property has similar rights and obligations as with lost 
property unless the place where it is found is public, in which case it is likely that the 
true owner will retrace his or her steps and return to the place of mislaying the 
property; the owner of the place where the object is found (the owner of the locus in 
quo) has rights to the found property superior to those of the finder (he or she is more 
likely to find the true owner).  
An overriding common law theme in rights of lost property is the public-policy 
goal that the true owner’s rights be revered. 
In the case of abandoned property, a finder is under an obligation to ascertain 
that the lost property has, in fact, been abandoned, after which the finder has superior 
rights against all. 
Accession presents peculiar problems. Accession occurs when the personalty 
of different persons is inextricably combined to produce a new and distinct personalty. 
For example, if two owners of raw wheat have their wheat mixed and that mixture is 
ground into flour, the owners of the separate raw wheat are now “tenants in common” 
of the combined-wheat flour. The intent of the parties is normally immaterial. 
Confusion refers to a type of accession in which chattel is mixed such that there can 
be no distinguishing the original property in the new mixture. Owners are typically 
made by pro rata, sharing on the basis of their original property. However, if the 
confusion is intentional, the wrongdoer loses all rights and cannot convey title (i.e., the 
owner can completely recover from third parties). 
                                                 
82 Armory v. Delamire, 1 str. 505 (1722). 
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If there is an increase in value of the combined property, ownership goes to the 
owner of the principal goods. However, the ownership of the combined property is 
normally apportioned according to the proportion of the mixing. If a valuable property 
is mixed with a relatively less valuable thing, ownership normally rests with the owner 
of the originally more valuable property. Similarly, if the value of the new mixed 
property is very much greater than that of the property added, the owner of the more 
valuable property is the owner of the new property. Conversely, original owners have 
no ownership if their property is so much less valuable than the new property created 
or if the identity of the old property is lost in the new property (the original owner may 
recover damages, however). 
Although a trespasser (innocent or willful) has no cause of action against an 
owner in an accession, an innocent trespasser in an accession is given credit for his or 
her added increment of value. A willful trespasser may gain no rights in an accession.   
A bailment is the transfer of possession of personal property from the owner 
(the bailor) to another (the bailee) without transfer of title. 
The bailee has the right to possession and control over the bailed property for 
the term of the bailment, and these rights are superior to all including those of the 
bailor. 
There are several types of bailment: 
Gratuitous bailment: for bailor’s sole benefit; requires only modest diligence 
of care by bailee. 
Bailment for mutual benefit: requires a reasonable level of diligence of care 
by bailee. 
Bailment for sole benefit of bailee: requires a high degree of diligence of care 
by bailee. 
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A bailee has an absolute duty to return the property at termination of the 
bailment. A bailment may be terminated by simple notice when it is for an undefined 
period. 
Where the bailment is for a definite time, a bailor cannot maintain trover83 or 
replevin84 during the life of the bailment against a third party; if bailment is terminable 
at bailor’s will, a bailor may bring trover or replevin if the bailed property is not 
returned by bailee on request by bailor. 
A bailee is normally held to a reasonable standard of care but is absolutely 
liable for misdelivery of the bailed property to someone other than the bailor 
(misdelivery is a breach of bailment contract and, therefore, a conversion, and is not 
based on negligence). 
If a bailee uses the property outside the scope of the bailment contract, it is a 
conversion for which the bailor may bring a trover action. 
Negligent use of a bailor’s property by a bailee creates no liability on the part 
of the bailor. The negligence of a bailor is not usually imputed to the bailor. 
During the term of the bailment, the bailee has exclusive right of possession 
even against the bailor and may sue in trover or replevin to recover (even against 
bailor). 
Unauthorized use by a bailee that results in loss or damage renders the bailee 
absolutely liable regardless of negligence. 
The bailor’s rights include suing for breach of contract for damages, bringing a 
tort action for damages, bringing an action in trover, and bringing an action in 
replevin. 
                                                 
83 “Trover” means the recovery of value but not title or possession. 
84 “Replevin” means the recovery of possession and damages. 
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Where a third party has acquired the goods by an unauthorized act of the 
bailee, the bailor may maintain an action of conversion or replevin against the third 
party. 
Adverse possession is a form of transfer of possessory rights and title in which 
actual possession is held by the non-owner, in an open, notorious, continuous, and 
hostile manner. Such possession, which runs for a statutorily defined period, will 
convey rights in the adversely held property from the original owner to the possessor. 
Trespass in chattel is the unauthorized intentional interference with the rightful 
possession of a chattel by a rightful owner. The use of trespass has been largely 
replaced by conversion as a legal means of redressing wrongful possession (Burke, 
1983). 
Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over personalty. There are 
two types of redress available to the owner of the wrongful act of conversion: replevin 
and trover. 
Replevin is the legal act of the rightful owner to recover possession of the 
wrongfully converted personalty. Personalty that has been wrongfully taken through 
trespass conversion or distraint (described below) may be replieved by the rightful 
owner. Replevin requires that the chattel be identifiable, which means that most 
accession and all confusion cuts off rights of replevin. Replevin involves a recovery of 
property possession with attendant recovery of damages caused by the wrongful 
conversion and any interim value created during wrongful possession.  
Recovery by act of trover is a very different matter. In trover, the rightful 
owner of the converted property obtains a court action to force a transfer of title from 
the original owner to the possessor by conversion. Thus, in this “forced sale” the 
possessor by conversion retains possession but is forced by the court to purchase the 
property and in so doing, to obtain title and the full value of the property to the 
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original owner. Such title to property in a trover action transfers only an actual 
satisfaction of the court judgment; therefore, failure to so satisfy means the original 
owner retains title and can furthermore bring suit in replevin to gain possession. 
Conversion includes both wrongful taking and wrongful holdings (i.e., a 
rightful possession followed by a wrongful failure to return). 
3.10.2 Biological Chattel 
Generally, property in biota falls under the rules of personal property. A few 
key characteristics distinguish biological chattel from non-biological chattel. First, 
living biological chattel is capable, if a whole organism, of auto-reproducibility. The 
reproductive capacity of an organism creates some unique property attributes. Also, 
whole organisms are frequently self-locomotive and capable of self-directive and 
related behaviors.  
The first distinction is whether the biota is transient or fixed. In the instance of 
obtaining a property right in a transient wild animal, the first-possession doctrine first 
described in Pierson v. Post allows for the acquisition of a property right in a free-
roaming, res nullius organism if and when a certain threshold level of control is 
asserted over the creature.85 First possession requires actual or constructive control 
with an intention to possess.86 Chasing is not a sufficient control; mortal wounding 
is.87 A captured, living res privatae creature that was res nullius before capture 
becomes a res nullius ferae naturae upon escape.88 However, by virtue of the doctrine 
of animus revertendi,89 a captured wild animal that escapes and is conditioned 
(through training or otherwise) to return to the capturer is the property of the capturer 
even when it is out of the sphere of control of the original capturer. 
                                                 
85 State v. Shaw, 65 NJ 875 (1902). 
86 Kenon v. Cashman, 33 A 1055 (1860). 
87 Leisner v. Wamie, 156 Wisc. (1914). 
88 Muller v. Bradley, 53 NY Supp. 781 (1898). 
89 Ulery v. Jones, 81 Ill., 403 (1876). 
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According to Hogan (1955), this assertion of res privatae property rights in a 
res nullius wild creature is affected by overarching public policy. In the early years of 
the United States, in which there was little or no industry in wild-animal husbandry, 
courts viewed the assertion of a property right in wildlife as strictly determined by 
physical control. Later, as such industry developed (e.g., mink and fox pelts), courts 
extended property rights to a looser definition of control. The term mansuetae naturae 
arose to define living wildlife that is rendered as commercial stock or merchandise 
through a variety of controls. Under mansuetae naturae, it is immaterial whether the 
free-roaming ferae naturae is animus revertendi, only that the creature has value to the 
original captor as stock or merchandise.90 
Companion animals hold a unique place in the continuum of property in living 
matter. Unlike livestock and animals of commerce, these creatures are valued for their 
emotional connection with humans. Courts have generally held these animals to be 
treated as chattel. However, some courts have granted damages for loss due to 
suffering and anguish (on the part of the animal and owner), and some have argued for 
dropping the property rules on such animals altogether (Root, 2002). 
At present, courts will generally support the biota-property rights of an original 
captor that has done all that can be reasonably expected to control the biota (Burke, 
1983). Such rights are conversely true of liabilities. Wildlife that has been reduced to 
res privatae through capture and which then escapes to another’s property and causes 
damage remains the property and liability of the original captor. The owner of 
damaged property may distrain the wild animal until such damages are compensated 
for (Hogan, 1955). In a related scenario, if a trespasser kills or captures a ferae 
naturae specimen on another’s property, the ferae naturae is the property of the 
landowner (Webb and Bianco, 1970). 
                                                 
90 Stephens v. Albers, 81 Colo. 488 (1927). 
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Fixed-biota property, including trees, shrubs, and herbaceous plants, follows 
different rules. Wild plants are fructus naturales and are fixtures on the land and part 
of realty property rules unless severed from the land. Fructus industriales are 
cultivated plants, and their ownership is dictated by separate rules. 
In lieu of a contract otherwise, ripened fruit is generally personalty. However, 
fruit growing on fructus naturales is the property of the landowner. Fruit on fructus 
industriales is personal property that may be owned by the sower. Such property rights 
in the “fruits” of such sowing are termed “enablements” (Burby, 1961). Enablements 
require a tenancy of uncertain duration, a crop maturation after termination of the 
tenancy, and a termination not caused by the tenant. 
Nursery stock is always considered tangible personal property, and property 
rights in that stock are typically not coincident with rights in the land. In Georgia, 
owners of land on which pecan trees grow are the owners of all the pecans produced, 
regardless of where they fall.91 
Fructus industriales planted and harvested by an adverse possessor are the 
property of the adverse possessor even if such possessor owes the landowner rent. 
Property rights in domesticated animals also fall under personal-property rules. 
Domesticated animals are defined as animals raised generation after generation by the 
owner(s), generally of docile and manageable temperament or bait, and typically 
requiring human intervention for survival.92 
An excellent review of property in animals can be found in St. Julian (1995), 
the key points of which can be summarized here. Domestic animals are personal 
property.93 A bailee of an animal is not entitled to property rights in the progeny. 
However, the holder of a life estate is entitled to such offspring during the period of 
                                                 
91 GA Code §§ 85-2101-2103 (1973). 
92 American Jurisprudence. 
93 Oppenheimer Indus v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423 (1987). 
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the estate. In general, the owner of the mother is the owner of all progeny, regardless 
of whether the owner is in possession of the mother.94 If contracts dictate ownership of 
progeny, the courts tend to follow. In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the 
owner of an animal also owns the animal’s by-products (e.g., milk, eggs). Pigs, cows, 
horses, oxen, mules, burros, yaks, and other large animals are typically owned/sold 
through contract. A registration or certificate may act as title (e.g., Simmental 
registered cattle, Arabian horses, Holstein dairy cows). Both herds and individual 
animals are typically owned through contracts. A brand is used to mark and assert 
ownership. Poultry is typically owned as personal property and exchanged via 
contract. 
3.11 Biota Property Plurality 
Geisler (2000) describes property systems as a complex mix of varied use 
rights and jurisdictions. Rather than a clear and clean matrix of mutually exclusive 
property boundaries, property in land is complicated by “ownership hybrids, mutants 
and . . . mixed-use, transboundary systems” (p. 80). Property in wildlife is similarly 
complex, and combining the property complexity of land and biota yields a 
particularly rich property stew. 
The “bundle” of property rights and liabilities provides a first layer of 
complexity. The uncoupling of rights of possession from rights of use, for example, or 
the separating of right of possession and use from right to alienate demonstrate the 
potential rights mosaic in a single object. 
In the state of New York, a wild, free-roaming bear is absolutely the property 
of the state. An individual may not acquire any property right in the bear except under 
a license from the state and may render the bear res privatae only in a licensed killing. 
However, the state retains certain property control over parts of the bear carcass by 
                                                 
94 Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S.S. 69 (1888). 
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prohibiting the sale of the bear flesh95 by the licensed carcass possessor. Similarly, in 
New York, the bodies of dead birds may be possessed but not sold. A second layer of 
complexity arises in the connection of property rights in land and property in biota. 
Under trespass law, landowners may assert a type of biota-property right by 
controlling others’ access to their land and therefore controlling access to the wildlife 
on that land. So, although a landowner has no property in a deer controlled by the 
state, he or she can keep others from accessing that deer.  
Nothing in the language of the ESA or the CFR 50 explicitly describes the 
control over a patent application on biotechnological utility obtained from an 
endangered species from private land. It is questionable, therefore, whether a 
landowner may collect tissues of an endangered plant species on his or her land, 
discover/invent a biotechnological utility therefrom, and file a patent application: Does 
the landowner have a right to undertake such intellectual-property activity? Does the 
government have any control over the intellectual property? 
                                                 
95 Hide, organs, and teeth of the bear are exempt from this prohibition and may be sold. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
FEDERAL AND STATE WILDLIFE LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to characterize the relation of patent law to biological conservation 
law, it is essential to analyze relevant federal and state laws. 
In the following sections, I break federal biological conservation law down 
into three basic types: 1) law that springs from the federal government’s regulation of 
interstate commerce, 2) law designed to protect individual species, and 3) law 
governing the management of federal lands and waters. Within each type, I describe 
the federal laws in terms of their relevance to the possession and use of relevant 
wildlife. 
Analyzing relevant state law presents a problem given the fifty distinct bodies 
of law that exist. To make this analysis tractable, I have conducted a general overview 
of all relevant state laws and drill deeper into the detail of New York State’s statute. 
In both sections of federal and state law, I focus on conservation law and not 
on law that is designed to control noxious, invasive, or other pest species (e.g., Federal 
Noxious Weed Act; Non-Indigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act). 
4.2 Federal Res publicae Biota 
Although there is a complex balance of federal and state rights in wildlife, the 
federal government has ultimate sovereignty (Roth and Boynton, 1993). Federal res 
publicae in wildlife is statutorily asserted through laws that regulate commerce, 
conserve species, or manage federal lands. Each of these approaches, and the laws 
they comprise, are defined below. 
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4.2.1 Regulation of Commerce 
Lacey Act 
Anderson (1995) provides a comprehensive review of the Lacey Act,1 the first 
federal wildlife law. The Lacey Act began as a domestic anti-poaching law and has 
become the primary tool in the control of international trade in wildlife.  
The act, passed in 1900, was originally intended to protect birds. It was 
motivated by the damage done to crops by insects that would otherwise be eaten by 
birds. The Lacey Act is the original assertion of federal sovereignty over wildlife. Its 
provision to make a federal crime of introducing wildlife taken against state law into 
interstate commerce frames the finely balanced relationship between federal and state 
sovereignty. The Lacey Act strengthens states’ right to control the biota within their 
borders by putting the power of federal law behind state law and regulation. As 
originally written, it empowered the U.S. Department of Agriculture to authorize the 
introduction and preservation of game, song, and insectivorous wild birds; to prevent 
the “unwise” introduction of foreign birds and animals; and to supplement state laws 
that protect game and birds.  
The ineffectiveness of state laws in controlling interstate commercial 
trafficking in game resulted from the Geer vs. Connecticut doctrine of state wildlife 
ownership.2  
The Lacey Act was not designed to be a federal wildlife law but rather to 
augment and support state wildlife law. The author and sponsor, Lacey himself, 
believed that the authority of the national government was to begin where the state’s 
authority ended. The Lacey Act did not assert any federal control over “state-owned” 
wildlife. Furthermore, the act distinguished between state and federal sovereignty in 
wildlife by removing federal restrictions on the states’ regulation of the sale of wildlife 
                                                 
1 18 U.S.C. § 42-44 (1981). 
2 161 U.S.C. § 519 (1896). 
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within their borders and by placing all game animals and birds entering a state under 
the jurisdiction of that state’s laws. It was directed at interstate traffickers in the game 
trade, particularly the market hunting of game birds and animals. It criminalized the 
delivery and shipment of parts or bodies of “wild animals or birds” killed in violation 
of state law. Utilizing the federal Commerce Clause power, the Lacey Act required the 
marking and labeling of wildlife shipments.  
The original Lacey Act did not cover fish. The Black Bass Act was passed in 
1926 and amended in 1930 and 1947. In 1981, the Black Bass Act was repealed and 
an expanded Lacey enacted, which covered all fish and wildlife, including migratory 
birds. 
The 1981 Lacey Act established a comprehensive federal law controlling trade 
in wildlife. The act covers captive-bred wild animals and certain wild plants,3 
including wildlife taken in contradiction of Indian laws or federal treaties. The act 
defines “taking” to include any possession or trafficking in illegally obtained wildlife. 
Under the act, where the wildlife was originally obtained is irrelevant. In New York ex 
rel Silz v. Hesterberg,4 the Supreme Court held that to bring plover and grouse killed 
in another country into a state with laws against possessing such animals was a 
violation of state law and therefore of the Lacey Act. 
The Amendment of 1935 extended the act to include wild animals, birds, and 
parts or eggs captured or killed contrary not only to state and federal U.S. law but also 
to foreign law. Related to this power, the Tariff Act of 19305 provides that if any 
foreign law restricts the taking or exportation of any wild mammal, bird, or part or 
product thereof, it may not be imported into the U.S. without certification from the 
U.S. consul in the country of origin where it was taken legally. The Tariff Act is 
                                                 
3 That is, those indigenous to any state that are listed in CITES (Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species) or in a state or federal Endangered Species Act. 
4 New York ex rel Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908). 
5 19 U.S.C. § 1527(a) (1976). 
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limited to mammals and birds and provides exemptions for scientific and educational 
purposes. The Lacey Act, on the other hand, covers any foreign wildlife or fish as well 
as “injurious” wildlife. In 1993 and 1994, some 700 Lacey Act violations were filed in 
U.S. federal courts. Examples include: United States v. Hansen-Sturm,6 in which the 
defendants were convicted of violations stemming from the sale of caviar illegally 
harvested from Columbia River Sturgeon; United States v. Borden,7 in which the 
defendants were convicted of harvesting mussels in violation of West Virginia state 
law for resale to commercial oyster producers; United States v. Miller,8 in which the 
defendants were convicted of removing Arizona cactus for commercial resale9; and 
United States v. Miranda,10 in which the defendants were convicted of selling 
undersize lobsters. 
The Lacey Act covers wildlife, defined as  
any wild animal, whether alive or dead, including without limitation any wild 
mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, fish, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod, 
coelenterate, or other invertebrate, whether or not bred, hatched, or born in 
captivity, and includes any part, product, egg or offspring thereof. Any wild 
member of the plant kingdom, including roots, seeds and other parts thereof 
(but excluding common food crops and cultivars) which is indigenous to any 
State and which is either (a) listed on an appendix to the CITES, or (b) listed 
pursuant to any State law that provides for the conservation of species 
threatened with extinction.11 
Acts prohibited under the Lacey Act include the following:  
3372. Prohibited acts 
(a) Offenses other than marking offenses. It is unlawful for any person— 
                                                 
6 United States v. Hansen-Sturm, 44 F.3rd 793, 793-794 (9th Cir 1995). 
7 United States v. Borden, 10 F.3rd 1058, 1060-61 (4th Cir 1993). 
8 United States v. Miller, 981 F.2d 439, 440-41 (9th Cir 1992). 
9 cert denied 113 S.Ct. 1644 (1993). 
10 United States v. Miranda, 835 F. 2d 830, 831 (11th Cir 1988). 
11 U.S. Code Title 16, Chapter 53, section 3371. 
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(1) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish 
or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any 
law, treaty, or regulation of the United States or in violation of any Indian 
tribal law; 
(2) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in 
interstate or foreign commerce— 
(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in 
violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any 
foreign law; 
(B) any plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any 
law or regulation of any State; or 
(C) any prohibited wildlife species (subject to subsection (e)); 
(3) within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States (as defined in section 7 of title 18, United States Code)— 
(A) to possess any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold 
in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any 
foreign law or Indian tribal law, or 
(B) to possess any plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in 
violation of any law or regulation of any State; or 
(4) to attempt to commit any act described in paragraphs (1) through (3). 
(b) Marking offenses. It is unlawful for any person to import, export, or 
transport in interstate commerce any container or package containing any fish 
or wildlife unless the container or package has previously been plainly marked, 
labeled, or tagged in accordance with the regulations issued pursuant to 
paragraph (2) of subsection 7(a) of this Act [16 USCS § 3376(a)(2)]. 
(c) Sale and purchase of guiding and outfitting services and invalid licenses 
and permits. 
(1) Sale. It is deemed to be a sale of fish or wildlife in violation of this Act 
[16 USCS §§ 3371 et seq.] for a person for money or other consideration to 
offer or provide— 
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(A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or 
(B) a hunting or fishing license or permit; for the illegal taking, 
acquiring, receiving, transporting, or possessing of fish or wildlife. 
(2) Purchase. It is deemed to be a purchase of fish or wildlife in violation 
of this Act [16 USCS §§ 3371 et seq.] for a person to obtain for money or 
other consideration— 
(A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or 
(B) a hunting or fishing license or permit; 
for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or possessing of 
fish or wildlife. 
(d) False labeling offenses. It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any 
false record, account, or label for, or any false identification of any fish, 
wildlife, or plant which has been, or is intended to be— 
(1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or received from any 
foreign country; or 
(2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce.12 
Penalties for Lacey Act violations include the following:  
$200 fine for shipping violations maximum civil fine of $10,000. A bifurcated 
felony/misdemeanor scheme. Felony violations require knowingly violating 
the Act. Misdemeanor violations require only negligence. Maximum felony 
penalty of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations and/or five 
years in prison; misdemeanor maximum penalty of $100,000 and/or 1 year in 
prison. Forfeiture of contraband, vessels, vehicles, aircraft and equipment. 
Loss of permits, licenses, stamps. Civil fines of up to $10,000. Authorized 
enforcement officers to carry firearms.13 
An open question is the relation of the Lacey Act to intellectual property from 
wildlife covered by the act: If a wildlife specimen is obtained illegally and is used to 
                                                 
12 U.S. Code Title 16, Chapter 53, section 3372. 
13 U.S. Code Title 16, Chapter 53, Section 3373. 
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obtain a patentable biotechnological utility, does the act of filing a patent application 
constitute a violation of the Lacey Act?  
Other federal laws control certain wildlife in the United States. The Federal 
Noxious Weed Act provides federal control over “noxious weeds,” defined as: 
a living plant of foreign origin that is either new to or not widely prevalent in 
the United States and that “can directly or indirectly injure crops, other useful 
plants, livestock or poultry or other interests of agriculture.”14 
The Non-Indigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act grants powers to 
control listed species to the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce and Interior. 
4.2.2 Conservation of Species 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
The Convention with Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds was ratified in 1916. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act,15 enacted in 
1918, provided protection of three types of migratory birds, each with different levels 
of federal control: 
Migratory game birds can be taken (i.e., hunted) by permit only during an 
open season (September 2–March 9). There is no restriction on what can be done with 
a bird or its parts taken under permit. Permits that prescribe the particular manner and 
period for taking are authorized for birds listed. 
Migratory insectivorous birds can be taken by permit only, and then only for 
a justifiable scientific, educational, or propagational purpose. 
Migratory non-game, non-insectivorous birds can be taken by permit only, 
and then only for a justifiable scientific, educational, or propagational purpose. 
                                                 
14 7 U.S.C. § 2802(c), cited in Bean and Rowland, 1997, p. 56.  
15 16 U.S.C. § 703-712 (1981); US & UK Treaty signed 1916 (39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No 628); US & Mexico 
Treaty signed 1936 (50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No 912); US Japan signed 1972 (25 U.S.T 3329); US & USSR 
signed 1976 (29 U.S.T 4647, T.I.A.S. No. 9073). 
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For birds in the last two categories, no taking is allowed at any time unless by 
permit for scientific or propagation purposes. For birds in the first category, there is no 
taking during the closed season, and taking is allowed in the open season only by 
permit. 
Similar migratory bird treaties were signed between the U.S. and Mexico 
(1936), Japan (1972), and the USSR (1976). Each of the treaties is slightly different. 
The treaties with Canada and Mexico allow taking for scientific and propagation 
purposes, and the latter treaty provides exceptions for museums. The Japanese and 
USSR Conventions allow taking for educational and other specific purposes that are 
consistent with the conventions’ objectives. Each of the treaties or conventions 
provides for hunting seasons. Overlap of the several migratory bird treaties creates 
varying control for the same species. However, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act itself 
and Title 50 of the U.S. Code resolve these inconsistencies. The act is primarily 
administered by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). 
Biota covered by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act include all living and dead 
whole specimens, parts, eggs, and nests of any species listed in Title 50 of the U.S. 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
Under the act, no person may take, possess, import, export, transport, sell, 
purchase, or barter any listed migratory bird or the parts, nests, or eggs of such bird 
except as permitted under CFR 50 or as permitted by special regulation of the 
secretary (Agriculture or Interior). The act also prohibits disturbing nests and interstate 
commerce in listed birds, parts, eggs, or nests  
or any product whether or not manufactured which consists, or is composed in 
whole or part, of any such bird or any part nest or egg thereof.16  
                                                 
16 U.S. Code, Title 16, Chapter 7. 
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Lawfully possessed wildlife may not be exported, purchased, sold, bartered, or 
offered for purchase, sale, or barter. Shipments are allowed but must be in marked 
containers.17 
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act provides for exceptions. Listed species may be 
taken by permit if  
under extraordinary conditions, [birds] may become seriously injurious to 
agricultural or other interests in any particular community.18  
The Mexican and Japanese Conventions exempt game farms and subsistence 
hunting by indigenous peoples. Permits for taking listed birds may be obtained from 
the USFWS for “public” purposes. State game departments, municipal game parks or 
farms, public zoological parks, accredited members of the American Association of 
Zoological Parks and Aquariums, and public or educational institutions may acquire 
by gift or purchase, possess, transport, and, by gift or sale, dispose of lawfully taken 
wildlife without a permit.19 Wildlife lawfully bred in captivity may be acquired 
without a permit. Carcasses of birds killed during legal banding may be donated to 
public, scientific, or educational institutions. Scientific-collection permits are available 
for accredited scientific or educational institutions. Falconry permits allow for the 
highly controlled possession of live animals. Raptor propagation permits are required 
in order to take, possess, transport, import, purchase, barter, or offer to sell, purchase, 
or barter any raptor, egg, or semen for propagation purposes. Falconry permits require 
detailed record-keeping of each bird. Non-permittees may possess a permitted bird for 
no longer than 30 days. A dead raptor must be immediately destroyed and its marker 
returned to the USFWS unless written approval to retain the carcass is obtained. 
                                                 
17 CFR 50, Part 21, Subpart A, Section 21.2. 
18 U.S. Code, Title 16, Chapter 7. 
19 Record-keeping is required. 
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Approval from the USFWS is required in order to return a possessed raptor to the 
wild.  
Penalties for violations include a fine of not more than $500 and/or 
imprisonment of not more than six months. If violations involve a sale, offer for sale, 
barter, or offer to barter a bird, the fine is not more than $2,000 and/or imprisonment 
of not more than two years. All equipment used in the violation is subject to forfeiture.  
A banding permit allows temporary capture of animals and acquisition of 
blood or tissue samples. Possession and use of these samples are not controlled by the 
government; therefore, they become res privatae upon collection. It is unclear what 
disposition of whole specimens or parts may be permitted for listed non-game birds.  
Eagle Protection Act 
The original Eagle Protection Act20 was passed by Congress for the purpose of 
protecting the bald eagle only. This act contained numerous exceptions, including for 
scientific or exhibition purposes and for all of Alaska. Two substantial amendments 
modified the original act. The 1962 amendment extended coverage to golden eagles 
and allowed taking and possessing for Native American religious purposes and for 
protection against depredation of domestic animals. The 1972 amendment tightened 
restrictions on the killing of eagles and substantially increased penalties for violations. 
It also provided exceptions for falconry and for the authorized taking of golden eagle 
nests if those nests “interfere with resource development.” 
Wildlife covered by the Eagle Protection Act include any living or dead whole 
specimen, or any part, nest, or egg of a bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) or 
golden eagle (Aquila chrysaetos). The act applies to “specimens” of eagles, whereas 
the CFR refers to parts, eggs nests, and eagles themselves. 
                                                 
20 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1981). 
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Prohibited acts include the taking, possessing, transporting, selling, 
purchasing, bartering, trading, offering to sell, purchase, or barter, exporting, or 
importing of any bald eagle or golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg.  
Exceptions include the use of eagle parts in religious ceremonies of Native 
Americans or the non-commercial use of eagle parts by Native Americans under 
several treaties between Indian nations and the United States. Some seasonal taking to 
protect domestic herds or flocks may be authorized. Other takings for scientific 
purposes, exhibition by public institutions, or falconry may be permitted by the 
USFWS. 
The Eagle Protection Act provides felonies for commercial transactions 
(buying, selling, bartering) or misdemeanors for simple negligent taking and/or 
possession. Each taking (of an animal or part) is a separate violation. First violations 
are fined a maximum of $5,000 and/or imprisonment of a maximum of one year. 
Subsequent violations are fined a maximum of $10,000 and/or imprisonment of a 
maximum of two years. Civil penalties include a maximum of $5,000 for each 
violation. Violations may also result in cancellation of any lease, license, permit, or 
other authorization for grazing on federal lands.  
Marine Mammal Protection Act 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act21 (MMPA) was enacted in 1972 in 
response to the public outcry against the killing of dolphins by tuna fishing, the 
slaughter of baby harp seals, and the general public affection for cetaceans and 
pinnipeds. The MMPA plays a role in the federal- versus state-sovereignty dialectic 
described in Chapter 3. It exemplifies the shift of state to federal sovereignty in select 
wildlife. Although the MMPA provides a protocol whereby a state may attempt to 
                                                 
21 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994). 
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eventually assume a modicum of control, it allows no state involvement in the control 
of listed species. 
Wildlife covered include  
any mammal which a) is morphologically adapted to the marine environment 
(including sea otters and members of the orders Sirenia, Pinnipedia and 
Cetacea), or b) primarily inhabits the marine environment (such as the polar 
bear); and . . . includes any part of any such marine mammal, including its raw, 
dressed, or dyed fur or skin.22 
The MMPA prohibits taking,23 hunting, capturing, or killing, or attempting to 
harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal. It also prohibits the transport, 
purchase, sale, or export of, or the offer to purchase, sell, or export any marine 
mammal or marine-mammal product taken in violation of the act or for any purpose 
other than public display, scientific research, or enhancing the survival of a species or 
stock. Importing listed species is also prohibited. 
The MMPA allows taking for authorized scientific purposes,24 for appropriate 
public display, or for the purposes of enhancing the survival or recovery of a protected 
species. Exceptions also include taking by Alaska Natives for subsistence and for 
handicraft manufacture; select taking or importing is allowed by the Secretary of the 
Interior: taking for bona fide scientific purposes, taking necessary for enhancing the 
survival or recovery of a species or stock, taking for public display, or incidental 
taking by commercial fishing operations.  
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 The term “take” means to harass (“the term harassment means any act of pursuit, torment, or 
annoyance which has the potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild or 
has the potential to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption 
of behavioral patterns, including but not limited to migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding or 
sheltering”). U.S. Code Title 16, Chapter 31, Section 1362, pp. 711, 712. 
24 “requires that the taking is required to further a bona fide scientific purpose . . . a non-lethal 
method . . . is not feasible . . . unless the Secretary determines . . . such research will directly benefit that 
species . . .” U.S. Code Chapter 35, Section 1539, p. 91. 
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Penalties include the revocation of permits and the assessment of civil 
penalties by the Secretary of the Interior of not more than $10,000 for each violation. 
Convictions may involve fines of not more than $20,000 and/or imprisonment for not 
more than one year. 
The Secretary of the Interior may be petitioned to allow for the acquisition of 
tissues and cells if it can be argued that such taking is a bona fide scientific purpose or 
in furtherance of the survival or recovery of the species.  
Wild Horse and Burro Act of 1971 
The Wild Horse and Burro Act25 was intended to protect a symbol of the 
nation’s heritage and to control the abusive exploitation of these animals. The act 
covers wild horses or burros on federal land and relies on the property clause of the 
Constitution to pre-empt states from jurisdiction over wild horses and burros on 
federal land under the auspices of the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) or Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM). The act asserts federal control of unbranded and unclaimed 
horses or burros on federal land but allows states to determine whether such animals 
are unclaimed, especially if they are on private land. Other than this allowance for 
state determination of the status of such animals, the act has primacy over any state 
law.  
The act prohibits the malicious causing of death or harassment, the willful 
removal or attempts to remove protected animals from public lands, and the 
processing of protected animals or their remains into commercial products. Penalties 
include $2,000 and/or one year in prison per violation. 
The act provides some exceptions for protected animals that voluntarily stray 
onto private land; they may become the property of the private landowner. 
                                                 
25 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1981). 
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Endangered Species Act 
The Endangered Species Act26 (ESA) is the most comprehensive extension of 
federal sovereignty over wildlife under U.S. law. The prohibition against taking a 
specimen of a listed species is absolute, although certain exceptions may be permitted.  
Beginning in 1966, Congress enacted a series of three laws, each building upon 
the previous, designed to prevent the extinction of certain threatened wildlife species. 
The ESA utilizes the major wildlife regulatory tools available to accomplish its 
objectives. The initial ESA of 1966 encouraged protection but did not prohibit 
possession, leaving this power to the states, and did not restrict interstate commerce in 
listed species. The 1966 law was limited to “fish and wildlife” and “vertebrate 
animals.” Some of these deficiencies were rectified in the act of 1969, which expanded 
its prohibitions on interstate and foreign commerce in unlawfully taken wild birds and 
mammals to include reptiles, amphibians, mollusks, and crustaceans. The international 
treaty known as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Fora (CITES) was ratified by the United States in 1973, which motivated a 
reevaluation of the 1969 ESA. The acts of 1966 and 1969 had left intact the traditional 
state authority to regulate the taking of wildlife. The federal obligations under CITES 
and Congressional willingness to supersede state authority in the wild demonstrated by 
the MMPA of 1972 provided a basis for more assertive federal authority over 
endangered species. The ESA of 1973 extended protection to any listed member of the 
animal or plant kingdoms. Further, it distinguished between “endangered” and 
“threatened” species. A critical modification was the “similarity of appearance” rule, 
an acknowledgment that certain species look so similar to endangered and threatened 
                                                 
26 Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No 89-669, §§ 1-3, 80 Stat. 926 (repealed); 
Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275; Endangered Species 
Conservation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 
(1976 and Supp. V. 1981)) amended by Nov.10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, §§ 1, 92 Stat. 3751. 
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species that they should be afforded protection to assure the protection of the 
endangered species they resemble. 
The implications of listing a species as endangered were made clear by Hill v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority,27 the famous “snail darter case.”  
The ESA amendment of 1978 vastly complicated the listing process by 
imposing a “social balancing” component on otherwise biological criteria. The 1978 
listing process, further burdened by the Reagan administration’s imposition of 
economic reviews beyond the act’s requirements (Bean and Rowland, 1997), halted 
the listing of some 2,000 species.  
The amendment of 198828 expanded the ESA to cover endangered plants, 
making it illegal to remove and reduce to possession any listed plant from federal 
lands or to maliciously damage or destroy any such plant  
on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any state or 
in the course of any violation of a state criminal trespass law.29  
An endangered plant growing on private land is the property of the landowner. 
However, the landowner may not sell, offer for sale, deliver, receive, carry, transport, 
or ship, in interstate or foreign commerce, by any means whatsoever, and in the course 
of a commercial activity, such plant.  
Wildlife covered by the ESA include all species listed as “endangered” or 
“threatened” in the U.S. CFR, Title 50, Section 17.11. This includes birds, crustacea, 
amphibians, fish, insects, mammals, reptiles, mollusks, and plants. The ESA defines 
“fish or wildlife” as 
                                                 
27 Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir 1977); aff’d 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
28 ESA § 9(a)(2)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(2)(B) (1988); Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1973 
(Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat.884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 and Supp. V. 1981)) as 
amended by 1978 (Nov.10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, ss1, 92 Stat. 3751), 1982 amendments. 
29 Ibid. 
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any member of the animal kingdom, including without limitation any mammal, 
fish, bird (including any migratory, nonmigratory, or endangered bird for 
which protection is also afforded by treaty of other international agreement), 
amphibian, reptile, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod or other invertebrate and 
includes any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof, or the dead body or parts 
thereof.30  
The ESA covers listed species, specific populations, sometimes a species only in a 
portion of its geographic range, and sometimes “similarity of appearance” to listed 
species. Listing requires a petition to the Secretary of the Interior or his/her designate 
(the USFWS) and concurrence by the Secretary of Commerce. The listing 
determination is to be made solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial 
data available. 
Acts prohibited under the ESA include taking, harassing, harming,31 pursuing, 
hunting, shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, capturing, collecting, or attempting to 
engage in any such conduct; and exporting, importing, possessing, selling, delivering, 
carrying, transporting, shipping, or engaging in interstate or foreign commerce of a 
listed species; and removing and reducing to possession any listed plant species from 
federal land. 
ESA exceptions include authorized incidental taking, captive breeding, 
falconry, economic hardship, and scientific purposes. “Permits for Scientific 
Purposes”32 require an application with details on the species to be taken: a statement 
that the species sought is still wild or already removed from the wild or born in 
captivity, location of the removed species, a complete description of the institution 
where the species will be used, and rationale for the taking. In evaluating the request 
for taking, the Secretary of the Interior will consider 
                                                 
30 US Code Title 16, Chapter 35, Section 1532, p. 13. 
31 This includes significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife. 
32 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2002). 
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if the purpose is justifiable, what the direct or indirect affect on the wild 
population would be, the opinion of scientists, and the degree that the purpose 
would likely reduce the threat of extinction of the species.33 
“Special Rules” eliminate normal permit requirements for designated 
threatened species in specific instances. For example, the San Marcos salamander may 
be taken without a permit in accordance with Texas state law. Loggerhead, green, and 
Olive Ridley sea turtles may be taken incidental to fishing operations.34 Subsistence 
taking is permitted in certain cases. For example, green sea turtles may be taken in 
certain areas by select Pacific Islanders, although such turtles cannot be transferred to 
non-residents or sold. 
Penalties under the ESA depend on the violation: a civil penalty of between 
$500 and $25,000 for each violation may be assessed by the Secretary of the Interior. 
Criminal violations may be assessed between $25,000 and $50,000 and between six 
months and one year in jail. Federal permits for grazing or wildlife importation may be 
revoked or suspended. Federal hunting, fishing, or other wildlife permits may be 
revoked or suspended. All equipment, vessels, aircraft, and other transportation used 
in taking and/or possessing may be forfeited.  
The ESA is ambiguous on the extent to which federal sovereignty over listed 
species extends to such wildlife on state land. Gidari (1994) provides an overview of 
the balance of federal power in wildlife and a landowner’s rights. Meltz (1994) also 
reviews the ESA reach over endangered species on private land.  
Much of the tension between a private landowner’s rights and federally 
controlled biota has centered on habitat modification that results from logging, 
construction, and development. The ESA permits some of this activity, and it is 
ambiguous as to the rights of the landowner. Although there is no case law to shed 
                                                 
33 US Code Chapter 16, Section 1534, p. 91. 
34 Such taken turtles must be released to the sea if alive and handed over to USFWS if dead, or 
resuscitated and released, if possible. 
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light on the subject, it appears that, as with other wildlife law, the non-incidental 
possession of endangered-species specimens is prohibited on any lands, including 
private. 
In the most recent Supreme Court case on the ESA, Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon,35 the court interpreted the taking 
prohibition to include significant habitat modification that kills or injures listed 
species. This decision extends federal sovereignty over listed species on private lands.  
4.2.3 Wildlife on Federal Lands and Waters 
The constitutional provision that any transfer of U.S. government property to 
any other entity requires the approval of Congress (through statutes that grant 
government agencies this right) provides a basis of federal res publicae in wildlife on 
federal lands and waters. 
The federal government may not abandon U.S. government property without 
expressly stating its intention to do so. 
The federal government asserts varying degrees of control of the wildlife on 
federal land. The type and extent of federal property control over that wildlife depends 
on the type of federal land. For example, governmental control of property in national 
parks is different from control of wildlife on BLM lands. 
Forest Service Lands 
The taking of any game or non-game animals, birds, or fish from any national 
forest lands or waters, including any overlap with military reservation or bird refuge, 
preserve sanctuary or reservation, requires a permit from the Forest Supervisor.36 Title 
50 of the CFR requires the U.S. Forest Service and the relevant state authority to 
cooperate to develop plans for wildlife protection on national forest land.  
                                                 
35 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
36 36 C.F.R. § 241.3 (2002). 
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Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Lands 
Management of wildlife on BLM lands is a cooperative effort between host 
states and the BLM. States are responsible for species management, and the BLM is 
responsible for habitat management (Bean and Rowland, 1997). The Classification 
and Multiple Use Act of 196437 authorized and directed the Secretary of the Interior to 
administer BLM lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield. The 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 directs the secretary to develop and 
maintain land-use plans for particular tracts that are coordinated with plans in 
proximate national forests and that 
use a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration 
of physical, biological, economic and other sciences.38 
There are no requirements for a federal permit to hunt or fish on BLM lands, although 
areas may be designated in which no hunting, fishing, or trapping is allowed by the 
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture. Decisions on BLM land-use 
plans are made by Resource Advisory Councils composed of commercial and 
environmental interests, public officials, the public at large, and academicians. 
National Wildlife Refuges 
The enabling statutes include the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act 
(NWRAA) of 1966,39 the Refuge Recreation Act of 1962,40 and the Refuge Revenue 
Sharing Act of 1964.41 The 1966 NWRAA combined various administrative units 
(“game ranges,” “wildlife ranges,” “wildlife management areas,” “waterfowl 
production areas,” and “wildlife refuges”) into the National Wildlife Refuge System 
                                                 
37 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418, 373-75 (2002). 
38 Ibid. 
39 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd, 668ee (2002). 
40 16 U.S.C. §§ L160K-460k-4 (2002). 
41 16 U.S.C. §§ 715A (2002). 
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and allowed some hunting and fishing within the lands of the Refuge System under 
rules promulgated by the Secretary of Interior. The Refuge Recreation Act authorizes 
the secretary to permit public recreation (including taking wildlife) on refuge lands. 
Litigation42 confirmed the jurisdiction of the USFWS over refuge properties and its 
primary role in controlling wildlife. The courts also confirmed the government’s right 
to prevent trespassing (Bean and Rowland, 1997) and the secretary’s right to allow 
regulated hunting.43 The CFR states, 
Unauthorized removal of any natural objects from any national wildlife refuge 
is prohibited and disturbing . . . collecting or attempting to collect any plant or 
animal . . . is prohibited except by special permit.44  
Combining this prohibition with the Coupland vs. Morton45 decision, which gave the 
federal government authority to prohibit public access to refuge lands, defines a strong 
federal property right in biota on national refuge lands. 
National Parks and Monuments 
National parks are governed by several federal laws including the Yellowstone 
National Park Act of 187246 and the National Park Service Act of 191647 (the 
“Organic Act”). The Organic Act explicitly recognizes wildlife conservation as a 
primary purpose of national parks: 
the fundamental purpose of . . . said parks . . . is to conserve . . . the wildlife 
therein . . . in such a manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired 
for . . . future generations.48 
                                                 
42 Schwenke v. Secretary of Interior, 720 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1983). 
43 Humane Society of the U.S. v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 360 (D.D.C. 1991). 
44 50 U.S.C. §§ 27e (2002). 
45 Envmntl. L. Rep. 20504; 4th Cir 1975. 
46 16 U.S.C. § 821 (2002). 
47 16 U.S.C. §§ 881, 2-3 (2002). 
48 Ibid. 
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The Secretary of the Interior has broad discretion to take any action necessary 
to conserve park wildlife unless Congressionally prohibited from doing so.49 Litigation 
has confirmed the secretary’s public-trust obligation to protect park resources.50 The 
Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 197851 gave the secretary the 
comprehensive authority to enforce the government’s public-trust obligation in all 
national parks, authorizing the “highest standards of protection and care.” Hunting and 
trapping are not permitted in national park areas,52 and the courts have upheld the 
secretary’s right to enforce such prohibition.53 Courts have also held that the secretary 
has authority over non-federal waters on national park lands.54 The CRF (Title 36) 
prohibits the possession of dead or living wildlife, fish, plants, or their parts except as 
permitted by the secretary and the superintendent of the particular park land or water. 
National Parkways/Rivers and Riverways, Water Gap Areas, National 
Recreation Areas, National Lakeshores, National Conservation Areas, and 
Seashore Recreation Areas 
The U.S. Code Title 16 states that hunting and fishing in national parkways 
and related lands is to be cooperatively managed with state and federal agencies and 
provides that the Secretary of the Interior may, after consulting with state and federal 
agencies, issue regulations designating “no take” zones or periods. Except in 
emergencies, any regulations of the secretary pursuant to this section shall be put in 
effect only after consultation with appropriate fish and game departments. This federal 
regulation also provides that hunting, fishing, trapping, and collecting are controlled 
by the secretary during open season as prescribed by local, state, and federal law. The 
                                                 
49 Michigan United Conservation Clubs s. Lujan, 949 F. 2nd 202 (6th Cir. 1991). 
50 Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 93 (1974). 
51 The Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95 – 250 § 101,92 Stat 163 (1978). 
52 51 Fed. Reg. 33263 (1986); 36 C.F.R. § 882.2(b)3 (1996). 
53 Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202 (1991). 
54 U.S. v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (8th Cir) cert denied 431 U.S. 949 (1977), aff’g 431 F. Supp 56 (D. 
Minn 1976). 
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secretary is to administer the regulations and protect wildlife with the aim of 
conserving natural resources. 
National Military Parks 
U.S. Code Annotated USCA Title 16 Ch. 1, Section 413 prohibits the taking of 
wildlife from military parks. The removal of any tree, shrub, or plant is a 
misdemeanor. 
Department of Defense 
The Natural Resources Management Program55 requires the heads of military 
services and directors of defense agencies with land-management responsibilities to 
“act as trustees for natural resources under their jurisdiction.”56 The policy states that 
“watersheds, natural landscapes soils, forests, fish and wildlife and protected species 
shall be conserved and managed or vital elements of D.O.D.’s natural resources 
program.”57  
“Integrated Natural Resources Management (INRM) Plans” are required for 
properties under Department of Defense (DOD) control. INRM plans include fish and 
wildlife management, and both game and non-game species. Such INRM plans are 
designed to conserve the wildlife benefit for the public. Under these plans, endangered 
and threatened species are managed according to ESA and USFWS regulations; the 
Sikes Act requires coordination and cooperation between the Departments of Defense 
(DOD) and Interior and the host states on management of fish and wildlife on DOD 
properties. Hunting, fishing, and trapping are allowed on DOD properties according to 
the fish and game laws of the host state. Enforcement of such laws is done in 
accordance with an INRM plan in coordination with a “wildlife manager.” The 
                                                 
55 32 CFR § 190 (2002). 
56 32 CFR § 190.5 (2002). 
57 32 CFR § 190.4 (2002). 
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for Protection and Logistics (ASD P&L) has 
responsibility for these activities. 
Department of Energy 
The Secretaries of Energy, Interior, and Agriculture and state agencies 
cooperate to develop and implement wildlife conservation plans on specific 
Department of Energy properties.58 
Army Corps of Engineers—Department of the Army 
CFR 36 provides the Department of the Army jurisdiction over wildlife on all 
Army Corps of Engineering properties. The District Engineer has authority to prohibit 
the taking of any wild animal or bird. Where it is allowed, hunting, fishing, and 
trapping are to be done in accord with the laws of the host state. 
Wilderness Lands 
The Wilderness Act of 196459 adds certain management directives to federal 
lands that are in the public domain for other purposes and includes lands under the 
auspices of other agencies including the BLM, Forest Service, USFWS, and National 
Park Service. The only express mention of wildlife in the act is the statement that 
nothing in the act “shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of 
the several states with respect to wildlife and fish in the national forests.”60 
International Treaties 
Treaties have power equivalent to that of federal laws enacted by Congress. 
They are also akin to contracts between the U.S. government and the other signatory 
nations. For a treaty to be effective within the United States, some implementation of 
                                                 
58 16 U.S.C. § 670 (2002). 
59 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 314-29 347-49, 374 (2002). 
60 The Wilderness Act. Public Law 99-577, Sept 3, 1964, Special Provisions (d), Section 8, p. 896. 
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federal legislation is required, and the treaty per se may or may not have enforceable 
rights in the United States over U.S. citizens. Treaties obligate the federal government 
to adhere to the treaty provisions and have primacy over any state law. The United 
States is a signatory to several international treaties that govern wildlife, including the 
following: CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species); the 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (the 
“Bonn” Convention); the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific 
Fur Seals, which controls the taking of fur seals in the north Pacific; the Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling, which was implemented by the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act and the Fishery Conservation and Management Act61; the Agreement 
on the Conservation of Polar Bears; and the Antarctic Treaty, which controls the 
taking of birds, marine mammals, and krill. 
The ESA and the Lacey Act provide the implementation of these treaty 
obligations. The ESA listing of species includes those that have been designated as 
controlled under CITES. The Lacey Act extends federal protection to any species 
taken or possessed contrary to state, federal, or foreign law or treaty to which the 
United States is a signatory. 
4.2.4 Federal Control of Pathogens and Pests 
Federal control over human pathogens is asserted in a variety of laws and 
regulations, primarily by the Food and Drug Administration, but that is not the focus 
of this study. However, I do review control of agricultural and environmental pests. 
Agricultural pests are controlled by the federal government under a variety of 
laws. Animal pests fall under the Lacey Act.62 Plants fall under a variety of statutes.63 
                                                 
61 22 U.S.C. §1 (1978 Supp. V. 1981). 
62 18 U.S.C. § 42 (2002). 
63 Federal Plant Pest Act (7 USC §§ 150aa-jj (2002); Organic Act (17 USC §§ 47a-e (2002); Plant 
Quarantine Act (7 USC §§ 151-64a, 167 (2002); Federal Noxious Weed Act (7 USC §§ 2801-13 
(2002); Agricultural Quarantine Enforcement Act; Non-indigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and 
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In addition, Executive Orders 11987 (1977) and 13112 directed federal agencies to 
restrict exotic species, to establish a National Invasive Species Council, and to 
establish a National Invasive Species Management Plan and an Invasive Species 
Advisory Committee. 
Agricultural pests are defined and controlled by the federal government under 
U.S. Code Title 7 (Agriculture). Section 147 of Title 7 exemplifies the broad federal 
government powers for control of such organisms. The Secretary of Agriculture is 
directed to identify pests (Section 136w-3) and is authorized “to carry out operations 
or measure to detect, eradicate, suppress, control, or to prevent or retard the spread of 
plant pests.” Section 148 extends these broad powers to insect pests and plant diseases. 
Under this Title (Section 150aa), a “plant pest” is defined as 
Any living stage of: any insects, mites, nematodes, slugs, snails, protozoa, or 
other invertebrate animals, bacteria, fungi, other parasitic plants or 
reproductive parts thereof, viruses, or any organism similar to or allied with 
any of the foregoing, or any infectious substances, which can directly or 
indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in any plant or parts thereof, or 
any processed, manufactured, or other products of plants. “Living stage” 
includes the egg, pupal, and larval stages. 
Section 150bb of Title 7 U.S.C. prohibits importing or entering any plant pest 
into the United States, moving any plant pest interstate, or accepting delivery (unless 
the movement is made in accordance with regulations). Section 150dd also gives the 
Secretary of Agriculture broad emergency powers.64 
                                                                                                                                            
Control Act of 1990 (17 USC §§ 4201, 4202, 4711, 4712, 4721-28, 4741, 4751 (2002); 18 USC § 42 
(2002)). 
64 “The Secretary may, whenever he deems it necessary as an emergency measure in order to prevent 
the dissemination of any plant pest new to or not theretofore known to be widely prevalent or 
distributed within and throughout the United States, seize, quarantine, treat, apply other remedial 
measures to, destroy, or otherwise dispose of, any character whatsoever, or means of conveyance, 
which is moving into or through the United States, or interstate, and which he has reason to believe is 
infested or infected by or contains any such plant pest, or which has moved into the United States, or 
interstate, and which he has reason to believe was infested or infected by or contained any such plant 
pest at the time of such movement; and any plant pest, product, article, or means of conveyance which 
is moving into or through the United States, or interstate, or has moved into the United States, or 
interstate in violation of this chapter or any regulation thereunder: Provided that this subsection shall 
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Noxious weeds are controlled in Chapter 61 of U.S.C. Title 7. The Secretary of 
Agriculture is authorized to promulgate regulations that prohibit the import or entering 
of a noxious weed interstate and the sale, purchase, barter, exchange, receipt 
acceptance for delivery, or transport of any noxious weed. A list of noxious weed 
species is provided in Title 7 of the CFR, Chapter 3. These powers of the secretary are 
extended to predatory and other wild animals in Section 426 of Chapter 17 of Title 7 
U.S.C. and to nuisance mammals, birds, and organisms constituting reservoirs of 
zoonotic diseases in Section 426, Chapter 17. 
The control of pest and pathogen species is spread across several departments 
and agencies (see Table 4.1 for several examples).  
Despite significant cross-agency responsibility, the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) has the primary burden of controlling pest and pathogen 
species. The regulations by which APHIS controls federally controlled pests are 
contained in Title 9 of the CFR. These regulations are numerous and complex, and 
they cover a broad range of wildlife. For example, Title 9 authorizes APHIS to assert 
federal power over animal semen, cell cultures, livestock vaccines, hay/straw from 
tick-infested areas, sera, toxins, organisms, hedgehogs, tenrecs, dogs, ratites, 
elephants, hippos, rhinos, and tapirs. APHIS has the power to examine records 
(Section 2.126); to confiscate and destroy organisms and their products (2.129); to 
prohibit interstate movement of land tortoises (74.1); and to control marine mammals 
(3.100), non-human primates (subpart D), guinea pigs and hamsters, animal stomachs 
and extracts from ruminants and service (95.19), and glands, organs, ox gall, and bone 
marrow (95.17, 95.18). 
                                                                                                                                            
not authorize such action with respect to any product, article, means of conveyance, or plant pest 
subject, at the time of the proposed action, to disposal under the Plant Quarantine Act” (7 U.S.C. § 151 
(2002)). 
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Table 4.1. Federal Agencies and the Pest Species under their Control. 
Department and agency Controlled pest and pathogen species 
Agriculture 
Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service 
citrus canker, glassy-winged sharpshooter, Mediterranean fruit fly, 
Asian long-horned beetle, plum pox virus 
Agricultural Research Service glassy-winged sharpshooter, brown citrus aphid, citrus psylla, 
papaya mealybug, pink hibiscus mealybug 
Forest Service European gypsy moth, Asian long nosed beetle, hemlock woolly 
adelgid, Port-Orford-cedar disease, Miconia 
Interior  
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Caulerpa taxifolia, Asian swamp eel, zebra mussel, brown tree 
snake, round goby 
Bureau of Indian Affairs cogongrass, purple loosestrife, Russian knapweed 
Bureau of Land Management giant salvinia, yellow starthistle, purple loosestrife, dyers woad, 
squarrose knapweed 
U.S. Geological Survey Asian swamp eel, giant salvinia, garlic mustard, round goby, black, 
silver and bighead carp 
Bureau of Reclamation giant salvinia 
Commerce  
National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 
Caulerpa taxifolia (aquatic plant) 
 
Marine Wildlife 
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 197665 (also called the 
Magnuson–Stevens Act) asserts exclusive federal management authority over 
“fish . . . mollusks, crustaceans, and all other forms of marine and plant life other than 
marine mammals and birds.” 
Within 200 miles of the U.S. coast, and wherever the continental shelf extends 
beyond the 200-mile zone, the United States asserts a property interest in all sedentary 
species, including crabs, sponges, mollusks, and corals. This law also establishes eight 
Regional Fishery Management Councils, which are composed of federal and state 
officials. The councils develop management plans for each fishery, which are 
                                                 
65 16 U.S.C. 88 § 1802.11 (1811); Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-659 88 101(a), 100 stat. 3706. 
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approved by the Secretary of Commerce.66 A critical aspect of these plans is the 
determination of the “optimum yield” of a particular fishery. The secretary is 
responsible for implementing the final regulations of such plants. Bean and Rowland 
(1997) point out that these hybrid federal–state councils are unique in wildlife law. 
Unlike the MMPA, there is no preemptory federal power over ocean fisheries. Title 50 
of the CFR provides a voluminous set of complex fishing regulations that define 
authorized taking in particular fisheries. 
Curiously, despite a title that suggests otherwise, the Marine Protection 
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 197267 provides no federal or state control over 
wildlife. Chapter 20 of the U.S Code describes the jurisdiction over wildlife on 
“Submerged Lands.” Submerged lands are all lands within boundaries of each state 
covered by non-tidal waters (navigable at time of statehood) or those covered by tidal 
waters. Natural resources within those lands include corals and coral reefs, fish, 
shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other marine and plant life. 
The U.S. Code provides that “public interest and title to such lands and natural 
resources with such lands with rights to manage shall belong to the state.”68 However, 
the federal government reserves the right to control the taking of wildlife in coastal 
fisheries under the commerce clause.69 In U.S. Code Chapter 43, Subchapter III, the 
designation “outer continental shelf land” includes the subsoil and seabed. 
4.3 State Res publicae Wildlife 
4.3.1 General Overview 
While capture historically formed the basis of property in wildlife, the “capture 
doctrine” is subordinate to state “ownership.” This flows from the “public trust” 
                                                 
66 The secretary can develop such a plan if the council fails, but the council can review it in that event. 
67 Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, tit. III, 86 Stat. 1061, 
16 U.S.C. 88 §§ 1431-1445(a) (2002). 
68 U.S. Code Title 43, Chapter 29, Section 1301. 
69 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. Va., 431 U.S. 265 (1977). 
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doctrine in wildlife, with its roots in the “king’s prerogative in England” (Blum and 
Ritchie, 2005). 
Each state has extensive and complex laws and regulations that govern the 
possession and use of wildlife. The scope and extent of the state res publicae character 
must be determined state by state and taxon by taxon. Detailing this complexity is 
beyond the scope of this work. However, a general overview of the common elements 
of state wildlife law and regulation and a few descriptive examples provide a useful 
framework. 
A synopsis of wildlife law in all fifty states is provided by Musgrave and Stein 
(1993). Thirty states explicitly claim ownership of wildlife within their borders (Blum 
and Ritchie, 2005). These authors describe the following nine elements that generally 
characterize state wildlife law: 1) statements of policy, 2) state agencies involved, 3) 
protected species, 4) exceptions to protection, 5) hunting regulations, 6) fishing and 
trapping regulations, 7) animal damage control, 8) habitat protection, and 9) Native 
American provisions. 
States vary considerably in their definitions of “wildlife.” Some include 
invertebrates and insects; others do not include reptiles or amphibians.70 Similarly, 
definitions of “game” and “non-game” also vary significantly. 
States typically designate “game” vs. “non-game” and “protected” vs. “non-
protected” species. States typically control the taking of game and protected species 
but not non-game or non-protected species. Game are typically controlled by hunting 
regulations, which permit taking, but only under strict prescriptions including required 
licenses or permits, definitions of closed/open season, hours of taking, bag limits, and 
control over manner of taking. Non-game wildlife are not controlled unless they are 
                                                 
70 New Mexico. 
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protected. Protected species are protected against various types of taking. Non-
protected wildlife are typically uncontrolled by the state. 
Nearly every state protects songbirds, insectivorous birds, and non-predacious 
wild birds (jays and crows are an exception), their eggs and nests. Of course, the 
federal MBTA has primacy over any state law, and each state has enacted laws and 
regulations that are in accordance with the federal control of all species listed in the 
federal act. New Mexico appears to have the most extensive listing of protected birds. 
Although protection for various types of wildlife varies by state, most states 
protect birds, game animals, sport fish, and any species (including plants) that are 
protected by federal law. Other animals, such as reptiles, amphibians, crustaceans, 
mollusks, and arthropods, are covered under some state laws and not at all under 
others. “Lower” life forms such as protozoa, algae, bacteria, and fungi are not 
explicitly covered under any state wildlife law. 
Some states exhibit anomalous or unique wildlife-control laws. New York and 
Utah have the only laws that protect aquatic insects, prohibiting the taking of any such 
species without a permit (Musgrave and Stein, 1993). Other states do not protect 
insects except those listed in the ESA. Most states have wildlife-in-captivity laws that 
vary greatly in their specifics but generally control this practice. Maryland protects all 
wild mammals in the state except nutria and woodchuck. 
Nearly every state provides for the taking, under strictly regulated conditions 
and procedures, of endangered or threatened species for scientific, zoological, or 
educational purposes, for propagation in captivity, or when public health or welfare is 
involved. Good examples of states with explicit regulations for scientific taking 
include Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. All states allow taking exceptions for virtually any 
species through a permit or license process. The states all vary greatly in the details of 
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their season lengths and their fish-and-game-hunting and fishing-and-trapping laws 
and regulations. Many states issue free hunting licenses to landowners for hunting on 
their own land. Another area of great variation is in enforcement and penalties. 
4.3.2 New York State Res publicae Wildlife Law 
New York State wildlife law and regulations are embodied in the 
Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) enacted in 1972.71 The ECL is implemented 
by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. The ECL states 
that 
The State of New York owns all fish, game wildlife, shellfish, crustacean and 
protected insects in the state, except those legally acquired and held in private 
ownership. Any person who kills, takes, or possesses such fish, game wildlife, 
shellfish, crustacean and protected insects thereby consents that title shall 
remain in the State for the purpose of regulating and controlling their use and 
disposition.72 
Several New York state court cases have confirmed the state’s assertion of a 
property interest in wildlife. In People v. Doxtater, the court stated that 
even a fee title of the land under the waters of the lake and the exclusive right 
of fishing therein does not confer upon the holder thereof the ownership of the 
fish in the lake.73  
In People v. Bootman, the court stated that 
the game and fish within the boundaries of the state [belong]to the people in 
their unorganized capacity; there is no property in living wild animals and only 
as the law permits their capture is there a right of property in them after they 
are caught or killed.74  
In Rockefeller v. LaMora, the court decided that  
                                                 
71 The latest version may be found in McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated published 
by WestGroup in 1997. 
72 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0105 (McKinney 1997). 
73 People v. Doxtater, 147 N.Y. 723 (1894). 
74 People v. Bootman, 180 N.Y. 1 (1904). 
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fish and game are migratory and those which may now be on private lands may 
quickly change their location to public lands and public waters, no man owns 
wild game or fish even though they be on his land, unless he has reduced them 
to his possession by capture and if they wander from his premises to those of 
the public or another, he may not complain of their taking.75  
According to In re Fishway, 
fish running at large are ferae naturae . . . [and] are the public property of all 
the people of the state in common and no person can acquire property 
therein . . . 76 
In Barrett v. State, the court declared that 
the general right of the government to protect wild animals is too well 
established now to be called in question; their ownership is in the state in its 
sovereign capacity, for the benefit of all the people.77  
In Sloup v. Town of Islip, the court found that  
migratory marine fish are ferae naturae and are the property of the state.78  
In the People v. Chimbers the court stated that 
ownership of fish and game within the state is in its sovereign capacity and the 
state has general right to protect fish and game.79 
In 2000, a New York appellate court held that the state’s interest in protecting 
its wild animals is a legitimate basis for rejecting a “takings” claim for endangered 
species.80 The state’s sovereignty over wildlife that is not federal res publicae 
dominates any rights in wildlife that Native American nations may have in the state. In 
People v. Pierce, the New York court held that 
                                                 
75 Rockefeller v. LaMora, 83 N.Y. 289 (1903). 
76 In re Fishway, 115 N.Y. 745 (1909). 
77 Barrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423 (1917). 
78 Sloup v. Town of Isli, 356 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1974). 
79 People v. Chimber, 398 N.Y.S. 222 (1977). 
80 714 N.Y.S. 2d 78 (2000). 
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the Indians of the state are bound to obey the [NY State] game laws . . . 81 
Definitions in state wildlife law are critical to definition and assertion of res 
publicae in wildlife. The New York ECL provides the following definitions: 
“Fish” means all varieties of the super-class Pisces. 
“Fish protected by law” means fish protected, by law or by regulations of the 
department, by restrictions on open seasons or on size of fish that may be 
taken. 
“Game” is classified as (a) game birds; (b) big game; (c) small game. 
“Game birds” are classified as (1) migratory game birds and (2) upland game 
birds. 
“Migratory game birds” means the Anatidae or waterfowl, commonly known 
as geese, brant swans and river and sea ducks; the Rallidae, commonly known 
as rails, American coots, mud hens and gallinules; the Limicolae or shore 
birds, commonly known as woodcock, snipe, plover, surfbirds, sandpipers, 
tattlers and curlews; the Corvidae, commonly known as jays, crows and 
magpies. 
“Upland game birds” (Gallinae) means wild turkeys, grouse, pheasant, 
Hungarian or European gray-legged partridge, and quail. Grouse means ruffed 
grouse and every member of the grouse family. Pheasant means the ring-
necked, dark-necked, and mutant pheasants and all species and subspecies of 
the genus Phasianus . . .  
“Big Game” means deer, bear, moose, elk, except captive bred and raised 
North American elk (Cervus elaphus), caribou and antelope. 
“Small Game” means black, gray and fox squirrels, European hares, varying 
hares, cottontail rabbits, frogs, land turtles, box and wood turtles and the bog 
turtle (Clemmys muhlenbergi, coyotes, red fox (Vulpes vulpes) and gray fox 
(Urocyon cinereoargenteus) except captive bred red fox or gray fox, raccoon, 
opossum, or weasel, skunk, bobcat, lynx, muskrat, mink, except mink born in 
captivity, fisher, otter, beaver, sable, and marten but does not include coydogs. 
                                                 
81 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0307 (McKinney 1997). 
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“Wild game” means all game, except (a) domestic game bird and domestic 
game animal as defined in Subdivision 4 (below); (b) carcasses of foreign 
game as defined in Section 11-1717, imported from outside the U.S. and 
tagged as provided in section 11-1721; (c) game propagated or kept alive in 
captivity as provided in section 11-1907; (d) game imported alive pursuant to 
license of the department, or artificially propagated, until such game is 
liberated; and (e) game so imported or propagated when liberated for the 
purpose of a field trial and taken during the field trial for which it was 
liberated. 
“Domestic game bird” means ducks, geese, brant, swans, pheasants, quail, 
wild turkey, ruffed grouse, Chukar partridge and Hungarian or European gray-
legged partridge, propagated under a domestic game bird breeder’s license 
pursuant to section 11-1901 or a shooting preserve license pursuant to section 
11-1903 or propagated on a preserve or island outside the state under a law 
similar in principle to title 19 of this article. 
“Domestic game animal” means white-tailed deer propagated under a 
domestic game animal breeder’s license . . .  
“Unprotected wild birds” means the English sparrow and starling and also 
includes pigeons and psittacine existing in a wild state not domesticated. 
“Protected birds” means all wild birds except those named in paragraph a of 
this subdivision. 
“Wildlife” means wild game and all other animal life existing in a wild state 
except fish, shellfish and crustacea. 
“Wild bird” means birds which are “wildlife.” 
“Protected wildlife” means wild game, protected wild birds and endangered 
species of wildlife designated by the department pursuant to section 11-0535 
hereof or species listed in section three hundred fifty-eight of the agriculture 
and markets law. 
“Unprotected wildlife” means all wildlife which is not “protected wildlife.” 
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“Protected insect” means any insect with respect to the taking of which 
restrictions are imposed by the Fish and Wildlife Law or regulations of the 
department pursuant thereto.82 
Other sections of the NY ECL further define the state’s scope of rights in 
wildlife. 
The ECL exhibits federal sovereignty in wildlife in New York. The state will 
adopt rules and regulations in relation to migratory game birds consistent with the 
federal MBTA.83 It provides for the designation of “endangered” and “threatened” 
species, including those listed in the federal ESA, and prohibits the taking, 
importation, transportation, possession, or sale of any such species without a license or 
permit.84 
In addition, the ECL provides a mechanism for extending res publicae over 
select wildlife:  
the department shall have power to give to any wildlife or fish, other than 
migratory fish of the sea, protection or additional protection to that afforded by 
this article, if ten or more citizens file with the department a petition, a public 
hearing is held and the department determines that there is reason to adopt such 
protection, it may adopt such regulations.85 
The state’s rights are grantable to individuals. It may issue to any person a 
license revocable at its pleasure to collect or possess fish, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea, 
aquatic insects, bird’s nests or eggs for purposes of propagation, banding, science, or 
exhibition. Such license may require a fee of as much as $10, testimonials from two 
well-known persons, filing of a bond of $200, and submission of an annual report. 
This section also provides that the department may issue a similar license to possess 
                                                 
82 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0103 (McKinney 1997). 
83 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0307 (McKinney 1997). 
84 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0535 (McKinney 1997). 
85 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0311 (McKinney 1997). 
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and sell for the same purposes and that such license shall be in force for one year. 
Such wildlife may be sold at any time by the licensee.86 
The state may, at its discretion, issue a license or permit to take, transport, sell, 
import, and/or possess endangered or threatened fish or wildlife for purposes it deems 
legitimate.87 
The state follows federal CITES obligations by prohibiting the sale or offer for 
sale of the skin or body of a list of wild animals that includes several exotic species 
(e.g., snow leopard, crocodile, vicuna, kangaroo, Sumatran rhino, etc.).88 
In New York, all wild birds are res publicae except the starling, English 
sparrow, pigeon, and psittacines. The robbing or willful destroying of res publicae 
nests is prohibited without a permit. 
The state distinguishes between res publicae and res nullius biota in the ECL. 
Any unprotected wildlife may be taken, possessed, transported, bought, or sold 
without restriction at any time.89 The ECL also prescribes numerous rules for the 
possession, sale, and transport of a variety of wildlife. 
The state asserts a variety of interesting proprietary rights in somewhat obscure 
biota. For example, the ECL prohibits obstructing fish; setting bear or deer traps; 
preventing frogs access to water; robbing or willfully destroying nests of protected 
birds; disturbing beaver dams or muskrat houses without a permit; disturbing a 
nestbox or structure constructed to harbor wild birds; or taking, detaining, 
transporting, or possessing homing pigeons wearing a registration marker. 
Unprotected wildlife in New York include mammals (shrews, moles, bats [except the 
Indiana Bat], woodchuck, chipmunk, red squirrel, southern flying squirrel, northern 
                                                 
86 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0515 (McKinney 1997). 
87 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0535 (McKinney 1997). 
88 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0536 (McKinney 1997). 
89 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0917 (McKinney 1997). 
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flying squirrel, mice, rats, voles and porcupines); all reptiles (except wood and box 
turtles and all marine turtles); and all amphibians (except frogs). 
Whole specimens of controlled wildlife lawfully taken may be possessed, 
transported, bought, or sold. However, no person may possess any live beaver, otter, 
mink, muskrat, raccoon, red fox, gray fox, skunk, coyote, fisher, bobcat, opossum, 
weasel, marten, or other protected species other than pursuant to a license to collect, 
possess, or sell for propagation, scientific, or exhibition purposes.90 The head, skin or 
hide, fur, and feet of legally taken game and wildlife, except birds, may be bought, 
sold, imported, or transported without license or permit. No domestic duck, goose, 
brant, or swan killed by shooting shall be bought or sold unless marked by having had 
the hind toe of the right foot removed.91 
However, the state’s control over legally possessed res publicae wildlife is 
demonstrated in the prohibition of sale, offer for sale, or possession for sale for food 
purposes of any dead bodies of birds belonging to all species or subspecies native to 
the state.92 
The state’s rights in wildlife are confined by private-land property rights. The 
ECL provides that no license, permit, or stamp for the hunting, fishing, or collecting of 
fish, wildlife, or game authorizes the holder to trespass on private lands or water or to 
interfere with another’s property, to take from Indian reservations, to enter upon or to 
take or disturb fish or wildlife on state lands/water without permit or order, or to take 
fish, wildlife, or game from any closed area.93  
The state defines when, where, and how any of the state’s wildlife may be 
possessed. The ECL prescribes the open hunting season, bag limits for all state 
                                                 
90 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-1705 (McKinney 1997). 
91 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-1723 (McKinney 1997). 
92 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-1707 (McKinney 1997). 
93 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 §§ 11-0703, 11-0705 (McKinney 1997). 
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game,94 and the scope of legal trapping.95 This law also allows landowners to hunt 
wildlife on their land (except deer and bear) and to trap bobcat, coyote, fox, mink, 
muskrat, raccoon, opossum, weasel, skunk, and unprotected wildlife.96 
The state governs the possession, transportation, and sale of all fish taken in 
the state. There are no restrictions on the disposition of fish taken legally. Fish taken 
illegally may not be possessed, sold, or transported. However, trout, Atlantic salmon, 
black bass, walleye, and muskellunge may not be bought or sold, even if taken 
legally.97 
                                                 
94 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 §§11-0903, 11-0905, 11-0907, 11-0909, 11-0911 (McKinney 1997). 
95 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 §§ 11-1101 thr. 11-1109 (McKinney 1997). 
96 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-0713 (McKinney 1997). 
97 N.Y. Env. Con. Law, art. 11 § 11-1319 (McKinney 1997). 
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CHAPTER 5: 
IDENTIFYING AND CHARACTERIZING THE RELATION BETWEEN 
PATENTS AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
5.1 Analyzing the Relation between Patent and Wildlife Conservation Laws 
The detailed reviews of patent and wildlife conservation laws in Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4 make it clear that these laws have been developed for entirely different 
purposes. Patent law fosters technological progress, whereas wildlife conservation law 
protects wildlife resources. Not surprisingly, these bodies of law evolved in entirely 
separate legal and policy realms. But are they parallel, or do they intersect at one or 
more meaningful points? That is, are they orthogonal?  
Chapter 2 demonstrates that statutory patent law contains no reference to 
wildlife or wildlife law. Similarly, Chapters 3 and 4 show that federal and state 
wildlife conservation laws make no reference to inventions, patents, or patenting 
activity. Thus, at an explicit, superficial level, there is no intersection of these laws. 
However, the issued U.S. patents on inventions made from wildlife (some listed in 
Table 1.1) are evidence of an obvious, practical linkage: U.S. patent law 
accommodates the use of wildlife to acquire intellectual property. But, conversely, 
does U.S. patent law ignore wildlife conservation law?  
Under U.S. patent law, as long as the statutory criteria of patentability are 
satisfied, “everything under the sun made by man is patentable.”1 These criteria—
novelty, nonobviousness, and utility—have absolutely no relation, however, to 
wildlife law. Patents are strictly limited by the rules of patentability. Courts have held 
that a patent may be invalidated by reason of criminal acts, but only if through such 
acts the patent applicant fails to disclose information relevant to patentability or 
submits false information to the patent office with an intent to deceive, and only if 
                                                 
1 Chakrabarty v. Diamond, 1005 ct.2204 (1980). 
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such information would have been material to patentability.2 As long as the rules of 
patentability are met on an invention, a patent will be issued regardless of whether 
other laws are broken in the process of inventing and patenting (U.S. Code, Title 35). 
Thus, violating wildlife law in the course of inventing and patenting is irrelevant to 
patent issuance and validity as long as the criminal activity is not directly relevant to 
patentability.  
Since the patent confers the right to stop others from use, a very direct linkage 
between patents and wildlife conservation law could exist if wild organisms per se 
were patentable. This would create overlapping and conflicting rights of possession 
and use in the same specimen—some arising from the patent, others from res publicae 
rights of conservation law. In this context, it is useful to examine the patentability of 
wildlife per se.  
Patents have never been issued on whole creatures except for microbes. And 
there is no evidence that any attempt has ever been made to apply for a patent on a 
multicellular wildlife species. However, it is not legally impossible (Rohrbaugh, 1997; 
Cooper, 2000) that such patents could be issued in the future. This is unlikely, 
however, given the long history of the “product of nature” doctrine, difficulty in 
meeting the nonobviousness patent criterion, and the questionable market value of 
such patents. Microbes are clearly the exception.  
In patent litigations, courts have considered pure cultures of single-celled 
organisms to be more akin to human-made chemicals than to wildlife.3 Patent rights 
may be acquired on a pure culture of a microbial species that satisfies the patentability 
criteria. There are many U.S. patents on such cultures of prokaryotes and eukaryotes, 
including bacteria, yeast, fungi, and algae. While the issuing of such patents presents a 
                                                 
2 Regents of U. of Calif. v. Eli Lilly and Company, U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 96-1175, 
7/22/1997. 
3 Ex parte Bergy 197 USPQ. 78 (POBA 1976). 
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potential clash between private patents and public wildlife, this conflict is averted 
because species-based state and federal wildlife conservation law does not cover 
microbes (Bean and Rowland, 1997). However, the potential for conflict between 
private patents and res publicae biota does exist for microbes on governmental 
property. Unless the government controls the taking of soil and other wildlife-
containing environmental samples from governmental property, a private intellectual-
property right can be established on biota in those samples that would otherwise be res 
publicae by ratione soli. A patent holder in this situation would have the exclusive 
right to stop others (including the government) from making, using, or selling pure 
cultures of that organism. Of course, the patentee’s rights extend only to pure cultures 
and not to the patented organism in its natural environment, as in a microbial mixture. 
Nonetheless, the public’s rights in the res publicae biota will have been diminished, 
particularly with regard to shares of commercial return from the patent and access to 
technological use of the organism’s genome. In addition to the problem of the 
uncompensated privatizing of the public domain, this scenario presents a market 
failure in which resource beneficiaries (patentees) do not pay for maintenance of the 
resource. Physical possession of a specimen is pivotal in this dynamic. The 
government could assert a public-property right in microbiota collected from 
governmental land or water property, and could preclude or regulate private patent 
rights to require a public sharing of the private benefits that flow from any 
technological value from such biota.  
As described above, the direct conflict between private patents and public 
wildlife has been limited to microbes. However, because of their patentability, in 
theory there is no reason why a wild, higher organism could not meet the test for 
patentability (Cooper, 2000), and existing patents on naturally occurring mutant 
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animals4 support this premise. Rohrbaugh (1997) explores the legal theory of this 
possibility in a discussion of the patentability of extinct animals resurrected 
biotechnologically.  
Patent law veers closer to an intersection with wildlife law in the “product of 
nature” doctrine. Cooper (2000) points out that courts have rejected patents on 
inventions that are “products of nature,” although there is no basis for such a rejection 
in the patent statute. Cooper posits that there is no reason, a priori, that a newly 
discovered, non-microbial species that satisfies the statutory requirements of 
patentability could not be patented. Given the tenuous distinction between microbial 
and non-microbial in the Bergy cases, there seems to be a basis for such arguments. It 
is theoretically possible, then, that a patent could be issued on an organism per se and 
that the organism is also covered by wildlife law. 
Patent law and the procedures for acquiring a patent are statutorily unfettered 
by wildlife law. Let us examine wildlife law and its relation to patents. Table 1.1 
demonstrates that U.S. patent law allows the creation of intellectual property on 
inventions made from wildlife. Based on the species listed in the table, it appears that 
patents can be obtained from governmental (res publicae), non-controlled (res 
nullius), and privately held (res privatae) taxa. Do wildlife conservation laws provide 
control over a patent process that involves wildlife? It is logical to suspect that they 
might. After all, patenting is a market-related activity, and a primary purpose of 
wildlife conservation law is to control the use of wildlife, especially by the market. 
Chapters 3 and 4 reveal that federal and state wildlife conservation laws 
contain no explicit control of the patent process or of the patents the process yields. 
Wildlife laws, on the other hand, are replete with strictures on wildlife possession and 
use. And these laws assert governmental control over possession of explicitly listed 
                                                 
4 U.S. Patent No. 6,316,691 “Atrichia mouse,” issued to Kondo et al. 
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protected wildlife specimens and of those on federal or state land (Bean and Rowland, 
1997). However, this governmental authority does not extend to patents obtained from 
legally possessed biota. Under existing federal and state law, anyone possessing a 
specimen of public wildlife is free to invent patentable subject matter using that 
specimen. No federal or state law that I have examined explicitly prohibits or 
otherwise controls the act of filing for patents on a biotechnological utility from res 
publicae wildlife (Musgrave and Stein, 1993; Bean and Rowland, 1997). Once a 
governmentally controlled wildlife specimen is legally possessed under federal or state 
law, these laws provide no control of patent activity with that specimen. And because 
the patent process is unfettered by wildlife conservation law, this lack of control also 
applies to specimens that are illegally possessed. Thus, wildlife conservation laws 
provide no governmental rights in the ownership or financial benefits of any patents 
obtained from legally or illegally possessed wildlife (Bean and Rowland, 1997).  
There is clearly a property firewall between patents and tangible property in 
wildlife.  
The lack of a legal linkage between patents on inventions made from legally or 
illegally possessed wildlife confirms the parallel relation of patent and wildlife laws. 
This parallel configuration means, first, that wildlife conservation law does not 
provide governmental control over patent rights obtained from legally possessed 
public wildlife. But the lack of intersection between wildlife law and patents obtained 
from wildlife possessed in violation of wildlife law is even more serious.  
Let us examine, in detail, how wildlife-law restrictions on the possession and 
use of specimens fails to link to patents obtained by breaking such laws. The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), the most restrictive of the federal biological 
conversation laws, is a logical test. 
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The ESA prohibits the physical possession of public specimens except by 
permit.5 Permits for legal specimen possession may be obtained for purposes of 
propagation for species survival, scientific research, and incidental taking. Any 
commercialization of a specimen, or a part thereof, of a listed species is a violation of 
the ESA. The ESA prohibition on possession without a permit precludes the 
acquisition of private property in tangible matter and thereby, to some extent, prevents 
patentable inventions. So, to the extent the ESA controls specimen possession, the law 
controls access to patentable inventions from ESA species. However, the ESA 
contains no explicit prohibition on filing patent applications on an invention made 
using a legally possessed specimen or its parts. Thus, if a specimen of an ESA species 
is legally possessed, the ESA does not control the acquisition of private intellectual 
property obtained through that possession. Why does this situation arise? It does so 
because although the ESA controls the commercialization of tangible specimens, a 
patent application and a patent contain only intangible information. That is, unless the 
act of inventing or filing a patent application can be considered a “commercialization” 
of a tangible specimen, anyone who obtains an ESA permit for possession of a public 
specimen can acquire private intellectual property in an invention from that specimen, 
without obligation to the public (i.e., the government). 
Under the ESA, if a specimen is possessed illegally, the federal government is 
empowered to confiscate it and to levy significant penalties, demonstrating 
governmental control over tangible, biological material. But what if a patentable 
invention is made from the illegally held specimen before it is confiscated? As 
described earlier, violating the ESA in order to obtain a U.S. patent has no effect on 
the validity of that patent. The ESA does not clarify whether the government might 
have some rights in such a patent. Because such situations have not yet arisen, it is 
                                                 
5 This includes the taking of tissue samples. 
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unclear how the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the agency responsible for enforcing 
the ESA, might respond or how courts might decide. However, it is logical to 
conjecture that patent ownership could be clouded by the “inequitable conduct” rule of 
U.S. patent law. Therefore, while the filing of a patent application per se is not a 
violation of the ESA, the inequitable conduct rule could provide a basis for a court to 
confiscate the patent from the ESA violator.  
A proposed change in European patent law would eliminate this kind of 
disconnect between laws governing wildlife and those governing intellectual property 
(Williams, 1997). The proposal would require European patent applicants to submit an 
affidavit that the subject matter of their application was obtained from biological 
material collected and possessed legally and with the consent of the rightful owner or 
an entity with legitimate rights of possession. 
The Lacey Act represents another test of the relationship of patent and 
conservation law. The Lacey Act is a broad and powerful federal biological 
conservation law. It makes a federal crime of interstate commerce in wildlife (or its 
parts) taken or possessed in contradiction of any state or foreign law. Despite this 
sweeping power, the Lacey Act fails to provide control of patent rights obtained from 
illegally held wildlife, because the event that triggers the Lacey Act is the introduction 
into interstate commerce of something tangible: A patent application contains only 
intangible information. However, if a state or a foreign government were to enact a 
law prohibiting the use of its wildlife for inventing or patent filing, the Lacey Act 
would represent an important shift in the relation of patent and conservation laws. This 
shift would be toward a violation of wildlife law, not patent law. As with the violation 
of the ESA described earlier, violating the Lacey Act in the process of inventing and 
patenting would have no effect on patent validity but might cloud issues of ownership.  
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I have established that patent and wildlife conservation laws are orthogonal. 
That is, they are entirely independent but intersect at a point. That point of intersection 
is the physical possession of specimens. The physical possession of a specimen is 
necessary to make a patentable invention, and the control of the possession of 
specimens is a basic tenet of wildlife conservation law. A right in the possession of 
tangible property is the nexus of patents and conservation. 
5.2 The Orthogonal Intersection of Patents and Wildlife: Tangible Property 
and Conservation Law 
Tangible property in wildlife specimens, including individuals or groups (e.g., 
a hive of bees), whole organisms, or their parts and by-products, is the intersection of 
patent and wildlife biological conservation law. Svarstad et al. (2000) correctly point 
out that the focal issue is the right to possess and use tangible wildlife material, not the 
patent right. Wildlife conservation law defines the rules of possession for public (res 
publicae) wildlife. All other wildlife are either private property (res privatae) (e.g., 
wild plants rooted on private land or legally captured specimens) or res nullius. 
Private-property specimens produce private patent property. And, since res nullius 
wildlife may be readily converted into private property through capture, patent 
property made from that property is also private property. 
The scope of the rules defining the possession and use of public wildlife varies 
significantly, from strict public-property assertions as in the federal ESA to more lax 
assertions found in state fish and game laws (Musgrave and Stein, 1993; Bean and 
Rowland, 1997). For example, while the ESA prohibits the private possession of an 
ESA-listed species except under rarely used and strict provisions, state fish-and-game 
laws encourage some types of possession, albeit with typical constraints on methods 
and timing of capture and use. However, regardless of the extent of a public-property 
assertion, all current federal and state wildlife conservation law asserts governmental 
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control over tangible specimens only. The creation of intangible private patent 
property from wildlife specimens falls outside the purview of all existing federal and 
state wildlife law, even the most stringent. However, the doctrine of “unclean hands” 
could provide a bridge between patent and conservation law (Koopman, 2005). 
There are important distinctions between patent and tangible (i.e., personal) 
property rights. Personal-property rights include the right to exclusive physical 
possession. Patent rights do not include this exclusive possessory right (U.S. Code, 
Title 35). The patent owner holds only the right to preclude others from making, 
selling, using, or importing the patented subject matter. The patent does not grant the 
right to preclude possession. For example, if Party A holds a patent on enzyme X, 
purified from a wildlife specimen, and Party B (legally or not) possesses a vial of pure 
enzyme X, Party A cannot compel Party B to relinquish possession of the vial; Party A 
can only stop Party B from making, selling, using, or importing enzyme X. Certainly, 
prohibiting the making, selling, or using of enzyme X effectively controls Party B’s 
privileges and benefits of possession, but it does not dominate pure possession. 
Conversely, if Party B transfers possession of its vial of enzyme X to Party A but not 
ownership (i.e., a bailment), Party B may legally compel Party A to relinquish this 
personal property on demand despite Party A’s patent right on the enzyme. So, in 
some instances, personal-property rights can dominate patent rights. This dominance 
is strengthened by the fact that personal-property rights are essentially perpetual, while 
patent rights are limited by time.  
Even though there may be an overlap of private patent rights and public rights 
in a public species, this dichotomous relation of patent versus personal-property rights 
remains. Even if a microbe is patented, which is permissible as described in Chapter 2, 
the patent right does not dominate a personal-property right in a test tube of a pure 
culture of the organism. And the microbe-patent owner has no control over the 
156 
organism in its natural habitat. Furthermore, holding a patent right on a material or 
method obtained from a wildlife specimen does not grant the patentee any personal-
property rights in the intact organism per se (Bent et al., 1987; Cooper, 2000). 
Since physical possession is the intersection of patent and wildlife 
conservation law and because physical possession of a wildlife specimen intersects 
with real estate law through trespass law, a landowner’s right to control access to 
wildlife on his or her land creates an important link in the relationship between patents 
and wildlife conservation law. 
5.3 The Special Case of Collections 
A natural outcome of the fact that tangible property possession is the link 
between wildlife law and patents is the importance of collections. Parry (2004) has 
described the conservation and economic implications of collections of wildlife such 
as those in museums, zoos, and private menageries. She correctly points out the 
importance of the appropriate management of rights of possession and also how 
disconnects can arise between tangible property and the intangible intellectual 
property she terms “bio-information.” Although Parry correctly notes the importance 
of collections in the patent-versus-wildlife dynamic, she does not understand that 
linkages can be made between the tangible and intangible domains. 
Collections will present one of the most interesting and complicated areas for 
implementing the property links. Making such links may be easier in collections than 
in ecosystems and may provide the best opportunity to see effective use of property 
management to effect potential benefits for conservation. 
5.4 The Linkage Between Trespass Law and Property Rights in Wildlife 
Because physical possession is the nexus of patent and wildlife conservation 
law, the right to control a possessor’s ability to possess is a salient factor. Trespass law 
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empowers owners of real property to restrict others from access to their property 
(Dukeminier, 2002). This right of exclusive possession in private land confers a de 
facto, private-property right in wildlife located in situ on that land by the right to 
control access. This de facto property right created by access control is assertable over 
private, res nullius, and, to a large extent, public wildlife on a landowner’s land.  
Trespass law developed over many years, with traditional exceptions made for 
hunting, trapping, and fishing (Tober, 1981). Such exemptions for wildlife-takers have 
gradually disappeared. At present, real-property owners hold strongly enforceable 
rights of access by any party, including government. 
It is an open question whether a property right in a wildlife specimen in situ on 
land is dominated by the landowner’s right to preclude trespass (Hawaii Audubon 
Society v. Lujan, No 91-00191 D. Hawaii; Dukeminier, 2002). However, it is clear that 
breaking trespass law (and thus violating the landowner’s rights) must occur prior to 
possession of a wildlife specimen located on that land. Without access to the land, 
there can be no possession, and without possession, creation of intellectual property 
from in situ wildlife is not possible. Such landowner rights can be used by a 
landowner to contractually bind those who are given right of access to the land and the 
wildlife found there. This can extend the landowner’s control of such wildlife beyond 
the confines of the real property. However, a landowner’s rights in wildlife on the 
property do not extend to wildlife that have left the premises voluntarily. So, for 
example, while a res nullius dragonfly is on the property, a landowner has the right to 
capture (unless it is public wildlife) and a trespass-related exclusory right to the 
dragonfly. However, once the dragonfly leaves the premises, these landowner rights 
extinguish. Also, the rights of a landowner in resident wildlife may be diminished by 
unauthorized possessions of wildlife taken from the land by others. For example, if 
Party A, which has, by contractual agreement with a landowner, taken certain wildlife 
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specimens from the landowner’s property, then loses possession of that material to a 
third party unauthorized to possess by the landowner, the authority of the landowner 
and Party A to assert rights in the wildlife may be diminished. And while a 
landowner’s trespass-based, de facto personal property in wildlife probably dominates 
governmental rights of possession in public wildlife specimens on private land, 
governmental rights in the specimens dominate when the wildlife is physically 
possessed, whether on or off that land, by the landowner or anyone else.  
The juxtaposition of private quasi-property right in specimens derived from 
trespass law and governmental rights in transient wildlife defines the dynamic tension 
between private right and public good. This tension is exemplified in the ESA 
treatment of endangered plant species growing on private land. Such plants rooted and 
growing on private land are private property, but with public-property attributes 
created through government-enforced restrictions on malicious destruction and entry 
into commerce. Similar examples of the juxtaposition of governmental rights in public 
wildlife and private land rights can be found in the cases Sweet Home v. Babbit6 and 
Hawaii Audubon Society v. Lujan.7 In Sweet Home, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
governmental rights in federal res publicae wildlife (as defined in the ESA) supersede 
private land rights. In Hawaii Audubon Society v. Lujan, the plaintiffs sued the federal 
government to force it to assert a dominant public-property right in specimens of an 
endangered species over the private right to preclude trespass (Bean and Rowland, 
1997). Unfortunately, the case was settled out of court, and the court did not resolve 
the dichotomy of rights in this case. 
The interplay of property rights in wildlife creates a complex mosaic, 
described below. 
                                                 
6 115 S. Ct 2407, 132 L. Ed. 2d 597, 63 USLW 4665, 40 ERC 1897, 25. 
7 No 91-00191. 
159 
5.5 The Mosaic of Property Rights in Wildlife 
Table 5.1 defines a property-regime framework for whole, free-roaming, and 
captured wildlife, their parts, and derived patents as a function of a property-regime 
type. The table defines the basic property type and shows that free-roaming, whole 
wildlife is encompassed by three property-regime types. The table also shows that 
once such wildlife has been captured, property in free-roaming wildlife shifts from 
simple categorization to more complex amalgams of the basic property regimes. While 
res nullius wildlife becomes purely private on capture, within public wildlife, 
possession results in property mixtures. For example, under the ESA, Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA), and Eagle Protection Act, physical specimens of captured 
wildlife remain purely public. However, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) 
exhibits a commingling of public and private biota-property rights. This commingling 
arises from provisions that allow the private possession of whole organisms through 
permitted hunting, temporary possession via a bander’s permit, and unfettered 
acquisition of private property in tissues from such legally possessed biota.  
State fish and game law (as exemplified by New York State law ECL-90) 
creates similar mosaics of governmental and private rights in physical specimens of 
free and captured wildlife and their parts.  
Once a free-roaming wildlife specimen is legally reduced to private possession, 
whether through a governmental permit or because there is no governmental control of 
the specimen, the private possessor has an unfettered right to acquire private 
intellectual property in a biotechnological utility obtained from that possessed 
specimen.  
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Table 5.1. Property Type in Free-Roaming and Captured Whole Organisms of 
Wildlife, Their Parts, and Derived Patents as a Function of Property-Regime Taxon. 
Property regime type 
Free-roaming, 
whole organism 
Captured, whole 
organism 
Parts of 
organism 
Patent rights 
from organism 
Res publicae–federal  
Endangered Species Act res publicae res publicae res publicae res privatae 
Eagle Protection Act, 
Marine Mammal Protection 
Act 
res publicae res publicae res publicae res privatae 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act res publicae res publicae & 
 res privatae 
res publicae & 
res privatae 
res privatae 
Res publicae–state  
NY State Fish & Game  
Law (ECL90) 
res publicae res publicae &  
res privatae 
res publicae & 
res privatae 
res privatae 
Res nullius res nullius res privatae res privatae res privatae 
Res privatae res privatae res privatae res privatae res privatae 
 
The dynamic transformation of property rights in wildlife by the various 
relevant factors is exemplified in the following scenario: A free-roaming wild deer is 
controlled by the state government, which requires a hunting license to obtain 
possession. In this condition, the deer is publicly “owned” parens patriae by the 
government in trust for the public. If applicable law does not prohibit the acquisition 
of a tissue sample during legal and temporary possession, the sample is private, and 
potential biotechnology utilities from that sample are res nullius until captured (i.e., 
discovered). When a licensed, private hunter takes possession of the deer by killing,8 
the whole specimen is private.9 However, states often place use restrictions on the 
privately owned carcass of the once free-roaming public wildlife. For example, sales 
of animal parts are often restricted.10 So, although the carcass is mostly private, 
because of these restrictions it also remains partially public. The now-harvested, 
                                                 
8 State fish and game law usually requires killing as a prerequisite to possession. 
9 There are minor rights still held by the government (i.e., government tags must be affixed). 
10 For example, see NY State law ECL-90, which prohibits the sale of bear “flesh” and game birds. 
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mostly res privatae deer carcass contains a biotechnological utility that, because it 
remains undiscovered, is res nullius. If the private possessor of the deer carcass 
discovers (or contractually allows another to discover) a tangible biotechnological 
utility (e.g., a useful cell line), that tangible property is private upon discovery. 
Similarly, if the carcass possessor obtains a patent on an invention made using the 
carcass, the intellectual property is private. 
5.6 Private Versus Public Property Rights in Wildlife 
Table 5.2 defines the complicated relation of governmental versus private 
property rights and liabilities in free-roaming and legally captured public wildlife. 
This table describes the several rights that encompass property ownership. In free-
roaming governmental wildlife, there are no privately held rights or liabilities; the 
government holds most, but not all, of these rights. Except where stipulated by statute, 
the government does not hold the same right to consume, waste, or destroy as in 
private property. However, unlike private entities, the government has no liability 
connected to its parens patriae rights in wildlife. This lack of property-related liability 
is a defining characteristic of the parens patriae governmental right. For specimens of 
public wildlife that are legally captured by private individuals, most (but not all) of the 
personal-property rights are privately held. For example, the right to receive income 
from the captured property is not conveyed by the government in the transfer of rights 
of possession to the individual. Such prohibitions on market transactions are a 
hallmark of public wildlife (Lund, 1980; Tober, 1981; Bean and Rowland, 1997). 
Rights of use in many privately captured public wildlife are jointly held, because the 
private holder cannot sell the carcass or its parts, and the government retains the right 
to restrict use of the carcass. However, there is a domain of wildlife possession by 
private possessors in which the government retains no rights restriction. Once private 
possessors have physical possession, they have an unfettered right to invent with the 
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carcass or its parts. The unfettered right to use privately possessed public wildlife for 
the discovery of biotechnological utilities is critical to the relation of intellectual 
property and wildlife law. 
Table 5.2. Governmental and Private Property Rights in Free-Roaming and Legally 
Captured Res Publicae Wildlife. 
Res publicae wildlife 
Free-roaming Legally captured 
Property right Government Private Government Private 
Physical possession yes no no yes 
Use yes no yes yes 
Manage yes no yes yes 
Income yes no no no* 
Consumption no no no yes 
Waste, destroy no no no yes 
Security yes no no yes 
Transmission yes no no yes 
Absence of term yes no no yes 
Liability no no no yes 
* Some state laws allow the sale of some portions of legally captured specimens. 
5.7 Specific Patents from Wildlife 
Table 1.1 lists some U.S. patents that claim inventions made using various 
wildlife species. These patents were uncovered by keyword searching of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office Web-based database. Keywords used included common 
wildlife names and Latin binomials. The use of the wildlife specimen in the act of 
invention was confirmed by reading the body of the patent, which describes the 
invention-making protocol. 
Given the methodology employed to identify these patents, Table 1.1 is neither 
comprehensive nor exhaustive. It serves only to confirm the existence of the linkage 
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between the possession and use of wildlife and U.S. patent rights and exemplifies the 
range of types of inventions and wildlife involved. 
The next level of analysis would be to determine, with each issued patent, the 
conditions under which the inventor possessed and used the wildlife specimen. For 
example, did possession require approval from a governmental body or a private 
entity? If approval was required, was it obtained, and under what terms and 
conditions? Did these terms and conditions create any linkage between the approving 
entity and patent rights? 
This level of analysis is beyond the scope of this work but is contemplated as a 
logical next step in the analysis initiated here.   
5.8 Detailed Characterization of the Orthogonal Relation of Biological 
Conservation Law and Patents 
Now that the orthogonality of patent law and wildlife conservation law has 
been established, it is appropriate to characterize this intersection. Specific situations, 
either real or hypothetical, can be used to probe where these two bodies of law 
intersect. Such situations are used below to more fully characterize this orthogonal 
relationship. 
A hypothetical situation in which patents are issued on inventions made by 
possessing a federal endangered species presents interesting questions. Under the 
ESA, the Secretary of the Interior has authority to grant permits for the private 
possession of specimens of listed species for scientific purposes and for enhancing the 
survival of the species. Would the filing of patents on biotechnological inventions 
made with an ESA creature possessed under a scientific permit be allowed by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, or would it be considered a prohibited commercial purpose?  
The ESA does not explicitly prohibit inventing nor the act of preparing a patent 
application. However, the filing of a patent application could easily be construed as a 
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commercial purpose. But the ESA forbids the commercial use of tangible specimens, 
and a patent application contains only information. This would seem to weaken the 
argument that a patent filing is a commercial use of a specimen. On the other hand, the 
act of inventing, which does require a tangible specimen, is necessarily coupled to the 
act of patent-application filing, which could then be construed as a commercial use 
and thus prohibited. Of course, if a tangible specimen is publicly deposited, as is 
required for certain types of biotechnological inventions, this would much more 
clearly fall in the prohibited category. One may look to the intent of the ESA for some 
guidance in interpreting this ambiguity. Does the issuance of a patent on an invention 
made using an endangered species further the aims of the ESA? Would 
“bioprospecting” activities (Reid, 1993a) that include commercial returns for 
conservation purposes be permitted under the doctrine of “enhancement of species 
survival”? The ESA appears to grant the Secretary of the Interior the authority to 
allow the private possession of listed specimens by those whose intent could include 
the acquisition of patents from endangered species. This authorization would seem 
more justifiable if the commercial use of any such patents were to be linked, 
financially or otherwise, to “enhancement” (i.e., species survival). Without this 
linkage, such justification is lacking. The linkage and justification for allowing patent 
acquisition could be established if the Interior Secretary required that a royalty be paid 
on the commercial use of patents on inventions from listed species and if such monies 
were used for species conservation. Probing this potential link between patent and 
wildlife conservation law raises important policy questions. Should the federal or state 
governments take a proactive policy stance in which “inventing” rights in endangered 
species are licensed in exchange for financial consideration or some other obligation 
in keeping with the intent of the ESA? 
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The MBTA presents another useful situation to probe the intersection of 
wildlife law and potential patents. The MBTA prohibits the possession of specimens 
of all listed species, with limited exceptions for permitted possession for hunting or 
scientific purposes. Through capture, under a hunting license, a tangible MBTA 
specimen is transformed from public to private. However, the potentially patentable 
inventions of the specimen remain res nullius. As with the ESA, it is not clear whether 
the MBTA allows the acquisition of patents or their commercial use under scientific-
use permits.  
The MBTA exhibits an important lacuna in the governmental control of public 
wildlife. This particular biota-property loophole in the MBTA exemplifies the 
systemic failure of federal and state law to assert public rights in inventions from the 
nation’s public wildlife. This loophole results from the MBTA allowance of the 
private possession of biota tissue samples legally obtained by a private collector under 
an MBTA bird-banding permit. The MBTA allows a permittee to acquire unfettered 
property rights in tissue samples from governmentally protected wild birds. By 
allowing the permittee to own the tangible sample, the government has lost control 
over tangible biotechnological utilities as well as future patentable inventions from 
these wild birds. 
Like the ESA, the Marine Mammal and Eagle protection acts assert strict 
control over tangible specimens but also exhibit the ESA’s lack of control over patents 
derived from those specimens. All other federal laws that govern public biota 
directly,11 or through federal land management, exhibit even less stringent control over 
free-roaming public wildlife and, of course, any patents that would arise from that 
wildlife. 
                                                 
11 For example, Magnuson Fisheries Act, Coastal Zone Act. 
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The little-known Lacey Act may play a critical role in the long-term 
management of the link between public wildlife and private patents. Certain 
provisions of the Lacey Act could act as an effective nexus of conservation and patent 
laws. This nexus is fundamental to the issue of governmental control over patentable 
biotechnological utilities from public wildlife. Depending on the interpretation of 
these critical provisions, the Lacey Act could serve as the essential legal instrument in 
regulating patents from public wildlife.  
Under the Lacey Act, it is a federal crime to introduce into interstate commerce 
a tangible specimen or “part thereof” of any wildlife obtained and possessed in 
contravention of any state or foreign law. This provision of the Lacey Act (and similar 
clauses in the ESA) raises a fundamental question of the intersection between state 
(and foreign) and federal biological conservation law and patent property: Does the 
filing of a patent application containing information on a DNA sequence, protein, cell 
(but not the tangible matter), or some other biotechnological utility from a specimen of 
wildlife taken contrary to state or foreign law constitute an introduction of the wildlife 
specimen or “part thereof” into interstate commerce? If so, the Lacey Act would 
provide blanket control over patents from state, federal, or foreign governmentally 
controlled wildlife. However, when one files a patent application on a gene, for 
example, the gene per se (i.e., the actual DNA oligonucleotide molecule) does not 
leave the laboratory. Only an informational representation of the gene (i.e., a DNA 
sequence of molecular symbols representations: A,G,T,C) crosses interstate lines and 
is filed in the patent office. Strictly speaking, then, a patent application does not enter 
a “part thereof” of a controlled wildlife specimen into commerce. Furthermore, it is 
not clear whether a patent application filing constitutes an introduction into interstate 
commerce. If the Lacey Act does not apply to patent application filings, it is further 
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evidence of the orthogonal relationship and represents a critical failure to couple 
patents and biological conservation law. 
State law controls the possession of most of the nation’s public wildlife. The 
overview of state wildlife law described in Chapter 4 indicates that state law is similar 
to federal law in its lack of governmental control over patents from public wildlife 
under state jurisdiction. The review of New York State wildlife conservation law 
ECL-90 in Chapter 4 confirms this.  
New York’s ECL-90 law demonstrates the essential orthogonality of state law 
to patent law. New York State law ECL-90 governs state-controlled wildlife. Under 
ECL-90, the state lists all species that are and that are not state-controlled. Controlled 
species include all fish and game and other species. Under ECL-90, the state controls 
the possession of all controlled species. ECL-90 contains a myriad of rules that 
constrain the use of privately possessed, state-controlled specimens. However, none of 
these rules constrain the acquisition of patentable subject matter.  
Even where New York law provides state control of wildlife, the penalty 
provisions can be so weak as to render the law ineffective. Under ECL-90, the cost of 
permits and penalties for illegal possession of certain species are much too low to 
provide meaningful control, especially over potentially high-value patent activity.  
5.9 Natural Resource Implications 
What are the implications of the orthogonality of patents and biological 
conservation law to natural resource economies? Because national and state law—and 
the policies they embody—do not assert governmental control over patentable 
inventions from public wildlife at the level of the physical possession of a specimen, 
all potentially patentable inventions in any wildlife are res nullius. Such inventions are 
available to be owned by capture. And, by patent law, they are ownable by the first 
capturer. 
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In the next chapter we will see that natural resource economics dictates that a 
scarce, res nullius natural resource that has utilitarian value is susceptible to market 
failure and potential destruction through a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1977) 
or similar process. Are all potentially patentable inventions from wildlife scarce? That 
depends first on whether the source organism is scarce. If it is, any patentable 
inventions of utility would also be scarce. But what about patentable inventions from 
creatures that are not scarce, such as gnats or biting flies? 
A basic premise of wildlife conservation law is that such law is generally 
designed to protect scarce wildlife. Thus, by extension, patentable inventions from 
scarce wildlife would also be scarce. 
It seems apparent that private entities are acquiring the physical possession of 
wildlife and creating patents from that wildlife for private gain. And since the linkage 
of patents and the law controlling public wildlife is orthogonal, government (and 
thereby, the public) has no direct means of mitigating potential market failure and 
destruction. 
Wild biodiversity continues to decline, by most measures (Perrings, 1995; 
Howe, 1997; Novacek, 2001). Conversely, the economic value of biotechnological 
inventions from wildlife is increasing. And because of the orthogonality that has been 
described, there is a failure to require beneficiaries of biotechnological inventions to 
pay their reasonable share of the cost of conservation. This is a failure of the market to 
develop the sustainable use of natural resources. In cases of past market failure, 
government has asserted res publicae control over a common resource in order to 
protect that resource for the public good. Given the existing situation with wildlife and 
patent law, it is logical to draw a parallel between Supreme Court Justice Holmes’s 
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statement about the necessity of governmental protection for wild birds for the public 
good and the current unfettered exploitation of wildlife for invention.12 
In the next chapter, I examine the resource economics of patentable inventions 
from wildlife and the implications of the orthogonality of patent and wildlife law. 
                                                 
12 Missouri v. Holland, 25, U.S., 416, 1920 
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CHAPTER 6: 
THE ORTHOGONALITY OF PATENT AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 
LAW AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
WILDLIFE RESOURCE 
6.1 Introduction 
It is clear that wildlife is the source of huge economic value in useful 
discoveries and that intellectual-property and traditional wildlife-property rules 
present new problems in natural resource economics (McLaughlin, 2003). In this 
chapter, I examine the natural resource economic implications of the orthogonality of 
patent and wildlife law. But to do so requires understanding the larger context of 
inventions from wildlife. 
Below, I summarize some fundamentals of wildlife economics and describe 
wildlife as a source of inventions. I elucidate the dual-property aspects of many such 
inventions (tangible and intellectual), which relate directly to the nexus of patent and 
wildlife law: the physical possession of specimens. This analysis also requires an 
understanding of the unique resource-economics character of wildlife inventions. 
I present an argument for and evidence of a market failure in the resource of 
inventions from wildlife. I critique certain current methods of economic valuation of 
invention in wildlife and propose an alternative. The overview I present of the political 
economy of inventions from wildlife is a preface for a discussion of a tragedy of the 
commons in these kinds of inventions. I describe an efficient property regime for the 
resource of wildlife inventions that leads to a revisiting of the conclusion of patent and 
wildlife law orthogonality. Finally, I define the public-policy problem that embodies 
these findings and develop some policy prescriptions. 
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6.2 Economics of Wildlife 
6.2.1 Historic Commerce in Wildlife 
Harvest of and trade in wildlife and their products has a long and far-ranging 
history (Roth and Merz, 1997; Freese, 1998). Local, regional, national, and global 
trade in wildlife commodities has included fisheries, timber, non-timber forest 
products, meat, and by-products such as skins, oil, ivory, and caviar. Other goods have 
included horns, feathers, organs (e.g., bear gall bladder, tiger penis), shells, and natural 
compounds from plants and microbes. The legal and illegal trade in living specimens 
for private collectors, for zoos, and as pets has long been significant. In addition, the 
economic value of biodiversity (Pimentel et al., 1997) and ecosystems (Costanza et al., 
1997) has also been estimated. The economic value of these goods is based on the 
direct consumption of the wildlife resource, and the economics of their exploitation is 
the domain of natural resource economics. 
6.2.2 Some Fundamentals of Resource Economics 
What is the domain of resource economics? Randall (1987) defines a resource 
as something that is useful and valuable in its natural condition. According to Randall, 
things that are unknown or for which no uses have been found are not resources 
because they have no value. And, if useful things are available in huge amounts 
relative to demand, they have no relative value and are, therefore, not resources. This 
is a traditional economic view that sidesteps questions of option value and uncertainty 
in resources and seems to fail to account for future discovery of value. For example, 
using Randall’s definition, the naturally occurring rare-earth element germanium was 
not a resource until semiconductor technology created a use for it. Many a “future 
resource” could be lost through failure to consider future value as part of the economic 
equation. Randall (1987) also requires scarcity as a criterion of a natural resource. This 
scarcity stipulation also suffers from a failure to account for future uncertainty.  
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Neoclassical economic theory is built on the simple idea that individual 
economic entities seek to maximize their welfare through the buying and selling of 
economic goods in a freely competitive market. Natural resource economics is the 
search for the welfare of individuals and society through the efficient maintenance, 
allocation, and distribution of natural resources, particularly through the production 
and consumption of commodities and the provision of resource stocks and waste sinks. 
Natural resource economics attempts to rationally determine efficient allocation of 
natural resources in the present and future and the distributional outcomes of such 
allocation decisions (Randall, 1987). The goal is optimal economic welfare of the 
individual and society. The premise of neoclassical economics and liberal democracy 
is that the well-being of society is promoted by individuals, each working in his or her 
economic self-interest, without coercion from others or from the state. 
Resource economics theory is anthropocentric utilitarianism (Randall, 1987; 
Common, 1996). The goal of classical Utilitarianism is to maximize the good (i.e., 
utility) for society, whereas neoclassical (Paretian) Utilitarianism seeks an economic 
equilibrium in which no act is sanctioned that renders someone worse off than before 
the act. Tisdell (1991) describes the basis of modern welfare resource economics as 
the Utilitarian notion that each individual obtains utility or measurable satisfaction 
from his or her consumption of commodities and that the use of society’s resources 
should maximize the sum of utility obtained by individuals. According to Tisdell 
(1991), modern resource economics is concerned with the social administration of 
scarce resources for the purpose of satisfying, to the maximum extent possible, human 
desire for commodities, whether necessities or not. 
A fundamental tenet of neoclassical Utilitarianism is Paretian welfare 
economics, which relies on individual preferences but avoids interpersonal 
comparisons of utility (Blaug, 1985). It is based on a system for utilizing resources 
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that is efficient in satisfying human wants. The “Pareto criterion” holds that human 
welfare is not at maximum if it is possible to make an individual better off without 
making another worse off. A “Pareto improvement” occurs when, as a result of a 
change in the use of resources, an individual is made better off without anyone being 
made worse off. A corollary to the Pareto welfare model is the “Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion” (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939), in which a potential Pareto improvement is 
sanctioned if “losers” can somehow be compensated. Randall (1987) describes a 
“Pareto-safety” situation in which the losers in a Kaldor-Hicks improvement obtain 
actual compensation.  
Randall (1987) describes a related broad economic policy tool, the “maximum 
social well-being” (MSW) model, which posits that MSW may exist anywhere on a 
social aggregate “grand utility frontier.” There are a great many ways to achieve an 
MSW on that frontier, and economists can identify policies that eliminate waste but 
cannot evaluate alternative, efficient solutions. 
The belief, championed by Adam Smith, that individual action by freely acting 
economic agents will result in a maximization of social well-being was challenged by 
Pigou (1940). Pigou held that some self-interested individuals will behave 
antagonistically toward the social good, particularly as a result of the negative 
externalities caused by these individuals’ actions, and that these externalities would 
violate “Pareto optimality” if uncontrolled. In large systems, government would 
intervene in the economy with fines or taxes that would bring the system into Pareto 
optimality. Coase (1960) responded by arguing that those negatively affected by 
externalities could alter the actions of externality producers via perfectly defined and 
enforced property rights and side payments and thus avoid the coercion and distortion 
of governmental intervention.  
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The following elements provide a basis for analyzing the economics of 
biotechnological utilities in wildlife. 
Scarcity means the amount available is limited relative to demand. While 
Randall’s (1987) premise that scarcity is a necessary characteristic of all resources is 
arguable, it is clear that non-scarcity renders economics superfluous. Intertemporal 
change in demand or supply can transform non-scarcity into a scarcity. For example, 
technical innovation can create demand where none existed, as with germanium. 
Conversely, supply may decrease below the level of demand, as occurred with the 
passenger pigeon and bison.  
In a market economy, any resource with a positive price must be scarce 
(Randall, 1987). However, some scarce resources are unpriced because there is no 
market to trade them. Endangered species are scarce, unpriced wildlife.  
Scarcity is fundamental to the model of a self-regulatory market efficiently 
rationing a resource. Underwood and King (1989) state that absolute economic 
scarcity will not exist because scarcity is relative and price signals will produce 
resource substitution. Substitutability is an economic answer to the extinction of 
wildlife (Solow, 1993), although this view is criticized on grounds of real 
biophysical/ecological constraints (Cleveland, 1991). 
Efficiency, the optimization of economic well-being of the individual and 
society, is a goal of welfare economics. Pareto welfare efficiency seeks economic 
optimality centered on individual human well-being. A Pareto-optimal economic 
system is efficient when there are no opportunities for costless improvement of human 
well-being. A market in which supply and demand reach equilibrium through price is 
the preferred means of arriving at efficiency (Randall, 1987; Common 1996). Implicit 
in the efficiency criterion is the monetization of all components of the economic 
equation. At the efficient point, net monetary benefits produced will be maximized. 
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The difference of all benefits and all private and external costs will be as large as 
possible at the efficient point. Stroup and Baden (1983) believe that increasing the 
economic “pie” is the essence of economic efficiency and is the only way to make 
everyone better off in the use of natural resources. Sources of market imperfection 
(e.g., public goods, common-pool resources, monopolies, and transaction costs) 
produce inefficiency of economic well-being. However, reaching points of economic 
efficiency does not guarantee socially desirable results (Sagoff, 1988). 
The intertemporal efficiency of resource allocation is fundamental to resource 
economics (Krutilla, 1967; Common, 1996). It is affected by the financial factors of 
saving, borrowing, interest rates, wealth, assets, capital, and discounting (Randall, 
1987). Norgaard and Howarth (1992) question reliance on an efficiency standard in 
which questions of intertemporal efficiency are framed as though the present 
generation holds all rights to resources. They describe the conflict between efficiency 
optimization based solely on the economic needs of the current generation and the 
economics of sustainability, which must include the welfare of future generations. 
Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is a framework for determining economic 
efficiency for a particular action. It organizes information to evaluate whether an 
action is a Pareto improvement. CBA hinges on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the 
equal treatment of all individuals. Some argue that CBA is limited because relief of 
pain or suffering, for example, should take precedence over pleasure promotion when 
evaluating competing costs and benefits (Randall, 1987). 
Intertemporal dynamics must be accommodated because economic systems 
change over time. Short-, medium-, and long-term change in supply and demand are 
affected by many factors, including those technological, ecological, and demographic. 
Intertemporal efficiency is particularly relevant to resource sustainability and 
intergenerational equity in resource allocation. 
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Individual preference, which is based on the classical Utilitarian philosophy 
of the maximization of individual well-being, is the desire of an economic agent to 
satisfy his or her well-being. Individual preference is fundamental to determining the 
economic efficiency point at which maximum well-being is achieved. Economists 
equate individual preference with individual utility; the willingness-to-pay model is a 
widely applied measure of such utility. But reliance on individual preference is 
confounded by complexities. For example, preference often deviates from utility-
theory models (Shogren and Nowell, 1992). Page (1983) claims that individual-
preference models are typically blind to complexity and that they incorrectly assume 
individuals have only one preference ordering. Tisdell (1991) believes such 
preferences are quite malleable and are strongly subject to societal institutions. Sagoff 
(1988) raises the confounding effects of external manipulation of preference by 
advertising. Kelso (1977) states that western institutions have channeled individual 
preference into consumption, production, and growth, and that this runs counter to 
resource sustainability in a world of finite resources and increasing population. 
Lehman (1995) points out fundamental flaws in the reliance on individual preferences, 
questioning the basic assumption that achieving one’s desires equates to improving the 
individual’s or society’s welfare. For example, satisfying a preference for drugs, 
alcohol, and sex may not enhance welfare. In addition, individual preference fails to 
account for preferences of future generations. 
Individual well-being and the Collective Good. Adam Smith’s theories are a 
basis for the belief that the aggregation of individuals’ economic well-being produces 
the greatest social good. In balance, Marshall and Marshall (1890) and Pigou (1912, 
1920) describe individual actions that counter social good and that create social costs 
that are the cause of externalities. 
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Externalities are economic effects that are beneficial or negative to entities 
other than those that created the effects. Externality per se is a broad concept in which 
the utility of one economic agent is affected by activity under the control of a different 
economic agent (Randall, 1987). Also called “spillovers,” externalities are costs or 
benefits that fall outside the market exchange. When included in the exchange, they 
are “internalities,” accounted for in the quid pro quo equation of all participants. Many 
minor externalities occur, but no one cares because they are not Pareto-relevant. 
Externalities create economic inefficiency and market failure. Property rights can link 
externality producers to those affected, which can internalize costs in the market 
exchange and mitigate the externality (Stroup and Baden, 1983; Randall 1987; 
Bromley, 1991; Tisdell, 1991). 
Natural-resource use has historically entailed significant negative externalities. 
Logging can create social cost as a result of stream-silting and habitat loss. 
Manufacturing creates pollution, and pesticide poisons aquifers. With biotechnological 
utilities, an externality will exist if a species is used up for a non-biotech utility use 
that would cost future biotechnological-utility discoveries. The Yellowstone–PCR 
case exemplifies such an externality. The cost of maintaining this wildlife is borne by 
the taxpayer, not by the beneficiaries (the inventors and exploiters of PCR). However, 
it could be argued that the externality is at least partially mitigated by the economic 
development enjoyed by the taxpayer. 
Rivalry is a physical, intrinsic property of a resource. It has nothing to do with 
institutional choice. Rival resources are those in which an individual’s consumption 
diminishes another’s ability to consume that resource. A fishery is a classic example 
of a rival resource. If a fish is caught, no one else can catch that fish. Consumption of 
a non-rival resource, on the other hand, does not diminish another’s opportunity for 
consumption. Consumption of sunlight does not affect anyone’s ability to consume 
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that sunshine. Examples of rival resources include groundwater, wildlife, oil, and 
timber. Non-rival resources include national defense and roads. Feeny et al. (1990) 
have pointed out that rivalry is the point of divergence between individual and 
collective economic rationality. 
Exclusivity, an intrinsic resource characteristic, dictates whether individuals 
may feasibly be excluded from access. Non-exclusivity may result where exclusion is 
impossible (e.g., clouds) or highly infeasible or prohibitively costly (e.g., open-ocean 
fish, all insects). Unlike rivalry, exclusivity can be institutionally created. For 
example, although it is difficult to physically exclude individuals from access to free-
roaming fish and wildlife, fish-and-game laws render this resource exclusive. When 
exclusivity is physically possible, specification of property rights in the resource 
becomes a political choice. For example, it is feasible to make exclusive a resource 
such as public education. However, in the United States, the political choice has been 
to make pre-college education a non-exclusive resource. 
Property rights are the mechanism of institutionalizing exclusivity, and the 
primary and most basic form of exclusivity is physical possession. Resource 
exclusivity requires definition, maintenance, and enforcement of a property right. 
Without exclusion, users cannot be kept from access, making it impossible to collect a 
price for use. Without exclusivity, price cannot ration use or provide revenue for 
sustaining a resource. So, non-exclusive resources are under-provided by markets, 
resulting in under-investment and economic inefficiency (Randall, 1987).  
In property-right terms, non-exclusivity is the res nullius regime, whereas 
exclusivity may be either res privatae, res publicae, or res communes. Economists 
tend to view res privatae as most conducive to efficient market dynamics and res 
publicae as a deviation from that ideal (Stroup and Baden, 1983). Randall (1987), 
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1975), Ostrom (1990), and Bromley (1991) all variously describe 
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res communes as a middle ground in which a group has exclusivity in a resource. This 
“group private property” regime, based on institutionalized rules of membership and 
resource access or use, does not have all the characteristics of non-attenuated private-
property rights but provides a workable system where res privatae is not feasible. 
Randall (1987) believes that even the most efficient res communes will not result in 
attainment of Pareto efficiency, but can produce “second best” solutions that will act 
to sustain long-term productivity, discourage waste, and also provide for satisfactory 
incomes. 
The Economic Taxonomy of Natural Resources provides a framework from 
which to distinguish and analyze different types of resources as economic goods and 
to define the socioeconomic implications of those distinctions. 
Renewable/Non-Renewable is a primary resource distinction. Non-renewable 
(or exhaustible) resources do not reproduce and can be used up. The theory of the 
mine (Tietenberg, 1988) exemplifies how potential exhaustion of non-renewable 
resources is a physical necessity that constrains resource use of this type. Potential 
exhaustion of renewable resources is not a physical necessity but is a function of a 
number of factors. Biological resources are a complex subset of renewable resources, 
characterized by their ability to auto-reproduce. Reproduction rate is a function of 
factors that can vary such that reproductivity may be great, small, or non-existent. 
Biological resources are renewable but destructible. 
The natural-resource taxonomy is further characterized by combinations of 
rivalry and exclusivity. 
Rival–Exclusive resources are readily provided by markets, and if suitable 
market dynamics exist, Pareto optimality is possible. Rival–res privatae resources 
(“private goods”) fall clearly into this category. Rival–res communes resources 
(“communal goods”) approach, but never reach, the capacity of rival–res privatae to 
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achieve Pareto optimality. According to Stroup and Baden (1983), Pareto optimality is 
not attainable for rival–res publicae resources (governed by the state because of 
market-system distortions) as a result of government bureaucrats’ lack of economic 
incentive, need for economic efficiency, and imperfect information, as well as politics, 
corruption, and inherent bureaucratic inefficiency.  
Rival–Non-Exclusive resources cannot be provided by markets because 
exclusion is not possible, payments cannot be collected, price loses meaning, and the 
demand–supply/price dynamic collapses. Some of these resources are res nullius, in 
which no exclusivity can exist because of the physical nature of the resource (e.g., 
global atmosphere). Others are practically res nullius because property rights are 
technically difficult to define and enforce (e.g., satellite orbits). Technology and/or 
institutional mechanisms can alter this economic taxon. For example, technology may 
enable imposition of exclusivity (e.g., enclosing the open range with barbed wire). A 
political choice may impose res publicae exclusivity on a resource (e.g., prohibition 
on possessing endangered species). Technology may enable an institutional choice to 
impose res publicae exclusivity (e.g., electromagnetic spectrum, groundwater). 
Although markets cannot provide rival–non-exclusive goods, such goods can be 
supplied by the public sector or through philanthropy (Randall, 1987). If exclusion is 
physically and economically feasible and res privatae is politically acceptable, 
markets can provide these goods in a potentially Pareto-efficient manner (Randall, 
1987). Where only res publicae is politically acceptable (e.g., radio frequency 
broadcast rights), government may offer these goods for fees, but this is only a 
facsimile of market-based, Pareto-optimal rationing. 
All rival–non-exclusive resources are susceptible to a “tragedy of the 
commons” (TOC). 
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Non-Rival–Exclusive. Exclusivity allows these to be provided by the market, 
but non-rivalry precludes Pareto optimality unless perfect, discriminatory pricing can 
be achieved (Randall, 1987). Government may provide such goods through a user-fee 
structure. Biotechnological utilities may fall into this category since the use of such 
utilities does not affect another’s ability to use the same material (Aylward, 1992).  
Non-Rival–Non-Exclusive resources (“pure public goods”) cannot be supplied 
by markets, only by philanthropy or government. Examples include national defense, 
roads, bridges, wilderness, and existence of wildlife. If exclusion becomes technically 
feasible, the resource may become non-rival–exclusive in which private markets (if 
politically acceptable) or government may provide, although with less than Pareto 
optimality. Baden (1998) points out exceptions to the non-rival–non-exclusive (public 
good) problem: in small groups, social pressure can compel self-imposed exclusivity 
and payments for use; if the private benefit of providing a public good exceeds the 
private cost, the public good will be provided privately. 
Congestible resources are non-rival up to a threshold of use at which 
congestion by users renders the resource effectively rival. Examples of congestible 
resources include bridges, airports, restaurants, public toilets, and the Internet.  
6.3 The Market: Supply, Demand, Price, and Equilibrium 
A cornerstone of economics is market function. An ideal market exists when 
providers and consumers freely engage in an equilibration of provider’s supply and 
consumer’s demand in a two-dimensional domain of price and quantity. The elegantly 
simple “market diagram” describes a demand curve that relates the quantity of a 
commodity produced to its price. As price rises, demand decreases, and supply 
increases. As quantity increases, demand decreases, and price drops. Equilibrium 
occurs when the price–quantity point is such that production equals demand. Price is 
the “signal” that rations goods among consumers, motivates (or demotivates) 
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producers, and directs the allocation of resources. Price is the mechanism that moves 
economies in the direction of efficiency. Baden (1998) extols the market as the ideal 
process for moving people voluntarily to coordinate their actions in allocating scarce 
resources efficiently since price effectively and efficiently coordinates rationing and is 
incentive-generating. 
Common (1996) defines the ideal market as requiring the following: an 
absence of externalities, an absence of public goods (or bads), consumers and 
producers with complete information, and producers and consumers that respond to 
price. Randall (1987) describes market imperfections that produce inefficiency: 
attenuated property rights producing non-exclusivity in resources and goods, including 
“public goods”; non-rivalry in resource use; congestible resources; monopolies; and 
externalities. 
The market diagram is anthropocentric, and market efficiency has little 
connection to inter- or intra-generational equity in resource allocation. Other 
limitations include failure to account for non-monetized values and future uncertainty. 
Value is fundamental to the economic equation. Valuation of a resource is 
essential to making economic choices. It is an organizing principle but has limitations, 
particularly in some natural resources (Daily et al., 2000). Traditional economics relies 
on market price as a valid indicator of value. This reliance is confounded when there is 
no market for a resource and when determining monetized value is difficult or 
practically impossible. Valuation is also constrained by the long time horizons of 
sustainable resource methodologies, uncertainty, and inter-generational equity. 
Economists have developed various sophisticated resource-valuation methods in this 
complex environment (Anderson and Bishop, 1986; Costanza, 1991, 2000). Valuation 
models such as “Travel-Cost,” “Hedonic-Price,” “Willingness-to-pay” and 
“Contingency-Valuation” exhibit more or less utility depending on the resource. Other 
183 
methods include “Bidding games,” “Payment Card,” “Duality/Cost Function,” 
“Producer-Optimization,” and “Household-Production.” These methods are 
intrinsically anthropocentric and intra-generation–limited, and, furthermore, 
externalities are frequently left out of such valuation models. Costanza (1991) 
describes an ecological dimension to resource valuation. Barbier (1992), Tisdell 
(1991), and Freese (1998) define a “Total Economic Value” of natural resources, 
composed of use and non-use values, with several components: 
Use Values 
• direct use (non-consumptive, such as access to genetic information; 
consumptive, such as fishing) 
• indirect use (carbon storage, waste removal) 
• option (future discoveries from wildlife) 
Non-Use Values 
• bequest (preserve for future generation) 
• existence (wilderness, cultural, intrinsic) 
Existing biotechnological utilities are direct, non-consumptive use values that 
can be quantified. Potential biotechnological utilities in wildlife are an option use 
value whose value presents a vexing economic problem. 
In my opinion, option value is the closest economists come to valuing the 
potential of future technological discoveries. It is the present value placed on a 
resource in order to have the option to use the resource in the future. It is usually 
determined by valuing uses that would preclude future use. An option price is that 
price which present consumers will pay to forego other uses for this option. A 
limitation in determining option value is lack of information about the future. 
Technology, for example, may transform a present low-value resource to future high 
value.  
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If it is determined that there is risk of catastrophic or irreplaceable loss of a 
resource—for example, the irreplaceable loss of a species and its unique genetics by 
extinction—the “precautionary principle” may be invoked (Perrings, 1991). When 
such risks exist, the precautionary principle holds that standard methods of valuation 
are unacceptable. Common (1996) states that the precautionary principle represents a 
unique way to approach project assessment in relation to social goals and is different 
from the standard method of allocative efficiency and cost–benefit analysis. 
Common (1996) advocates performance bonds to manage this dilemma. 
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1968) proposed a “Safe Minimum Standard” (SMS) policy 
approach to potential irretrievable loss resulting from gene resource extinction. The 
SMS uses a public-policy decision process that accounts for the economics of resource 
loss through extinction (Bishop, 1978). The SMS for a species is that viable 
population sufficient to sustain the species. The SMS cost is evaluated by the foregone 
economic benefits lost by foregoing projects that would have caused the population to 
drop below its SMS. Ciriacy-Wantrup (1968) proposed that a SMS be adopted for all 
species and adhered to unless the social cost of doing so is “unacceptably high.” The 
difficulty is determining the “unacceptably high” cost at which the present generation 
is not willing to convey options to future generations. In the famous Snail Darter v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority test case of the Endangered Species Act, the decision 
involved a choice between quantifiable benefits of a dam versus the unquantifiable 
cost of species loss. Extinction creates potential for large future losses, small or no 
losses, or even gains by future generations. 
Regarding valuation of endangered species, Brown and Goldstein (1984) 
developed a model that points out the necessity of determining the probability of 
discovering improved products from the species evaluated and of evaluating the value 
of such discoveries. This emphasizes the difficulty in valuing a resource with such 
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high scientific uncertainty. The discovery of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in 
microbial thermophiles demonstrates the difficulty of such a priori valuation. Prior to 
the PCR discovery, no commercially valuable products had been derived from these 
organisms, and the idea of PCR could hardly have been predicted. 
Property rights are essential for trade. Competitive, free markets require 
property rights (Randall, 1987). Coase (1960) argues that if non-attenuated property 
rights in a resource are clearly defined, enforceable, and held by involved parties in a 
market, Pareto-relevant externalities will be eliminated, resulting in economic 
efficiency. Efficient markets require property rights in which rights of use are 
specified, enforceable, and transferable (Randall, 1987). 
Market failure occurs when markets do not produce allocative efficiency 
(Common, 1996). Non-exclusive, res nullius or free-access resources are a source of 
market failure caused by economic “free-riders” (Bator, 1958; Randall, 1987; 
Bromley, 1991). Stroup and Baden (1983) point to lack of property-right definition or 
enforceability as a prime source of market failure. Externalities are also a significant 
cause of market failure. Natural resources are highly susceptible to market failure 
because of their typical non-exclusive and public-good character. A market failure to 
supply a non-rival, non-exclusive good leads to temporary under-supply, whereas a 
market failure in an exhaustible or destructible common resource may lead to 
irretrievable loss of the resource (Baden, 1998). Bromley (1991) defines market failure 
as individualistic, wealth-maximizing behavior that results in outcomes that are less 
than socially optimal. 
Excessive transaction costs (such as the cost of defining and enforcing property 
rights) can cause market failure. Market economists typically advocate establishing 
property rights and a market for a res nullius renewable resource as a preferred means 
to move market actors voluntarily (Baden, 1998) toward efficiency and recommend a 
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perfect price-incentive mechanism rather than governmental regulation (Common, 
1996). Randall (1987) cautions that an apparent market failure may actually be the 
absence of a market. Some markets are not worth the cost of their creation. 
Governmental interference in a market through distortions caused by taxation, 
subsidies, regulations, and so forth can create market failure. Randall (1987) suggests 
that the middle ground between market failure and governmental intervention is 
governmental assistance in market creation and maintenance through well-crafted 
regulations.  
Tisdell (1991) describes a market failure in wildlife resources caused by their 
mixed-goods character. Wildlife harvested for a private good (e.g., as a trophy or pelt) 
may have existence, option, or other value. Economic optimality for the private good 
may be met while a market failure simultaneously exists for values of other parties. 
Uncertainty presents a significant challenge to economic valuation. The extent 
to which uncertainty will affect an economic model is a function of the uncertainty 
that surrounds a particular resource scenario. Although the future is inherently 
uncertain, the degree of uncertainty is increased by long time horizons, technological 
change, demographic dynamics, changing demands, unexpected resource-stock 
changes, changing governmental regimes, and other factors. For example, the 
invention of the electric light had a profound effect on the economics of oil lamps and 
transmission lines, which could not have been evaluated ex ante. In the case of 
biotechnological utilities, technology has created utilities where none existed. PCR 
was not preconceived but has created entirely new markets. 
When an action involves an irreversible transformation of the environment (as 
in the loss of a species), uncertainty should be included in a CBA (Arrow and Fisher, 
1974). Hartwick and Olewiler (1986) construct a model in which it could be “socially 
optimal” to extinguish a renewable resource. However, this model ignores the 
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uncertainty of potentially greater values discovered in the future. Randall (1987) sums 
up the effect of uncertainty by claiming that intertemporal problems that involve long 
time horizons, uncertainty and/or irreversibility may be best handled by the caution 
and risk aversion that conservationists often espouse.  
Faber and Proops (1998) have developed economy/environment models that 
take uncertainty and the emergence of invention and innovation into consideration. 
They acknowledge that novelty is unpredictable, occurs frequently, and can produce 
significant economic effects particularly relevant to biotechnological utilities. To be 
patentable, a biological utility must be novel and not obvious. Inventions cannot be 
predicted. It is impossible to formulate a rational expectation of the value of an 
unpredictable invention. By the very nature of invention, patentable biotechnological 
utilities and their value cannot be predicted in an economic model.  
Economic models of biological resources: The fishery and forest represent 
two bionomic model types that represent the property/resource dichotomy between 
fugitive and sedentary wildlife. The fishery has attributes of a fugitive and 
reproducible resource. It reproduces under density-dependent growth rates that are a 
function of various environmental and human-caused factors, it is subject to depletion 
through over-harvesting, it is destructible, it is fugitive and is res nullius (because of 
the infeasibility of property rights), and it is rival. 
Economic models of a fishery take biological growth and reproduction into 
account in the stock calculation of “Maximum Sustainable Yield” (MSY). The MSY is 
the quantity of fish harvested per unit of time within which there is no net decrease in 
the fish stock. It is the maximum amount of harvest that equals growth in overall fish 
biomass over time. Gordon’s (1954) “bionomic equilibrium” is that point of harvest 
where MSY produces revenue that is just sufficient to cover the cost of harvest.  
188 
The fishery exemplifies a rival–non-exclusive resource subject to the TOC. 
Gordon (1954) preceded Hardin (1968) in a TOC analysis of the fishery model. The 
fishery represents the classic case of lack of property rights (res nullius) in a common 
resource destroyed by the combined actions of numerous individuals seeking to 
maximize their value through capture (Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986; Neher, 1990). 
It is not surprising that the fishery is the subject of considerable thought and 
experiment concerning alternative property-right regimes. Ruddle (1989), Miller 
(1989), Acheson (2003), and Ostrom (1990) describe res communes management 
regimes of fisheries. An integrated res communes and res publicae regime has been 
described in which “individual tradable quotas” (ITQs), or access shares in the fishery, 
are granted to fishers by the government and in which the ITQs may be exchanged in a 
market (Townsend, 1998). 
The forest is a different type of bionomic model. Although it shares 
characteristics with the fishery (rivalry, auto-reproducibility, destructibility), it is not 
fugitive and is feasibly exclusive. Property rights may be defined and enforced in the 
forest, which eliminates TOC problems. The forest model is dominated by a different 
type of resource economics problem: discounting. The central economic thesis of the 
forest can be illustrated by the following scenario. The owner of the resource 
(measured in board feet or tons of standing timber) has two choices: cut and sell the 
timber and put the monetary gain into an interest-bearing instrument, or leave the 
timber to grow and cut later after growth has increased the value (board feet or tons) 
of the timber sold. At any point in time, the key is determining when the return will be 
greater through interest on investment of the proceeds of sold timber versus growth 
rate of the trees. It is a straightforward calculation that argues for cutting all slow-
growing trees now. It also suffers from a lack of consideration given to other values 
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(habitat, clean streams, reduced flooding, water conservation, carbon sequestering, 
scenic beauty), and the attendant externalities this inconsideration produces. 
6.3.1 Some Wildlife Economics 
Traditional resource economics analyzes natural resources that are directly 
useful to humans. Fish and game are those wildlife that have traditionally been the 
economist’s purview. Since biotechnology creates uses for wildlife outside of 
traditional wildlife economics, it is necessary to expand the economic analysis. But, 
before addressing an economics of biotechnological utilities, it is useful to review 
wildlife economics.  
The application of appropriate economic models to wildlife depends on the 
physical character of the wildlife itself and the institutional milieu that governs its 
accessibility. All direct uses of wildlife are rival. However, the supply of some 
wildlife is so high or the demand for it so low that it is effectively non-rival. Gnats are 
rival but so plentiful and useless as to be practically non-rival. For this analysis, 
effective non-rivalry is ignored. 
There is great variability in the exclusivity of wildlife. The fishery typifies 
non-exclusive wildlife, while the forest is feasibly exclusive. It can be assumed that 
transient wildlife are non-exclusive, although exceptions to this generalization could 
include populations that, because of their nesting or habitat patterns, are endemic to an 
area enclosed by property rights. Such species may be characterized as having an 
exclusivity character for certain periods of their lifecycle (e.g., during nesting). 
Despite exceptions (which require a case-by-case analysis), the useful working model 
is for non-transient wildlife to be rival–exclusive and for transient wildlife to be rival–
non-exclusive. 
The rival–non-exclusive character of transient wildlife creates a market 
inefficiency that becomes apparent if the wildlife is scarce. History is replete with the 
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destruction of rival–non-exclusive wildlife populations by market forces (Garretson, 
1933; Matthieson, 1987), and governmental control has played a key role in stopping 
this destruction (Tober, 1981). Emphasis has been on the prohibition of markets in 
scarce fish and game (Bean and Rowland, 1997). Such species have been made 
exclusive through res publicae mechanisms of law and regulation. In the case of 
regulated wildlife, in which species may be hunted, fished, trapped, or collected by 
permit, a governmentally controlled “market” of permits, licenses, and fees is 
presumably linked by governmental decision makers to some form of supply and 
demand. In other cases of res publicae wildlife, there is no “market,” because of the 
absolute prohibition against taking, possessing, or trading (e.g., endangered species). 
Some argue that these prohibitions reduce market pressure on species viability, create 
perverse incentives in poaching and black markets, and limit economic options to 
incentivize conservation actions, and that some portion of wildlife could be made 
private goods as a conservation approach (Swanson, 1991, 1992, 1994; Anderson and 
Leal, 1997). Lueck (2001) suggests that the Endangered Species Act can act against 
species conservation by eliminating conservation incentives and creating conservation 
disincentives. The use of trespass laws has been advocated as a means of imposing a 
type of exclusivity over wildlife on private land. Innovative institutional structures that 
combine aspects of res communes, res privatae, and res publicae control of wildlife 
for purposes of conservation have been described by Freese (1998), Baden (1998), and 
Anderson and Leal (2001). 
For many species of wildlife, there is no res publicae control. Most arthropods, 
mollusks, and microbes are res nullius. These species could be in danger of a TOC 
degradation if they were to become valuable and scarce. Biotechnology has the 
potential to create such value and scarcity. 
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Determining the usual economic values of wildlife such as meat and skin is a 
relatively simple calculation. But other, competing values are typically ignored in this 
calculation. For example, the existence value of a wild species will be lost if the 
species is harvested for tangible goods (Tisdell, 1991). 
The ex post determination of the value of wildlife biotechnological utilities has 
been little studied, although some have made preliminary and narrow attempts 
(Principe, 1989; Artuso, 1994; Simpson and Sedjo, 1996). Even less studied is the ex 
ante evaluation of potential value of this resource. 
A unique property of biota that impacts its exclusivity is autoreproducibility. 
Possession of a biota specimen often confers the ability to possess more through 
reproduction: Livestock have progeny, and plants may be vegetatively reproduced to 
create clones of a single sample. With biotechnology, one cell may be sufficient to 
reproduce the organism. This allows capture of value through possession of very small 
portions of the biota. The source of this value lies in two distinct but related types of 
property: tangible personal property and intangible intellectual property. 
6.4 Wildlife as a Source of Proprietary Biological Material and Intellectual 
Property 
Proprietary biological material is tangible personal property in an organism, 
groups of organisms, their parts, or by-products. Although one’s dog or horse is not 
typically called proprietary biological material, such creatures are tangible personal 
property. A single wild chipmunk becomes proprietary biological material when 
caught and caged. The role of proprietary biological material in the resource 
economics of wildlife becomes more crucial when considering biotechnologically 
rendered parts. Cell and tissue cultures, plasmids, DNA constructs, proteins, and 
antibodies are proprietary biological material. They can be reproduced or subcultured 
and can contain genetic information. Proprietary biological material is the direct 
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source of most biotechnological utilities. Although a wildlife specimen is the original 
source of any biotechnological utility, the biotechnologist invents by using a sample of 
tissue taken from the organism. The sample is proprietary biological material. 
Depending on the extent to which law controls the possession and use of the wildlife, 
the sample may be the private property of the possessor. If law controls the taking, 
possession, and use of the sample, then the biological material remains public 
property. The Endangered Species Act asserts public control of biological material 
from listed species. Other laws, including many state game laws and the federal 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, do not extend state control to sampled biological material, 
thus allowing private-property rights in the sample. 
Thus, within technical constraints, proprietary biological material can be 
created from any biota and, depending on the reach of the law, such material may be 
privately owned or public property. 
6.5 Defining Biotechnological Inventions 
The term “biotechnological invention” refers to those utilitarian materials and 
functions that are biotechnologically discovered in or invented using biota. It is an 
umbrella term that encompasses any biological matter or method that has utility. A 
biotechnological invention may or may not be patentable. A gene that conveys a trait 
on transgenic organisms is a biotechnological utility and may very well be patentable. 
So, too, is the transgenic organism per se. Less obvious, but no less utilitarian, 
biotechnological utilities include DNA sequences that code for gene regulation 
functions, such as “promoters,” “translational enhancers,” and “terminators” of gene 
expression. Many biotechnological utilities are not patentable because they do not 
satisfy the patent requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement or because 
they are “naturally occurring.”  
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Biotechnological inventions also encompass functions such as honey-making 
by bees, demonstrating that the value of biotechnological inventions values is not 
limited to genes or to biochemicals. 
Biotechnological inventions encompass DNA sequences in artificial “genetic 
constructs,” “vectors” that facilitate insertion of foreign DNA sequences into a host 
cell genome, and intangible methods such as “parasite-derived resistance”1 and 
“replicase-mediated” disease resistance in transgenic plants.2 Biotechnological utilities 
also include cell lines, tissue cultures, plasmids, and biochemicals that are useful per 
se or that provide a template for further invention. For example, biological optics 
systems have inspired advanced photonics designs.  
6.6 Dual-Property Aspects of Biotechnological Inventions 
A biotechnological invention can exist simultaneously as biological material 
per se (for example, the actual DNA oligonucleotide molecule of a gene) and as 
intellectual property (such as a patent on the use of the DNA sequence as a 
technological entity). PCR technology exists as enzymes per se and as patents on the 
use of those enzymes. As matter, a biotechnological invention may be possessed and 
controlled as personal property. This property may exist in test tubes, in petri plates, as 
propagules (cells, tissues, seeds, etc.), or as whole organisms. Biotechnologically 
rendered genes typically exist in a genetic construct within an engineered host cell. 
These materials are valuable because of their utility and their alienability (i.e., they 
may be bought, sold, or exchanged). Ownership and control of these properties is 
secured through possession or contract. Once possessed, such property may be owned 
unfettered unless governmental rights extend from the biota to the derived biological 
material. Two aspects of such physical property obtained from wildlife are important: 
                                                 
1 Embodied in U.S. Patent No. 5,580,710. 
2 U.S. Patent No. 5,596,132. 
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physical possession is a requisite to obtaining an invention (patentable or not), and the 
possession or use of such property may be constrained by federal or state law. In 
addition to constraints on the physical property, however, there is also the intellectual 
property aspect to consider.  
The duality of tangible versus intellectual property rights is reminiscent of the 
dichotomy between usufruct rights and title in land law. Personal-property rights in the 
biological material are separate from the patent rights that convey the exclusive right 
to prohibit others from making, using, or selling. The use of the biotechnological 
invention may be covered by patent rights. Patents are granted by the federal 
government and are owned by the inventor or otherwise by contract between the 
inventor and another party (e.g., an employer). Like the personal property of tangible 
biological material, the patent may be exchanged in a market transaction. The 
following scenario illustrates this dichotomous property relation.  
A test tube containing a cell line is possessed by an individual, and absent a 
contract or law that controls such possession, all the cells in that tube are the sole 
personal property of the possessor. Another individual holds a patent on a use of this 
same cell line. The patent owner has no right of possession in the tangible property of 
the cell line, only the right to stop anyone (including the owner of the cell line, and 
anyone the owner transfers the cells to) from making, using, or selling the cells for that 
use. Simply possessing these cells does not infringe on the patent owner’s rights. 
A biotechnological invention may be owned as tangible property only. For 
example, antibodies (proteins with immunological utility) are either unpatentable or 
their patentability is narrow to the point of uselessness in terms of market value. In 
some cases, the biotechnological invention is patentable, but doesn’t exist as matter. 
Such inventions are inspired by something in a specimen. For example, the “parasite-
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derived resistance” method covered by U.S. Patent No. 5,580,710 can be embodied in 
any type of biological matter.  
Thus, with biotechnological inventions, situations arise in which the owner of 
personal property in the biological material controls possession of that material while 
another simultaneously owns the use of that material via patent rights. Layered on this 
ownership quilt is the control of free-roaming wildlife per se. These attributes 
confound traditional natural resource economic models. 
6.7 The Unique Resource Economic Characteristics of Inventions from 
Wildlife 
Characteristics of inventions from wildlife produce a unique set of attributes 
that are relevant to the economic analysis of this natural resource.  
Dual utilitarian value: the utilitarian value of inventions is based on physical 
matter and information derived from that matter (Parry, 2004).  
Dual rival and non-rival character: The biotechnological invention is rival 
to the extent that the relevant biological material is rival. This rivalry is partially 
mitigated by reproducibility in which genetically identical clones can be created. 
Regarding the rivalry of the genome, DNA per se in rival biological material is also 
rival. But, since the same genome exists in any other specimen of the some species, 
the genome as a source of information is non-rival. 
Mixed exclusivity/non-exclusivity: Wildlife fixed to the land (plants and soil 
microbes) on private property is exclusive; on public land it may or may not be 
exclusive. Fugitive wildlife is inherently non-exclusive (exceptions include small, 
endemic populations in circumscribed areas). Public property has been established 
over specimens of federal and state-controlled wildlife. The extension of such public 
rights over tangible biotechnological utility varies from species to species according to 
applicable federal or state law. In either case, property rights in the biotechnological 
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invention will be exclusive by virtue of either res privatae, res publicae, or a mix of 
res publicae and res privatae (i.e., private ownership of legally taken specimens with 
some governmental control on disposition). However, the biotechnological invention 
will exist in all members of the taxon; therefore, possession of a biotechnological 
invention does not exclude others from accessing the same invention from other 
specimens of the taxon. The use of the invention may be patented, which would grant 
exclusivity over use, but not that matter, which is tangible biological property. 
Mixed property-right character: Living wildlife are either private property 
(plants on private land), public property (federally controlled species including plants 
on public land, or free-roaming, state-controlled species), or res nullius (free-roaming 
and uncontrolled by federal or state law). Tangible biotechnological invention may be 
private property (matter obtained from res nullius species or plants on private land), 
public property (matter from species controlled by federal and state law that extends 
governmental control over parts of specimens), or public–private property (federal- or 
state-controlled specimens for which federal or state laws do not extend public control 
to either tangible personal biological property or intellectual property). In some cases, 
specimens of wildlife may be a combination of public property–private property and 
res communes,3 which is a logical extension of the controlling regime of wildlife 
specimens. 
Utility through consumption and non-consumption: Aside from aesthetic 
values, wildlife utility normally requires consumption of the wildlife. Such 
consumption is only marginally relevant to biotechnological inventions because such 
inventions are either information or are typically reproducible through cloning and 
sub-culture. Consumption of inventions is irrelevant given that only a negligible 
amount of biological material, relative to the population, is necessary to invent. 
                                                 
3 For example, in the case of “Individual Tradeable Quotas,” granted by government, managed by a 
community, rights and values belong to the individual on capture. 
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High uncertainty: Inventions are characterized by their high scientific 
uncertainty. Invention is inherently unpredictable. It is nearly impossible to determine, 
a priori, whether a species will yield value through invention. This is especially true 
with patentable inventions, which must be novel and not obvious. The impact of 
uncertainty is exacerbated by the irreversibility of species extinction. Once a species is 
extinct, its potential inventions are lost. The probability of obtaining an invention from 
a particular species may currently be low, while potential value may be very high—a 
lottery, in effect. This “lottery effect” means that each genetically unique organism is a 
lottery ticket in the risky search for useful, valuable invention.4 Each unique species 
taxon has a high option value created by two factors: the high scientific uncertainty 
that a valuable invention may eventually be found in it, and the catastrophic effect of 
irretrievable genetic loss caused by extinction. 
6.8 An Economic Taxonomy of Inventions in the Wildlife Resource 
The economic taxonomy of inventions in the wildlife resource may be divided 
into two property types: tangible and intangible. Tangible invention is rival, but that 
rivalry is mitigated by its potential to be reproduced. So, if a tangible invention is 
possessed as personal property, that matter is rival. However, to the extent someone 
else can obtain and possess the same tangible invention from another specimen of the 
same species, it is not rival. 
Intangible inventions are not rival because possession does not diminish 
supply. 
Tangible inventions from wildlife will be exclusive, with a mix of private-
property and public-property characteristics, depending on the extent to which 
governmental control extends to the tangible biological matter. For example, a 
                                                 
4 In some cases, organisms may exhibit a unique utility that may not be directly represented in the 
genome per se. For example, some populations of Monarch butterfly exhibit incredible migratory feats, 
while other, genetically identical Monarchs do not. 
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tangible invention from most insects would be private personal property because most 
insects are a res nullius resource (honeybees can be an exception). The possessor of 
that insect matter would own it as personal property by right of first possession. 
However, others could obtain identical matter from another res nullius specimen of the 
same species. A tangible invention from an endangered species would be exclusively 
public property because the whole, living specimen is public property, as are samples 
taken from it. 
The intangible patent right is exclusive by the nature of the right of a patent 
holder to exclude others from use. The patent does not, however, prohibit the physical 
possession of a tangible invention, only the making, using, and selling of the patented 
invention. 
Where a wildlife specimen is exclusively possessed, it will be controlled by the 
government,5 privately (through individual possession of a specimen of a res nullius 
species), or through a mixture of public and private ownership. These public–private 
mixtures take a variety of forms. For example, in the state of New York, bears are 
public property when free-roaming in the wild, and no private individual may possess 
a living, free-roaming, New York bear. However, wild bears can be possessed by 
individuals by killing under a valid permit issued by the state government. Once 
possessed, the bear carcass becomes private property with an exception: the flesh 
cannot be sold; therefore, public control over select uses of some parts of the bear 
remains even after reduction of the free-roaming public bear to a dead, private 
specimen. 
Tangible inventions and intangible property rights from wildlife can be 
categorized using the resource economics taxonomy illustrated in Table 6.1. 
                                                 
5 Federal for endangered species, migratory birds, or other species listed in federal law; state for other 
fish and game; other species controlled by state law. 
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Table 6.1. Property Type in Tangible and Intangible Inventions from Wildlife. 
Invention Undiscovered Discovered 
Tangible Common-pool resources Mixed private–public goods 
Intangible Pure public goods Pure private goods 
6.9 Is there a Market Failure in Inventions from Wildlife? 
6.9.1 Contributing Factors 
Ideal markets provide a mechanism in which the costs of maintaining and 
supplying a resource and the benefits from its use are efficiently allocated between 
maintainers or suppliers and beneficiaries. Is the current market use of inventions from 
wildlife a market failure? 
Sources of failure of a market to efficiently allocate costs and benefits of a 
natural resource include ambiguous property rights and exploitation of a valuable, res 
nullius resource. Property rights must be defined and enforceable if a market is to 
function. Markets should provide a direct link between the cost of a resource and the 
financial return from that resource. Externalities exist when the costs of maintaining 
and supplying a resource are not borne by the beneficiaries. A corollary is the free-
rider problem: Do all of those who benefit from exploitation of the resource participate 
in the cost of its maintenance and supply? Is there governmental “interference” in the 
market mechanism? Is there an equitable allocation of costs and benefits over all 
participants and stakeholders, including future generations? Does the mixed-goods 
problem described by Tisdell (1991) yield a “mixed market failure” in wildlife 
inventions? Let us examine each of these components of potential market failure in the 
context of wildlife inventions. 
Property rights: Property rights in specimens of wildlife, their carcasses, and 
parts are defined for public species (species listed in federal laws, state wildlife laws) 
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and plants (owned by the real estate property owner). The many species that do not 
fall under these umbrellas are res nullius. For example, most arthropod species are res 
nullius and are subject to market failure. Property in tangible inventions from public 
wildlife is confused but appears to be private. Thus, the governmental entity 
responsible for managing a wildlife population has no rights to benefits that arise from 
an invention obtained from that wildlife; the beneficiaries are free-riders since they are 
not obligated to share the costs of wildlife maintenance. For the many wild species 
that are currently res nullius (in fact, the vast majority of species), it seems only a 
matter of time before technology renders some of them scarce, thus creating 
conditions for market failure. 
Allocative efficiency: The condition of nonexistent or ineffectively defined 
property rights in wildlife inventions yields a disconnect between financial returns 
from commercialization of such inventions and the cost of wildlife maintenance. An 
intergenerational allocation inefficiency arises from the uncertainty of future value of 
undiscovered inventions in wildlife. Regardless of efforts to connect present 
beneficiaries of wildlife invention exploitation to investment in the wildlife resource, 
unless future inventions are maintained for future generations by maintaining wildlife 
species, a serious intergenerational allocative efficiency exists. 
Mixed-good character: A resource with mixed-good character may have a 
market in some of its goods and a failure in others (Tisdell, 1991). Trophy hunters 
who pay for taxidermy goods participate in a market in big-game “hunting goods” but 
simultaneously participate in a failure to supply existence or option values. The 
inventions from wildlife are highly susceptible to the mixed-goods problem. 
These several factors suggest that wildlife invention systems are inherently 
prone to a market failure. This failure seems intuitive, since the increasing value of 
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wildlife inventions are paralleled by decline in many wildlife populations. In the next 
section, I present specific cases that substantiate a market failure.  
6.9.2 Evidence of Market Failure in Wildlife Inventions 
In the summer of 1966, Dr. Thomas Brock, a professor at the University of 
Wisconsin, and his student H. Freeye collected microbial samples at Mushroom 
Spring in Yellowstone Park under a park collection permit. The permit placed few 
restrictions on the collector’s use of collected samples. The researchers isolated an 
unknown, thermophilic microbe from the sample, published a paper describing the 
species they named Thermus aquaticus, and deposited an axenic culture of the species 
in the American Type Culture Collection (the ATCC is a public biological repository) 
as culture “25104.” ATCC restrictions to access 25104 were simply the required 
nominal fee and standard “hold harmless” clauses for liability. Kary Mullis, an 
employee of Cetus Corporation, obtained a sample of 25104 from ATCC (Cetus paid a 
$35 fee) and used it to invent the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method. Cetus filed 
its first U.S. patent application on the PCR technology with K. Mullis as sole inventor, 
on October 25, 1985. A subsequent U.S. patent application was filed by Cetus (with 
Mullis and five others as inventors) on February 7, 1986. The October 1985 and 
February 1986 applications ultimately were issued on July 28, 1987, as U.S. Patent 
Nos. 4,683,202 and 4,683,195, respectively. 
U.S. Patent No. 4,683,202 (K. Mullis inventor; Cetus Corp Assignee), titled 
“Process for Amplifying Nucleic Acid,” was issued with twenty-one claims that cover 
“a process for amplifying any desired specific nucleic acid sequence contained in a 
nucleic acid mixture thereof . . . .”6 U.S. Patent No. 4,683,195 (Mullis et al.; Cetus 
                                                 
6 Claim 1 reads as follows: “A process for amplifying at least one specific nucleic acid sequence 
contained in a nucleic acid or a mixture of nucleic acids wherein each nucleic acid consists of two 
separate complementary strands, of equal or unequal length, which process comprises: (a) treating the 
strands with two oligonucleotide primers, for each different specific sequence being amplified, under 
conditions such that for each different sequence being amplified an extension product of each primer is 
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assignee), titled “Process for Amplifying, Detecting and/or Cloning Nucleic Acid 
Sequences,” was issued with twenty-six claims.7 
With these two patents, Cetus controlled the making, using, and selling of PCR 
technology. In the late 1980s, Cetus and Perkin Elmer commercialized PCR through 
licenses and sales of PCR reagents and thermal cycle equipment. Hoffman-Laroche 
purchased the Cetus PCR patent estate for $300 million. Since this transaction, PCR 
has produced significant commercial activity, including large intellectual-property 
costs. 
Neither Yellowstone National Park, the National Park Service, nor the 
Department of the Interior has received any direct share of the revenue resulting from 
the PCR property (Lindstrom, 1997). This demonstrates a market externality produced 
by lack of a market connection (other than normal business taxes) between the 
financial beneficiaries of the PCR (Cetus and Hoffman-LaRoche and their investors) 
and those who invested (the federal government, trustee for the people of the United 
                                                                                                                                            
synthesized which is complementary to each nucleic acid strand, wherein said primers are selected so as 
to be sufficiently complementary to different strands of each specific sequence to hybridize therewith 
such that the extension products synthesized from one primer, when it is separated form its 
complement, can serve as a template for synthesis of the extension product of the other primer; (b) 
separating the primer extension products from the templates on which they were synthesized to produce 
single-stranded molecules; and (c) treating the single-stranded molecules generated from step (b) with 
the primers of step (a) under conditions that a primer extension product is synthesized using each of the 
single strands produced in step (b) as a template.” 
7 Claim 1 reads as follows: “A process detecting the presence or absence of at least one specific 
nucleic acid sequence in a sample containing a nucleic acid or mixture of nucleic acids, or 
distinguishing between two different sequences in said sample, wherein the sample is suspected of 
containing said sequence or sequences, which process comprises: (a) treating the sample with one 
oligonucleotide primer for each strand of each different specific sequence, under hybridizing conditions 
such that for each strand of each different sequence to which an oligonucleotide primer is hybridized an 
extension product of each primer is synthesized which is complementary to each nucleic acid strand, 
wherein said primer or primers are selected so as to be sufficiently complementary to each strand of 
each specific sequence to hybridize therewith such that the extension product synthesized from one 
primer, when it is separated from its complement, can serve as a template for synthesis of the extension 
product of the other primer; (b) treating the sample under denaturing conditions to separate the primer 
extension products from their templates if the sequence or sequences to be detected are present; and (c) 
treating the sample with oligonucleotide primers such that a primer extension product is synthesized 
using each of the single strands produced in step (b) as a template, resulting in amplification of the 
specific nucleic acid sequence or sequences if present; (d) adding to the product of stop (c) a labeled 
oligonucleotide probe for each sequence being detected capable of hybridizing to said sequence or a 
mutation thereof; and (e) determining whether said hybridization has occurred.” 
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States) in the resource (pristine hot springs and their biota). This externality arose 
from the failure of park management to define and assert property rights in its wildlife 
and, specifically, its failure to assert its property right in collected samples of biota 
through its collection permit. 
Identifying patents on biotechnological utilities from wildlife is prima facie 
evidence of an externality-produced market failure that is much broader than the 
Yellowstone thermophile–PCR case. A search for such patents is summarized below. 
Reptiles and amphibians are well-known sources of biologically active venom 
compounds. Reviewing U.S. patents reveals numerous examples of intellectual 
property on biotechnological utilities from snakes and amphibians. A number of 
patents claim rights in purified “ajoene” (and its manufacture or use), a venom enzyme 
from the snake genus Bothrops (vipers). U.S. Patent 5,968,988 claims ajoene for shock 
treatment. Other patented uses of ajoene include contraceptive (U.S. Patent 
5,863,954), antithrombotic (U.S. Patent 5,744,584); lupus diagnostics (U.S. Patent 
5,705,198), and eye-disease treatment (U.S. Patent 3,869,548). 
Novel cytotoxic polypeptides from the western diamondback rattlesnake 
(Crotalus atrox) are claimed in U.S. Patent 4,731,439 owned by Oncogen, Inc., of 
Seattle. A tumor treatment based on “crotoxin” obtained from the Cascavel (Crotalus 
durissus terrificus), a rattlesnake relative native to Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and 
Brazil, is the subject of U.S. Patent 5,164,196, owned by Ventech Research, Inc., of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. A metalloproteinase pain treatment from the Mexican 
West Coast rattlesnake (Crotalus basilicus basilicus) is the basis of U.S. Patent 
5,314,899, owned by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. A 
prothrombin-activator enzyme, useful for disease diagnosis and obtained from the 
Australian brown snake (Pseudonaja textilis), is claimed in U.S. Patent 5,922,587, 
owned by Pentapharm AG of Switzerland. A fibrinolase, useful in thrombosis 
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treatment, obtained from the Southern copperhead snake (Agkistrodon contortrix 
contortrix), is the subject of U.S. Patent 5,260,60, owned by the University of 
Southern California. Similar thrombolytic materials and methods from Agkistrodon 
contortrix contortrix are the subject of U.S. Patent 5,951,981, owned by Diatide, Inc., 
of Londonderry, New Hampshire. Agkistrodon contortrix contortrix is an endangered 
species in Iowa and Massachusetts (Levell, 1995). A phospholipase isolated from the 
Mozambique red spitting cobra (Naja mozzambica pullida) is the subject of U.S. 
Patent No. 5,045,462.  
It is not clear whether these patents have generated commercial activity or 
whether the “appropriate” owner, if any, of the biota asserted property rights in the 
wildlife specimen. However, it is reasonable to assume investigation will evidence the 
same disconnect as Yellowstone and PCR. A number of other reptilian 
biotechnological utilities can be found in the scientific literature requiring further 
investigation of the property situation. For example, Coelho et al. (1999) report the 
effect of disintegrin “jarustatin” from Bothrops jararaca on neutrophil migration and 
actin skeleton dynamics. Danem et al. (1998) report that a venom component from the 
leaf-nosed viper (Eristocophis macmahoni) may have anti-cancer properties. A 
patentable utility from wildlife need not be complex or technically esoteric. U.S. 
Patent 5,866,160, owned by Hainan Life-Nourishing Pharmacy, Co., of Hainan 
Province, People’s Republic of China, claims a precise composition of whole, ground, 
and dried turtle and tortoise for use as a nutriceutical. Similarly, U.S. Patent No. 
5,912,018 covers the treatment of certain human medical conditions using secretions 
of the Arabian Gulf catfish. U.S. Patent No. 4,677,069, owned by Cornell Research 
Foundation, claims the industrial use of enzymes from clams. 
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Magainin Pharmaceuticals owns patents on the antimicrobial “Locilex,” a 
diabetic–foot-ulcer treatment based on pexiganan from Xenopus (frog) skin. Xenopus 
is a widely available laboratory animal and, essentially, res nullius. 
A number of U.S. patents have been issued on compounds and methods 
obtained from spiders. For example, Patent 5,196,204, owned by the University of 
Utah, claims compounds and methods derived from Agelenopsis aperta venom. 
An animal repellant obtained from firefly (Photinus) is claimed in U.S. Patent 
4,490,360, owned by Duke University. 
The discovery of novel combinatorial chemistry of bioactive compounds 
obtained from the squash beetle (Epilachna varivestris; Schroeder et al., 1998) is the 
subject of U.S. Patent No. 6,384,026, owned by Cornell Research Foundation. 
Birds are also a source of biotechnological utilities. U.S. Patent No. 4,112,074 
claims the use of the ovomucoid egg fraction of Japanese quail (Coturnix coturnix 
japonica) for treatment of allergy. 
In many instances it is not clear whether a technical discovery from wildlife 
has produced patented or valuable personal property. Often, the report of such 
discovery is difficult to link to an issued or pending patent. For example, Harborne 
(1986) has described a number of potentially useful utilities from insects including 
repellants from ladybird beetles and pheromones from butterflies, moths, flies, 
lacewings, and weevils. Harborne also describes a further complexity: the chemical 
defense of poison-dart frogs (dendrobatids) appears to result from the frog’s ingestion 
of ants (Solenopsis), which contain alkaloids that yield a toxic exudate of the frog’s 
skin. No patent information is available on the report that antibacterial peptides have 
been found in the hemipteran insect, Palomena prasina (Chernysh and Cociancich, 
1996), or that discodermolide, a compound from a marine organism, appears to have 
anti-cancer potential (ter Haare et al., 1996). 
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Marine organisms are a particularly rich source of biotechnological utilities. 
Eleutherobin, a recent cancer-drug candidate obtained from the coral Eleutherobia, is 
covered by a U.S. patent owned by the University of California and licensed to 
Bristol-Myers Squibb (Mlot, 1997). Mlot also relates a statement by D. Newman of 
the National Cancer Institute that the AIDS drug AZT was developed from a basic 
structure found in a marine sponge. Halopyrroles with antiviral and antibacterial 
properties are obtained from the Caribbean sponge (Agelas coniferin) and claimed in 
U.S. Patent 4,737,510, owned by the University of Illinois. 
An example of the disconnect between wildlife property, intellectual property 
commercialization, and conservation is the discovery and exploitation of 
pseudopterosin from Caribbean soft corals. In the early 1980s researchers at Scripps 
Institute of Oceanography (University of California) legally collected blue sea whip 
(Pseudo pterogurgia) specimens in coastal waters of the Bahamas (Look, 1983). As in 
the Yellowstone case, the researchers complied with Bahamian regulations that 
provided negligible constraints on use of the collected specimens. Later, in the Scripps 
laboratories, the researchers discovered “pseudopterosins,” complex heterocyclic 
compounds that exhibit anti-inflammatory, anti-cell-proliferation, and pain-reduction 
properties in mammals. Subsequently, the University of California filed U.S. patent 
applications on pseudopterosins and their uses. Eventually, U.S. Patents 4,745,104 and 
4,849,410 were issued with claims on pseudopterosin-derivative molecules and their 
use as an anti-inflammatory, analgesic, and pain reducer. These patents contain a 
general reference to gorgonians in the “West Indian region” but no reference to 
Bahamas or to anything that links the patented subject matter to the biota source. After 
filing the patent applications, the University of California licensed its intellectual 
property to several companies. These licenses did not include any Bahamian party, nor 
was there any obligation on the part of the University of California to share any 
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control or benefits arising from the discovery of these compounds from wildlife 
collected in Bahamian waters. 
These examples evidence a property-based market failure in the exploitation of 
biotechnological utilities of wildlife. In these examples, property rights in the wildlife 
are either unclear, unperfected, or not asserted. 
6.10 Economic Valuation of Inventions from Wildlife 
Economic valuation is essential to the political economy of natural resources 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1968; Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; Daily et al., 2000). 
Effective natural resource management requires such valuation, but such resources are 
difficult to value. The importance and technical challenge of resource valuation has 
led to a variety of approaches (Costanza, 1991; Daily et al., 2000). Valuing wildlife is 
a particularly difficult problem (Swanson and Barbier, 1992; Barbier, Burgess, and 
Folke, 1994). Analysts have tackled the problem of determining wildlife value, 
including non-monetizable or difficult-to-quantify values such as existence, aesthetics, 
or ecosystem service (Costanza and Daly, 1987). Inventions are a significant valuation 
problem, and inventions from wildlife are even more so.  
Wildlife inventions are a direct use of wildlife, and determining the value of 
such existing inventions is difficult, but straightforward. However, this is not true of 
inventions that have not yet been discovered. Patent law exacerbates this problem, 
since only unpredictable discoveries are patentable. It is intuitively obvious that many 
such utilities are yet to be found.  
A fundamental limitation in determining values of wildlife inventions is the 
high uncertainty of discovery of a valuable utility in a particular specimen or species. 
It is extremely difficult to predict ex ante the value of inventions yet to be discovered 
in a wildlife specimen. Analysts have tried various approaches to dealing with this 
uncertainty, with varied success. Some are based on the simple assumption that the 
208 
invention-value potential of a species is obtained by multiplying the probability (based 
on past discoveries of inventions) that a species will yield a commercial product by the 
average ex post value of such a commercial product. Such estimates require broad 
assumptions that can produce wide-ranging results. Principe (1989) uses this method 
to determine that a wild plant species is worth $23.7 million, while Aylward (1993) 
calculates the figure to be $44 per plant species. These values are based on the 
assumption that all plant biotechnological utilities will be human medicinals. Artuso 
(1994) uses an ex post analysis of a pharmaceutical company’s willingness-to-pay and 
the statistical probability of discovering a drug from a set of tested samples within a 
known testing template. Mendelsohn and Balick (1995) determine the potential value 
of higher plants to yield drugs by estimating a probability of discovery of a drug by ex 
post estimates of net drug revenue, yielding an aggregate value of $48 per hectare of 
tropical forest. This narrow focus on medicinals from plants is also used by Pearce 
(1990) to quantify the value of tropical rainforest. Pearce determines an aggregate 
value of billions of dollars based on consumers’ willingness-to-pay to preserve this 
resource. Pearce and Puroshothamon (1992) set a value of $420 billion for potential 
drugs from plants in tropical forests, and Gentry (1993) suggests a $900 billion 
aggregate value for the same resource.  
Although these analyses may be useful in establishing some basis for a limited 
determination of potential value of drugs from plants or other well-studied species, 
they are too narrow to be generally useful in determining a comprehensive and 
accurate value of wildlife inventions. The first problem is that although such 
inventions encompass medicinals, they are much broader in scope, including 
fundamental methods (e.g., the PCR) and materials (e.g., DNA sequence traits and 
promoters) and even inventions outside of the life-science domain (Hamilton, 2004). 
Beyond this initial limitation lie more serious, conceptual flaws. Simpson and Sedjo 
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(1996) and Simpson (1997) point out some of these, including the failure to account 
for scarcity, pre-planned discoveries, or redundancy of useful discoveries. These 
authors describe such flaws in their earlier analyses and prescriptions to correct them. 
Despite their efforts to improve valuation, their own approaches are deeply flawed.  
Simpson (1997), Simpson and Sedjo (1996), and Polasky and Solow (1995) 
conduct sophisticated statistical analyses of a process of identifying a drug candidate 
in a set of untested samples in a pre-planned screening protocol. They conclude that 
the willingness-to-pay value of a “marginal species” to a pharmaceutical researcher in 
their contrived drug discovery process is low. Simpson and Sedjo (1996) use a simple 
demand function for biological samples in pharmaceutical screening. They calculate a 
maximum possible value of any species at less than $10,000 based on an ex post 
evaluation of a pharmaceutical researcher’s willingness-to-pay for a marginal species’ 
contribution to a set of samples and on the sensitivity of the value of that species to an 
ex post probability of discovery with assumptions of drug discovery and value 
probability. This narrow approach leads Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) to conclude 
that the discovery of a drug product from wildlife is either so common in species as to 
be redundant or so rare as to make discovery unlikely.  
These analyses are mathematically sophisticated statistical constructs. 
However, their conceptual framework is too limited for general application to 
valuation of the wildlife invention problem, given its tremendous technical breadth 
and the serendipitous path of discovery embodied in the patentability criteria of 
absolute novelty and nonobviousness. The models of Simpson and his colleagues do 
not account for the functional breadth of invention and rely on a ludicrously simple 
“litmus” model for discovery that is practically useless in evaluating the potential for 
discovery of unexpected inventions such as PCR. 
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Most important, Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) significantly overstate the 
applicability of their conclusions beyond the framework of their analysis. While they 
concede their model is narrow, they proceed to state the broad general value of 
biodiversity based on that narrow model. The danger of such broad generalizations 
may be the acceptance of such conclusions by others who will miss the narrow and 
simplistic conceptual basis of this analysis, further promulgating improper conclusions 
of biodiversity value. For example, Garrod and Willis (1999) parrot the conclusions of 
Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) without acknowledging any conceptual limits of the 
work that would temper even their narrow conclusions. The detailed critique of 
Simpson’s work presented below is useful at this point. 
Simpson’s tenuous linkage of a narrow analytical base to the broad conclusions 
made can be seen in several examples. Simpson and Craft (1996) ask, “what is the 
value of preserving biodiversity?” and then proceed to limit their focus to the 
discovery of a commercial drug by a pharmaceutical firm. They refer to this 
conceptual limitation when they comment on the importance of saving yet-unknown 
species or obtaining genetic insurance against as-yet unidentified disease.  
This analysis ignores the great complexity and variety of wildlife inventions 
that already include methods and materials found in wildlife. This ignorance of the 
practically limitless breadth of inventive methods and materials, and of the multitude 
of uses of wildlife invention, is evident in Simpson’s constant focus: “chemical 
compounds produced by wild organisms” and a “commercially valuable substance” 
(Simpson and Wildavsky, 1996). This narrow focus ignores the discovery of a variety 
of enabling technologies that provide a platform for many products. 
Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) argue that a “valuable substance” of a species 
is redundant. While such redundancy may be true for some discoveries (e.g., 
ubiquitous, conserved genes or common metabolites) in a broad range of taxa, it may 
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be very wrong for others (e.g., flavor variety within a single species of wine grape, 
coffee varieties, or specific cheese-producing bacteria). 
Simpson’s model is based on a “need for a new product” that ignores 
innovation and invention. It is also based on “testing for a particular application,” 
which ignores the real biological discovery process in which observation of 
experimental phenomena leads to insight, discovery, and invention. Simpson and 
Wildavsky (1996) generally rely on an ex post prediction of probability of discovery 
and value. Their conceptual blinders are obvious when they state their belief that one 
does not find something unless one is looking for it, a most telling statement that sums 
up their lack of knowledge of the discovery process and its significance in the value of 
wildlife. Their models are based on a simplistic process in which a known drug target 
is screened for, and when a “hit” is discovered, testing stops. Real discovery of 
biotechnological invention is much less systematic. In fact, in order to be patentable, 
an invention must be novel and unanticipated. Simpson’s frequent use of the term 
“testing” belies a simplistic view of looking for a “substance” in some binary “litmus 
test,” rather than the complex process of research, which follows serendipitous leads 
through unintended and multi-branched paths. Burke (1978, 1996) describes a more 
realistic perspective of technical discovery as a web of unintended connections in a 
“pinball effect.” Simpson’s model does not account for the process of inventing 
biotechnological inventions from wildlife. Using the Simpson model of “testing” for a 
discovery, the PCR would still lie undiscovered. 
Simpson assumes that when a “substance” is found in a “test” of a collection, 
the process stops and the collection is discarded. Au contraire, the discovery of a drug 
lead is more likely to incentivize further research. Researchers continue to investigate 
a species after a discovery has been made and are often more motivated to look for 
other discoveries in such a biological “hot spot.” 
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Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) also make numerous erroneous technical 
assumptions. They state that “genetic recipes” for “valuable chemicals” in wildlife can 
be exploited by “gene transplantation.” Although this statement is in theory true, drugs 
are typically complex molecules made by the coordinated expression of multiple genes 
scattered across chromosomes and are not, at present, technically amenable to such 
“transplantation.” 
The simple Simpson model is also based on the assumption that every species 
is equally probable of yielding the commercial product for which it is being “tested.” 
This assumption ignores the fact that species are heterogenous in harboring certain 
functions. For example, venomous spiders and snakes have a higher probability of 
yielding a cytoactive compound than do doves or butterflies. It is well known that 
certain families of plants (e.g., Solanaceae, Apiaceae), fungi (e.g., Streptomycetes), 
frogs (e.g., Bufo, dendrobatids), insects (e.g., ants, wasps, beetles), fish (e.g., puffers), 
coelenterates, and others exhibit a propensity for containing biologically active 
compounds. 
Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) state that “genetic resources” are non-rival 
goods and then proceed to confuse intellectual- and personal-property rights in 
biological matter. Intellectual property is non-rival, whereas the DNA of a species is 
rival, especially considering restrictions on access to or possession and use of public 
specimens by government and of private specimens by private-rights holders or as a 
result of physical scarcity.  
Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) postulate that species’ redundancy results from 
geographical dispersion and the superfluity of specimens in excess of those needed for 
species viability. They also argue for drug redundancy, in which competing drugs will 
be available for the same condition. Such redundancy and value are atomistic, 
unecological, and reminiscent of hunters taking buffalo for their tongues (Hanner, 
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1981). Simpson’s focus on “potential products” ignores the importance of 
biotechnological services. For example, calculating the economic value of PCR must 
include the services based on this method, including forensics, diagnostics, and 
research tools. Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) greatly overstate their findings when 
they claim that a marginal species’ value in new product research is low. They neglect 
to reveal that their conclusion is derived from a simplistic chemical-screening model. 
Their assertion that the significant question is the value of the marginal species, rather 
than total value, may be supported by their narrowly construed statistical framework, 
but does not follow from the more complex real situation.  
Simpson’s narrowly construed view of the biotechnological value of wildlife is 
only one of many components of a comprehensive value equation. The Simpson 
models are devoid of any sense that species may, in some cases, have value only in 
their habitat or in connection with other species. They pay lip service to other species’ 
values but do none of the intellectually demanding work necessary to tackle this 
problem. Their simple one species–one drug model is inadequate for complex 
situations such as the frog exudate that apparently depends on ingested ants (Harborne, 
1986). The Simpson view can be summarized by this simplistic protocol: Biota is a 
collection of equal units; systematically screen the units for a known function, find the 
unit that yields the function, and you are done with the collection and the process. 
Simpson and Wildavsky (1996) rhetorically ask why firms are not rushing to 
invest in biodiversity searching and then argue that this justifies their position. 
However, their position also emphasizes their myopic economic analysis. For-profit 
companies utilize a short time frame of profitability and usually limit their vision to 
exclude activities that are not profitable within this time frame. But this short-term 
view is not easily compatible with biotechnological discovery. Discovery of the PCR 
required over one hundred years of resource investment (maintaining Yellowstone 
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Park) before “profitability” was remotely possible. History is replete with accounts of 
many years of investment (often contrary to a profit-taking mentality) before 
commercial success was realized. It took more than two decades from the invention of 
xerography before the first sale of a copy machine (Mort, 1989). Similarly, it took 
many decades from the discovery of germanium before its economic value was made 
significant by semiconductor technology. Simpson’s statement that lack of investment 
by for-profit firms means biodiversity has low value is short-sighted and woefully 
incomplete. Simpson’s (1997) arguments are largely based on the wildlife redundancy 
argument, stating that 
losses in biological diversity may have little bearing on whether the next 
miracle drug is found. That’s because there are so many wild plants and 
animals that can be used by researchers engaged in biodiversity prospecting. 
With millions and millions of species, sources of useful products are either so 
common as to be redundant or so rare as to make discovery unlikely. Either 
way, the sheer numbers involved weaken the argument that biodiversity 
prospecting generates any appreciable economic value. (p. 12) 
There are many examples of unique biotechnologies that demonstrate the 
weakness of Simpson’s argument. Although there are other palliatives, there is no 
replacement for morphine. Despite the many antibiotics developed, vancomycin is the 
only drug that kills drug-resistant bacteria. There are no substitutes for spices like 
saffron, nutmeg, and pepper. Only Apis mellifera produces honey in an economically 
useful way. There is only one aspirin (acetylsalicylic acid). There is only one 
“Empire” apple. Orange juice can only be made from oranges. Only Mentha piperita 
can produce natural peppermint. The Monarch butterfly is the only insect that displays 
precise transnational migrations of huge length. Only Merino sheep produce Merino 
wool. Nothing tastes like abalone. Despite years of effort, plant breeders have never 
created a true black tulip. Nothing grows taller than a redwood. The Komodo dragon 
is the largest lizard. Only Yersinia causes bubonic plague, and Mycobacterium, 
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tuberculosis. In short, Simpson’s redundancy argument is contrary to the definition of 
biodiversity. Politically, the philosophical basis of the law of the land is entirely 
contrary to such redundancy. The Endangered Species Act acknowledges that species 
are not redundant, that the loss of a species is irreversible and potentially so 
catastrophic that government must act to preserve such species’ existence. Simpson is 
hoisted by his own petard with his example of tea and coffee as being redundant for 
caffeine. He fails to notice that tea and coffee are economically different and that it is 
the unique beverage that is valuable, not the caffeine. A logical extension of the 
redundancy argument weakens the justification for saving any species. 
6.10.1 A Broader Conceptual Basis of Analyses 
Freeman (1986) writes that it is difficult for neoclassical economics to 
accommodate the high uncertainty of creating a biological invention, simply because it 
is very difficult to value something that does not yet exist, and notes that species 
extinction is an irreversible loss of such potential. Nonetheless, some have attempted 
to estimate a value for biota based on undiscovered biotechnological inventions.  
Brown and Goldstein (1984) have developed a valuation model that requires an 
a priori estimate of the probability of discovering valuable products in a species but 
acknowledge the difficulty of determining such probability ex ante. Ciracy-Wantrup 
(1968) and Bishop (1978) also acknowledge the importance of establishing an 
economic value of a species that includes potential for future discoveries, the difficulty 
in establishing that value ex ante, and describe a SMS economic policy approach. This 
skirts the issue of affixing a monetized value to a species and instead uses a decision 
rule that holds that a SMS of a species population be maintained unless the social cost 
of doing so is “unacceptably large.” Bishop (1978) points out the difficulty of defining 
“unacceptably large,” particularly given the irreversible loss of potential 
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biotechnological inventions (and other values) of a species, high scientific uncertainty, 
and intergenerational equity. 
Montgomery et al. (1999) approach species valuation by developing a model 
for the “management price” of increments in habitat that contribute to a population 
size. Their model incorporates a term for “index of diversity,” which represents the 
value of benefits consumers associate with biodiversity. Their model also utilizes 
“diversity weights” from phylogenetic data as an indicator of genetic scarcity. While 
they utilize a value based on consumers’ perceptions of biodiversity value, they 
acknowledge that contingent valuation is based on an elusive, credible quantitative 
measure of marginal willingness-to-pay on the part of consumers. Their model 
ultimately links the value of biodiversity to land value. Using their model, the value of 
biodiversity in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, is $60 million per resident, or a one-
time payment of $600 million in 2020, or $16 million per resident now. 
6.10.2 The Conceptual Limits and Future Needs of Valuation 
The above analyses value each species as an independent economic unit. This 
is contrary to ecological structures in which species are integral parts of a biome. 
Leopoldism (the idea that any species must be valued in its ecological context) is 
difficult to reconcile with atomistic species-valuation approaches. A particularly 
serious limitation of existing valuation models is the reliance on a static domain of 
value and a bias in ex post analysis. Relying on this type of value and bias ignores 
technological and sociological change. 
Daily and her colleagues (2000) point out the importance and difficulty of 
valuing natural resource systems and the limitations of prevalent economic models, 
especially their failure to encompass future costs and benefits. More comprehensive 
analyses are needed to produce estimates of value, especially those that include the 
value of existing and potential biotechnological inventions from wildlife. New 
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theoretical frameworks that encompass the uncertainty of unpredictable invention, the 
uniqueness of species, and the irretrievable loss of their extinction are necessary. 
However, some question whether the value of a species can be monetized 
(Norton, 1991). Norton believes that economists are very far from having, even for 
one well-known species, a complete accounting of all its present and future values. He 
criticizes reductionist economic analyses for ignoring the interdependence of species 
(e.g., destroying one species may destroy several; the biotechnological value of one 
species is dependent on another) and concludes that aggregation and the reductionistic 
language of economics is ill-suited to values so complex as those environmentalists 
pursue in protecting biodiversity. 
6.11 The Political Economy of Biotechnological Inventions from Wildlife 
The political economy of biotechnological inventions from wildlife is defined 
by the governing property regime and the economics of the biotechnological 
invention. The property regime of the biotechnological invention is linked to the 
property milieu of the particular wildlife taxon. 
The federal government asserts control over the access, possession, use, and 
disposition of all specimens of species explicitly listed under federal laws. Those 
assertions extend to the corpus of these specimens and their parts. In some instances, 
governmental control is not asserted over all parts of the corpus (e.g., tissues taken 
from birds legally collected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act). Existing federal 
laws and regulations do not explicitly assert the government’s rights in 
biotechnological inventions when they are in the form of intellectual property. 
States assert rights in some wildlife within their borders that is not covered by 
federal law. These laws variously assert the state’s rights in the specimens of the 
species and their parts. State laws and regulations variously assert the state’s control 
over the possession and use of the specimen’s corpus and parts. Specimens that are 
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controlled by the state belong to the state as long as they are free-roaming. Upon legal 
capture under state law, the corpus becomes the property of either the state, or the 
individual, or a mixture of both. Some states do not assert rights over many species of 
wildlife, such as arthropods,8 protozoans, and microbes. States often assert rights over 
certain tangible biotechnological inventions but, as with federal law, this assertion 
does not extend to intellectual property. A review of state laws (Musgrave and Stein, 
1993) reveals widespread use of hunting and fishing laws to regulate the taking, 
possession, and disposition of wildlife specimens. However, as with federal wildlife 
law, these laws do not explicitly regulate the conversion of the biotechnological 
inventions from wildlife into private property. A wild bear in New York exemplifies 
this situation. 
Under New York State law, a free-roaming bear is state property. A bear 
hunter may obtain a hunting license from the state to legally kill (but not capture) the 
bear. The carcass becomes the property of the individual but the state retains some 
control over use of the carcass (i.e., the meat may not be sold). This includes tangible 
biotechnological utilities from the meat. Tangible biotechnological inventions from 
other parts of the bear and any intangible biotechnological inventions from any bear 
part are personal property, without obligation to the state of New York. 
In the case of res nullius species such as most arthropods, the government has 
no rights in any specimens, or their parts, or any tangible or intangible 
biotechnological invention derived from them. 
Private property in the biotechnological invention from wildlife can be 
perfected through first occupancy for any public specimen and through regulated 
taking of any res publicae specimen. In most cases, regulated taking is low-cost: a 
state fishing license, for example. In a few cases, regulated taking entails significant 
                                                 
8 New York places some controls on stream insects. 
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cost or regulatory hurdles, as in a scientific-use permit for the possession of 
endangered species. However, the existence of patents on wildlife inventions 
demonstrates that existing governmental control of the tangible biota corpus allows 
private property in biotechnological inventions as intellectual property. 
Biotechnological invention from wildlife has already generated significant 
value and will generate more in the future. The existence of such valuable inventions 
from wildlife prompts serious questions. Is the existing property regime for wildlife 
invention optimal? If so, optimal for which goals? Is the commercial exploitation and 
private gain obtained from these inventions optimal from a political and economic 
perspective? Is resource sustainability optimized in this situation? How should the 
rights in biotechnological utility of wildlife be allocated across the continuum of res 
nullius, private, public, and res communes? How is this allocation affected by 
efficiency, social equity, and ecological integrity factors?  
These questions are made critical by the widespread decline of biodiversity 
(Reid, 1993b; Meffe and Carrol, 1997; Wilson, 1997), the rapid rise of 
biotechnologically generated value of wildlife, and the ambiguous or lacking 
governmental control of rights in wildlife inventions. Exacerbating this situation is the 
orthogonality of the bodies of intellectual property and wildlife conservation law. 
Right or wrong, there is no comprehensive and coherent national or state policy to 
allocate property rights in or to manage inventions from wildlife for the sustainable 
use of biodiversity. This policy void, lack of governmental control, and the market 
failure create a significant public-policy problem. This problem is exacerbated by the 
failure of government to carry out its parens patriae trustee responsibility to manage 
the public’s wildlife resource. The following federal and state laws exemplify 
governmental failure to manage the wildlife biotechnological utility as a res publicae 
resource instead of a res nullius free-for-all. 
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The Endangered Species Act may be the most effective federal law controlling 
access to and possession and use of wildlife. However, its exceptions allow for 
possession, and once wildlife specimens are possessed, there is no explicit control 
over the creation of intellectual property from such legally possessed specimens, nor 
are there any apparent governmental rights in the commercialization of such 
intellectual property obtained from protected species, even if possession was illegal. 
The federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act controls the commercial exploitation of listed 
species. However, like the Endangered Species Act, the law does not explicitly control 
the use of protected specimens for discovery of biotechnological utility. Collection of 
tissue samples (e.g., blood) from temporarily possessed specimens is allowed with 
banding permits, allowing an individual to have unfettered access to the genome of 
otherwise federally protected birds in the United States. The other federal wildlife 
laws, including the Lacey Act, the Marine Mammals Protection Act, the Eagle 
Protection Act, the Wild Horse and Burro Act, and the Magnuson Fisheries Act, 
similarly fail to restrict private entities from creating res privatae intellectual property 
from res publicae wildlife.  
The Lacey Act emphasizes this legal and policy void. Under Lacey, it is a 
federal crime to enter into interstate commerce any wildlife specimen, or part thereof, 
that has been obtained contrary to state law. While otherwise effective, this fails to 
control creation of res privatae intellectual property because it requires the entering of 
the specimen (or a part) per se into commerce. To obtain a patent, only information 
need be entered into commerce. With a patent application, one submits information 
(e.g., the DNA sequence of a gene), not the actual biological matter of the protected 
specimen. 
One may violate one or more state laws to illegally possess a specimen of 
wildlife and then, upon discovering a patentable biotechnological utility from that 
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specimen, submit a patent application to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. In so 
doing, the possessor of the illegally held material may own a valid U.S. patent on 
subject matter from that material. 
Recent economic analyses of wildlife have relied on a property-right and 
transaction-cost framework (Demsetz, 1967; Williamson, 1985; Barzel, 1989). Lueck 
(1995, 1998) points out that perfecting property rights in wildlife is difficult and costly 
and that res nullius dissipates wealth and value. Also, the transience of wildlife and 
the patchwork pattern of land ownership present a difficult contracting problem among 
owners of real property. And, in general, wildlife is also typically valued less than 
other land-use purposes. Therefore, landowners normally lack incentives to maintain 
wildlife populations at a biological optimum. Incentive to assert rights in wildlife 
depends on the value of a viable stock less contracting costs among property owners 
that harbor the stock (Lueck, 1995). When contracting cost exceeds value, res nullius 
dominates, creating conditions for a commons tragedy. Under such conditions, if the 
resource is scarce, the typical political solution is to impose public rights, averting 
contracting problems but potentially conflicting with private-landowner decisions. 
This situation is particularly evident in the Endangered Species Act. Lueck (1995) 
points out that wildlife law has been largely formed by the belief that market forces 
should be curtailed and access regulated but that such laws generally reflect a market 
value and cost of the stock. For example, pelt values are reflected in trapping laws. 
Although trade restrictions are often considered a limit on wealth creation, Lueck 
(1995) sees such restrictions on wildlife as necessary to control res nullius and to 
increase its value.  
The res nullius character of some wildlife species has created the conditions 
for a TOC (Hardin, 1977). Recommendations for correcting the tragedy range from 
the imposition of strong public-rights prohibition of market forces (Lund, 1980) to 
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strengthened private, market incentives (Anderson, 1998). Lueck (1998) concludes 
that the existing wildlife-property mix is largely without economic logic and is too 
complex for application of simple property-rights economics. But, nonetheless, 
wildlife has large economic value, and institutions can be designed to capture such 
value. 
These analyses do not explicitly address biotechnological invention in wildlife. 
Does a TOC exist for this resource? 
6.12 A Tragedy of the Commons in Biotechnological Inventions from Wildlife? 
6.12.1 A Commons Versus a Res nullius Resource 
As originally defined by Lloyd in 1833 (Hardin, 1977) and by Gordon (1954) 
and Hardin (1968), a “tragedy of the commons” (Sage Action, Inc. TOC) can occur 
when an unowned and scarce natural resource is freely accessible to all and its use by 
one individual diminishes the resource for others. There are three criteria for a TOC in 
a natural resource: scarcity, rivalry, and a res nullius regime. A TOC resource is 
valuable only on capture, and there is no incentive for an individual to consider the 
needs of others or the long-term, sustainable use of the resource. The aggregate acts of 
individuals’ capture causes resource degradation.  
Many resource economists embrace the TOC concept and its property roots 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; Neher, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Tisdell, 1991). 
However, there is terminology confusion in the literature. This confusion arises 
because the term “commons” is used in two very different ways: to describe both res 
nullius and res communes regimes. Res nullius lacks any property rights, while res 
communes regimes are characterized by private property held by a group. 
This confusion of terms is evidenced by Tisdell (1991), who defines “common 
property” as a resource “to which all have free access.” He terms this “common 
access,” a resource in which individuals gain no property rights (and no value) from 
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conserving the resource. Neher (1990) describes the fishery in his analysis of res 
nullius regimes, which he calls “common property.” Neher espouses the TOC concept, 
stating that “open access, rule-of-capture” resources dissipate rents and lead to stock 
degradation, but he defines res nullius as “common property.” 
Despite the confusing terminology, there is general agreement by resource 
economists that property rights in a natural resource are directly linked to the use or 
misuse of that resource. Randall (1987) articulates a microeconomic basis for the TOC 
and states that ownership is a necessary precondition for trade. The TOC is a tragedy 
of inexorable events driven by human nature that lead naturally to destruction of the 
resource. It is practically inevitable that when no entity has rights to control access, 
possession, or use, all have unfettered access to possess and use; the resource is scarce, 
and valuable, and rivalrous. 
Ostrom (1990) describes examples of a TOC in “common pool resources,” 
with a res nullius cause. These include the 1970s Sahelian famine, the firewood crises 
in many developing countries, acid rain in the Adirondacks, and urban crime in the 
United States. Ostrom explains the TOC in terms of the “free-rider” problem: since an 
entity cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each entity is 
motivated not to contribute to the joint effort but to free-ride on the efforts of others. 
A true commons, res communes, is defined by the common control of 
possession and use. It is not res nullius. Res communes ownership and control is vastly 
different from the null-ownership of res nullius. A more precise use of terms and 
definition is needed. The tragedy of the “commons,” “common property,” “common 
resource,” or “common pool resource” is more precisely termed the “tragedy of a 
scarce, rivalrous res nullius resource.”  
Bromley (1991) clearly articulates the important distinction between res 
nullius and res communes and the impact of those distinctions on the political, 
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economic, and ecological fate of a natural resource. Several analysts have described 
the utility of res communes in sustainable, equitable use and protection of public 
goods (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom and Schlager, 1996).  
A res communes regime is characterized by the definition and use of property 
rights by a defined group. Entry into the group must be controlled, and communally 
accepted rules must control the access, capture, possession, and disposition (Ostrom, 
1990; Bromley, 1991) of property. Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952) and Ciriacy-Wantrup and 
Bishop (1975) define res communes as “common property,” a distribution of rights in 
resources to which access is restricted to a group of defined “owners” that are co-equal 
in their rights of access and whose rights are not lost by non-use. They make it clear 
that res communes does not mean that co-owners are necessarily equal in the 
quantities of the resource they individually acquire. They draw an analogy between the 
tradition of “stinting” the commons (i.e., grazing quotas) and modern fishery quotas. 
Waldron (1990) defines res communes as “common property” in which a resource is, 
in principle, available to every member of a community that is limited by barriers to 
entry and governed by rules of membership. This requires an institution that defines 
community structure, governs with rules for equitable common-property access and 
disposition, and considers the needs of every community member when allocative 
decisions are made. Caldwell and Shrader-Frechette (1993) make a clear distinction 
between a “commons” and a res nullius resource and describe how res communes 
resources have often been well managed, particularly by pastoral and less 
industrialized cultures. 
Lafargue (1894) describes the social evolution of property from types of res 
communes of tribal societies including non-family-centered primitive communism, 
consanguinal collectivism (family-centered communal property), feudal property 
(landed gentry, landless peasants with access to a common woods and pasture) and, 
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finally, bourgeois property. Laveleye (1878) describes in detail the res communes of 
cultures ranging from the consanguinal collectives of Italian family alliances, early 
Celtic agrarian systems, Swiss allmends, and communities in Java, India, Russia, and 
Greece. Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) acknowledge the capability of less 
industrialized cultures to successfully manage common resources and observes that 
the true tragedy of the commons was the feudal transformation of peasants from co-
equal owners of the commons to landless workers of the lord’s estate. Laveleye (1878) 
posits that under feudalism, peasants were given a measure of group ownership of the 
commons in concert with the lord and that it was bourgeois mercantilism that 
destroyed the commons by carving it into private, alienable parcels. Berkes (1989) 
also provides several examples of res communes regimes for effectively sustainable 
and equitable management of common natural resources. 
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952) describes governmental intervention to remedy the 
tragedy of res nullius, such as control of the individual’s right of capture in the Taylor 
Grazing Act, and makes a case for res communes rather than public-property solutions 
to resource allocation, giving examples of successful res communes systems including 
high alpine grazing areas in Switzerland (the “allmend”), Germany, and Austria, and 
riparian use in Anglo-Saxon and German land law. Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 
(1975) view the political choice between private res nullius, private, or public property 
as simplistic and ignorant of res communes. They believe that common property and 
its implied institutional mechanisms is effective at managing natural resources in a 
market economy. According to Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, res communes systems 
require institutional rules that include resource boundaries (geographic or biotic) and 
community governance that articulates membership entry, obligations, privileges, and 
regulations. Ostrom (1990) also criticizes those who provide only two choices to 
rectify the tragedy of a scarce res nullius: “Leviathan” (i.e., authoritative 
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governmental coercion), or private ownership within a free market. She describes 
difficulties with Leviathan, including government’s difficulty in determining resource 
capacity, unambiguously assigning rights, monitoring user actions, and certain 
punishment for non-compliance. She also points out that limitations of private 
property include the difficulty of developing cost-effective means of defining and 
asserting ownership. For Ostrom, res communes regimes can solve many res nullius 
resource tragedies if effective governance can be developed. She analyzes 
management of scarce, non-renewable resources in relatively small-scale res 
communes systems (i.e., 50–15,000 users) and presents general guidelines for 
structuring res communes institutions. Such institutions must implement rules to 
prohibit free-riders, define member commitment, and monitor compliance. Ostrom 
describes several res communes “design principles”: clearly defined resource 
boundaries and rules defining who has access and use rights, congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, collective choice arrangements 
(i.e., participants freely participate in rule making or changing), monitoring for rule 
compliance, graduated sanctions (i.e., punishment fits the crime), conflict resolution 
mechanisms, and a recognition of the right to organize. 
6.12.2 A Tragedy of the Commons in Biotechnological Inventions from 
Wildlife? 
A TOC can occur in scarce and rivalrous, res nullius resources. So, a TOC in 
biotechnological inventions from wildlife depends on the physical nature and property 
milieu of the wildlife. The issue is the extent of res nullius in wildlife and inventions 
from wildlife. Any wildlife that is res nullius “contains” potential inventions that are 
also res nullius. And, because the private-property rights of a patent are given to the 
first to “capture” the invention, such wildlife and their inventions are susceptible to a 
TOC. 
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Public-property regimes are established to mitigate the problems of res nullius 
resources. Is it, therefore, safe to assume that inventions in public wildlife are safe 
from a TOC? 
To answer that question, let us examine the public-property regime more 
closely. First, public-property rights are not homogenous. It has been pointed out that 
public property exists as a range of types and levels of governmental control 
(Clawson, 1983; Klyza, 1996). For example, the extent and type of control over 
Bureau of Land Management lands is very different from that over national parks. 
Control over national forest land is different from that over Department of Defense 
properties. Also, public accessibility to public property varies greatly. For example, 
nuclear weapons facilities and national forests are both public properties, but the 
public’s right to access and use them is vastly different. How does this relate to public 
wildlife?  
Some wildlife is public, but governmental control of it is limited, such that 
specimens or parts may be readily converted to private property. Under many state and 
federal governmental regulations, individuals can legally possess and, to varying 
degrees, control the use of a public specimen. Many states’ laws permit the taking and 
possession of game animals, but the extent of governmental control of the possessed 
specimen or its parts ranges from none to very strict. For example, state laws typically 
prohibit sales of game carcasses or parts but allow personal use, including research. 
The Federal Endangered Species Act tightly controls the possession and use of a 
specimen and its parts but does not control the acquisition of intellectual property 
obtained from such specimens. 
A review of state wildlife laws (Musgrave and Stein, 1993) reveals widespread 
lack of control of the use of specimens for obtaining tangible and intangible 
inventions. Thus, at the instant the public wildlife specimen is legally possessed, the 
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physical specimen per se is private for the purpose of creating an invention. By 
extension, a tangible invention is also unfettered private property unless the law 
constrains the use of specimen parts. However, and most important, intangible 
inventions will almost certainly be unfettered private property.  
Possessing a private specimen of public wildlife does not give the possessor 
inherent rights in free-roaming specimens of the taxon or in any inventions from that 
species except intangibles obtained by the specimen-holder through intellectual-
property law or personal-property contract. Since the reach of government is limited, 
the store of potential inventions yet to be found in other specimens of the taxon 
remains res nullius. So, where wildlife is public for free-roaming specimens, but 
governmental control does not extend to tangible or intangible invention, there is a 
TOC of the inventions nested within a non-TOC wildlife form. Potential inventions in 
res nullius wildlife are res nullius. Since state and federal laws do not limit the 
ownership or use rights in intangible inventions and weakly limit such property and 
use in some wildlife, the potential pool of invention in wildlife is largely res nullius.  
What about scarcity of wildlife inventions, another criteria for a TOC? Without 
scarcity, there is no TOC (Randall, 1987). Street pebbles are res nullius. But, because 
pebbles have no value and are abundant, there is no scarcity. Historically, scarcity of 
wildlife (particularly game, fish, and “useful” animals) motivated the gradual 
enactment of federal and state laws (Bean and Rowland, 1997). Species with value as 
sources of food, clothing, or sport developed scarcity, and wildlife control laws 
followed (Lund, 1980; Tober, 1981). 
Many wildlife species have had no direct or apparent value to humans and 
have not, therefore, been economically scarce. Most arthropods, for example, are not 
considered scarce. But the development of biotechnological invention through 
technology can change this character. The PCR invention and potentially useful 
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discoveries in ants (Attygalle et al., 1998), beetles (Borman, 1998), and flies (Steyn 
and van Heerden, 1998) suggest technology-mediated shifts in scarcity of certain 
wildlife. 
Where free-roaming wildlife species are res nullius and become valuable 
through biotechnology, a TOC situation is possible. Where such a public species 
becomes valuable and the government controls possession, but not invention, a TOC is 
also possible. This latter situation may largely depend on the political will to eliminate 
the res nullius character of the biotechnological invention from the public wildlife 
though a modification of the law. 
Finally, to what extent are biotechnological inventions from wildlife rivalrous? 
Wildlife specimens, or their parts, are all effectively rivalrous depending on their 
abundance. For example, blue whales are more rivalrous than are white-tailed deer, 
and gnats are effectively non-rivalrous. Rivalry can shift as a function of population 
dynamics, including the factor of human capability for harvest. Tangible 
biotechnological inventions will, at one level, be as rivalrous as their source 
organisms. However, some biotechnological inventions are reproducible. For example, 
a culturable cell line can be grown and reproduced in vitro. So, one can imagine such 
reproducibility mitigating rivalry. What about the patented information obtained from 
wildlife? Is it rivalrous? While tangible inventions are essentially rivalrous, 
information is not. However, a patent prohibits others from using that information for 
a limited period and is, therefore, institutionally rivalrous for that period. However, the 
patent information is public domain and is, for the purpose of educating others, not 
rivalrous. This public information may be used freely by others to develop their own 
intellectual property. 
In summary, there are likely to be TOC situations in wildlife inventions that 
will hinge on the status of federal and state law as they control the rights to possess 
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and use for the purpose of inventions and on technological advancements as they 
affect value and scarcity. 
6.12.3 Efficient Property-Rights Regimes in Inventions from Wildlife 
Since economic efficiency is non-unique (Randall, 1987), various property 
regimes can satisfy any particular efficiency perspective. The view that efficiency 
requires non-attenuated, private-property rights (Stroup and Baden, 1983) does not 
explain the situation fully. The simple view that there are only three natural-resource 
property choices—res nullius, public, or private—is incomplete (Randall, 1987). 
There are a variety of possible intermediate property-regime “mixtures.” It is not 
difficult to envision a natural resource that exists in a blend of private, res nullius, 
public, and res communes in a complex web of interdigitated rights. Given the 
potential permutations of property-right mixtures, it seems that a reasonable number of 
them could approach efficiency. The question then becomes, Whose efficiency should 
take precedence: that of corporate shareholders, entrepreneurs, taxpayers, landowners, 
future generations, or conservationists?  
There is general agreement by political economists that a TOC in a resource is 
a social bad and that it is caused, in large part, by a res nullius regime. However, there 
is significant disagreement over how to configure an optimal property regime for a 
scarce natural resource. Stroup and Baden (1983) and Hill and Meiners (1998) argue 
strongly for private and against public constructs as solutions to natural resource 
problems. These authors view the market as a preferred process for establishing the 
socially optimum condition of economic efficiency and articulate the central role res 
privatae plays in that process. They disparage public approaches as inefficient, often 
corrupt, or controlled by special interests. Others argue that public control is 
mischaracterized by free-market advocates. Lehman (1995) refutes the argument that 
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res publicae is worse for the management of a natural resource that is a public good. 
Klyza (1996) describes the complexity and variety of res publicae in his analysis.  
6.13 Public-Policy Considerations 
6.13.1 The Problem 
Inventions from wildlife present a potent mix of policy factors: the growing 
value of biotechnological invention, the ongoing decline of biodiversity, market 
externalities of wildlife value and conservation, an inadequate legal framework, and 
governmental inexperience with these issues. A serious public-policy issue is created 
as inventions from res nullius and public wildlife are converted to valuable private 
property while biodiversity declines. The lack of a comprehensive national policy for 
managing inventions from the nation’s wildlife is made urgently problematic by the 
widespread and accelerating loss of biodiversity and the simultaneous rapid 
advancement of biotechnologies. 
Evidence indicates an externality-based market failure or “missing market” 
(Neher, 1990) in wildlife inventions. When markets fail and the resulting lack of 
conservation has adverse income-distribution consequences, government is compelled 
to intervene (Tisdell, 1991). Existing markets undervalue the uncertain future 
inventions from wildlife (Barbier, 1992). The cost to future generations of biodiversity 
loss receives little weight in neoclassical economic evaluations (OECD, 1997).  
The value of biodiversity must increase to effect sustainable conservation 
(Swanson and Barbier, 1992), and this requires new incentives and instruments that 
rely on more fully specified property rights (OECD, 1997). But who should hold such 
rights, and how they should they be used, presents a significant question. Some 
suggest governmentally regulated trade in wildlife goods. For example, Swanson 
(1994) argues that banning trade in ivory is counterproductive to sustainable 
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conservation of elephants. Tierney (2000) describes examples of sustainable resource 
use through property mechanisms. 
Using a policy-process definition of Jones (1984), the policy problem of 
wildlife inventions is in the earliest stage: problem definition. A policy vacuum exists 
at both the federal and state levels, and the literature suggests that governmental 
agencies are unaware of the problem. Congress and the executive branch have also 
been uninvolved, with the exception of some dialogue on the Biodiversity Convention 
(Congressional Reporter, 1993). The PCR from Yellowstone’s thermophiles 
exemplifies federal inexperience (Milstein, 1994a,b). Although Yellowstone National 
Park has developed a case-specific handling of the biotechnological-utility issue 
(Varley and Scott, 1998), there is no evidence that this is widespread in the Park 
Service or the Department of the Interior. At the state level, managers in New York’s 
Department of Environmental Conservation have no experience with the issue.9 
6.13.2 Stakeholders and Actors 
The following stakeholders and actors play a role in the disposition of property 
rights in inventions from wildlife. 
The federal government: As the ultimate guardian of the public trust in 
wildlife, particularly biota that range across state borders, the federal government has 
a responsibility to deal with this policy question at least where it concerns wildlife 
covered by federal law. Through a legal void, the federal government is allowing 
private interests to take unregulated advantage of the public resource of inventions 
from wildlife while the resource suffers for lack of protection. It is conceivable that 
under certain policy alternatives, public coffers could gain revenue from certain types 
of controlled commercial use of wildlife invention, similar, for example, to the 
                                                 
9 Managers in New York’s Dept of Environmental Conservation, responsible for implementing ECL90, 
the law governing state biota, personal communication with author, 1999. 
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licensing of broadcast frequencies or to royalties on mineral extraction. Any 
comprehensive, national policy must involve the federal government. 
State governments: States have control over all public wildlife except those 
few species explicitly covered by federal law. States are in the best position to assert 
public control over res nullius wildlife. They could establish proactive policies to 
manage public interest in wildlife inventions for various purposes; for example, 
financing conservation. However, such policies could stifle innovation and discovery 
of valuable inventions if implemented improperly. The Lacey Act could give states 
significant control over this resource, if modified to explicitly encompass intellectual 
property obtained from state wildlife. 
Conservation groups: Non-profit, non-governmental conservation groups 
such as The Nature Conservancy, Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and World Wildlife 
Fund are likely to be motivated by policies that could provide a new, positive impetus 
and funding for conservation activity. Such groups could be expected to support 
expanded governmental control over wildlife inventions if such policy is designed to 
enhance the protection of wildlife. If properly designed, such policy could be used by 
groups that own habitat to generate income for their organization and conservation 
activity. 
For-profit companies: Companies, especially those that sell products or 
services based on biotechnological inventions, are likely to resist efforts to give 
government more control over a resource that is now easily and freely accessible, and 
fundamental to their business. They are likely to perceive that expansion of 
governmental control over access and use of wildlife will add cost and reduce profit. 
Some corporate owners and managers may understand that some form of 
governmental control could provide enough structure to the market to eliminate the 
free-for-all chaos of the jumbled and ambiguous property mixture that now reigns. 
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Some companies may appreciate the long-term value of sustaining an accessible and 
diverse wildlife resource through regulatory mechanisms. However, corporations will 
always resist efforts to attach strings to their business assets. Although there is 
evidence that for-profit entities can work within a wildlife-property regime that is 
linked to conservation (Coughlin, 1993; Reid, 1993a; Tinker, 1995; Hunter, 1997; 
Varley and Scott, 1998; Weiss and Eisner, 1998), there are skeptics (Burk et al., 1993; 
Macilwain, 1998) and outright opponents (RAFI, 1997) of such plans. 
Traditional commercial harvesters of wildlife: These stakeholders, 
including commercial fishers and trappers, would likely resist any increase in 
governmental control over their livelihoods. Given the power, influence, and long 
tradition of the exploitation of wildlife, these groups might play a key role in changes 
in policy. However, governmental control of inventions in wildlife that are already 
valuable and regulated would be less problematic for traditional harvesters. 
Commercial harvesters are unlikely to be concerned by new controls over wildlife that 
is, from their perspective, economically trivial (e.g., arthropods). New utilities in 
previously trivial species could create new types of commercial harvesters and 
expansion of these markets. 
Public and private non-profit research institutions: Research universities 
and other non-profit research institutions are likely to support expanded governmental 
control over wildlife as long as it does not unduly hinder research and education 
activities. The federal government has a long track record of partnering reasonably 
well with such institutions; it has long been supportive of scientific activities and 
currently allows universities to retain intellectual property rights in federally funded 
projects. All federal and most state wildlife-protection laws provide for scientific, 
research, and educational uses. Based on this tradition, expanded governmental control 
of wildlife inventions could act, for the most part, in the interests of these institutions. 
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However, there could be some resistance to the sharing of benefits from inventions 
developed by these institutions. 
Federal agencies: The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), which 
enforces most federal wildlife policies, is most likely to manage increased federal 
control over wildlife inventions. It is interesting to consider how the USFWS would 
assume this role in light of the critique by Clark and McCool (1985) that compares a 
“bureaucratic superstar,” the Army Corps of Engineers, to the “bureaucratic bumbler,” 
the USFWS. Among their reasons for this distinction, they point to the political “pork 
barrel” value of Army Corps projects and to the lack of such values for the USFWS. If 
the USFWS could expand its mission into inventions, it might be a more powerful 
factor whose ascendancy could be matched by the rise in value of discoveries in 
federal wildlife. Other federal agencies, particularly land managers, could assert 
control of wildlife inventions. The National Park Service has already established a 
policy of control of such inventions within its borders (Varley and Scott, 1998). The 
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) could implement a similar 
policy. These agencies raise the issue of significant differences in enabling legislation, 
regulations, and management policies that govern any wildlife on lands. National 
parks have a clear path to assert control over wildlife on their lands, while national 
forests and the BLM have blurred jurisdictions as a result of their mixed public-use 
missions. Other agencies with considerable land holdings but little wildlife-
management experience include the departments of Energy and Defense. Federal 
regulations require these land managers to coordinate wildlife management with state 
agencies, creating potential sovereignty issues. Overlapping jurisdictions may arise. 
For example, the Interior Department is likely to lead governmental wildlife control, 
but Commerce has control over fisheries and marine mammals, which it is unlikely to 
give up. 
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Recreational hunters, fishers, and trappers: These groups could be affected 
significantly if regulations strengthen governmental control over uses of game 
carcasses or parts. These groups might split into ideological segments that oppose or 
support additional governmental control over wildlife. Some view government as a 
necessary but negative aspect of their hunting lifestyle and would likely resist 
increased governmental control. Others may view the governmental control of 
inventions from wildlife as a positive, long-term benefit if it is linked to the 
conservation of game species. 
Private landowners: This large and powerful group presents one of the most 
difficult political problems for any expansion of governmental control over wildlife. 
Any diminution of private land rights will be strongly resisted by private-property 
advocates (Jacobs, 1998), as well as by those who consider private property to be the 
optimal social structure for natural-resource allocation in general (Alessi, 1998) and 
wildlife in particular (Anderson, 1998). The political tension over public wildlife and 
private land is already high, particularly with the Endangered Species Act (Meltz, 
1994), especially since the Sweet Home v. Babbit case (Lueck, 2001). 
The public: It is extremely difficult to describe the public’s interest. However, 
I presume that preserving the option to discover future inventions is a public good and 
that to do so requires the preservation of biodiversity. Therefore, the public’s interest 
is served by maintaining sufficient biodiversity for present and future direct and 
indirect uses. Key questions include the meaning of “sufficient” and the issue of future 
use. Montgomery et al. (1999) have shown that the general public is willing to 
significantly value future inventions based on past discoveries. And, there is general 
public support for maintaining species viability via the Endangered Species Act. The 
public also demonstrates support for recreation and aesthetics that include wildlife. 
Concomitantly, the public interest is served by maximizing the entrepreneurial 
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generation of inventions. All these goals could be met if conservation efforts 
synchronize with inventive activity. This is likely to be feasible given that inventions 
are usually generated by the consumption of very few wild specimens.  
The acquisition of inventions from Yellowstone National Park by a Swiss-
based multinational corporation (Hoffman-LaRoche) raises questions of whether the 
“public” of public interest is domestic, foreign, or both. 
Future generations: These stakeholders may have the most to lose in the 
irreplaceable loss of species. Preserving future wildlife inventions could be the most 
important aspect of a proactive governmental policy. 
Inventors: These are the drivers of technical innovation. Biotechnological 
inventors need access to the raw materials of discovery. Inventors, and their 
employers, are likely to resist restrictions on access to wildlife, although this may 
depend on the nature of the inventor’s employer (i.e., self, corporate, or non-profit). 
6.14 Policy Considerations and Prescriptions 
Wildlife is a valuable public good (Tietenberg, 1990; Aylward, 1992), and its 
loss is a significant social problem that may be increasing in severity (UNEP, 1992; 
WCMC, 1992; Wilson, 1992; Barbier et al., 1994; Ward, 1994; Culotta, 1995; Pimm 
et al., 1995; Meffe and Carroll, 1997), although this view has its opponents (Simpson 
and Wildavsky, 1996).  
Table 6.2 shows how the goods character of inventions from wildlife are a 
function of whether they are discovered or undiscovered, tangible or intangible. 
Undiscovered wildlife inventions are a public good that become mixed private–public 
goods when captured (i.e., discovered) and if tangible, and purely private goods if 
intangible. Undiscovered, tangible inventions are not purely public goods because they 
are rival. Ostrom and Schlager (1996) call such public goods “common pool 
resources,” which can be depleted with no concomitant incentive for stock 
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maintenance. Confusingly, although intangible wildlife inventions are private goods, 
they also fit the definition of pure public goods since they are non-rival and non-
exclusive (Randall, 1987). In any case, when discovered, both utility types instigate 
market value that could link conservation and technology development depending on 
the policy framework embodied in property mechanisms.  
Table 6.2. Inventions from Wildlife. 
Invention Undiscovered Discovered 
Tangible res publicae res privatae 
Intangible res publicae res privatae 
 
Some basic property-regime principles have emerged from the debate about 
the political economy of natural resources: private property is best for private goods 
but inadequate for sustainably providing public goods, and markets are ineffective in 
sustainably providing public goods because of free-rider problems and lack of present 
market value (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996). The complex property character of wildlife 
inventions presents a conceptual challenge to the creation of optimal policy through 
property mechanisms. 
This policy challenge is exacerbated by technologists’ increase of wildlife 
value by creating private inventions from public resources. It is as though 
undiscovered inventions in wildlife were a fishery commons in which technologists 
“fish” for inventions from the wildlife pool, owning them on capture and exploiting 
them for private benefit. This exploitation generates market value that is disconnected 
from the cost of maintaining the resource. Therefore, beneficiaries do not pay for 
resource maintenance—a classic externality. What is the cause of that externality, and 
what policy and property regime might correct it?  
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Correcting market failure in public goods typically results in public-property 
approaches that are more or less coercive and not incentive-based. But, although the 
market produces these externalities, it is also produces economic value in wildlife that 
could enhance conservation. What property mechanisms might harness present and 
future value of wildlife inventions to motivate conservation? Given the complexity of 
the problem, the answer is likely not simple. Exploring the tension between different 
resource-property regimes and the value of wildlife may provide insight. 
The idea that markets could enhance biodiversity runs counter to the fact that 
uncontrolled markets have historically been ineffective in sustaining biodiversity 
(McDaniel and Gowdy, 1998) and typically accelerate its loss (Clark, 1976; 
Tietenberg, 1988), especially if the species (e.g., dugong or sea turtles) are 
“uneconomic” (Tisdell, 1986). These market failures lie, in part, in a fundamental 
incompatibility between the “instant-in-a-given-time-period” valuation by markets and 
the uncertain future value of most wildlife (Gowdy and O’Hara, 1986). Markets 
require valuation, and natural resources are particularly difficult to value (Daily et al., 
2000). Existing methods of valuation of wildlife inventions are either incomplete, 
inaccurate, or lacking. 
In addition to valuation problems, political economists across the ideological 
spectrum have identified the lack of property rights as a critical factor in the 
generation of natural resource externalities (Hardin, 1968; Randall, 1987, 1988; 
Berkes, 1989; Feeny et al., 1990; Swanson and Barbier, 1992). A lack of property-
right definition or assertion in wildlife specimens as sources of invention produces an 
externality by failing to establish a firm and direct link between the value of present 
and future invention and the cost of maintaining sufficient wildlife populations. But 
correcting the property-right problem is complicated. Beyond simple definition and 
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assertion, how should such rights be structured and distributed, who should hold them, 
and how should they be used? 
Market failures in res nullius wildlife have traditionally been addressed 
politically, by imposing public-property regimes (Lund, 1980; Tober, 1981; Bean and 
Rowland, 1997) that range from comprehensive prohibition of private rights and 
market exchanges (e.g., Endangered Species Act) and tight regulation (e.g., Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act) to weak regulation of private rights in wildlife specimens (e.g., most 
state fish and game laws). The public-property regime includes a variety of policy 
approaches. Tisdell (1991) defines several typical policy mechanisms for a public 
correction of market failure: taxes; subsidies; fiats, prohibitions, and regulations; the 
auctioning and licensing of rights to engage in externality-producing behavior; state 
ownership and control of property; the strengthening of private-property rights and 
facilitation of private negotiation; and the internalization of externalities by extension 
of ownership. Market failures in wildlife use have historically been corrected 
primarily through the assertion of governmental control with some limited licensing of 
access to capture (Tober, 1981; Bean and Rowland, 1997).  
Experience with years of public natural resource management has led to 
conclusions that such regimes are not socially optimal. Alessi (1998) argues that 
governmental control of natural resources is inherently flawed and should be avoided; 
that private or communal ownership of a resource is preferred for reasons of market 
efficiency, personal liberty, and individual welfare. Alessi (1998) and Gordon (1994) 
consider governmental “command and control” of wildlife to be an inherent failure in 
sustainable conservation as well as a diminution of private land rights, and to be 
unnecessarily costly and coercive. Using the Endangered Species Act as an example, 
they conclude that governmental coercion and prohibition of market mechanisms 
nullifies economic incentives to conserve and creates perverse incentives to destroy 
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resources. They argue that private landowners are punished for providing a public 
good rather than rewarded because there is no economic return from the cost of 
maintaining an endangered wildlife population.  
There are others reasons why the public-property regime does not produce 
socially optimal, sustainable conservation. Tisdell (1991) argues that governmental 
control often fails to conserve wildlife populations because agencies attempt to mimic 
the marketplace with an imperfect cost–benefit framework. Stroup and Baden (1983), 
Anderson and Leal (1991), and Yandle (1997) point out several governmental 
limitations, including innate bureaucracy inefficiency, lack of individual and firm 
incentives, imperfect information, centralization of decision-making, policy and 
operational inflexibility, excessive public costs, politics, and even corruption.  
Given the disadvantages of public management, some political economists 
have concluded that non-coercive, private incentive–based policy approaches to public 
natural resources are generally preferable when feasible and equitable (Goldstein, 
1991; Weck-Hannemann and Frey, 1995) and are always more cost-effective than 
command-and-control policy approaches (Markandya, 1997). Experiments with 
incentive-based, private-property mechanisms for resource management, including 
pollution control and fisheries (Pearse, 1994), illustrate the advantages of such 
regimes: decentralized decision making (Barbier, 1993), improved cost-effectiveness 
(Tietenberg, 1990), and opportunity for innovative contractual and institutional 
arrangements (Anderson, 1998). Even conservationists who are not typical advocates 
of private property–based solutions to common resource-use problems point to private 
economic incentive as critical to politically sustainable resource conservation. 
Hanemann (1988), McNeely (1988), and Tisdell (1999) all lend credence to the idea 
that enhancing the market value of wildlife under controlled conditions is essential for 
long-term conservation and that sustainable management of wildlife requires local 
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ownership of that wildlife to establish motivation for conservation through linkage of 
conservation action to benefits from these actions (Mangel et al., 1996; Ostrom et al., 
1999).  
Advocates of marketable private rights in wildlife as a basis for conservation 
policy believe Coase (1960) was right: natural resource allocation problems can be 
solved if property rights are fully defined and private, and if transaction costs are zero. 
However, the difficulty in defining and enforcing such rights in transient wildlife 
populations and high transaction costs among many scattered landowners practically 
precludes simple private approaches for most (Lueck, 1995), but maybe not all, 
wildlife (Anderson, 1998). Coaseian res privatae solutions are infeasible with large 
numbers of property-right holders, but such large numbers might be tractable by 
aggregating private-property rights through associations, clubs, or other organizations 
(Yandle, 1997). Anderson (1998) and Lueck (1995) describe aggregated private-
property mechanisms in wild game for market-based conservation, although their 
model is difficult to extend to wildlife that range widely (e.g., migratory birds) or that 
are obscure and lack obvious, present value (generally insects, for example).  
Although private solutions have appeal, there are cautionary views. Incentive-
based policy instruments that exploit the relative-price effect may be most efficient 
and desirable; however, they may also create perverse effects as economic incentive 
“crowds out” ethically based decisions (Weck-Hannemann and Frey, 1995). McDaniel 
and Gowdy (1998) view market-based conservation skeptically, pointing to the 
intrinsic conflict between ecosystem principles and rules that govern markets. They 
reject price as an infallible signal for sustainable wildlife use, providing examples 
where scarcity, high price, and functioning markets have not prevented the over-
exploitation of a resource. They conclude that private economic exploitation is 
incompatible with the sustainable use of biodiversity because price will never fully 
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reflect the true value of wildlife in its ecological and evolutionary matrix. Gowdy and 
O’Hara (1986) question the prudence of using unfettered markets as a conservation 
mechanism by exposing the economist’s reliance on the substitutability of species. 
This economic view of sustainability trivializes the loss of a species, positing that the 
market will produce functional substitutes (Solow, 1993), a position that is 
fundamentally flawed, biologically (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1992). Tisdell (1991) 
summarizes by concluding that neoclassical market forces cannot be relied on to 
ensure biological preservation and are likely to “drive many species to extinction.” 
Lueck (1995) acknowledges the complex property milieu of wildlife but 
concludes that optimal property regimes will naturally evolve as the economic value 
of wildlife increases. However, difficulty in valuation stymies incentive mechanisms 
for wildlife conservation. A market approach to conservation using unfettered private 
rights might be accomplished by allowing private landowners to own inventions from 
wildlife on their land. Unfortunately, the incentive to conserve wildlife collapses 
because of indefinable present value. Since undefined value must compete with other, 
known values, more attractive market choices usually supersede conservation 
investments.  
Presuming the valuation problem could be resolved, private rights in tangible 
and non-tangible wildlife inventions align with incentive-based conservation policy. 
But, such rights per se do not inherently solve the problem of linking market value to 
conservation. What is the nature of that linkage?  
Beneficiaries of the market value of inventions from snake venom currently 
have no incentive to pay for snake conservation if the snake or its venom is available 
in the marketplace at a price disconnected from the cost of snake conservation. The 
key to linking the market value of inventions to conservation is determining the cost of 
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sustainably maintaining wildlife in its habitat, who bears that cost, and whether the 
market value of wildlife inventions reflects that cost.  
Possessing a snake with valuable venom provides the ability to farm the snake 
and to produce and sell venom at a price that reflects the cost of farming. The crucial 
question is whether possession of the snake is coupled to legal obligations to tie 
financial return from the snake to maintenance of other members of the species in its 
natural habitat. This raises the corollary questions of snake ownership and the owner’s 
obligation to participate in snake conservation. What about snakes with venoms of 
unknown value or snakes with no venom? How can a mechanism that links the market 
value of inventions to conservation cost work without a known present value of these 
inventions?  
The lack of quantifiable present or future economic value, the unfeasibility and 
too-high transaction-cost barrier of owning transient species, the patchwork of 
property rights in wildlife, and the disconnect between present market value and the 
unknown value of wildlife all argue against a pure private-rights approach. 
Conversely, there are compelling arguments that blanket prohibitions on private rights 
and market mechanisms in wildlife are not optimal for the sustainable conservation of 
wildlife in a politically and economically complex world. Do blends of public, private, 
and communal regimes provide solutions? 
Evaluating property regimes for resource management requires stated policy 
goals. Considering wildlife inventions, two primary goals provide guidance: the 
sustainability of wildlife, and optimal technology development. Different policy 
choices could favor one goal over the other. Should policy emphasize technology, or 
wildlife protection? Simultaneously pursuing both goals requires an equilibrium of 
emphasis. What is the proper balance?  
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The numerous inventions from wildlife reveal the ability of technologists and 
entrepreneurs to exploit wildlife—unhindered by property rules—creating an 
externality-based market failure of resource use. A logical reaction is to shift away 
from technology exploitation toward conservation. However, policy mechanisms that 
tinker with a system that creates valuable inventions is likely to affect the public good 
of technology development. For example, future externalities like PCR and 
Yellowstone could be corrected by prohibiting all future research on park wildlife. But 
correcting such market failure with such a policy would inhibit technology. The 
Endangered Species Act is intended to preserve the value of this scarce public good 
but also thwarts the development of inventions that could provide some fulfillment of 
that value. This creates a conundrum: the act preserves a species’ public value while 
precluding the full realization of that value. 
A balance may lie in allowing the pursuit of technology development that is 
non-consumptive of wildlife. Inventions can be created with negligible consumption 
of wildlife, allowing technology to create wildlife value without reducing wild 
populations. However, a simple increase in market value per se is likely to be 
insufficient to sustain wildlife. As McDaniel and Gowdy (1998) point out, increased 
market value does not mean wild populations will necessarily be conserved, and a 
high price may actually accelerate extirpation (Clark, 1976; Silvert, 1977; Tietenberg, 
1988). And, if Simpson (1997) and Barret and Lybbert (2000) are correct, increased 
market value will not be sufficient incentive for private-sector conservation efforts. 
A pure private-property solution to the problem seems unsatisfactory. The high 
uncertainty of inventions from wildlife, the high transaction cost of contracting among 
too-numerous private-rights holders, the transient nature of wildlife, and the public-
good character of this resource argue for a public approach regime of some kind.  
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Rose (1986) describes the long tradition of publicly owned resources going 
back to the Roman res publicum. Public resources, such as town defenses, roads, 
waterways, and intertidal zones, cannot be effectively managed by individual property 
holders. Such resources are not valuable enough to any one individual investor, are too 
boundless to privatize, and their users too numerous to collectivize. She argues that res 
publicae regimes are socially optimal when “economies of scale” render individual 
property holdings inefficient or unfeasible. For example, government must acquire 
rights to contiguous properties to build a highway or power line. Similarly, practical 
biological conservation requires an ecosystem approach (Grumbine, 1990; Baydack, 
Campa, and Haufler, 1999), which argues that a public-property regime is necessary to 
maintain the wildlife resource.  
Any property regime for wildlife inventions will entail a fundamental tension 
between rights in wildlife and rights in land. Alessi (1998), Gordon (1994), and 
Epstein (1998) argue that public rights in transient wildlife should be superseded by 
private rights in land. By the extension of private rights in land, the wildlife thereon 
should also be private. Their arguments are based on the virtue of private-property 
rights as the social optimum of economic efficiency, liberty, and rule of law. Taking 
their view, free-roaming wildlife ought to be res nullius since private landowners can 
then capture rights and value to such wildlife via trespass law. Further, they would 
argue that if landowners could expect a return on the value of inventions from wildlife 
on their land, they would have incentives to provide habitat. This concept suffers from 
the free-rider problem created by the wide-ranging, geographical transience of many 
wildlife species. The habitat investor has no rights in the wildlife that moves to 
another’s land; therefore, habitat-investment incentive is diminished. Despite 
allegiance to private-property resource regimes, even Alessi (1998) acknowledges that 
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private-property mechanisms are insufficient when the present value of the resource is 
low and the transaction costs of enforcing such rights are high.  
Despite their limitations, market solutions offer significant advantages. Private 
rights allow for the voluntary partitioning of rights to a resource, providing the 
flexibility to combine rights bundles (e.g., usufruct versus title) necessary for 
efficiency. The market provides a low-cost institution for organizing the production 
and consumption of a resource through the voluntary exchange of private-property 
rights. The key to eliminating externalities is the improved definition and enforcement 
of property rights in a resource (Alessi, 1998).  
However, optimal property regimes for natural resources are not simply 
choices between Leviathan and private property (Ostrom, 1990). Evidence indicates 
that no single type of property regime works efficiently, fairly, and sustainably for all 
natural-resource, public-good situations (Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1996). Even within 
public regimes, wildlife-property mechanisms vary. Governmental control of a 
resource ranges from unorganized (no formal control) to organized (statutory; Rose, 
1986). Types of public wildlife control reflect this range; from absolute prohibition of 
market transactions to less regulated. Aylward (1992) defines the mixed public-good 
character of wildlife and argues for a mixed public–private property regime. Barbier 
(1993) argues that a mix of property mechanisms is to be expected and defines criteria 
for designing resource policy: the balance of financial objective versus resource 
stability, uncertainty of market value versus private incentive, governmental difficulty 
in implementing market-based mechanisms versus certainty of regulation, charges on 
market activity that have unintended impacts on macroeconomic processes, and 
sufficient funding for policy implementation. 
The equilibrium of private versus governmental control is the basic policy 
issue. At a fundamental level, all property is public because government, as sovereign, 
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ultimately enforces all property rights. The puzzle lies in the tension of these two 
regimes. Private-rights advocates concede that private rights per se will be ineffective 
in sustaining the wildlife resource, whereas it is widely held that creating economic 
value in wildlife creates incentives to maintain it. The search is for property-regime 
blends that combine the advantages of both private and public control. Furthermore, 
property regimes are not the same as management regimes, and it is the management 
of resources that is ultimately most critical. Therefore, ownership may be less critical 
than who manages the resource and how (Weck-Hannemann and Frey, 1995). The 
combinations of public/private/communal rights described below may provide routes 
to solutions.  
Anderson (1998) and Lueck (1995) describe game-ranching scenarios in which 
limited private property in wildlife, with an oversight role of government, produces 
economically and biologically satisfactory outcomes. Anderson (1998) describes how, 
in the case of transient wildlife, free-rider and hold-out problems created by multiple 
owners of habitat or species effectively preclude private-contracting solutions to 
conservation. But a solution to this is to combine ownership of species and habitat in 
the same “firm,” and this is essentially what governmental agencies do. However, such 
agencies are hampered by an inability to integrate interagency jurisdictions, by lack of 
economic incentive by governmental personnel, and by politics. Anderson gives 
examples of innovative, non-governmental institutional arrangements for wildlife 
conservation that exemplify this “firm” approach. However, he does conclude that 
some governmental ownership of wildlife is unavoidable. 
Covenants are another private–public property hybrid. Hafkamp (1997) 
describes these instruments as contracts between the government and a private right-
holder to attain a public-resource goal. Such covenants are mostly private rights with 
relatively minor public rights that are voluntarily granted by the private entity. 
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Experiments with private rights in a wildlife resource under a public-control 
umbrella have been attempted in fisheries (Hanna, 1997; Fujita, Foran, and Zevos, 
1998). In these property hybrids, the government establishes a limit on total harvest 
and creates a market in which individuals exchange “individual fishing quotas” (IFQ), 
which are tradable shares of fishery catch. Analysts have recommended this property 
hybrid in these rival and non-exclusive wildlife resources to mitigate over-harvest 
(NRC, 1999). These schemes grant private access rights to public wildlife but do not 
grant private ownership of the wild populations, nor do they provide private incentive 
to maintain the wild population. Radomski (1999) proposed to solve these limitations 
by a novel scheme in which the government grants private property in the free-
roaming fish to non-harvesters who will have incentive to maintain the wild fishery. In 
this scheme, the government grants private property rights to the free-roaming fish, 
establishes ground rules and limits on over-harvest, and monitors compliance. Such 
systems are essentially communal-property regimes.  
Numerous economic analyses indicate that communal regimes may be 
preferable for sustainable ecological and economic management of natural resources 
(Berkes, 1989; Leal, 1998; Ostrom et al., 1999). These authors all point out that 
destruction may befall scarce res nullius resources but that communal property in 
resources has worked to sustainably manage many different types of natural resources 
(including wildlife) in many different cultures. Such property mechanisms are a good 
alternative to pure private or public property for depletable, common-pool resources 
(rival but non-exclusive public goods), when exclusion is costly, when the resource is 
not physically divisible, or when it is mobile (Ostrom, 1990; McKean, 1996). 
Effective communal regimes require restricted access to the resource (no res nullius), 
creation of a governance structure, and incentive mechanisms to invest in maintenance 
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of the resource. They are also limited in the number of participants and the size of the 
resource that can accommodated. 
When confronted with the structural difficulties of private ownership of 
wildlife, free-market advocates suggest communal approaches because they permit the 
internalization of externalities over a large resource system and allow the privatization 
of rights without physical divisibility (Yandle, 1997; Alessi, 1998; Anderson, 1998). 
McCay (1995) points out that limiting access to a communal resource will fail unless 
incentives or regulations prevent over-exploitation. Some governmental control may 
be necessary to assist the community in organizing, monitoring, and enforcing rules of 
resource use, particularly when the users of the resource don’t all perceive its value, 
don’t all understand its biological nature, or have divergent interests. Uncertain 
resource value disincentivizes the organization of communal organizations, and very 
large numbers of users makes such organization difficult (Ostrom, 1990). 
While locally devised property rights may be most effective for some resource 
management, other natural resource problems have boundaries that are too large for a 
manageable res communes institution. These may be managed by “nesting” local 
control within a larger institutional milieu that coordinates the nested organizations 
(Ostrom and Schlager, 1996). McKean (1996) describes a “resource federalism” in 
which smaller collectives own a resource and are nested in a larger resource 
federation. The smaller collectivities manage the resource unless externalities among 
the nested collectivities arise that the federation must resolve through coordinated and 
coercive action. 
It is unlikely that any single policy can effectively cover all property issues in 
wildlife inventions. Nonetheless, it is useful to establish policy principles and defining 
resource parameters to inform the search for promising institutional arrangements. 
Those principles and parameters are described in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3. Policy Principles and Resource Parameters 
1) Maximum biodiversity must be maintained, including the ecological and 
evolutionary process context. 
2) Optimum technological advancement should be fostered. 
3) Private incentives rather than coercion should be used whenever possible. 
4) Blends of property regime are likely to be necessary. 
5) Inter- and intragenerational equity and efficiency should be considered. 
6) Making inventions is generally not a consumptive use. 
7) The value of inventions must be linked to the cost of maintaining wildlife 
regulations and their habitat. 
 
What property-regime types and policy choices are suitable? The policy 
principles require incentives for the sustainable protection of wildlife and the linkage 
of commercial benefits to conservation. Researchers should have freedom to explore 
wildlife for inventions and to develop them. But this freedom must be associated with 
investment in the maintenance of wildlife in its habitat. There must be a direct link 
between the financial returns from wildlife invention and conservation. There are 
several potential policy mechanisms to accomplish these goals. The following four 
meta-policies provide a framework for evaluation. 
• Laissez-faire/res nullius: unfettered market in rights in 
biotechnological utilities privatized by capture. 
• Command and control/res publicae: absolute governmental rights, 
market prohibitions, tight control of government wildlife property. 
Free-roaming, wildlife specimens (and their utilities) are privately 
ownable. 
• Governmental regulation of private rights/res publicae–res 
privatae: regulated market forces.  
• Communal ownership/res communes. 
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Laissez-faire/res nullius: This policy–property regime currently exists for all 
inventions from any res nullius wildlife, for all patented inventions, and for some 
tangible inventions from wildlife whose free-roaming corpus is res publicae. The 
advantages are unfettered commercial exploitation of inventions, the allowing of 
investment incentive to develop an enhanced economic value of wildlife, and a low 
cost of implementation. The disadvantage is no link between the economic value of 
such utilities and the cost of the resource. Despite cautions against upsetting the 
technology development engine with wildlife-property mechanisms (Burk et al., 
1993), history shows that voluntary linkages to conservation are insignificant. The 
susceptibility of a scarce res nullius resource to a TOC under this regime is a good 
basis for eliminating this policy choice. Also, while private landowners might have 
incentive to sustain res nullius wildlife on their property, this is unlikely when the 
value of inventions is insufficient or uncertain. The free-rider problem also inhibits 
incentives to invest in habitat when the wildlife can be captured off the investor’s 
property. These flaws cause insufficient habitat investment, a problem that indicates 
the need for some public control.  
Command and control/res publicae: As exemplified by the Endangered 
Species Act, a key advantage of absolute governmental control of wildlife inventions 
is the preservation-of-species option value when such control is linked to the 
preservation of wild populations. Disadvantages include clashes between private-
property rights and coercive government, lack of private economic incentive to sustain 
populations, failure to realize inventions and their attendant social and economic 
benefits, and failure to enhance the economic value of wildlife. Eliminating market 
exchanges in a resource destroys economic value and incentive to preserve the 
resource. Analysts point out that the sustainable protection of endangered species is 
likely to require controlled market forces (Swanson, 1994; Hutton and Dickson, 2000). 
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And, if it is true that increasing economic value is essential to conserving wildlife 
(Alyward, 1992; Swanson, 1992; Barbier, 1993), endangered species would be the 
most valuable because of their high scarcity. An alternative under this regime would 
allow governmental researchers to develop inventions, but this would eliminate the 
innovative power of the for-profit sector. Similarly, government could permit for-
profits to discover and develop inventions but would own them. However, unless the 
sharing of benefits is allowed, profit-seeking firms will have insufficient incentive for 
the work. 
Privatization/res privatae: This policy–property regime is distinguished from 
res nullius in wildlife by extending private rights to free-roaming wildlife populations, 
making the physical capture of inventions unnecessary. However, except for endemic 
populations entirely on a single private land, perfecting res privatae rights via trespass 
law and contracting with other habitat owners is technically infeasible—one of the 
primary reasons for existing public regimes (Lueck, 1995). However, it may be 
feasible for government to grant rights in a population (defined by geography or 
taxon) of wildlife to private entities, similar to the government’s granting of certain 
private rights to a public fishery (Radomski, 1999). 
Governmental regulation of private rights/res publicae–res privatae: Even 
the strongest private-property rights are ultimately granted and enforced by the 
sovereign government (Rose, 1986). But, in practice, there are a wide range of public–
private blends that exhibit a gradient of governmental versus private control. The 
balance can be skewed to governmental control, as in federal and state law that allows 
possession, but not sale, of captured game, with an extension of such a ban to the 
discovery of invention. This would preclude technological discovery, value creation, 
and incentive. Shifting toward private rights might include allowing the private 
ownership of inventions in public wildlife captured under license and requiring 
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payment of a royalty or fee to the government, as with certain mineral rights. If the 
state uses such monies for conservation, the externality could be, at least indirectly, 
corrected. Such policy could be designed by relatively simple adjustments to existing 
federal and state laws and regulations. Implementation would be costly because 
monitoring of possession, record-keeping of specimen disposition, and results of 
inventions discovered and commercialized, including patents applied for, would be 
necessary. To maximize the effectiveness of this policy, it might be necessary to 
modify patent law to require applicants to disclose the wildlife source that produced 
the patentable invention and to swear that such wildlife was held and used legally. 
This is politically more difficult than an assertion of rights through existing wildlife 
control laws. Also, this policy–property scenario does not effectively address 
externality created by wildlife specimens that are res nullius or that have already been 
made private by legal capture (e.g., zoos and other legally caged specimens). This 
externality might be corrected by expanded governmental rights in inventions from 
any wildlife. Such expansion, most likely by state government, would be politically 
difficult, particularly for obscure wildlife on private land or wildlife long-held and 
reared for many generations in captivity. Such difficulty might be mitigated if 
government does not assert ownership of captured specimens, limiting its rights to a 
share of commercial return or requirements to use in the public interest. Significant 
monitoring and enforcement issues would arise, some of which might require 
modification of patent law as described above. These policy–property mechanisms, 
whether more or less politically feasible, would indirectly correct the market failure if 
governmental uses returns for conservation. However, although the externality may be 
indirectly addressed by this governmental connection to private benefits, it yields no 
link between enhanced economic value of wildlife to private incentive to invest in 
sustaining free-roaming wildlife.  
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Communal ownership/res communes: Ostrom (1990) points out the general 
unfamiliarity with, and even resistance to, communal-property regimes in this country. 
Despite the long history of successful communal property in the form of the 
corporation, such resource management schemes are not well known. Communal-
property systems provide an alternative, where applicable, to an otherwise stark choice 
between socialism or private property and free enterprise (Hardin, 1968). Property 
regimes of “shared private rights” (McKean, 1996) have many of the advantages of 
private property and can be applied where simple private rights in a resource are not 
feasible. Numerous examples of communal resource management in fisheries (Hanna, 
1997; Leal, 1998; NRC, 1999), wildlife (Lueck, 1995; Anderson, 1998), water, 
(Ostrom, 1990; Somma, 1997), pasture (Netting, 1972), and others (Berkes, 1989; 
Ostrom and Schlager, 1996) suggest the potential of this approach for sustainable 
management of inventions in wildlife. However, other than large fisheries, successful 
res communes systems are typically relatively small-scale or single resource/user 
systems (Acheson, 2003; Ostrom, 1990; Warner, 1997; Iida, 1998). The challenge will 
be to apply these mechanisms to much larger and more complex systems and to solve 
complex system design and governance issues (Ostrom, 1990). In addition, unless 
effectively linked to land rights, the communal ownership of transient wildlife is likely 
fraught with significant conflict with private landowners (Geisler and Bedford, 1995; 
Alessi, 1998; Epstein, 1998). As a further cautionary note, the converse of the 
commons tragedy, the “tragedy of the anticommons,” is a resource-use problem that 
results from too many owners of a resource blocking each other (Heller, 1998), and 
the anticommons may be a particular problem with intellectual property (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998). 
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6.15 Policy Prescriptions 
Effective property policy for managing the resource of wildlife inventions 
must resolve the simultaneous challenges of correcting the market externality, creating 
incentive for conservation, facilitating technology discovery and development, and 
reconciling the species-focus of wildlife-property rights with the ecosystem approach 
of practical conservation biology.  
Habitat owners could be incentivized to invest in habitat creation and 
maintenance if they were able to capture at least some of the value of any invention 
from wildlife on their property. This is easily done with res nullius wildlife and is 
possible for public wildlife in cooperation with government. However, two problems 
still loom large: the uncertain value of unknown inventions and the wide geographical 
range and transience of wildlife. The uncertain-value problem might be mitigated by 
technology investment that leads to the finding and owning of inventions from wildlife 
they harbor. Private and governmental investment in such research could play a role. 
But the free-rider problem of transient wildlife remains. One solution is to organize 
landowners in biologically contiguous or related habitat into associations that would 
share values found on any property in the association. A very different policy strategy 
might address the value and free-rider/transience problems: a species-focused 
property-rights approach.  
In the species-focused policy strategy, exclusive rights to inventions are 
granted to a non-governmental entity such as a for-profit firm, conservation group, or 
other organization. As with the fisheries property example of Radomski (1999), the 
government would grant property rights in any invention to the entity obtained in their 
particular species. The entity would contract with habitat owners to support the wild 
population, and the exchange could include shares of commercialization return. This 
strategy also lends itself to the governmental auction of rights, as in the allocation of 
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broadcast frequencies. For example, exclusive rights to the inventions of endangered 
species could be auctioned with fees and royalties used for conservation. Appropriate 
controls on wildlife exploitation would be required to assure population maintenance.  
These strategies would require the organization of “firms” to hold private 
rights in wildlife inventions. Such firms might include novel conservation associations 
established solely for this purpose or existing organizations. Anderson (1998) 
describes several types of wildlife conservation organizations that could provide 
models. The variety of communal institutions for wildlife conservation described by 
Ostrom et al. (1999) are also templates. Such “firms” might be corporate or 
cooperative in governance. Reid (1996) postulates cooperative associations and other 
partnerships to own and exchange wildlife inventions. Such “biodiversity 
cooperatives” would be granted certain wildlife-property rights by government. 
Ellis (2001) describes “common pool equity,” a particularly novel mechanism 
that aligns with these policy strategies. A “common pool equity” is a share of profits 
of any firm that extracts from the common resource. So, any firm that is a member of a 
common-pool equity association for exploitation of inventions from a wild species 
would receive a share of any profits obtained by any other member of the association. 
Such a structure might fit with the “nested resource federalism” model of McKean 
(1996) and Ostrom and Schlager (1996). For example, a migratory bird flyway could 
be organized as nested organizations with either a species or geographical focus, with 
a larger governing collective aggregating the rights of the nested groups. 
Government often has rights in both habitat and species, sometimes separately 
and sometimes together. How should it manage its potential inventions? Regarding 
species, if it assures against population over-exploitation, granting certain private 
rights to such inventions is likely to have advantages for both technology and 
conservation. Where no private partner exists, government ought to invest public 
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resources to fund inventions on its species and to license rights in such discoveries to 
private firms, as it does with currently patentable governmental inventions. A similar 
approach is possible with governmental habitat ownership. Government should 
maintain the integrity of habitat and populations and facilitate non-consumptive, non-
destructive searching for biotechnological utilities by firms that will have the 
obligation to share commercial return with the government to use for conservation. 
How does genomics affect these scenarios? A fundamental premise underlying 
the analyses in this work is the dependence of property in inventions on property in 
free-roaming or captured wildlife specimens. In order to invent an invention, someone 
must have had physical possession of a biological specimen. However, once 
information is extracted from the specimen, that information may be used to create 
property in intangible patents. Thus, once the information is untethered from the 
original dependence on the physical specimen, the linkage has been severed. If 
possessors of wildlife specimens have no obligation to previous owners or possessors, 
information gleaned from the specimen is purely private. The fact that genetic 
information from endangered species is being systematically obtained raises questions 
about the appropriate property rights in and disposition of such intangible material. 
For example, the San Diego Zoo reports genotyping and gene sequencing of the 
Arroyo toad, bighorn sheep, Chacoan peccary, California condor, owl monkey, 
Przewalski’s horse, bonobo, black rhino, Somalian wild ass, and mountain gorilla 
(Mounce, 2001). The existence of the “Frozen Zoo” project in the Center for 
Reproduction of Endangered Species, in which a “bank vault” of cryopreserved cell 
cultures of many endangered species is maintained, emphasizes the importance of this 
question. These issues require further analysis and should be urgently considered 
given the growing use of genomics in wildlife study and the untethering of the 
valuable intangible inventions obtained from the specimens. 
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Finally, this analysis has provided only a preliminary base from which to probe 
deeper into the implications of potential design of optimal policy/property institutions 
for sustainable use of wildlife for technological discovery. Clearly, it is important to 
move the research in that direction. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
7.1 Case Studies 
The two cases examined below exhibit common themes of patent rights and 
inventions from wildlife. These cases also represent contrasts: of private- versus 
public-property rights and failure versus success in asserting a chain of property rights 
from wildlife in its habitat, through personal property of specimen collection and 
laboratory use, and eventually to intellectual property. The first case involves 
inventions from hot-spring bacteria in Yellowstone National Park and demonstrates a 
failure to link public rights in wildlife specimens to patents. The other case, 
bioprospecting and the Finger Lakes Land Trust, demonstrates a successful linkage of 
the chain of property rights by a landowner through contractual relations with research 
and commercialization partners. 
In both cases, specimen possession and use looms as the critical nexus. In the 
Yellowstone case, this is a nexus of failure to establish the policy link between 
economic value of invention and conservation. In the Finger Lakes case, possession, 
and the contractual strings attached to it, established this policy balance. 
7.1.1 Yellowstone’s Valuable Microbes: Specimen Possession and the 
Failed Property Chain 
Specimen possession and the failure to link that possession to invention and 
patents looms large in the Yellowstone National Park and patents on a polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR), one of the most valuable inventions of the biotechnology 
industry. 
In the summer of 1966, Dr. Thomas Brock of the University of Wisconsin, and 
his graduate student H. Freeye, collected microbial mat samples at Mushroom Hot 
Springs in Yellowstone Park as part of their academic research, under a national park 
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permit for scientific collection. The permit placed few restrictions on the researchers’ 
use of specimens collected in the park. From these samples, they isolated a 
thermophilic microbe (“YT-1”) and subsequently published a paper on this new 
species, Thermus aquaticus. As a routine part of the scientific publication process, 
Brock and Freeye deposited living, pure-culture specimens of T. aquaticus in the 
public repository American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) as “ATCC 25104.” 
Nothing in the park’s rules for biological-sample collection precluded such a deposit. 
In fact, some of the park’s regulations actually encouraged it. The only restriction 
placed on public access to ATCC 25104 by the ATCC was a requirement to pay a 
small fee and a standard “hold harmless” clause for liability. Anyone could obtain an 
ATCC culture on payment of this modest fee, and obtaining a sample gave recipients 
unfettered personal property rights in that sample. 
Several years after the deposit of T. aquaticus in the ATCC, Cetus Corporation 
paid ATCC’s $35 access fee, which allowed its employee Kary Mullis to acquire 
ATCC 25104. Mullis used this culture to discover the novel enzyme “taq”1 and to 
invent the patentable PCR method of DNA amplification. The PCR makes exact 
copies of specific sequences of DNA and has proven to be an essential biotechnology. 
It is used globally in research and has many commercial applications. Its discovery 
was so profound that Mullis was awarded a Nobel Prize in the late 1980s for its 
discovery, and Science magazine declared Taq polymerase the “molecule of the 
decade.” 
Cetus filed its first U.S. patent application on October 25, 1985, covering PCR 
materials and methods, with Mullis as sole inventor. Cetus filed a subsequent U.S. 
patent application, with Mullis and five other inventors, on February 7, 1986. These 
applications were issued on July 28, 1987, as U.S. Patent Nos. 4,683,202 (Patent 
                                                 
1 Taq refers to thermos aquaticus. 
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’2022) and 4,683,195. Patent ’202, titled “Process for Amplifying Nucleic Acid,” was 
issued with twenty-one claims covering a process for amplifying any “specific nucleic 
acid sequence contained in a nucleic acid mixture thereof . . . . ” With the issue of 
these two patents, Cetus controlled the making, using, and selling of PCR technology. 
Later, Cetus and its partner, Perkin Elmer Corporation, commercialized PCR through 
licenses and sales of PCR reagents and equipment. Eventually, Hoffman-Laroche 
purchased the Cetus PCR patent estate for approximately $300 million. Since this 
transaction, PCR has produced an ever-larger flow of commercially profitable activity. 
As original custodians of the samples taken by Brock and Freeye, neither 
Yellowstone National Park, the National Park Service, the Department of the Interior, 
nor any agency of the U.S government has received a share of the commercial revenue 
streams resulting from the PCR intellectual properties. Other than the usual business 
taxes, there has been no financial link between the beneficiaries of PCR (particularly 
Cetus or Hoffman-LaRoche) and the U.S. government, despite the latter’s parens 
patriae rights and obligations in national park wildlife (Clifford, 1994; Milstein, 
1994a,b). The source of this failed linkage can be identified in the failure to maintain 
the chain of property rights. 
Because the original specimen was taken from Yellowstone National Park, a 
logical first issue to consider is the extent of a public-property interest in wild 
microbial biota both on federal parkland and after it has been removed from the park. 
Then, to what extent do any government rights extend to intellectual property from 
that biota? The analysis below answers these questions. It also sheds light on larger 
questions: Does the federal government have the sovereign right to control access to 
and use of wildlife on all federal lands, and does this right extend to all types of biota, 
including microbes? Do such rights depend on the type of federal lands (e.g., Bureau 
                                                 
2 K. Mullis inventor; Cetus Corporation Assignee (i.e., patent owner). 
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of Land Management, national forest, national parks, Department of Defense)? Can 
the federal government actively control the access to and disposition of all biota on 
federal lands? Should it, and if so, to what end? Does the balance of state versus 
federal jurisdiction affect property in wildlife on federal land, particularly national 
parks? 
7.1.1.1 Federal Property in T. aquaticus 
Chapter 3 describes the long judicial evolution of federal sovereignty in 
wildlife on federal land and species selected for federal protection by Congress. In 
particular, the 1920 Missouri v. Holland Supreme Court decision establishes federal 
sovereignty over wildlife Congressionally selected for federal control. The combined 
effect of Hunt v. U.S. (1928), New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall (1969), 
and Kleppe v. New Mexico (1976) further cements federal sovereignty over such 
wildlife. But did Congress intend a federal property interest in national park wildlife? 
Like any landowner, Yellowstone National Park has certain rights in wildlife 
fixed to its land. This includes growing plants and, by the doctrine of ratione soli, 
ownership of the soil and soil organisms. In addition, the federal government has a 
parens patriae trust responsibility in national parks. This trust responsibility is based 
on the Yellowstone National Park Act of 1874, the 1894 Act to protect the Birds and 
Animals in the National Park, and the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916. 
Taken together, these acts grant power to the Secretary of the Interior to make and 
implement regulations necessary for the “proper care” of designated national parks, 
including the prohibition of all hunting and “the preservation from injury or 
despoilation of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities or wonders within said 
park.”3 
                                                 
3 16 U.S.C. §§ 881, 2-3 (2002). 
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There are other bases for a property right in the original specimen collected in 
Yellowstone by Brock and Freeye. Relevant federal regulations are found in the Code 
of Federal Regulations, Title 36 (CFR 36). Under CFR 36, which underlies the 
policies of Yellowstone and the National Park Service, select wildlife (i.e., large 
animals, fish, and birds) are explicitly controlled and their collection limited to certain 
uses (i.e., scientific research, museums). Other biota (e.g., arthropods, microbes) are 
not explicitly mentioned in these regulations. However, CFR 36 provides that all 
biological specimens taken from a national park shall remain the property of the 
National Park Service and that the superintendent of a national park has broad 
authority over all hunting or collecting in that park. Section 2.1 of CFR 36 prohibits 
the possession of any living or dead national park wildlife, fish, plants, or their parts 
and products without a permit. Section 2.5 (“Research Specimens”) defines conditions 
for taking specimens from a national park and prohibits “taking plants, fish, wildlife, 
rocks or minerals except by permission from the Park management (a prerequisite of 
permission to include a collection permit).” Section 2.5 also requires that a permit for 
collection be issued only to “an official representative of a reputable scientific or 
educational institution or a State or Federal agency for the purpose of research, 
baseline inventories, monitoring, impact analysis, group study or museum study.” 
Other requirements in CFR 36 for collecting in a national park include the following: 
1) the park superintendent’s approval of the stated scientific or resource management 
goals of the collecting institution or agency, 2) acquisition of all applicable federal and 
state permits, 3) that the intended use and final disposition is in accordance with 
applicable law and federal administrative policies, 4) justification that the specimen 
cannot be obtained elsewhere, and 5) that no damages will result. CFR 36 also states 
that killing park wildlife requires a research proposal approved by the park 
superintendent and prohibits “derogation of the values or purposes for which the Park 
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area was established.” In addition, such killing must have the potential for conserving 
and perpetuating the subject species. CFR 36 requires that collected park specimens be 
made available to the public and labeled “National Park Service” and “NPS Catalog.” 
Related rules4 include explicit requirements for the control of collected specimens 
(including a whole or part of an organism). Section 2.5 requires that intended uses and 
final disposition of any collected park specimen be consistent with all applicable laws, 
regulations, and policies. Most important, nowhere in CFR 36 is a transfer of 
ownership in collected park specimens authorized. Furthermore, perpetual 
“ownership” of the park’s collected specimens is supported by the Special Park Uses 
Guideline,5 which states, “if the collection is to be stored by an outside institution, it is 
placed on loan.” 
Beyond the national park’s regulatory control of park wildlife via the permit 
process, the U.S. Constitution requires that Congress approve transfers of ownership 
of federal property. Also, the federal government cannot abandon federal property 
without expressly stating its intentions to do so. 
Transient wildlife that are res publicae only when they are on federal land6 are 
no longer federal property when they leave the park boundary on their own volition. 
However, the park’s res publicae control does extend to wildlife that are wrongfully 
taken from the park. Court cases involving the illegal taking of public timber suggest 
the extent of these rights. For example, a purchaser of timber wrongfully taken from 
the public domain is liable to the government for the value of the timber at the time it 
was purchased, but not for the additional value added to the timber through 
manufacture.7 This ruling might suggest that the federal government’s rights in T. 
                                                 
4 NPS 77, Chap. 5. 
5 NPS 53, Appendix 12. 
6 That is, they are not explicitly protected species. 
7 U.S. vs. Kelly, 17 p. 878 (Wash.). 
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aquaticus cultures do not extend to the intellectual property derived from those 
cultures. 
Federal rights and obligations in national park wildlife are also defined in the 
1988 Management Policies, U.S. Dept of Interior/Natl. Park Service, which requires 
park policies to be based on the following principles: “National Parks must be 
maintained in absolutely unimpaired form; National Parks are for the use, observation, 
health and pleasure of the people; The national interest must dictate all decisions 
affecting public or private enterprise in the Park.” 
Based on an explicit reading of the law that underlies Yellowstone National 
Park, it is clear that the federal government has the sovereign right to control all 
wildlife on national parkland. Federal statutes and regulations have granted the 
national park superintendent power to implement that right in furtherance of park 
purposes and the national interest. Park management has a public-trust duty to 
preserve, protect, and maintain park wildlife and its habitat. At a minimum, park 
managers are obligated to control the physical collection of park wildlife. It is also 
clear that ownership of any specimen taken from a park must remain with the federal 
government unless specifically authorized by Congress and explicitly intended by 
federal agencies. But what about progeny of the original culture-specimen? The law 
relating to property in livestock may provide guidance (St. Julian, 1995). By common 
law and custom, in lieu of a contract otherwise, the owner of the mother organism is 
the owner of all her progeny.8 And although applying this doctrine to microbes is 
novel, it would extend federal rights to all subsequent cultures of the original T. 
aquaticus sample. Applying this doctrine, all T. aquaticus cultures are federal 
property. But the failure of the federal government to assert control over use of the 
cultures, allowing them to be made publicly available, and the lack of res publicae 
                                                 
8 Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co., v. Mann, 130 U.S.S. (1888). 
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reach into manufactured value, militates against any federal rights in the PCR 
intellectual property. What is the source of this failed linkage? 
Park managers did not violate federal law or policy in allowing Brock and 
Freeye to collect T. aquaticus. The placement of the organism in a publicly accessible 
repository was also in keeping with federal law and regulation. However, the NPS-
property labels on the samples were not maintained by the physical possessors, a 
violation of federal regulation. More important, even if such labels were maintained 
and monitored, control was necessary to link the park specimens to the resulting 
patents. Park management did not fulfill its parens patriae obligation to keep track of 
and control use of the park’s T. aquaticus property. This is the key point: The federal 
government failed to control the use of collected park organisms, in particular, their 
commercial use. If the government had maintained such control and extended it to 
patent activity, it could have allowed patent rights in exchange for a sharing of 
financial returns. The source of this failure lies in the terms and conditions of 
specimen possession, which were defined in the collection agreement. This agreement 
is dissected in the next section. 
7.1.1.2 Yellowstone’s Collection Permit and the Property-Right Failure 
The original specimen collection was done under a required permit. However, 
the permit did not require subsequent labeling of the specimen as NPS property and 
placed no restrictions on its use or distribution. Since public availability and use were 
not controlled, the government lost its control of the possession and use of the 
specimens. 
The Special Park Uses Guideline requires public access to all collected park 
specimens. This exemplifies the dual, contradictory policies of federal property in 
national park wildlife: perpetual governmental ownership of collected biological 
materials without restrictions on use. The result: loss of governmental interest in 
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intellectual property rights obtained from governmental wildlife property. In the PCR 
case, there was no linkage between rights of possession in T. aquaticus specimens and 
the PCR patents. Implementation of federal regulations that prescribe public access to 
collected park specimens, without control over use, breaks the link between res 
publicae property rights in federal wildlife and biotechnological property derived from 
collected specimens. Reestablishing this linkage requires modification of federal 
regulations so that patentable subject matter from federal wildlife is subject to some 
level of federal control. 
Until 1995 and the publicizing of the PCR issue, the Yellowstone National 
Park Collection Permit did not control most uses of collected specimens, including 
invention and patenting. Since then, Yellowstone has implemented a policy by which 
commercial use of its specimens requires prior approval of the national park 
superintendent, and gives the superintendent the authority to negotiate benefit-sharing 
arrangements. The park is also following federal rules that require that a park 
collection permit be granted only to a “reputable scientific or educational institution” 
and only with justification that the collection could not be accomplished outside the 
park. Also, any commercial use requires a written contract for the terms of such use 
(Varley and Scott, 1998). 
7.1.1.3 Federal Policy on Intellectual Property from National Park 
Wildlife 
Federal law and National Park Service policy guidelines implicitly allow, at 
the park superintendent’s discretion, the searching for and patenting of inventions, as 
long as the purpose is for the “use” and “health” of the public. Federal statutes also 
require that such activities serve the national interest. It can be argued that patents 
generally serve the public interest. However, allowing individuals to patent and profit 
by using an invention from park wildlife, without control by park management, may 
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not be in the public interest and could be a violation of the government’s public-trust 
responsibility. The question is whether it is in the public interest to allow a use of park 
wildlife that produces private profits but returns nothing directly to Yellowstone 
National Park, the National Park Service, or the U.S. Department of the Interior. 
Profit-making activity produces jobs, products, and taxes, and these are widely 
considered to be in the public interest. But is this indirect benefit sufficient or 
equitable? Does the public interest require a sharing of financial return to protect the 
source of the wildlife? Should such profits help park managers to steward park 
wildlife resources or to buy more park lands? After all, it is only because of the 
original purchase and ongoing protection of Yellowstone’s ecosystems that the 
profitable PCR patents exist. 
Before concluding that the park should share in the financial benefits of patents 
from its wildlife, consider picture-taking. The capture of visual images of the park is 
similar to the acquisition of patentable information from a small, ecologically 
insignificant sample of wildlife. National parks do not attempt to assert a property 
interest in park photos, and to do so seems over-reaching. Of course, a fundamental 
difference is the physical possession of wild biota required for patenting. However, 
federal law requires that the federal government maintain national parks “unimpaired.” 
Therefore, a basic policy premise of park specimen collection for intellectual-property 
purposes is that collecting will be non-destructive, non-consumptive, and will have a 
negligible biological or ecological impact. So, if that possession has essentially no 
impact on the park, should patents be treated like photos? 
The national park superintendent appears to have broad authority to design and 
implement a park-specific policy for specimen collection that could include invention 
and patenting. Is there a basis for a park superintendent’s allowance of patents from 
park wildlife? Federal regulations appear to encourage activities that enhance the 
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protection or management of park species and to discourage activities that do not. 
Therefore, establishing a mechanism to return resources for management through the 
controlled commercial use of collected specimens would appear to be a suitable 
activity. Discovering and patenting inventions from park wildlife would be within 
federal law and policy as long as: “1) the purpose is to provide for the health and use 
of the public; 2) is in the public interest 3) does not damage Park resources, 4) is 
undertaken by reputable research institutions; 5) is done under a proper collection 
permit and commercial use contract.”9 
Since federal law and regulations currently are not explicit on the collection 
and use of national park wildlife for inventing and patenting, park managers would 
need to exercise judgment and interpretation on a case-by-case basis. The National 
Park Service Museum Handbook for Complying with Regulations for Cataloging 
Natural History Specimens10 requires specimen labeling, recording of data on 
collection (site, collector, date), a specimen loan form, and a written contract with any 
who wish to collect for profit. Although the guide addresses the collection of museum 
specimens specifically, it provides a basis for the commercial use of park wildlife 
through patents. 
Assuming national park managers allow such wildlife-specimen collecting, a 
related policy question is whether for-profit institutions should be considered 
“reputable research institutions” and, therefore, qualified for such activity. Unlike non-
profit research institutions, companies conduct research solely for profit-making 
purposes. Furthermore, companies have a primary goal of protecting shareholder 
interests. However, law-abiding companies are arguably “reputable” institutions that 
conduct research and could qualify. If not, such activities must be done by universities 
and similar institutions or the federal regulations must be clarified, perhaps to include 
                                                 
9 1988 Management Policies, U.S. Dept of Interior/Natl. Park Service. 
10 Ch. 4, Sec. E. 
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the term “development” in the requirement (i.e., “reputable research and development 
institutions”). 
Based on changes in practice over the last few years, park wildlife patenting 
activities can be arranged to fall within federal law and regulation, and park 
superintendents have the authority to make key decisions that will affect the policy 
balance between technology and conservation. Undoubtedly, practical questions of 
implementation cost will arise. But a more fundamental question lingers: Should such 
activities be allowed (let alone encouraged) in national parks, at all? 
An argument for a policy that facilitates and encourages inventions and 
patenting from national park resources is strengthened by the hypothetical “wonder 
drug” discovery scenario. If there is a possibility that the national park’s biological 
resources contain a wonder drug that would be a boon to human health and welfare, 
and if this drug could be discovered only if such activities are allowed, federal law and 
regulation would appear to encourage such activities. But there are alternative views. 
Such uses of park wildlife could be considered a commodification of the park and a 
wholly inappropriate use of this treasured public good. An extreme, anti-
anthropocentric environmental view would hold that the development of new drugs 
exacerbates the problem of human population growth, a primary cause of biodiversity 
loss, and should not be encouraged. Clearly, however, this argument is politically 
infeasible. 
Although it is likely that there would be widespread support for drug discovery 
in national parks, it is also likely that such support would be contingent on certain 
conditions: the protection of the park’s inherent qualities, no widespread 
commercialization of park feasibilities, and no “selling off” of the park’s resources. 
The park directives, defined in the National Park Service’s 1988 Management 
Policies, foster the protection of park genetic resources and support the concept of 
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“appropriately-structured arrangements” for technical discovery and patenting. 
“Appropriately-structured” in this context could mean a mechanism that returns a 
share of financial gain to activities that protect “genetic resources.” Returns to the 
United States Treasury through business-related taxes probably do not satisfy this 
requirement. 
7.1.1.4 Yellowstone and PCR, Conservation and Sustainable Development 
Yellowstone’s hydrothermal features support a thermophilic microbial biota 
that is a globally unique natural resource. The financial value of the PCR patents and 
related products demonstrates the significant economic value of that resource. This 
value is emphasized by other commercial products that have been discovered from this 
resource.11 This valuable resource exists only because of the federal government’s 
intervention in the late 1800s to remove Yellowstone lands from the market, requiring 
a taxpayer investment in the land purchase and a public investment in the long-term 
protection of the resource. 
Yellowstone Park’s handling of T. aquaticus was a failure to assert res 
publicae rights. But was the park’s handling of T. aquaticus, and its downstream 
inventions and products, a failure in terms of conservation and sustainable 
development? From a narrow, ecological standpoint of the sustainability of the 
microbial resource per se, the answer is no. Sampling, when practiced with a “light 
hand,” and using appropriate collection procedures, is a non-extractive resource use. 
Quantity harvesting is another matter. Presuming that collecting per se does no long-
term12 damage to the resource, sustainability has been satisfied. The economic and 
social sustainability of the resource is another matter. 
                                                 
11 John Varley, personal communication with author, 1988. Dr. Varley is responsible for all biota 
collection at Yellowstone National Park. 
12 The definition of “long-term” is an open question. 
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Was the PCR case a failure of sustainable economics policy? Long-term 
maintenance of the national park requires the expenditure of taxpayer resources for 
land acquisition, protection, and management. Adequate personnel, facilities, and 
equipment all cost money. Unfortunately, the National Park Service is usually 
strapped for cash—and Congress rarely authorizes purchase of additional park lands. 
Yellowstone has historically employed one technician-level person to monitor and 
enforce the terms of all scientific-collection activities in the entire park. Logic dictates 
that such oversight is insufficient given the number of collectors, their varied 
activities, the size of the park, and the significant economic pressure on the resource. 
A situation in which significant economic values are obtained from a national park 
resource that does nothing to enhance the national park’s ability to sustain that 
resource runs counter to the concept of sustainable economic development. 
Even if the National Park Service were fully funded to effectively manage 
current resources, it could be argued that the service has a public-trust obligation to 
obtain resources for the purchase of additional lands that could potentially provide 
other such resources for future generations. 
From the standpoint of social sustainability (i.e., intragenerational equity), 
those who have profited from the commercial exploitation of national park wildlife 
have taken profitable advantage of the taxpayer’s burden of supporting the national 
parks, their lands, and facilities. Taxpayers have paid the full cost of maintaining the 
resource, while patent beneficiaries pay only a pro rata taxpayer’s share. 
An alternative view holds that the sustainable use of this resource may best be 
accomplished by fostering indirect benefits that result from the commercialization of 
such resources—innovation, new products and markets, increased jobs, and expanded 
tax revenues. This view holds that such innovation and its benefits are most efficiently 
obtained by society when governmental control is minimized. A primary limitation of 
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this argument is that the resource manager directly responsible for the resource (e.g., 
Yellowstone Park personnel) does not directly obtain benefit. 
7.1.1.5 Epilogue 
In August of 1997, the National Park Service announced that it would allow a 
small U.S. biotechnology company, Diversa, to take samples of soil, water, and plants 
over the next four years in return for a one-time fee of $175,000 and royalties of up to 
10% of sales on any future products derived from park samples. This arrangement 
spawned the filing of a suit against the National Park Service by several non-profit 
organizations (Pennisi, 1998). Although the suit was dismissed, the court decided that 
the park is required to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment before entering 
into such arrangements.13 
7.2.1 Fungal Bioprospecting and the Finger Lakes Land Trust: Effective 
Specimen Possession Proves the Linkage 
Unlike the Yellowstone–PCR case, in which the failure to maintain the chain 
of property rights destroyed the linkage between res publicae biota and personal 
patent rights, the institutional arrangements for fungal bioprospecting on the lands of 
the Finger Lakes Land Trust (FLLT) represent a successful connection of wildlife 
property and patents. In this arrangement, the FLLT established property rights in 
wildlife on its land and extended those rights to the control of possession and use by 
other parties. Most important, the FLLT’s biota-property rights extended beyond the 
removal of specimens from FLLT land and into the realm of intellectual property. 
Understanding how the biota-property rights assertion by the FLLT produced 
benefit-sharing from potential intellectual property sheds light on the mechanisms 
necessary to optimize the connection between the technologically derived value of 
wildlife and the cost of conservation. 
                                                 
13 As of the spring of 2002, no new such arrangements had been entered into by Yellowstone Park (J. 
Varley, personal communication with author, 2002). 
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The FLLT was established in 1989 as a public-membership, non-profit 
corporation for the purpose of protecting unique natural lands in the Finger Lakes 
region of New York State. The FLLT’s activities include land acquisition and 
management. In 1997, the FLLT purchased the “Biodiversity Preserve,” a biologically 
diverse parcel of land near Cornell University and Ithaca, New York. One of the 
reasons to acquire the preserve was to develop its potential to produce valuable 
inventions from its wildlife. 
Developing the bioprospecting potential for bioprospecting required the 
proactive development of a property-based framework that would allow non-
destructive capture of the economic value of inventions from the preserve’s biota. That 
framework was based on the FLLT’s establishment and enforcement of its property 
rights in all biota on its land. The first step was to establish control over access to biota 
on FLLT land, which was accomplished by the following steps: 
1) Control access to FLLT land: Using New York State trespass law, the 
FLLT established a coherent policy and the administrative capacity to control access 
to FLLT lands. 
2) Prohibit the unauthorized taking of biota on FLLT land: In conjunction 
with the establishment of controlled land access, the FLLT established a policy of 
strict prohibition against the taking of any biota on its land except through an explicit 
collection- or hunting-permit process. 
3) A collection-permit process to regulate the taking of biota: The FLLT 
established a biological sample collection- and possession-permit process that allowed 
only permittees to take and possess FLLT biota under explicitly prescribed conditions 
and protocols. These included justification for collection, definition of species to be 
collected, number/quantity of specimens, location, and nature of archived samples. 
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4) Property assertion in collected samples: The FLLT’s collection permit, a 
bailment contract defining the conditions of possession and use by the collector, 
placed the following restrictions on the permittee’s possession and use of collected 
biological material: 
a) required labeling of all samples collected, regardless of form, such as whole 
caged organism, culture tube, petri plate, deep freeze, etc. 
b) prohibited transfers to third parties without prior approval by FLLT. 
c) prohibited commercial use (by the FLLT’s definition) without license from 
FLLT. 
d) required acknowledgment of permittee to hold collected materials as a 
bailment. 
5) Ownership vigilance: The FLLT instituted mechanisms for follow-up 
monitoring of the permittee’s adherence to permit conditions, for example, biological-
property accounting. 
By implementing these steps, the FLLT established its control over biota on its 
land and could then enter into a bioprospecting partnership from a position of 
property-right-based strength. In the first step, the FLLT asserted control over access 
to possession of any biota on its property (fixed or transient), through its rights under 
trespass law. In steps two and three, the FLLT established property rights in its biota 
(distinct from the res publicae biota on its land). In steps four and five, the FLLT 
asserted property rights in biota removed from its land. 
The feasibility of this biota property construct was dependent, in part, on the 
biological taxa selected for bioprospecting. 
FLLT lands comprise a variety of habitats in the Finger Lakes region. 
Although a variety of wildlife taxa could have served as bioprospecting targets, fungi 
were selected as a particularly promising source of technical discoveries. There were 
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important biological reasons for this selection, but the lack of governmental law and 
regulation on fungi was fortuitous. There are no laws that give the federal or state 
governments control over wild fungal species on private land. Furthermore, as 
described in Chapter 3, law and custom in the United States consider soil to be part of 
real estate, and since soil organisms are part of the soil, these organisms are the 
property of the landowner by ratione soli. Fungi presented a clear original ownership 
situation: the FLLT is the unfettered owner of the fungi attached to its lands. 
Maintaining that property right after these specimens are removed from FLLT land 
requires a bailment contract. 
7.2.1.1 The FLLT Collection Permit: A Bailment Contract Retains 
Property Rights in Biological Samples 
Having established the basis for a property-right control over wildlife on its 
land, the FLLT created a protocol for the authorized taking of biota under the 
following guidelines: only select purposes14 are allowed, collection applications must 
include full disclosure of the collecting purpose and details of the sampling scope and 
methods used, and the signature of collection permit by the permittee is required.15 
The FLLT extended its biota-property rights after removal by transferring 
rights of possession, but not title, to their fungal materials through the bailment 
contract terms of the Collection Permit.16 This created the basis for entering into 
agreements with parties that would strive to discover and patent biotechnological 
utilities from FLLT fungi. 
                                                 
14 These are conservation, nature study, research, education, and approved bioprospecting. 
15 The Finger Lakes Land Trust Research and Collection Permit. 
16 The Collection Permit stipulates that a) all collected biological material must be clearly labeled as 
FLLT property and such labeling perpetually maintained throughout all laboratory manipulation 
culture, transport or storage; b) the permittee cannot distribute the materials to any third party without 
FLLT permission; c) the permittee may not use the material for any commercial purpose without FLLT 
permission; d) all collected biological material and any derivatives (clones, propagules, etc.) materials 
must be destroyed or returned on request by FLLT. 
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7.2.1.2 Establishing the Property Chain: The Bioprospecting 
Collaboration 
The FLLT has neither the staff nor the expertise to exploit the inventive 
potential of the diverse fungal species on its lands. However, Cornell University, the 
FLLT’s neighbor and bioprospecting partner, possesses both. Cornell and the FLLT 
agreed to allow Cornell mycologists to collect FLLT fungi under the terms of the 
FLLT Collection Permit. This allowed Cornell University staff to collect, study, and 
store FLLT fungi, but prohibited commercial use. It also obligated Cornell to maintain 
FLLT fungal specimens as a bailment. In order to realize financial benefits from 
inventions made with FLLT fungi, a commercialization channel was necessary. This 
necessity spawned a commercialization partnership between FLLT and Cornell’s 
technology transfer arm, Cornell Research Foundation, Inc. (CRF), a non-profit 
corporation. 
In the early 1930s, Cornell University created CRF as its mechanism for 
owning and managing the transfer of commercial rights to Cornell’s intellectual 
property. CRF was the logical agent to legally transform the FLLT’s research-use-only 
fungal biota into a bioprospecting target and the subject of a commercial transaction. 
CRF and the FLLT consummated an agreement in which CRF managed the FLLT’s 
fungal property for the sole purpose of CRF’s negotiating a bioprospecting contract 
with a commercial partner on behalf of CRF and the FLLT. Any such contract was to 
be in accordance with the FLLT’s rights as the bailor of its fungal property. CRF and 
the FLLT agreed to an equal sharing of returns from commercial activity with the 
FLLT’s fungal property. CRF and the FLLT agreed to transfer a certain number of the 
fungal specimens to the commercial partner under specified conditions in a bailment 
contract between CRF and the commercial partner. The FLLT agreed to not enter into 
other agreements that would be contrary to any bioprospecting agreement between 
CRF and the commercial partner. 
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Because the FLLT, Cornell University, and CRF have neither the capability to 
screen large number of samples for potential pharmaceutical applications nor the 
capability to develop, register, and market pharmaceuticals, Schering-Plough (SP), a 
drug company, was recruited to engage in drug screening of the FLLT fungi. 
CRF, acting as agent for the FLLT, and as manager of the commercial 
applications of the FLLT fungi, entered into a biological material bailment and 
screening agreement with SP in which Cornell–CRF provided a select number of 
fungal samples to SP. In exchange, SP agreed to provide funding to support Cornell’s 
mycologists to carry out the collecting, cataloguing, and storing of the samples. In the 
most critical provision of the agreement with SP, any discoveries or inventions, 
patentable or not, made using FLLT fungal specimens that generate commercial return 
are subject to a royalty paid to CRF that is shared equally between Cornell and the 
FLLT. In addition, SP paid a modest “bioprospecting access fee” to the FLLT. This 
provision established the final link in the property chain from specimen in its natural 
habitat to financial return on patent. 
This inter-institutional, biota-property-based arrangement focused solely on the 
patents in the field of human health. This leaves the FLLT free to enter into similar 
arrangements for other uses of their fungi as well as other arrangements for other 
wildlife such as insects or plants. However, other taxa may be controlled by either 
federal or state law, which would bring either of these governmental entities into the 
property-chain equation. 
The web of contracts between the FLLT and Cornell, Cornell and CRF, CRF 
and the FLLT, and CRF and SP all explicitly maintain the chain of FLLT property 
rights in fungal specimens, which began with the FLLT “enclosing” its lands to 
unauthorized taking. 
280 
An important aspect of these agreements is that patent ownership, throughout 
the chain of FLLT fungi possessors, is not necessarily for sharing in commercial 
returns. This demonstrates the power of property rights in biota per se. The holder of a 
property right in wildlife need not be an inventor in order to link their property rights 
in specimens to the financial returns from intellectual-property exploitation. 
Because the FLLT’s property-right assertion in its fungi possessed by any 
party exists as long as the fungi exists, and because the collection of its fungi is 
conducted in a manner that maintains the original population intact, sustainability is 
achievable. The sustainable use of wildlife is achieved by using biota property rights 
to link the resource conservation system (i.e., the FLLT) with a process of commercial 
exploitation and the generation of a benefit stream. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF PROPERTY IN INVENTIONS FROM 
WILDLIFE 
8.1 Introduction 
Various ethical questions surround the concept of property in inventions 
obtained from wildlife. An understanding of the appropriateness of owning a wild 
creature, a cell line collected from that creature, or a patent on that cell line rests on a 
set of property ideas. At the center is property per se, particularly private property. 
The idea of property has been debated for hundreds of years, and the ethical tensions 
of the property institution remain as strong today as ever (Rose, 1986). The purpose 
here is to first determine whether biota property can easily be considered personal 
property or whether it presents some unique ethical conundrums. Although there is an 
ethical foundation for a property right per se, the question here is whether that 
foundation is wholly adequate if the property is alive. Is the ethics of biota property 
perturbed if the biota is wild or if it is a single organism, a group of organisms, or even 
an entire taxon? What if the biota is a natural propagule (an egg or seed, for example) 
or part of a whole organism, such as a test tube of cells? Are these ethical 
considerations of biota property constant through the reduction of organism to cell and 
cell to molecule? And finally, does intellectual property present unique ethical issues, 
particularly in the milieu of wildlife? 
All biota can be divided into two fundamental property domains: wild 
commons and personal property. While the wild biota commons is, like most natural 
resources, enmeshed in a historical dialectic of private right versus public good, biota 
as personal property is a more mundane domain of longstanding legal rules. But 
ethical questions lurk even within the personal-property domain; for example, the 
issues of property in sentient beings, inherent rights of biota, and anthropocentric 
utilitarianism.  
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Examining the wild-biota commons first, I describe the evolution of wildlife 
from unowned commons to public good. This evolution can be seen as a balance of 
the public’s right in a common natural resource with the individual’s right of liberty 
manifest in private property. The ethics of biota as personal property is first 
approached by an examination of whether biota per se has unique moral significance, 
followed by a discussion of the applicability of general property theory to biota.  
Understanding the ethics of patents from wildlife also requires a description of 
the linkage between tangible biota and intangible intellectual property. Intellectual 
property per se is beset with questions of the “privatization of the knowledge 
commons.” Do patents derived from biota present an ethically special case? 
Elucidating the utilitarian basis of intellectual property leads to fundamental questions 
of anthropocentrism, cultural relativism, and commodification inherent in the property 
concept and also of the relation of religious and spiritual belief in the sacredness of life 
to biota property.  
After utilitarian and spiritual perspectives, biota property is considered within 
the environmental ethic. A review of environmental philosophies invariably leads to a 
critique of anthropocentrism, economic liberalism, consumerism, over-reliance on 
technology, and economic growth. Aside from economic efficiency, inter- and intra-
generational justice, and religious belief, there remains an ecology-based ethic. How 
does any form of property in wildlife align with interpretations of environmental 
ethics? The hardly disputable assumption that property—especially intellectual 
property—drives technological development leads to a critique of faith in technical 
progress per se.  
Finally, in the spirit of Norton’s (1995) criticism of certain theories of 
environmental ethics, I consider how ethical considerations of biota property inform 
the relationship between nature and humanity. 
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8.1.1 Biota as Two Property Archetypes: Wild Commons and Personal 
Property 
Biota can be divided into two archetypes: that which is wild and free-roaming, 
and that which has become possessed as personal property through taming, capture, or 
killing. In the first domain, wildlife is a natural resource—a public good such as air, 
rain, or a natural body of water. This domain is subject to public-access rules of the 
commons. The issue here revolves on the socio-political tension of natural resources 
as a common good and/or a private right. This tension is attendant with questions of 
generational equity and economic efficiency created by social allocations of rights and 
benefits. In the natural resource domain, the biological character of biota is hardly 
relevant. The type of organism (e.g., degree of cellular organization, sentience) is no 
more relevant to the ethics of property in biota than specific wavelength is to society’s 
allocation of rights in the electromagnetic spectrum. The question here is private rights 
in a public good, and the public-good character is little affected by the type of 
organism. Conversely, in the personal-property1 domain, biological character is 
ethically relevant, and there is little practical relevance to the question of social 
allocation of rights. Here, there is a difference between owning a dog and owning a 
hive of honey bees, but there is no public-good character to either. In biota property, 
the fundamental question is whether owning biota is ethically different from owning 
non-biota chattel.  
While all free-roaming wildlife can be lumped together as a single natural 
resource, such lumping ignores that some creatures are more valuable in terms of 
human utility than others (for example, oysters versus zebra mussels). But lumping 
allows us to focus on the question of distributive rights in this common good rather 
than on distracting questions of biological character. In this context, wildlife is like 
                                                 
1 Personal property, also “chattel” or “personalty,” is defined as any movable property; it is 
distinguished from real property (land) and its fixtures. 
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other common goods where ethical issues center on equity and efficiency and also the 
degree of anthropocentrism that should guide the relation of humans to nature. But the 
moment a wildlife specimen is possessed, it becomes tangible personal property. 
Personal property includes all tangible objects such as clothing, furniture, cars, art, and 
biological matter, and intangibles such as bank accounts, corporate shares, and patents. 
Property in these things is defined by the rules of personalty (Burke, 1983). Once legal 
possession has occurred, any biota, its progeny, parts, or by-products are personal 
property. Defining the divide between wildlife as a common good and as a possessed 
personal property begins by characterizing the wildlife commons. 
8.2 Wildlife as Common Good 
Why should wildlife be a common good? Is it unethical for free-roaming 
wildlife to be private property? Is it wrong for individuals to capture, for their own use 
(whatever that may be), a single wildlife specimen? What if they capture and possess 
all the specimens of a species? Even if there is no legal prohibition against an 
individual capturing and owning all ladybugs, would this be wrong? Does our moral 
intuition suggest that such possession is a violation of some common social principle? 
Many western philosophic arguments for property are built on the premise that 
untamed nature belongs to no one and should be accessible to everyone. Harper (1974) 
describes an early Christian view that the earth was originally owned by God, who 
grants right in common to all humanity. Henry (1974) describes the biblical view that 
“every person is to share abundantly in God’s created universe,” quoting Psalm 24:1 
(KJV): “the earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof; the world and they that dwell 
therein.” Henry states that private property is a biblically sanctioned moral good, but it 
must be combined with certain requirements of moral goodness in the use and holding 
of such property. In the Leviticus 25:23 statement “The land shall not be sold forever 
for the land is mine [God’s],” the Bible supports the notion that land (and in a larger 
285 
sense, all natural resources) is a sacred, common good. In 1646, Grotius summed up 
an early Christian view of property ownership that God is the genuine original owner 
(Grotius and Kelsey, 1962).  
Locke and Rousseau begin their theoretical property constructs with an 
original “state of nature” in which there is no property, a philosophic “ground zero” 
that gives everyone free access to all. In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke 
(1966) defines “a state of perfect Freedom and Equality . . . by Nature” as follows:  
God who hast given the world to men in common . . . all the fruits it naturally 
possesses and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common . . . and nobody 
has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind, in any of 
them as they are thus in their natural state. (p. 15) 
Rousseau (1974) begins his discourse on private property with the exhortation 
to an early member of the human race: “You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the 
earth belong to everyone, and the earth to no one!” (p. 164). He then proceeds to 
describe a degeneration from this pure egalitarian state as people carve out private 
property from the state of unowned things. Locke views private property as a 
necessary and basic human good. However, he believes acts of privatization must be 
delineated by a threshold: sufficiency for the possessor but not so much as to deprive 
fellow humans of the necessities of life. For Locke, the creation of private property by 
an individual’s labor is a moral bad if it takes from others that which they need to 
survive. 
The original state of res nullius nature is reflected in early human societies. In 
their descriptions of the evolution of the concept of property in various cultures, 
Laveleye (1878) and Lafargue (1894) support the hypothesis that many human 
societies began under a communal-property structure in which nature was unowned. 
Many early tribal cultures did not conceive of the idea of private property for the basic 
articles of sustenance, including game and the earth’s resources. Many of these early 
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cultures were also characterized by a belief in a spiritual source that provides natural 
resources to all people. Lafargue (1894) claims that when such tribal common 
societies were required to allocate resources, it was by lot, a random selection in 
which all had an equal chance of acquisition. In primitive societies, wildlife was the 
joint property of the tribe, and it was inconceivable to these peoples that an individual 
would have an exclusive right to such basic necessities (Laveleye, 1878). The rise of 
private-property consciousness in technologically evolving societies runs counter to 
the hunter-gatherer cultural mindset. Hughes (1983) describes how the idea of 
ownership of land, wildlife, or any natural resource was alien to Native American 
cultures. Beatley (1994) and Hargrove (1980) argue that the notion of private property 
in natural resources is a uniquely European construct.  
Lafargue (1894) and Laveleye (1878) depict the typical social evolution from 
communalism to private property as a gradual loss of the commons. Societies begin 
with pure common ownership and move successively to consanguine collectivism,2 
feudal property,3 and ultimately to bourgeois property.4 The rise of private property 
and the decline of the commons was accelerated by the development of complex civil 
societies and technologies such as agriculture and manufacturing (Schlatter, 1951). As 
Rousseau (1974) states, “The first person who, having fenced off a plot of 
ground . . . was the true founder of civil society” (p. 173). 
Agriculture and manufacturing economies contributed to the motivation to 
create private property from the unowned commons. But how can such privatization 
be morally justified and more than mere assertion of power? Locke’s Treatise (1966) 
provides moral grounds for taking a private-property right from a public good.  
                                                 
2 Consanguine collectivism is family-based ownership of some property in alliance with other families; 
with a commons. 
3 Feudal property is a hereditary and class-based concentration of property; with a commons. 
4 Bourgeois property strengthened private-property institutions; no commons. 
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Locke’s theory of a property right is based on the moral foundation of 
individuals’ inherent right to the fruits of their labor. And individuals’ inherent, 
exclusive right to possess and use their labor-fruits is essential to their survival and to 
the effective working of society. However, weaknesses in Locke’s labor theory have 
been described (Nozick, 1974; Becker, 1977). For example, parents do not own their 
children, and pouring a can of juice into a lake gives no rights in the lake to the pourer. 
Despite some flaws, Lockean theory underpins modern market economies.  
The importance of Lockean theory to modern liberal economic thought argues 
for an examination of Locke’s boundaries to individual acquisition from the common 
pool. How should we determine the ethical limits to an individual’s right to possess as 
much as he or she can labor to produce? What is the moral divide between the rights 
of all in an unowned common resource and the right to make something “mine” from 
that which is “everyone else’s”? Such private appropriation creates a drastic change in 
the relation of the appropriator to all non-appropriators. This appropriation transforms 
individuals from the tenants-in-common of Locke’s “God’s largesse” to a certain type 
of dependence on the appropriator. Locke establishes this boundary with the premise 
that a private-property interest, created by and for an individual via his or her labor 
from the public domain, is good only to the extent that the appropriation leaves 
enough and as good of the commons for others. For Locke, the “enough and as good” 
premise defines the ethical border between the rights of all members of society in a 
common resource, and individuals’ right to their labor-fruits implemented in a 
property-right structure. Locke’s justification of this boundary is based on several 
premises.  
First, Lockean labor theory links ownership of one’s body to one’s labor and 
thence to things labored on. Locke’s notion is that only human labor creates value, and 
the labor of the value-creator gives the laborer a property right in the valued thing. 
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Locke’s “spoliation proviso” limits the right to accumulate property to no more than 
the individual can use. Any taking beyond this amount will result in spoilage and 
waste, which is a moral bad. This proviso precludes the wasteful accumulation of 
perishable goods and even of land. However, for Locke, wild nature is also waste until 
labored on by humans—a view similar to that of some Judaic, Islamic, and Christian 
theologies.  
Each of Locke’s points has logical weaknesses, particularly since his 
Eurocentric, resource-rich, and sparsely populated world of the late 1600s was very 
different from that of today. Waldron (1988) points out a limitation of Locke’s 
premise by spelling out the difference between labor values made by creating and 
those of mere gathering. Also, the “spoliation proviso” has been left mostly irrelevant 
in modern society because, with money, there is no “spoliation” limit to an 
individual’s property accumulation (Waldron, 1988). However, money does create 
questions of moral limits to the amount of private property that may be accumulated, if 
it does not leave “enough and as good” for others.  
The asymmetrical accumulation of property within society is supported by the 
liberal economic thesis that individual welfare may be diminished by an act of private-
property acquisition if the net social product is positive (Paul, Miller, and Paul, 1994). 
The moral standard of net positive social gain allows individuals to be made worse off 
vis à vis other individuals in any act of private-property creation or acquisition. This is 
the essence of liberal utilitarianism: public good defined by the sum total of 
incremental increases in individual good, less decreases from individual bad. 
Everyone’s boat floats higher on the increasing sea of net social gain. Allowing 
individuals to carve private property from the public domain encourages them to 
invest labor and assets in the development of resources. Private-property rights allow 
free exchanges between rights-holders until the properties arrive in the hands of those 
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that value them most highly—benefiting all (Holderness, 1985). Liberalism 
encourages the private acquisition of resources in the belief that the world is best 
managed when divided among private-property owners (Bentham, 1931; Posner, 
1977; Yandle, 1983). However, this creates fundamental tensions and the conundrum 
of the liberal state as a mix of egalitarianism in the public-citizen sphere and a market 
system of inherent inequality (Boyle, 1992). Also, the required use of private-property 
rights to facilitate trade, economic growth, wealth accumulation, and resource 
exploitation confronts the finite public natural resource domain of “space ship earth” 
(Boulding, 1973).  
Despite various flaws, the justifications for private property as an essential 
social organizing principle are persuasive. Property rights are essential for a functional 
civil society (Hobbes, 1651; Bentham, 1982). Hobbes (1651) describes an anarchistic 
state of no boundary between “mine and thine” as so dangerous and unpleasant that 
individuals voluntarily give up some modicum of their liberty to a sovereign that will 
organize and protect individuals and their property. 
Large congregations of humans require a civil society based on institutional 
structure, laws, and custom. A stable society requires private security in property 
possession, use, and modes of acquisition. Property and its underlying institutional 
framework are necessary for the efficient and equitable allocation of resources among 
naturally competing individual interests. The “tragedy of the commons,” in which an 
unowned common good is destroyed by selfish individuals who seek to maximize only 
their well-being, compels the private-property right. But is it an unbridled right? 
The Romans understood that unbridled individual rights in a public good 
produce a diminution of that resource, which requires social control. Under Roman 
law, certain public resources such as roads and defensive walls required the assertion 
of the public’s right through statute, while in others, such as running water, the 
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public’s rights were asserted through custom and practice (Rose, 1986). Property 
rights are society’s means of supporting an individual’s freedom to participate in 
commerce, at his or her own discretion; to control socially centrifugal forces such as 
coercion that would otherwise destabilize the socio-economic order. Property rights 
are simultaneously necessary for the twin moral goods of social order and individual 
economic freedom (Buchanan, 1993). Is private property critical to other types of 
personal freedom?  
Liberty is a basic human right. The Declaration of Independence and the U.S. 
Constitution embody this political philosophy. A private-property right is a 
manifestation of an individual’s fundamental personal liberty in the socio-economic 
world: “property is not a natural, innate right, but it springs from an innate right, 
which is liberty” (Dalloz, a French jurist of the 1800s, cited in Laveleye, 1878, p. xli). 
The argument that private-property rights are necessary for economic and 
political freedom is based on the idea that in order for unlimited personal liberty to 
exist, individuals must be free to act to affect their own survival and pursuit of 
happiness, unfettered by anyone or anything. The importance of individual liberty and 
the freedom from coercion by the state and one’s fellow citizens is emphasized by the 
horrors of state-implemented genocide and other atrocities against individuals 
perpetrated in recent history (Caldwell and Schrader-Frechette, 1993). Unambiguous 
and unmitigated private-property rights provide the individual with this ability and, 
thus, his or her liberty. Anything that acts contrary to this ability is a diminution of 
liberty. The linkage of private property and liberty is a cornerstone of the liberal 
democratic social construct (Becker, 1977; Waldron, 1988; Buchanan 1993; Beatley, 
1994; Alexander, 1997).  
A society constructed on a framework of liberty through property must balance 
that with the pool of rights that is the common good. This creates a collision of two 
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“tectonic plates” of human right: the right to property that springs from the right to 
liberty versus the right of equal access to common goods. How can an individual’s 
liberty-based right to wildlife be reconciled with another individual’s right to not have 
that wildlife taken from the commons?  
Since Roman times, assertions of such public rights (Rose’s “comedy of the 
commons”) have been guided by a desire to facilitate commerce (Rose, 1986). So, 
aside from personal liberty and “tragedy of the commons” justifications, private 
property has dominated mercantile societies because it enables stable commerce. The 
ethical milieu that allows individuals to carve out their sphere of freedom from the 
nexus of social interdependence via a property right is tailor-made for commercial 
society. As Rose (1985) describes it, “private property is an articulation of a specific 
vocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and understood by a commercial 
people” (p. 88). 
Despite the potential ethical constraints on private property in natural 
resources, their value to a commercially driven society in a framework of a free-
market political economy ensures that this social institution flourishes. The 
legitimization of private property is manifest in legal support. The law has generally 
supported the idea that private property may be acquired, through labor (even if that 
labor is simple physical possession), from the commons, and, once property is 
acquired, the state enforces the legitimate owner’s rights. For example, the law 
recognizes a property right perfected through first possession (Rose, 1985). 
There seems little room for another social paradigm. However, within this 
political economy, ethical dilemmas are created when the utilitarian social goods of 
property produce intra- and inter-generational asymmetries. Does the utility of 
property rights fairly benefit future generations? Does it equitably benefit all of the 
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present generation? More basically, is this utility inherently flawed because it is 
inappropriately anthropocentric? Is human utility the only utility? 
Given the importance of private property to individual freedom, mercantile 
efficiency, and the liberal paradigm of integrating individual welfare and net social 
good, why should any resource be off-limits to private acquisition? Rose (1986) 
claims there are three fundamental reasons: 1) there are some goods that are so 
plentiful or so valueless as to not be worth allocating, 2) some goods are not ownable, 
and 3) some goods must be controlled by government so that individuals take others’ 
interests into account. Where does wildlife fall in this scheme? 
Locke’s property theory assumes an unlimited reservoir of natural resources 
and the premise that such resources have value only if and when humans make them 
valuable through human labor and productivity. The equitable allocation of a common 
natural resource becomes an issue only when the resource is useful and scarce. Who 
cares about property in gnats? They’re not useful (to humans) and are more than 
plentiful. If wildlife is useful but not scarce, as with game in early U.S. colonial days 
(Tober, 1981), everyone can have as much as they want or need. If wildlife is scarce 
but not useful, or vice versa, the ethics of allocation is academic. However, technology 
creates utilities in “economically trivial” wildlife, stimulating changes in utility and 
scarcity and the ethics of property-right allocation.  
At this point, it is useful to discuss biota as personal property and to determine 
whether biota represent a special type of such property. 
8.3 Biota as Personal Property  
First, let us define biota: all non-human, living organisms, their parts, and by-
products. Biota include domesticated and non-domesticated animals, plants, and 
microbes. Some biota are, without question, ownable, such as companion animals, 
livestock, and crops. What is the relation between property theory and biota? Are biota 
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simply chattel under property principles? Does personal-property theory apply equally 
to biota and non-biota? If biota property is no different from non-biota property, one 
need only look to property theory generally for ethical guidance. If biota property is 
qualitatively different, however, further analysis is required. Once the relation of biota 
and property is clarified, an understanding of the ethics of property rights in biota can 
be approached. Below, I first describe how biota differs from non-biota under property 
theory. Then, I construct a “dog and sofa” parable to further elucidate the unique 
character of biota property. 
Although biota property has unique characteristics that distinguish it from non-
biota (Hannah, 2001; Root, 2003), in practice it falls squarely in the personal-property 
realm. As such, basic justifications of property are applicable to biota. A deeper 
understanding of biota property requires an exploration of how biota property may 
differ from generally applicable property-right theory. 
8.3.1 Labor Theory 
The labor theory grants an individual a property right by virtue of his or her 
“labor” that wrests a new thing from a “state of nature.” This labor must be 
distinguished from mere intention, declaration, occupation, play, or accidental 
improvement (Becker, 1977; Waldron, 1988; and O’Brien, 1996). The Lockean labor 
theory is based on the premise that humans add value to raw (valueless) nature and 
that the individual’s labor creates a distinction between the thing worked on and the 
thing in its natural state (Becker, 1977). Locke’s arguments are directed primarily at 
land and manufacture. Does the labor-value basis of a property right apply also to 
biota?  
Do humans add value to biota through their labor? Certainly, animal 
husbandry, plant breeding, and crop cultivation adds utility for humans. Similarly, 
human labor creates utility in cell cultures and genetic constructs that did not exist 
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prior to the labor. This argument applies more weakly to the caging of a wild animal 
and also depends on the caging purpose. For example, there is a moral difference 
between a capture that restores public safety or that aids education or research and one 
that provides mere amusement. Caging animals for entertainment involves a level of 
frivolity, which suggests that labor-based values range in importance and vary 
according to moral perspective. For example, a circus elephant is valuable to the seller 
and buyer of tickets, but has a different value to the conservationist or animal-rightist. 
Thus, the labor-value of biota is likely to be a complex basis for applying the labor 
theory. 
Locke’s (1966) property theory begins with a philosophical “ground zero” of a 
“state of nature” in which everything is res nullius. Locke states, “God gave to 
mankind in common . . . all the Fruits it naturally produces and Beasts it feeds, belong 
to Mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature; and 
no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind, in any of 
them as they are thus in their natural state” (p. 15). In his law of “reason and common 
equity,” Locke uses the “fish in the sea” as his example of property created from a 
property-less state. Locke grants property in caught fish to the fisherman who removed 
it from “nature” by labor. Locke states that “this law of reason makes the deer, that 
Indian’s who hath killed it . . . ’tis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his 
labor upon it, though before, it was the common right of every one” (p. 16). 
Locke’s arguments underlie the premise behind most state law in which a 
caged wild animal is considered the property of the cager as long as the animal 
remains caged (St. Julian, 1995).  
One of the flaws in the labor theory of property rights is their mitigation by 
superior rights (Nozick, 1974; Becker, 1977). Why is it that parents do not own their 
children? Because human rights supersede a property right. Singer (1994) argues that 
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the intrinsic rights of higher animals similarly mitigate a property right in a specimen 
of that species. Taylor (1986) and Hettinger (1995) consider such rights applicable to 
all species, regardless of their complexity. 
8.3.2 Utilitarianism 
Utility arguments for property are based on the premise that such rights are 
necessary for human well-being and that property rights are essential for ordering 
stable social systems that clearly and consistently allocate scarce resources to their 
members. This utilitarianism is complicated by questions of inter- and intra-
generational equity (Bullard, 1994). Biota property provides utility for humans and 
their societies and appears to fall under the utilitarian theory. However, this raises 
questions over property rights in non-utilitarian species.  
Utilitarianism is anthropocentric, and from this view, biota property satisfies 
utility for human welfare, social order, and rational natural resource management. 
Utilitarian property begs the question of non-anthropocentric utility. Would arguments 
against anthropocentric utility weaken the basis for property rights in biota? 
8.3.3 First Possession, A Root of Utilitarian Property Right 
Under the doctrine of first possession, original ownership lies with the one who 
first physically possesses a thing (Dukeminier and Krier, 1993). The capture of 
wildlife, which converts it from free-roaming public good to private property, is the 
paradigm of first possession. Rose (1985) calls it the “root of title.” Becker (1977) 
points out certain weaknesses of the first-possession theory. For one thing, it assumes 
that all things are, a priori, ownable; regarding wildlife and other common-pool 
natural resources, this notion is contested. Wildlife as res nullius was the basis of U.S. 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Holmes’s 1920 majority opinion on sovereignty over 
wild birds in Missouri v. Holland. Justice Holmes made it clear that under the supreme 
law of the United States, wildlife is not ownable. Duckler (1997) describes the “legal 
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netherworld” of captured wild animals as falling somewhere between the personal 
property of a companion animal or livestock and an indentured servant. She argues for 
a reassessment of zoo animals as a unique type of property more akin to unique 
entities worthy of preservation (like great art or other cultural treasures) than to trade 
goods and recommends that abuse of such property, even by the owner, should be 
considered an offense against the public welfare. 
8.3.4 Personal Property in Biota Wholes and Parts 
To what extent do the concepts of biota property apply to parts of organisms? 
Biota parts include body parts, horns, teeth, skin, hair, feathers, eggs, and tissue 
samples. With biotechnology, cells in vivo, enzymes, DNA, as well as other 
biomolecules and structures are included. Do all these parts fall similarly under the 
property concepts described above? For purposes of property, is a feather the same as 
an egg? Unlike an egg, the feather is not alive and cannot auto-reproduce. A first 
simple distinction is the capacity of the part to become a whole organism. A fertilized 
egg can, without human intervention, become a whole animal. Similarly, but not 
identically, through biotechnological means, cells in vivo can (in some cases) be made 
to produce a whole organism. In both cases, one enters a realm in which the biota part 
is not a complete creature but has the potential to become one. This is related to the 
controversy over abortion. A feather or any other dead and non-auto-reproducible part 
would seem to have, for ethical, property purposes, lost its biota character. This would 
seem to apply to genes and other molecular pieces of biota. If the parts cannot auto-
reproduce the whole organism, they have lost their full biota character and, if legally 
acquired, may be owned with no more or less ethical consideration than owning a pair 
of leather shoes. 
Technological methods that allow the creation of whole organisms from single, 
non-sex cells present complexity to the whole-versus-part question. The ontogenous 
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character of an egg conveys some difference to the egg compared with a test tube of 
cells. Both are capable of ontogeny, but the cells only by human labor. Human labor 
can thus alter the property-rights structure in biota parts. 
Functional pieces of DNA (i.e., those that encode a biological function) 
represent a unique type of biota part. They are parts, but they are also part of the 
molecular “blueprint” of the organism and all members of the species. Removed from 
the genome, a gene cannot reproduce the organism and has, therefore, lost its 
organismal character. However, the catholic nature of a gene in a species gives it a 
public-good quality. Private property in a gene may be ethically problematic to the 
extent that such rights impinge on the public’s access to this good, not because it is a 
part of a wildlife species but because it is a public good. However, if owning a piece 
of DNA from wildlife does not preclude the public from access to identical DNA 
(since it is catholic and copyable), the public-versus-private issue is moot. 
8.3.5 The Ethics of Property in Biota Specimens and Species 
A biota-property right presents an ethical dilemma related to specimens versus 
species. Private property in one fish is a very different matter from owning the fish 
species. Owning one deer deprives the public of practically nothing if deer are 
plentiful. Owning all deer drastically alters the relation between the owner and the 
public and the ethical equation of property. The ethics of owning domesticated 
creatures is different from that of owning wildlife because they are not public goods. 
However, control of unique genetic resources of domesticated creatures presents a 
similar private-versus-public question. Should the maintenance of wildlife as a public 
domain be applied to genetically unique domesticated creatures? Does the public have 
some right in a rare breed of domesticated livestock, all the specimens of which are 
owned by an individual? From an animal-rights perspective, the collective species has 
no more or less moral value than an individual of that species (Singer, 1975; Regan, 
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1983). But, there is a difference here. Why is it justifiable to own one ladybug but not 
all ladybugs? The answer may lie in the utilitarian Lockean limit to “leave enough and 
as good for others” dictum for distinguishing the limit of private rights in a public 
good. The species is a communal resource, and as long as there are plenty of 
specimens, an individual is, practically speaking, not a communal resource. The 
Endangered Species Act is predicated on the idea that the value of society’s loss of a 
species is incalculable (Norton, 1991). 
8.3.6 A Dog and a Sofa: The Moral Uniqueness of Biota Property 
Consider property in a dog and a sofa. The owner may buy, sell, trade, give, or 
rent either one. As with any personal property, the owner may restrict others from 
possessing or using them. Both dog and sofa apparently fall within the same domain of 
personal property. A review of Honoré’s several rights of property ownership (Becker, 
1977; Waldron, 1988) reveals that the owner’s right in the sofa and the dog are 
similar. However, one right stands out—the right to destroy, waste, or abuse. One of 
the owner’s property rights in the dog is constrained. The owner cannot be cruel to the 
dog, whereas there is no such prohibition with the sofa. The owner of the sofa may 
destroy it with impunity but may destroy the dog only by sanctioned, cruelty-free 
methods. Animal-cruelty laws limit ownership in the dog. So property in at least some 
biota is different from non-biota property. Biota have different moral considerations. 
Bentham (1948), Goodpaster (1994), and Singer (1994) have all argued for sentience 
and capacity for suffering as the fundamental criterion for moral consideration of a 
being. A dog presents an easy case because of human affection for and communion 
with this species. But organisms range widely in their cellular organization, sensation, 
motor control, and cognition; the moral relevance of these characteristics is explored 
in the next section. 
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8.3.7 Moral Distinctions of Biota Types 
In any discussion of biota property, there is an implicit distinction between 
self-motile (e.g., free-roaming animals) and immobile (i.e., plants) biota. Historically, 
plants have been considered land fixtures and part of property in land. Is there a moral 
basis to this tradition? While Stone (1974) develops the thesis that trees and other 
“natural objects” have certain inherent rights, Regan (1983) and Singer (1990, 1994) 
consider only higher animals as beings with inherent rights that can mitigate against 
property rights. Taylor (1986, 1994) extends inherent rights to all living entities. 
Should the moral distinction be one of mobility? Level of tissue organization? 
Sentience? In terms of mobility and the capacity to sense and react to stimuli, a 
mollusk and an orchid are biologically similar, yet they are treated very differently 
under property law. To what extent do the rights of other species that have been 
described by animal-rights proponents apply to other creatures? What about “lower” 
creatures such as mollusks, insects, and protozoa?  
Do the tenets of the dog and the sofa apply equally to other biota species—to a 
chicken, for example? Animal-cruelty laws for chickens are considerably weaker than 
those for dogs. This difference is due, in part, to the fact that, unlike dogs, chickens 
have long been considered food.5 A property right in a chicken is stronger (or less 
mitigated) than those for dogs. What about insects? No one speaks of insect rights; nor 
are there any insect-cruelty laws. However, Lockwood (1987) describes evidence that 
insects sense pain, communicate, organize in social systems, and learn, and believes 
their level of sentience places them within the realm of our moral consideration. While 
Lockwood acknowledges that individual insects may be of infinitesimal moral 
significance, he states that humans “ought to refrain from actions which may be 
                                                 
5 The fact that dogs are eaten in other cultures points out the cultural relativism of ethical perspectives 
or empirical judgments. 
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reasonably expected to kill or cause nontrivial pain in insects when avoiding these 
actions has no, or only trivial, costs to our own welfare” (p. 70). 
What about even simpler creatures such as planaria, nematodes, protozoans, 
and fungi? Is it ludicrous to consider that microbes have inherent moral significance 
that would mitigate a property right? Hettinger (1995) does not think so. Clearly, the 
type of organism has a great effect on the ethics of a property right therein. A detailed 
analysis of the biological characteristics that affect property rights is required but will 
not be pursued here. 
8.4 Intellectual Property and Biota 
Tangible biota property is implicit in the discussion above. As Waldron (1988) 
points out, it is necessary to develop a legal framework in tangible property before 
moving to the intangible. Intangible property is widely and commonly accepted and 
plays an increasingly important role in modern economies. Corporate stock, 
commodity futures, insurance policies, bonds, promissory notes, and complex 
financial instruments exemplify the importance of such properties. Intellectual 
property, particularly patents, is a form of intangible property. Since the enactment of 
the United States Patent Law of 1790 and the first patent drawn specifically on biota in 
1887 (issued to L. Pasteur), thousands of patents have been issued by the government 
on inventions from biota. 
Does a link exist between tangible biota property and intangible intellectual 
property obtained therefrom, and, if so, is there an ethical implication to that link? Are 
there ethical considerations unique to intellectual property in biota subject matter per 
se, and do these considerations apply equally to intellectual property obtained from 
wild and domesticated biota? To answer these questions, it is important to examine the 
ethics of intellectual property per se and to then ask whether intellectual property from 
biota presents a special case. In other words, if patents are bad, surely patents from 
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biota are bad. But, if patents are good, is it the case that patents on mechanical devices 
are good but patents on “life” are bad? And, finally, is there an ethical difference 
between a patent on an invention from a companion-animal dog and a patent from a 
wild animal? 
8.4.1 The Link Between Biota Chattel and Intellectual Property 
Obtaining a patent requires an invention or discovery. Making an invention or 
discovery from biota requires the possession and use of tangible biota. Through the 
necessity of physical possession, the existence of a personal-property right in the 
tangible biota precedes and, to some extent, dominates any ensuing intellectual 
property. That is, the holder of private property in tangible biota has, at least initially, 
a superior right in the tangible matter to the extent of their assertion of that right to 
control its possession and use by others. 
Once intangible intellectual property is created from biota, it exists 
independent of the tangible property. There is a significant nuance in the relation 
between these distinct property types. A dog owner owns all the parts of the dog as 
long as they’re attached. Someone may obtain a patent on a gene sequence from that 
dog, and unless the owner has asserted his or her control over possession and use of 
the dog and its parts, the dog owner has no right in that patent. Conversely, the owner 
of the patent on the dog gene has no right in the actual DNA sequence as it exists in 
vivo in the dog. This scenario may be complicated if the dog part was obtained without 
the owner’s knowledge or permission. 
So, with few exceptions,6 intellectual property in biota is absolutely 
independent of tangible biota property unless the tangible-property holder has created 
encumbrances. What, then, is the ethical environment of intellectual property from 
                                                 
6 Pure microbial cultures, cell lines, and certain plant varieties exhibit connections between tangible 
property and intellectual property. 
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biota? Answering this requires an understanding of the intellectual-property 
institution. 
8.4.2 The Intellectual-Property Institution 
Patents confer property rights in discoveries and inventions to the first 
inventor. This follows the first possession rule for creation of a property right (Rose, 
1985; Lueck 1995). As with other arguments for private property, a justification for 
intellectual property is its utility in the stable functioning of a civil society based on 
rule of law and a free-market system.  
Intellectual property is intended to accomplish the social goal of advancing the 
creative and technological arts by providing incentive to creators, inventors, and those 
who invest in such activities (Machlup, 1958; Lesser, 1991). With early roots in the 
first intellectual-property law of the Republic of Venice in the 1500s, the codified 
English patent law of 1642, and patent laws enacted in the United States, France, and 
Germany in the late 1700s, intellectual property has evolved into a global phenomenon 
(Crespi, 1997). Every nation now has some intellectual-property laws, although their 
scope, extent, and enforceability have historically ranged widely from country to 
country. At present, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) requires the 
global harmonization and implementation of intellectual-property laws. Although 
some question whether intellectual property is equitable and appropriate (Hettinger, 
1989; Shulman, 1999), by many utilitarian measures, it is a widely accepted social 
good. Is such measure complete or satisfactory?  
As a subset of property, intellectual property falls prey to the same ethical 
questions that beset property in general. However, intellectual property has 
characteristics that present unique ethical issues: for example, questions of privatizing 
the pool of human knowledge and intellectual property’s demonstrated effectiveness 
in technological advancement. 
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The utilitarian justification for property rights in general similarly justifies 
intellectual property. But other than utility, is there an ethical justification for an 
inventor’s right to own his or her intellectual fruit? Is intellectual property a justifiable 
right, supported by political economic theories of liberalism, or is it an inappropriate 
taking from the public good of human knowledge? 
Shulman (1999) believes all knowledge is a public good and should be freely 
shared by all. He objects to patents as an unethical taking from the public pool of 
knowledge. This belief ignores the fact that patents are public documents. U.S. patent 
law requires complete and accurate public disclosure of an invention. And, unless 
Shulman also advocates a police state in which individuals must publicize everything 
they know, the alternative to patents is secrecy. Shulman’s view also lacks an 
understanding of how technical knowledge is created, implying that the only 
investment is one’s mind and hands. Technical-knowledge generation requires 
significant investment in facilities, salaries, and equipment. How should this 
knowledge creation be paid for? Shulman’s prescriptions leave one wondering, and it 
is in this pragmatism that intellectual property finds much of its justification.  
Ethical justification for intellectual property has at least two components 
(Ostergard, 1999). First, Lockean labor theory grants the creator inherent rights in 
something created sui generis by his or her labor, and second, intellectual property 
contributes to the overall social good. While Ostergard generally supports the property 
rights of a creator, he argues that the rights of the individual in his or her intellectual 
property must be counterbalanced by the public’s right to general physical welfare. 
His arguments are based on the idea that there is a hierarchy of intellectual “objects” 
relative to physical welfare and that the rights of the “consumers” of intellectual 
property must be considered along with those of the creators of that property. For 
example, Ostergard points to patents on life-saving drugs in which the practical 
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necessity of a patent right to encourage the investment needed to develop the drug 
collides with the ideal of curing human suffering. Recent controversies over patents on 
AIDS drugs exemplify this point. 
Both Ostergard (1999) and Shulman (1999) view the labor basis of intellectual-
property rights as flawed because the “cumulative process of invention” renders 
inventors—at most—co-inventors who rely on the labor of numerous prior inventors. 
However, this view ignores the patentability requirement for absolute novelty and 
nonobviousness. Only by clearly satisfying these criteria can an inventor demonstrate 
his or her unique intellectual creation of something unexpected and never thought of 
by anyone else. Ostergard claims that granting intellectual property to inventors makes 
all others “worse off” than they were prior to the granting of the intellectual-property 
rights because they cannot have free access to the invention. However, this notion is 
also contradicted by the patent-law requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. By 
these criteria, a patent takes nothing away from the public that it did not already freely 
enjoy before the patent was issued. 
Ostergard (1999) believes human progress is hampered by intellectual property 
because of restrictions on the free use of an invention. But this belief ignores the fact 
that the patent-law requirement of candor and full disclosure provides the public with 
all the information necessary to understand and examine the invention. Because a 
patent is a public document, anyone is free to “invent around” the intellectual-property 
rights of the patent, thereby improving the invention and resulting in overall technical 
progress for society. Ostergard claims that patents shield the creator from the 
competitive forces that normally force product improvements and that the patent 
monopoly allows “artificially” high prices. But this interpretation ignores the role of 
competition in developing alternative and improved inventions. 
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Ostergard (1999) bemoans the failure of patents to benefit the public because 
they stifle the dissemination of ideas. However, the basic nature of the patent is 
“teacher of the nation” (Machlup, 1958). Ostergard also completely ignores the role of 
patents in providing incentives for the large investment needed to develop an 
invention from conception to completion. Doesn’t this investment represent greater 
progress than the widespread dissemination of ideas that will never develop for lack of 
investment? 
Ostergard (1999) boils his ethical argument down to a basic contention 
between private-property rights in ideas versus subsistence rights that require the use 
of those ideas. Ostergard believes that subsistence rights are superior to property rights 
because the right to survive is morally superior to the right to wealth. Using the 
example of an AIDS-drug patent, Ostergard would see an ethical wrong in using 
patent rights to allow someone to suffer and die. But isn’t this an argument against any 
and all property rights? Is it not similarly unethical if a homeowner keeps a homeless 
person out? Does this argue against the private-property right per se or for a public-
property-type solution? 
Locke’s labor theory of property is strongest when applied to novel creations 
(Waldron, 1988). By law, an intellectual-property right belongs only to the first creator 
of a novel creation. But Hettinger (1989) attacks the Lockean basis of intellectual 
property on several fronts. However, his critique of intellectual property suffers from 
several key blunders, including his mistaken idea that a patent provides its owner an 
exclusive right to make, use, and sell the patented invention. In fact, the only right 
granted by a patent is a negative one—the right to stop others from making, using, or 
selling the invention. Hettinger (1989) and Ostergard (1999) attack the labor and first-
possession basis for patents by arguing that an inventor is not the sole laborer because 
the invention requires the prior work of others and because the labor of others was 
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used to create the institutional framework of the patent system itself. The first part of 
this argument ignores the distinction in patent law between the “prior art” and the 
novel invention. To obtain a patent, an inventor must establish absolute novelty vis à 
vis any prior work of others. The second part of their arguments, that the labor of 
others is required to create and maintain the intellectual-property institution, argues 
against any property right. Hettinger argues that a patent deprives subsequent 
inventors (who independently toil on the same invention) of their rightful property, 
thus violating the Lockean proviso to leave “enough and as good for others.” This is a 
rejection of the first-possession basis of most property rights and the “net positive 
social product” of asymmetrical appropriation in liberalism. Patent rights are time-
limited, but Hettinger ignores this in suggesting a ludicrous solution limiting a patent 
to the time it would take others to invent the same thing. Hettinger (1995) attempts to 
weaken the desert basis for a patent by arguing that reward in the marketplace does not 
necessarily belong to the creator of value but, in any event, should be proportional to 
effort. That is, it is unethical when an easily made invention returns a greater reward 
than a more difficult invention does. This is obviously a criticism of the free-market 
system, in general. Why, for example, is it ethical for the inventor of the cure for a 
childhood disease to be rewarded less than the inventor of napalm? For that matter, 
why are the discovers of cures for disease paid less than movie stars or professional 
athletes? 
Shulman (1999), Hettinger (1989), and Ostergard (1999) all argue against 
intellectual property as an unethical privatization of the common good of human 
knowledge. Shulman’s thesis is that knowledge and its free exchange has always been 
a public good and that patents inappropriately remove ideas from this public domain. 
Both he and Hettinger (1995) characterize “intellectual objects” as non-exclusive 
economic goods, which, they believe, argues against the economic logic of private 
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rights in such objects. These arguments suffer from a serious misconception about 
patents and a failure to appreciate the utilitarian argument for private property created 
from the knowledge commons.  
Do patents restrict idea creation and intellectual intercourse? By law, ideas per 
se are not patentable; only ideas that are inventions conceived and reduced to practice 
are patentable. Further, a patent must “teach the nation” the best way to reproduce the 
invention. The requirements of “candor” and the “duty to disclose” the best mode and 
preferred embodiment of the invention provide all the knowledge of the invention as a 
public good. The right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the narrowly 
claimed patent is another matter. That restriction is justified based on the utilitarian 
return on investment. The knowledge contained in many patents costs a great deal to 
create, and without such investment, the knowledge will not be created. Hettinger 
belatedly acknowledges this fact and prescribes complete public funding and 
ownership of all intellectual work! Shulman (1999) attempts to weaken the utilitarian 
argument for intellectual property by pointing out the transaction costs of its 
management and litigation, but he ignores the fact that such costs also apply to any 
property type.  
Hettinger (1989) invokes Locke’s spoliation proviso, claiming that it is 
wasteful when a patent holder withholds the invention from others. This could equally 
apply to any property, but it raises the point Ostergard (1999) elaborates on. Ostergard 
describes the ethical tension of the public’s right of access to an invention that is 
essential for human welfare. He points out that this dilemma is irrelevant for some 
inventions (a new compact disc) and acute for others (life-saving drugs). Can an 
inventor ethically withhold a cure for disease from those it would benefit? Such 
withholding appears to violate Nozick’s (1974) proviso that property acquisition must 
not make anyone “worse off” than before the acquisition. But a patent takes nothing 
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away from the public that it freely enjoyed before the patent was issued. Ostergard’s 
critical point is that any property needed to maintain individual well-being must be 
accessible. But, he also acknowledges the importance of property rights. The 
fundamental tension here is between property rights and subsistence rights. Ostergard 
claims that a patent holder’s right may be outweighed by a duty to assist others. He 
describes a moral fulcrum where profits may come at the expense of human well-
being. He argues that in certain situations, duties may outweigh rights, and that the 
duty to protect well-being outweighs wealth-based property-right considerations. Of 
course, such dilemmas are posed by any property rights in which social asymmetries 
arise. 
The arguments that all knowledge should remain a public good are further 
analyzed by Boyle (1992). Boyle defines a basic social tension of intellectual property 
in a liberal economy. The ideal market requires perfect information, but the 
commodification of information renders the market imperfect. He points out the 
dichotomy of information as a commons in the public sphere and a private good in the 
private sphere. For example, while free debate, dialogue, and scientific publications 
are the lifeblood of the public domain, forcing individuals to provide private 
information for public databases is a different matter. Further, the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments and the attorney–client privilege protect the individual from mandatory 
sharing of knowledge. 
Unlike Hettinger (1995), Boyle (1992) understands that knowledge is not an 
infinite and costless resource; it requires incentive to create. Boyle concludes that 
there is no black-and-white answer to the ethical conundrum of knowledge as a public 
good versus a private right but that these opposing ideas can and must co-exist.  
Patent property presents exactly the same problems as the liberal conception of 
property in general (Boyle, 1992). However, a basic question arises from the inherent 
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purpose of patents. The overarching public-policy purpose of patents is to motivate 
technological development. Abraham Lincoln (a patentee) called patents, “the fuel that 
added to the fire of genius.” Compelling evidence indicates that patents do drive 
technological advancement (Machlup, 1958; Lesser, 1991). From a utilitarian 
perspective in which entrepreneurial capitalism feeds on and furthers technological 
development for the production of goods and services, patents are a social good. If 
patents are good because they catalyze technological development, a more 
fundamental question is whether technological advancement per se is good.  
Crespi (1997) points out that patents are applied for, prosecuted, and issued in 
an ethical vacuum. There is nothing in the patent law that applies any ethical criteria: 
it is concerned only with ethical issues of truthfulness by the inventor solely on 
matters of patentability. The purpose of the patent law is guided entirely by the ethic 
of technological and scientific progressivism and the liberal economic faith in private 
property. Although some consider patents on biological materials to be “morally 
dangerous” because they “institutionalize disrespect for life” (Hettinger, 1995), I 
believe the ethical question here is not patents per se, but rather the technological 
development they facilitate. 
8.4.3 A Critique of Technical Advancement 
Winner (1986) presents a convincing argument that technology per se should 
be critically analyzed (but is typically not) for its intrinsic impact on socio-economic 
and political systems. Winner suggests that technology ought to be considered an 
integral part of the socio-political process and not passively accepted by the body 
politic because of long-held principles of economic efficiency, liberalism, and blind 
acceptance of inexorable technical change. Winner believes that framing public issues 
as mere questions of economic efficiency is inappropriate in the dynamic process of 
democracy. Winner critiques the blind acceptance of technology as it spreads 
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throughout social spheres and argues for more moral and political discourse over the 
proper use and extent of technology. 
Technology and social progress are inextricably woven in our cultural mindset. 
Beginning with the Greek dichotomy of humans and nature, and the Judeo-Christian 
view of linear history, with its providential progress, belief in the pursuit of 
technological solutions has been a given of western society. This faith in science and 
technology also has roots in the Baconian conquest of wild nature, Descartes’ mind-
and-matter dualism, and the Newtonian basis of the “divine watchmaker.” The 
economic liberalism of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Adam Smith provided the basis 
for entrepreneurial capitalism as a great social good. This belief holds the pursuit of 
individual economic welfare, fueled by technology, as a hugely civilizing influence 
and the basis for a just and stable society (Polanyi, 1968). These ideas, combined with 
the scientific positivism of Descartes, Bacon, and Dewey, produce a faith in 
technology as an overwhelmingly positive force for human welfare. Arendt (1978) 
describes a belief that technological change, and the economic development it brings, 
equates to the building of a good society, regardless of its consequences. The idea of 
ever-expanding technology as a social good took root in the fertile soil of the United 
States with its virgin resources, liberal philosophy, technologists, mercantile society, 
and belief in manifest destiny. It is not surprising that the right to patent is written into 
the U.S. Constitution. 
Although the great political movements of communism, capitalism, and 
socialism differ in how social goods and services are allocated, all are technocentric 
and technophilic. One reason communism failed is that it produced too little and 
shared too much, and capitalism may fail because it produces too much and shares too 
little. However, both depend on technology as a primary driving social force. 
311 
An overwhelming belief in economic efficiency and technology as a good has 
dwarfed concerns about the social impact of technology. Although many social 
problems have been caused by technology, viewing technology as a core problem has 
been derided as Ludditism.  
Modern concerns over technology have been spurred by ecological treatises 
such as Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) and the realization that technology can have 
unintended effects, such as pollution. While the downsides of technologies such as 
DDT, PCB, thalidomide, and plastic land mines are part of the social dialogue, Winner 
(1986) argues that these negative effects of technology are the tip of the iceberg and 
that technology has huge and often less-than-desirable social impacts to which we are 
blind because we are immersed in the technology-as-social-good dogma. Tenner 
(1996) presents numerous cases in which technology has unintended repercussions. 
Some are huge social negatives, such as pollutants that cause childhood leukemia. 
Others, such as the degradation of plastics, are merely annoying. Tenner alerts us to 
the widespread use of technology and its consequences—good and bad. Winner 
(1986) and Barbour (1980) go deeper to point out the profound cultural significance of 
technology. All implore for a public dialogue and critique of the assumption of the 
inexorable “advancement of technology.” 
Barbour (1980) describes four characteristics of modern technology that run 
counter to human welfare: uniformity, efficiency, impersonality, and uncontrollability. 
Each of these factors tends to dehumanize, counter individualism, and erode genuine 
community. Winner (1986) points out how technology facilitates centralization and 
social control and that, even without explicit choice by the body politic, technology 
advancement has become our dominant social form. Technology can also foster 
organizational gigantism to the detriment of smaller organizations and local 
communities. Winner argues that technology crowds out other forms of human 
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activity, replacing artisanship and craftsmanship with mass-produced articles. 
Technology has also led to ever-more sophisticated and powerful means of controlling 
social and political forces and individuals. 
Is the computer good or bad, or is it so intertwined in every aspect of who we 
are that the question can no longer be asked? Evaluating the goodness or badness of a 
technology is confounded by layers of interconnected ethical questions. Even anti-
anthropocentrists who look askance at much of technology might think twice about 
technology such as Global Positioning Systems when used to mitigate human abuse of 
the environment. 
Intellectual property covers a vast range of types of inventions, from simple 
devices to esoteric electronics, business methods, and software. What about patents on 
subject matter from biota? Strictly speaking, a wooden device is made from biota, but 
for this discussion, the question revolves on biotechnological inventions. Do patents 
from biota present an ethical taxon distinct from non-biota subjects? Is there any 
ethical basis for differentiating intellectual property on biota matter versus non-biota 
matter? 
8.4.4 Biota Intellectual Property 
Do patents from biota differ from patents on non-biota subject matter? This 
question is complicated by the difficulty in defining biota subject matter. Since the 
1790 Patent Act, many patents have been issued on objects made from wood, and 
these are, of course, patents from biota. But patents on novel types of furniture are not 
the ethical question here. For this discussion, patents from biota include methods and 
materials such as cellular components, biological molecules, cell lines, whole 
organisms, and populations. Such patents include a large variety of inventions, 
including secondary metabolites or antibodies and other complex molecules made by 
organisms. Patents may be issued on genes that encode for proteins that confer certain 
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whole-organism traits. Patents may be issued on isolated or genetically modified 
whole organisms, select plant varieties, or pure microbial cultures. Each of these exists 
in a different ethical milieu. First, let us examine a patent on a molecule isolated from 
wild biota.  
The inventor who first purifies and characterizes a molecule from an organism 
is entitled to a patent on a first-possession basis because the purified substance 
satisfies statutory patentability. Is this different from a chemist who discovers a new 
polymer? Is there a difference between assemblages of inorganic elements organized 
into inorganic and organic forms? Isn’t a living creature just a complex combination of 
carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and other elements? The discoverer of a unique molecule 
from an organism is entitled to potential patent rights because, although the molecule 
pre-existed in the organism, human manipulation isolated it. Could it not also be 
argued that the chemist who first makes a novel inorganic compound similarly 
manipulates nature to produce a natural (in the sense that natural forces are used) 
compound? If a biotechnologist only manipulates pre-existing nature to produce a 
biota invention, could it not be said that the inorganic chemist merely manipulates the 
pre-existing nature of chemical reactions dictated by the natural laws of elemental 
structure and kinetics? Thus, distinguishing an ethical difference between a patent on 
inorganic molecules and organic molecules based on a difference between the human-
made and the nature-made is difficult. Human-made molecules require nature-made 
processes and elements. At the level of chemistry, what is the difference between 
synthesized DNA and a synthesized organic polymer or inorganic compound?  
Perhaps human-synthesized strands of DNA are ethically no different from 
strands of polyvinyl chloride. But can the same be said about a naturally occurring 
sequence of DNA (i.e., a gene) from an organism? At the level of chemical structure, 
isn’t a gene just like an inorganic compound? Both are taken from nature by their 
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discoverers. Of course, the gene is taken from something alive, but that is no different 
from taking a piece of hair or bone. However, a naturally occurring gene represents 
something more: it is a part of the blueprint of a living being. Is this a critical ethical 
difference?  
Owning a cat is acceptable to all but the most radical animal-rightists. What, 
then, is the ethical difference between owning a cat and owning the DNA of or a 
patent on a gene from a cat? At one level, owning a cat and owning the DNA of a cat 
gene are the same. But there is a difference: specimen versus taxon. Owning a cat 
gives no rights in other cats, but owning the gene patent can grant exclusive rights to 
the technological use of that gene. This difference is an ethical boundary between a 
private right and the public good. Locke’s proviso that an individual’s right to 
privatize something from the public domain is limited by “enough and as good left for 
others” may be violated when the gene, which exists throughout a population, is 
privatized by the first possessor. Despite this, the political philosophy of liberalism 
allows such violations.  
A critical aspect of patent law distinguishes the domain of private rights from 
the public domain of nature. A patent on a piece of genetic “blueprint” of an organism 
does not grant the patent owner a property right in the whole organism. That is, a 
patent on a gene sequence does not give the patent owner any personal-property right 
in the gene as it exists in nature, only as it exists as a technological entity. A patent on 
a gene does not give an ownership interest whatsoever in the free-roaming creature! 
Do patents on whole organisms present a different ethical milieu? Is there an 
ethical difference between a patent on a whole organism and a patent on a gene? 
Unlike a gene, an organism is alive, capable of metabolism, sentience, and auto-
reproduction. So, there may be an ethical difference based on “aliveness.” The legal 
discourse in Diamond v. Chakrabarty case sheds light on this issue. Opponents of the 
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patentability of a living organism7 claimed that life has a “vital” or “sacred” property 
and that life could not be reduced to mere physiochemistry (Cooper, 1998). The 
principle of “vitalism” crumbled in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the 
advance of reductionist science led to the blurring of any distinction between a “vital 
force” and definable physicochemical principles (Needham, 1930; Coleman, 1971). 
According to the Supreme Court, aliveness per se does not affect patentability. The 
1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty represents a triumph of 
amoral property rights in the service of utilitarianism and a rejection of the principle of 
life sacredness as a prohibitive. 
The argument against vitalism as a valid criterion of patentability raises 
important questions. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court rejected life-
sacredness as a criterion relevant to an intellectual-property right. This provokes at 
least two ethical questions: What effect will lack of “sacredness” have on the 
commodification of biota, and what role, if any, should religious or spiritual beliefs 
play in the biota-property issue? A detailed discussion of these spiritual issues is taken 
up in a later section. But now, the question is the owning of a specimen versus the 
owning of an entire group. 
What is the ethical distinction between owning a patent on a pure culture of a 
microbial species and having personal-property rights in a single animal specimen? 
For example, is there an ethical quandary if an individual owns the only specimen of a 
rare breed of domestic livestock? This is a taxon-owning question. What is the ethical 
difference between owning the only animals of a breed (and thus, that unique genetic 
resource) and a owning a patent on an organism? From the perspective of private 
rights in a public resource (i.e., the gene pool), the answer is none—except one: the 
patent automatically terminates 20 years from the date of filing, whereas personal 
                                                 
7 That is, a bacterium modified by human addition of DNA-containing plasmids. 
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property can last in perpetuity. Thus, it appears that patents on biota are not ethically 
unique and fall into the same realm as any private property–public good dichotomy. 
All of this argues that questions about patents on biota subject matter are not 
ethically different from general questions of tangible biota property and intellectual 
property. 
8.5 Biota Property and Anthropocentrism  
Property is a human construct and is inherently anthropocentric. This raises 
questions of anthropocentric versus non-anthropocentric ethical systems. The 
anthropocentrism of property-right theory is implicit in most philosophical systems, 
including those of Locke, Rousseau, Marx, Hegel, Bentham, Rawls, Marcuse, and 
Nozick (Waldron, 1988; Paul et al., 1994; Cahn and O’Brien, 1996). Pyle, Bentzien, 
and Opler (1981) describe a view that humanity’s interests are the basis for ethical 
concern in non-human life and that such life is a “resource” to be used for human 
purpose. This fits Locke’s view of wild nature as “waste” and human productivity as 
the essential good. Locke’s arguments for property rights are based on human utility 
and the underlying theistic grant of human dominion over biota and all nature. Hegel’s 
(1996) “Philosophy of Right” also claims a position of human dominion.  
It is useful for a human to own a pig, but is it useful for the pig? What about 
human ownership of a wild animal? Some argue that biota have certain inherent rights 
that counterbalance strict anthropocentrism. Stone (1974) has argued that all natural 
objects have certain inherent rights. The idea of animal rights counterbalances human-
centered, utilitarian property rights in biota. Beginning with Singer’s work (1975), 
some have argued that animals have inherent rights that mitigate absolute human 
dominion (Regan, 1983; Gruen, 1994; Jamieson, 1994; and Watson, 1997). Going 
beyond animals, Taylor (1994) has defined a biocentric ethical view in which  
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all organisms are teleologic centers of life in the sense that each is a unique 
individual pursuing its own good in its own way . . . humans are not inherently 
superior to other living things. (pp. 44–45) 
Rolston (1994) describes a “vital ethic” based on ethical consideration for all life. He 
defines an ethic in which human respect for and responsibilities to other organisms, 
species, and ecosystems is based on a utility-and-value system that integrates human 
interests into a larger biosphere whole. Devall’s (1988) “deep ecology” philosophy is 
inspired by Arne Naess (1973), an “ecocentrist,” who believes the “natural world” has 
value independent of its usefulness to humans. 
Alternatives to a strict human-centered ethic should be borne in mind when 
examining the ethics of biota property. It should also be kept in mind that although 
property is an anthropocentric construct, it can be used to primarily benefit non-human 
nature (Stone, 1974), for example, assertion of a property right in an ecosystem to 
protect it from human-made destruction. 
8.6 The Cultural Dependence of Biota Property 
Ethical constructs of biota property are culturally dependent. For example, 
owning a dog for the purpose of eating it is acceptable in Asian cultures and 
unacceptable in the United States. Owning a cow to make steaks is acceptable in the 
United States and abhorrent in India. However, there is a global dogma that ownership 
and dominion over biota is ethically acceptable (Hargrove, 1980; Beatley, 1994).  
European and U.S. jurists, in support of the mercantile community, have led a 
historical globalization of property and contract law from Roman roots to a modern 
network of global business organizations backed by the economic and legal power of 
the U.S. and European governments (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). The worldwide 
system of clear and defensible property rights as the basis for market exchanges has its 
origin in ancient rules of mercantilism. Braithwait and Drahos make the case that the 
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current paradigm of property and contract rules is ultimately based on economic and 
military coercion of the dominant economic powers, particularly the United States, 
and is designed by and for global capitalism. This coercion is manifested in the 
outcomes of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property System (TRIPS) and the creation of global business 
organizations, including the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
While it is clear that modern property-rights systems foster mercantilism and 
economic liberalism, this should not overwhelm an appreciation for other cultural 
paradigms. We should not forget that the concept of private ownership of land was 
alien to Native American cultures (Laveleye, 1878; Lafargue, 1894; Hughes, 1983), or 
that some modern views express alternatives to the dominant property paradigm, 
especially with regard to wild biota and the natural environment. 
8.7 Commodification and Biota Property 
The commodification of things is an issue fraught with ethical issues. Whether 
it is proper to commodify biota or not, this question remains: What is the relation of 
property rights to commodification? Utilitarian arguments, personal liberty, and 
economic liberalism provide the justification for property rights in practically 
anything. Private property is strongly linked to commodification, as a primary purpose 
of the property right is to affect trade. For market efficiency, property rights must be 
clearly defined, enabled, and enforced (Randall, 1987). Private-property rights in biota 
make it possible to trade such rights in a marketplace (Stroup and Baden, 1983; Hill 
and Meiners, 1998), and most, if not all, societies have accepted biota ownership and 
trade in domesticated and legally captured animals.  
From a market-efficiency perspective, property mechanisms can solve natural 
resource problems, even for wild biota (Anderson and Leal, 1991; Lueck, 1995, 1998). 
And, if you believe in American liberalism, which bases the public good on a net 
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aggregate of incremental increases in individual welfare through private transactions 
in a “free” market, commodification is desirable.  
Commodification translates things into monetized terms, a situation that 
presents dilemmas in the case of wild biota. Norton (1991) describes the impossibility 
of quantifying the economic value of wild biota according to neoclassical economics 
and refers to the Endangered Species Act as an embodiment of this idea. Some argue 
that the commodification of nature is a serious strategic error that disregards other 
attributes that could outweigh market value (Farrier and Tucker, 2001) and creates 
potential perverse outcomes such as the loss of biodiversity (McCauley, 2006) and 
even social justice (Isla, 2005). But, beyond the quantification problem, let us examine 
the ethical significance of commodification per se.  
Andre (1992) describes various things that cannot or should not be 
commodified: for example, humans and their relationships, public necessities, and 
subsistence needs. Some things are technically commodifiable but ethically 
unownable, such as culturally significant objects of great art or historical artifacts. 
Some things, such as personal honors and awards, cannot be alienated, while others 
such as personal rights and freedom can, but should not be. Regarding subsistence, 
there is an important distinction between owning a loaf of bread and owning all loaves 
of bread. Certain things may be exchanged, but only if there is no attendant financial 
gain, such as in the adoption of babies. Some commodities are ethically bad for both 
buyer and seller such as body parts and things in a gift relationship.  
Commodification can have negative effects on the commodity. For example, 
commodification prices things, which are then commensurable with other priced 
goods, even if such things should not be valued. Furthermore, pricing emphasizes the 
instrumentality of things, detracting from intrinsic value. In summary, 
commodification can negatively disrupt social relationships and create social bads.  
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Northcott (1996) argues that the quest for economic growth drives the 
commodification of “more and more areas of human social interaction” (p. 75), which 
diminishes social goods and norms of behavior. He believes that trust, neighborliness, 
mutual regard, care, and non-violence are likely diminished by commodification and 
that commodification of nature is a major factor in environmental destruction. 
If we accept that the commodification of natural wildlife may be ethically bad, 
is it also true of the commodification of domesticated biota? While animal-rightists 
would say yes (for many types of biota), most would probably say no. Environmental 
ethicists argue for relaxed anthropocentrism, but since their focus is wild nature, they 
may be ambivalent about the sale of dogs or pigs. 
Let’s return to the question of commodifying wildlife. The commodification of 
biota emphasizes instrumental value and human dominance and serves human 
purposes: cultivation, manufacture, business. State and federal wildlife laws are 
focused on prohibition of the commercial use of wild biota, and the rise of such laws 
was spurred by the destruction of wildlife for market purposes (Tober, 1981; Bean and 
Rowland, 1997). Currently, there is widespread acceptance that the commodification 
of domesticated biota is not ethically problematic. But this is not true of wild biota. A 
thriving but regulated market in zoo and aquaria specimens is perhaps another matter. 
The commodification of these creatures may be acceptable because of the educational, 
scientific, and conservation purposes of these institutions. McCauley (2006) has 
described a set of problems that could arise with wildlife commodification. First, it 
values biota that have human utility and the expense of those that have none or less 
than none. The volatility of markets may prove ineffective in the long-term protection 
of biota. He believes protecting biota should be a wholly moral issue, like civil rights. 
And as Farrier and Tucker (2001) point out, it is critical to preserve potential value, 
which is very difficult to commodify. 
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8.8 Biota Property and Religion 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the sacredness of life as a criterion for 
precluding or mitigating intellectual property in Diamond v. Chakrabarty is a triumph 
of utilitarianism. But has the court’s rejection violated other ethical principles? 
Religion is an obvious place to look. How do religious doctrines relate to biota 
property generally, and to intellectual property from biota in particular? 
Webster (1952) defines that which is sacred as “holy, set apart and 
consecrated; hallowed by association with the divine and protected, in some fashion, 
by religious sanction; it is something worthy of reverence and respect.”8  
All of the world’s major religions speak of the sacredness of life. For example, 
in 1986, representatives of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Baha’i, 
Jainism, Sikhism, and Taoism met and expressed life’s sacredness in the Assisi 
Declarations (Posey, 1999).  
For Christians, Muslims, and Jews, life is created by a monotheistic God. 
Respect for life follows from devotion to and adulation of God, the Creator. These 
religions have a very strong anthropocentric core: Humans are made by God imago 
dei—in God’s image. Humans are closer to God than to other creations and are first in 
the hierarchy of creation. Humanity’s role is one of dominion and stewardship over all 
life: the Christian “steward,” Islamic “khalifa” (vice-regent), and Judaic “leader and 
custodian” of God’s creation. While there are various interpretations of the meaning of 
human dominion, these religions generally accept that wanton disrespect and abuse of 
life is disrespect for God. However, it is also clear that non-human life exists to serve 
the needs of humanity. The Assisi Declarations (Posey, 1999) reflect these values:  
Acts of irresponsibility towards God’s creatures are an abomination 
(Christian);  
                                                 
8 Webster’s New International Dictionary (1952), s.v. “sacred.” 
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Humanity is a very special creation among all God’s creations and must act as 
God’s steward as responsible for the Earth’s integrity (Islam);  
Humanity, as the leader and custodian of the natural world, must exhibit justice 
and compassion (Judaism); 
Humans are co-inhabitants of the earth and other species have the right to 
survive (Buddhism); 
The human race is not something apart from the Earth and its life-forms, the 
divine is not exterior to creation and thus, a reverence for life is required 
(Hinduism); 
The natural world is a reflection of God and that nature is to be respected and 
protected (Baha’i). (pp. 604–607) 
Islamic teaching includes “Iawheed,” a doctrine of absolute monotheism and 
divine ownership of nature by Allah. Man, next in the hierarchy, is appointed over 
nature as khalifa. Allah prefers the unprogrammed free will of man to the programmed 
goodness of angels and has conferred on man the power of reason and obligation to 
balance intellectual judgment with moral commitment to justice. Allah has given 
humans the right and power to use, but not abuse, the “nourishing goods” of the Earth. 
Extravagance and excess are forbidden, as man should conserve the balance of Allah’s 
creations. Mammon is an evil, and its pursuit is forbidden. Nasr (1990) argues that for 
Muslims, the technological domination of nature is a sign of deep spiritual lack in the 
denatured experience of modern humanity. 
Judaism places the earth under human dominion, as described in Genesis 1:26 
(KJV): “And God said, ‘let us make man in our image, after our likeness and let them 
have dominion over the fish in the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle 
and over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’” 
Judaic teachings hold that the relationship between man and nature is one of 
ownership and that love of nature may not take precedence over love of man. 
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All major religions teach respect for life. Their precepts do not prohibit 
property rights in biota per se. How one uses those rights, however, is another matter. 
Christianity plays a primary role in the analysis of biota-property ethics. An 
exploration of its varied interpretations of the human–nature relationship is 
illuminating. A great deal has been written on the Christian relation of God, humans, 
nature, and economics. White (1967) triggered some of this debate when he indicted 
Christianity as a primary cause of modern environmental destruction. White views the 
Bible as a clear call for human dominion over nature. White’s provocative argument is 
that Christianity, capitalism, liberalism, and technology have produced environmental 
destruction. White’s theme is fueled by Weber’s (1998) thesis that Christian adulation 
of capitalism and individual wealth accumulation is firmly based on Protestantism.  
The Christian view of non-human life balances on a fulcrum of deity–nature 
dualism versus wholism. In ancient religions, deity and nature were unified (Keller, 
1990). However, because of the biblical doctrine of fallen nature, Protestantism 
removed the spiritual power from the natural world (MacIntyre, 1981). Christian 
theologians purged the natural landscape of its sacred qualities and replaced it with 
God’s actuality solely within the human individual. Martin Luther reduced nature to a 
repository, at the service of man, for the work of God through man (Hendry, 1980). 
Thomas (1986) argues that the deification of nature ended with the advent of private 
property, the money economy, and Protestant desacralization of the natural world.  
In his modern fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible’s teaching on nature, 
humanity, and God, Beisner (1997) believes humans have an unequivocal mandate of 
dominion over nature; that wilderness is “waste,” in which God is displeased; and that 
the human cultivation and subduing of “cursed” wilderness and nature to create the 
“garden” is desired by God. In Beisner’s theology, humans have a duty to subdue 
nature and increase nature’s productivity—for human ends. Although Beisner believes 
324 
that wanton destruction and waste of nature is ungodly, he believes that “nature 
transformed by . . . man” is much preferable to pristine nature. Beisner asserts that the 
free market, constrained only by God’s law, is the manifestation of humanity’s biblical 
stewardship duty. Beisner rejects the premises of an environmental crisis, that 
biodiversity is truly threatened, even that biodiversity is necessarily a social good. 
Such narrow anthropocentric views have produced indictments of Christian teachings 
for their negative impact on the natural environment (White, 1967; McHarg, 1969; 
Moncreif, 1970). Nash (1989) believes that Christianity and Judaism are partly to 
blame for ecological destruction because of their overwhelming anthropocentrism and 
demonizing of nature and their central role in developed industrial societies. Stoll’s 
(1997) historical study of Protestant influence on the environmental movement and 
capitalism in America describes how the themes of “fallen nature,” “human 
dominion,” and “stewardship” have produced a philosophy of nature as an 
anthropocentric warehouse, a belief in manifest destiny, a conquest mentality, and a 
mind/nature dualism. However, there are alternative views of this indictment of 
Christianity. 
Samuelson (1961) rejects Weber’s (1998) link between Protestant theology and 
capitalism, arguing that other social forces have played a more important role. Such 
forces include mercantilism, the Enlightenment, Darwinism, and economic liberalism 
and its faith in economic expansion as the preferred means for enhancing human 
welfare. Passmore (1974) points out that the Christian denigration of nature is really 
an attempt to distinguish Christianity from nature worship with its myriad fears, 
taboos, and inhumanities, abundantly described by Frazer (1963). This view places 
nature at the bottom of the Christian moral hierarchy. Passmore also argues against 
Christian responsibility for “ecocide” by stating that ecological destruction results 
from a complex of social forces and that many environmentally problematic concepts 
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(such as mind/nature dualism) are actually rooted in Greek thought. As emphasis, he 
points out that modern non-Christian cultures do not manifest greater environmental 
virtue. 
Some Christian theologians have responded by admitting that some 
expressions of Christian theology may be “environmentally toxic” or, at least, 
complicit in some “earth destruction” (Hessel and Ruether, 2000). They accept that 
Christianity has played a role in the conquest of nature, driven by technological and 
market-based economic expansion. But they also believe Christianity provides a basis 
for “eco-theology”—that Christianity can contribute to a sustainable earth–human 
relationship by connecting contemporary science (particularly, ecology) with biblical 
teachings of community and justice. Since Christians are primarily concerned with 
human welfare, they can be persuaded to support economic liberalism. But, in eco-
theology, a wholistic God cares for the well-being of humans and the earth; Godliness 
includes a theological and biological kinship between humans and nature and a belief 
that the natural world reveals God. A number of Christian ethicists have constructed a 
cosmology that differs from the narrow anthropocentrism of Beisner (1997). Nash 
(1991) extends Christian love to God’s creations and includes non-human “neighbors” 
in the “love thy neighbor” commandment. Wallace (1996) believes God is the tangible 
universe, that ecocide is deicide, and that damaging the earth harms the “mystery we 
call God.” Northcott (1996) believes that the ecological crisis is a moral one and that 
the Christian tradition provides a basis for solutions. He replaces narrow 
anthropocentric Christianity with an “ecologically-informed focus” on humanity and 
the “moral significance” of the natural order. Northcott argues that Christianity does 
not legitimate “ecological plunder” and that under Christianity, the human relationship 
with nature is a covenant. However, Northcott does believe the root cause of 
ecological destruction is the Calvinist “gospel of prosperity” combined with Adam 
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Smith’s mantra of individual wealth-striving, which has produced a faith in property 
accumulation, self-interest, and avarice as means of achieving the public good. 
However, the environmental catastrophe of Soviet-style communism counters this 
argument. Northcott states that the Christian restraint of self-interest and its belief in 
community provide solutions, and that unbridled consumerism, the myth of inexorable 
human progress by technology, and economic expansion—not Christianity—are the 
real culprits. He argues that it is the loss of Christian ethics and the modern denial of 
teleological and moral significance of “embodied, biophysical, existence” that lays the 
natural world open to wanton physical reordering by humans. Northcott believes 
money has displaced God as the ordering force of human relations, allows abstractions 
of human welfare, and dissipates the relationships between social classes and 
“between humans and nature.” 
For Northcott (1996), the money economy and technology produce an 
instrumental view of nature that has gone “hand in hand with the demise of the 
traditional Christian view of creation as the sphere of God’s providential ordering” (p. 
83). Northcott decries the continual quest for economic growth as motivating the 
expansion of commodification into more and more spheres of human endeavor. 
The loss of Christian temperance, combined with un-Christian pursuits of 
individual pleasure and materialism, has also driven environmental destruction. Hessel 
and Ruether (2000) describe how the Christian tenets of economic sufficiency, 
generosity, self-restraint, frugality, and values independent of market value provide a 
basis for an ecologically sustainable society. 
Wallace (2000) describes a biblical basis for God as Holy Spirit that indwells 
and sustains all life-forms and a Christian ecotheology that is shifted toward a 
“biocentric model of spirit in nature” in which God and earth are inseparable. Low 
(1996) refers to Celtic theology to similarly develop a modern, Christian nature 
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theology. McDonagh (1994) rejects narrowly construed Christian earth stewardship 
because it fosters ecologically and socially unjust economic growth. He calls for an 
earth-centered Christian “ecological ministry” in which the dignity and value of 
humans is not abandoned but in which respect for other creatures is incorporated with 
traditional Christian ideals that prescribe personal lifestyles of moderation, simplicity, 
harmony, and discipline. Bratton (1993) counters the view of wilderness as a godless 
or demonic state. She rejects the idea that Christianity inherently considers wilderness 
as evil, as imparting evil, or that it is incompatible with wilderness preservation, 
describing the biblical tradition of wilderness as a setting for spiritual events. 
Some modern Christian writers search for a connection between God and 
nature. Gilkey (1993) describes nature as the imago dei (image of God). He believes 
the power, life, and order of nature are “traces” of God’s activity and presence, that 
order is a sacred principle, and that a mechanistic explanation of biological order is 
improbable. Other traces of God in nature include evolution, the human psyche, and 
the union of life and death. Gilkey points to verses in Matthew, Joshua, Timothy, 
Psalms, and Job that describe the order, beauty, and regularity of nature as signs of 
God. He arrives at this sacred nexus of God and life: “this is DNA . . . Here, if 
anywhere is the locus, principle or vehicle of the sacred in nature . . . It is DNA, not 
the neutrino that is the icon of the sacred” (pp. 96–97). Expressions of a more 
encompassing Christian nature theology from mainstream Protestant religions are 
demonstrated in these recent church declarations: 
The claim to have mastery over creation has resulted in the senseless 
exploitation of natural resources . . . every creature and whole creation in 
chorus bear witness to the glorious union and harmony with which creation is 
endowed . . . 9 we affirm that the world as God’s handiwork has its own 
inherent integrity; that . . . all creatures . . . are good in God’s sight. We will 
resist the claim that anything in creation is merely a resource for human 
                                                 
9 The World Council of Churches, declaration in the Granvollen document of 1988 (Posey, 1999). 
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exploitation. We will resist species extinction for human benefit . . . and the 
policies and plans which contribute to the disintegration of creation . . . it has 
been human selfishness, greed, foolishness or even perversity that has wrought 
destruction and death upon so much of the planet.10  
The divine presence of the Spirit in creation binds us human beings together 
with all created life . . . we are accountable before God in and to the 
community of life . . . as priests of creation. This requires attitudes of 
compassion and humility, respect and reverence.11 
While these mainstream religious statements clearly call for respect for nature 
and acknowledge the divinity in nature, there does not appear to be any ethical 
prohibition of property in biota, and some views even prescribe it. Further, there does 
not seem to be any Christian prohibition against intellectual property from biota, 
although Gilkey’s (1993) thesis of DNA as an “icon of the sacred” raises interesting 
questions. Christian teachings do provide guidance on the use of such property rights. 
Certainly, the use of biota property to harm persons violates religious principles. 
Similarly, while property in biota is compatible with traditional religious ethics, if 
such property is used to abuse God’s creation, an ethical barrier probably exists. For 
example, using ownership to wantonly harm violates the stewardship commandment. 
Despite significant differences in doctrine between mainstream religions, they 
all support biota property. This is based on the monotheism of Christianity, Islam, and 
Judaism, a God outside of nature, humans as God’s special creation with dominance 
over all other creations, and the goodness of nature measured by human utility. The 
teachings of mainstream religions and the political philosophies of modern economic 
liberalism are tailored for human use of nature and anthropocentric progress through 
private-property rights. However, the unfettered, anthropocentric use of nature has 
origins in the teachings and philosophies of several hundred years ago—long before 
the ecological crisis evolved as a human concern. For example, when confronted with 
                                                 
10 The World Council of Churches 1990 Affirmation. 
11 The 1991 World Council of Churches General Assembly. 
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the problem of private- versus public-property rights, Locke suggests that the New 
World will supply boundless lands and resources for all. Modern awareness of a finite 
Earth, an ever-increasing human population, and ecological degradation has stimulated 
a rethinking of these basic philosophies (O’Briant, 1974; McKibben, 1989; Northcott, 
1996).  
Some Christian ecotheologians have reinterpreted the relation of Christian 
theology and practice to humanity’s relationship to the environment. Fowler (1995) 
describes a wide gulf between Christian ecotheology and apocalypticism. According 
to Fowler, Christian ecologists believe in the possibility of eco-collapse and are 
willing to take counter action. Apocalyptics believe that saving nature is futile because 
preparing for the return of the Savior is paramount. Fowler also describes “Green 
Protestantism,” a Christian ecotheology characterized by a focus on human welfare 
through the political good of community and an unease with liberalism and its 
emphasis on individuality, rationalism, and capitalism. Green Protestants believe 
community is the nexus of humanity and ecology (Ellingson, 1993) and that Genesis 
can be interpreted such that human “domination” of nature is, rather, “dominion” and 
stewardship. 
Do other spiritual belief systems, particularly those that place wild nature in a 
spiritual context, create ethical boundaries on biota property? 
8.9 Biota Property and a Spiritual View of Nature 
Anthropocentric monotheism, in which the Creator is external to nature, 
establishes a dualism between the sacredness of man and his Godly works, and a 
mechanistic world in which desacralized nature is mere backdrop and props for the 
sacred human drama. An alternative, sacredness in nature, can be found in many 
ancient nature mysticisms and religions (Frazer, 1963). This fundamental divide has 
produced thousands of years of struggle between nature-as-sacred and man-god-as-
330 
sacred. McIntosh (1999) describes the transition from nature-as-sacred paganism to 
Christianity as embodied in the early Celtic Christians, who integrated God and 
nature: the long conquest of pagan Celtic religion by Christianity, in which the Celts’ 
“high regard for nature” and “gentle . . . love for all creations” was lost as Christianity 
focused less on nature and more on the salvation of the human soul (Hull, 1993). 
History is replete with the destruction of animistic religions of native peoples by 
Christian colonizers of the New World and Africa (McManners, 1990). Frazer (1963) 
describes how nature-worshipping peoples were freed from irrational cycles of 
subservience to nature’s whims, blood sacrifice, and acts of inhumane propitiation by 
a nature-free theism. Although the violent and inhumane worship of a nature deity 
seems a long-distant memory, “nature-worship” is still viewed negatively by some 
traditional religious believers such as Pat Robertson (1991). 
Modern expressions of nature-as-sacred draw upon reinterpretations of 
traditional religion (Hayden, 1996), new spiritual developments, and syntheses of 
spiritual teachings with ecological theory (Spangler, 1993). Page (1996) describes 
“pansyntheism,” in which nothing is outside God’s presence; God is not a finite 
creature but each creature has a relationship with God. Spangler uses the “Gaia 
Hypothesis” of Lovelock (1979), in which the Earth is a living organism, to develop a 
spirituality of Earth as sacred being and cornerstone of an eco-theology. 
Hayden (1996) draws out the nature-loving tenets of Christianity, Judaism, and 
Buddhism to create an “Earth Gospel” that provides a spiritual basis to protect the 
planet and its “life systems” from the destructive forces of “industrial enterprise.” 
The modern American nature-as-sacred belief has roots in the writings of the 
ecstatics and romantics such as Muir, Thoreau, and Emerson, in which a monotheistic 
God is not rejected but is manifest in nature. Stoll (1997) describes how neo-
Platonism, a yearning for union with God through worldly beauty, led to nature-
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ecstasy writings in which nature theology in America evolved to enlist reason, rather 
than mysticism, to articulate God through scientific nature study.  
Some spiritual views are wholly nature-centered. Neo-pagans believe that 
nature per se is holy and that Divinity is immanent in all nature (Adler, 1986). Modern 
expressions of pre-industrial religions often define God and spirit synonymously with 
nature.12 
Nature-as-sacred philosophies share beliefs that veer from a strict locus of 
sacredness in man and an external God toward non-human creation (living and non-
living) as embodying a sacred principle. All share a belief in a shift from God as the 
sovereign power outside of and ruling over nature to a God who is within and around 
everything, supporting and sustaining all nature and humans in a holistic community. 
They share a de-emphasis of the mechanistic nature of Descartes and Bacon, to a view 
of all life as an organic whole. Nature-as-sacred rejects the ethic, exemplified by 
Dewey (1939), that nature has neither purpose nor intrinsic value and that 
maximization of wealth in which nature is merely a source of goods and repository of 
wastes is the ultimate good.  
What, then, should be made of the relation of property in biota to the nature-as-
sacred belief? Property is a purely human construct, intrinsically anthropocentric, and 
tailored for commodification. This would seem to run counter to nature-as-sacred. 
Commodification is a powerful corollary of property and can be intrinsically unethical 
and damaging in certain spheres—certainly in sacred spheres. Weiskel (1999) relates 
the story of Jesus and the money-changers in the temple (Matthew 21:12). Regardless 
of the ethics of the commercial transaction vis à vis buyer and seller, the transaction 
itself is blasphemous. Weiskel believes this should also apply to biodiversity as a 
source of goods. Andre (1992) points out that commodification is antithetical to 
                                                 
12 Declaration of the International Meeting around the First World Gathering of Elders and wise persons 
of diverse Indigenous Traditions (in Posey, 1999). 
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sacredness. So, would a property right in biota profane sacred nature? In practice, 
property in biota is utilitarian and rarely, if ever, considered a violation of the sacred. 
Property and commercial transactions in livestock, pets, or zoo specimens are not 
profane. However, before biota property is unquestionably accepted, it should be 
recalled that it has not been so very many years since property in humans was 
considered an ethical practice.  
Although a property right may, in many cases, equate to commodification (and 
thus a profaning of the sacred), it need not necessarily do so. The antiquated res 
sacrae or sacred property was a common type of property hundreds of years ago. But 
it is hardly apparent today. The assertion of a res sacrae property right by the Catholic 
Church in the Pope’s mitre does not profane the object—it protects it. So, the property 
right per se does not inherently affect sacredness, but rather the intent and use of that 
right. Thus, holding a property right in an endangered species in order to simply profit 
with no regard to the species is profane. But using the property right to protect the 
species, even while profiting, may be sacred. 
The mechanistic, Cartesian reductionism of biotechnology and intellectual 
property seems somewhat contrary to nature-as-sacred. But this view would indict all 
the life sciences of medicine, environment, agriculture, and veterinary medicine. Is it 
profane to conduct mechanistic work on life to produce a result that is used to preserve 
life? Is it a violation of the sacredness of life to obtain a cell culture that is used to 
preserve endangered species? Does a sacred end justify profane, mechanistic means? 
This raises two final aspects of the nature-as-sacred versus utilitarian property 
dichotomy: ethical complexity created by aggregations of ethical concerns (even 
within a single event or action) and the need for a practical ethics. 
Ethical complexity is a result of the ethically different components of a single 
act. The interplay of these components presents conundrums that stymie the practical 
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application of moral absolutes. When a soldier kills an enemy soldier in war, is that act 
right or wrong? What if the soldier kills in hate rather than remorse? What if the war is 
unjust or illegal? What if the soldier killed is a criminal, and the killer a 
philanthropist? What if the war is unjust but the killer is a philanthropist killing 
another philanthropist to save the life of an innocent child? Any number of ethical 
layers can be aggregated, producing different ethical quandaries. 
Consider property in biota and the sacredness of nature. Does it violate the 
sacred to possess a wild animal in order to exhibit it for entertainment or profit? What 
if the entertainment is demeaning or cruel, or educational? What if the cage is 
uncomfortable? What if there is no profit motive and the cage is a good facsimile of 
the animal’s natural habitat? What if the purpose of caging is research on a disease 
that threatens the wild population of that animal? It seems that the violation of 
sacredness hinges, at least in part, on the end purpose of a property right. Perhaps a res 
sacrae property right asserted in biota for the purpose of its protection, even when 
involved in a profitable transaction, is a moral good. 
Norton (1991) describes the need for useful ethical guidelines that will inform 
real situations in his critique of non-anthropogenic “deep-ecology.” Absolutely 
avoiding the use of nature as a human resource is impossible. Absolute nature-as-
sacred is a difficult ethics template for the making of difficult decisions concerning 
humans and nature. A non-anthropocentric view of nature-as-sacred may be a valid 
moral theory and a necessary counterbalance to the obsessive and destructive 
anthropocentrism of the past but, alone, cannot clarify real-world ethical dilemmas if 
too strictly adhered to. 
8.10 Biota Property and Environmental Ethics 
Property rights are a cornerstone of mercantilism and economic liberalism and 
are essential for an efficient market function that rations natural resources among free, 
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economic individuals (Stroup and Baden, 1983). As Rose (1985) makes clear, the 
state-supported right to acquire and defend property is tailor-made for a merchant 
people that adhere to economic liberalism as the road to human well-being. 
Conversely, Taylor (1989) believes that a focus on efficiency in the search for 
happiness can lead to the destruction of a society’s way of life. 
Biota property aligns with the ideals of free markets, liberalism, and 
mainstream religion, tempered only by limited constraints that preclude animal 
cruelty, waste, and the egregious taking of public goods. Constraints on the 
commodification of biota by property mechanisms are overwhelmed by the mercantile 
ethic and its global reach (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). Mainstream religions are 
attuned to an ethic that easily allows or encourages a mercantile and mechanistic use 
of biota. A spiritual view of nature provides some mitigation of this utilitarian view. Is 
the environmental ethic relevant to the question of biota property?  
Environmental ethics include beliefs that the natural, non-human environment 
has intrinsic value apart from its human use in a market economy. Environmental 
ethics provide another perspective—mostly non-transcendent and largely based on 
ecologism and its subtending scientific disciplines. The varied expressions of 
environmental ethics are an important framework for interpreting the rightness of biota 
property.  
The early beginnings of an American environmental ethic can be seen in the 
late-1800s tension between John Muir’s God-in-nature and Gifford Pinchot’s 
stewardship of natural resources. John Muir’s “wilderness gospel” made a moral good 
of wilderness beauty as divine immanence. Muir believed that God’s word could be 
read in the “Book of Nature” more readily than in the Bible (Miller, 1993; Stoll, 
1997). Muir’s “divinity in nature” conflicted with Pinchot’s utilitarian natural-resource 
conservation philosophy (Norton, 1991). Muir viewed utilitarianism as Mammon 
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worship that would destroy the holy places of wilderness. Pinchot also believed in 
God, but in the rational stewardship of God’s resources by and for man. Muir came to 
view the private ownership of land as a primary roadblock to preserving God’s temple 
of wilderness. Pinchot shared Muir’s concern with private property but for different 
reasons: Pinchot believed unbridled private rights in resources were antiethical to the 
moral goal of resource conservation for the greatest public good. Stoll (1997) 
describes how these two men’s views, both rooted in Calvinism, came to a head in the 
political battle over the damming of Hetch Hetchy Valley near Yosemite, California. 
This debate continues today as some call for a dismantling of the Hetch Hetchy dam. 
Muir considered the drowning of this beautiful valley as the destruction of a temple of 
God, whereas Pinchot viewed unused wilderness as a waste of God-given resources. 
Muir lost the Hetch Hetchy battle, but the debate spawned widespread belief, 
especially in New England, in the idea that nature had intrinsic worth—an idea that 
provided a basis for a modern environmental movement. 
Seeds of early environmental ethics were also sown by Thoreau, who 
popularized an “Ethic of Adoration” for nature that emphasized the moral good of 
social asceticism (Santimire, 1985). Thoreau’s ethic rejected consumerism, reckless 
economic development, and human appetites in the service of and love for nature. The 
writings of Muir’s contemporary John Burroughs gave further voice to an 
environmental ethic based on love of nature for its own sake and its redemptive 
powers for humanity (Wiley, 1967; Bergon, 1987).  
Environmental ethics also has roots in the evolution of the concept of ecology. 
Perkins (1965) espoused the first environmental ethic arising from an ecological basis 
rather than from the transcendentalism of the nature ecstatics. The ecology-based 
environmental ethic was given modern impetus by Leopold’s “Land Ethic,” formed in 
his professional wildlife ecology experiences (Leopold, 1949) and by Rachel Carson’s 
336 
Silent Spring (1962), an alarming account of ecological destruction by pesticides. 
These works, followed by other indictments of society’s destruction of the 
environment,13 stimulated a rethinking of society’s relation to the environment. 
In reaction to the apparent cause of environmental destruction, a number of 
ethicists began to challenge the premise that moral good is defined solely in an 
anthropocentric framework (Zimmerman, 1998). Awareness of the centrality of 
ecology awakened the notion that absolute anthropocentricism may be flawed. 
Environmental ethics is a shift, weak or strong, from narrow anthropocentrism. Weak 
shifts from anthropocentrism are represented by “anthropocentric reformers” who 
believe the cause of dysfunction in the human–environment relationship is not human-
centered values per se but rather flawed human behaviors such as ignorance, greed, 
illegal acts, and short-sightedness. Such reformers believe the situation can be 
remedied by existing institutions. Ecofeminists (Mies and Shiva, 1993) and social 
ecologists also believe the problem is not anthropocentrism per se but rather the 
inherently inequitable institutions of patriarchy, capitalism, corrupted wealth, racism, 
and other social injustices. Strong shifts from anthropocentrism include the radical 
ecologists and animal-rightists. Radical ecologists include deep ecologists, biocentrics, 
and ecocentrics, who call the displacement of humans the locus of morality.  
Much of the intellectual dialectic of human and environmental ethics has 
centered on the proper locus of intrinsic value. If this locus is not human, what is it? 
Leopold’s (1949) locus of ethical value is the ecosystem (the “land,” in his 
lexicon). It is holistic, not individualistic, and denies human superiority. Leopold 
defined his ecocentric, moral compass as follows: “A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it 
tends otherwise” (pp. 224–225). 
                                                 
13 The Closing Circle (Commoner, 1971), The Population Bomb (Ehrlich, 1968), and End of Nature 
(McKibben, 1989). 
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The idea that the integrity of an ecological community is the defining principle 
of the environmental ethic differs from the animal-right ethic (Regan, 1983; Singer, 
1990) in being inclusive of all living creatures, their natural behaviors, and the 
connections between creatures and their abiotic support factors. Ecocentrists place 
highest value on the soundness of the ecological whole, including the interconnections 
of creatures ranging from sentient higher animals to microbes.  
The animal-rightist locus is higher animals, a view that produces an ecological 
blind spot. Singer (1990) applies the Benthamian utilitarianism of pain = bad, 
pleasure = good to sentient animals, but this does not prohibit the painless killing of 
animals. Regan (1983), on the other hand, extends inherent moral value to certain 
animals and thereby confers the right to be free from human domination to such 
animals. While animal rightists may be considered non-ecocentrists or “speciesists” 
because their moral locus is limited to higher animals (and in some cases, only 
mammals), Callicott (1994) points out that their view provides a “way station” 
between absolute anthropocentrism and an environmental ethic. Callicott relies on 
Leopold’s ecocentric moral good to argue that the animal-rights ethic leaves many 
creatures out of moral consideration and ignores the necessary ecological wholism of a 
truly informed environmental ethic.  
Taylor (1981, 1986) attempts to justify a “biocentric” ethic in which the good 
of the biotic community is the moral optimum. His ethical locus is the “teleological 
center” of each and every organism. He rejects human superiority as simply an 
irrational bias in our own favor. For Taylor, each wild organism is a teleological 
center, independent of human instrumental use. Property in organisms is antithetical to 
Taylor’s teleological centers to the extent that property is a utilitarian value, unless 
such property could be used to serve the teleological interests of organisms. 
Goodpaster (1994) extends moral consideration to all beings that are “alive” (i.e., that 
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harbor the “life principle”) and believes that unfettered human freedom of action 
regarding non-human beings is human chauvinism.  
“Bioegalitarianism,” the idea that all creatures have inherent and equal value, 
has generated a great deal of controversy and may have use in theoretical justification 
for some shift from anthropocentrism, but it would be “diabolically difficult to 
practice” (Zimmerman, 1998). Taylor’s extreme non-anthropocentric biocentrism 
would undoubtedly infuriate adherents of mainstream religion and utilitarians. Sylvan 
and Bennett (1994) place less emphasis on the value of an individual, shifting the 
focus to “wholistic entities” such as biomes and ecosystems. Such wholism is 
troubling to those who fear loss of individual human rights. Bioegalitarians and 
ecocentrists have been labeled “environmental fascists,” a name that recalls the human 
tragedy of the Holocaust that resulted from an erosion of the supreme morality of 
human-centered value (Regan, 1983). 
This tension between atomism and wholism is exacerbated by the imperative to 
maintain liberty-strong private-property rights as a shield for the individual against an 
oppressive state and other members of society. From an environmental perspective 
that values ecological wholeness and integrity, advocates of strong property rights 
seem too willing to allow ecologically destructive commodification. As Waldron 
(1988) points out, the “utmost property right” in a thing is the right to destroy it. 
Therefore, strong private-property rights are necessary to protect individual liberty, 
which may include the individual’s right to own parts of an ecosystem and to destroy 
those parts as well as the intact ecosystem. The ecocentric view would argue that 
ecological integrity has a higher rank than the individual’s right in property. 
Ecologically based ethics favor wholism at the expense of the atomism of private-
property rights. But this ecological view is tempered by the specter of “eco-fascism,” 
in which individual rights may be trampled by an aggressive state (Bookchin, 1988). 
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Rolston’s (1991) attempt to synthesize individualism and ecocentrism creates a 
gradient of moral value in which all living beings have a moral good of their own with 
a premium for sentience and self-consciousness. In Rolston’s ethic, humans take 
precedence in critical decisions, and ecosystems have value derived from the 
aggregate of intrinsic value of individual organisms. For Rolston, a “vital ethic” 
respects all life, and the species (the “genetic set”) is the telos; therefore, an individual 
member of the species has less moral weight than the species as a whole. 
The ethical clash of animal-rightists and ecocentrists is evidenced by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife policy of killing introduced, feral goats on California’s Santa 
Barbara channel island to protect native species (Zavaleta, Hobbs, and Mooney, 2001). 
Animal-rightists protested the killing of a single goat, whereas ecocentrists accepted 
goat-killing for the greater good of the native ecosystem. The biocentrism of Taylor 
would not support either approach, since each goat and each wild plant threatened by 
goats has a teleological good. The biocentrism of Sylvan and Bennett (1994) and 
Rolston (1991) would allow some destruction of either plants or goats as long as the 
species as a whole and the ecosystem are sustained. In a further ethical complication, 
the American Livestock Breed Conservancy14 has denounced the killing of these goats 
because they are a rare domesticated breed whose gene pool is endangered. The 
question of removing an alien species from an ecosystem presents a puzzle for 
environmental ethicists, particularly for ecocentrics. How does one define a “natural” 
ecosystem? At what point does an alien species belong in an ecosystem? Furthermore, 
the cost of returning to a “native” state may offend utilitarian-minded ecocentrists. 
These present practical difficulties but are underlain by very much larger ethical 
questions of human involvement in ecosystems. When is human involvement in an 
ecosystem natural or not natural? Furthermore, when Taylor denounces humanity’s 
                                                 
14 The American Livestock Breed Conservancy is a non-profit organization dedicated to preserving rare 
domesticated animal breeds. 
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ecological chauvinism, doesn’t he ignore the nature of the human species in seeking 
its own survival? 
Callicott (1998) believes Leopold’s “Land Ethic” transforms humans from 
conquerors to citizens of nature. Callicott defends ecocentrism against claims of 
“ecofascism” by arguing that the ecocentric ethic does not necessarily cancel human-
centered morality but adds to it, just as a human’s obligations to community add to 
those of family. For Callicott, anthropocentric values are in balance with a respect for 
other members of the ecological community and of the community itself. He looks to 
the cultures of Native Americans for insight in finding this balance, describing how 
they traditionally treated animals, plants, waters, and minerals as non-human persons 
that engage in reciprocal, mutually beneficial socio-economic intercourse with human 
beings (Callicott, 1982). However, Partridge (1982) points out that Native Americans 
may have considered non-human beings as having more moral value than humans of 
another tribe and questions whether this construct is a viable ethical guide. Further 
confounding the human-versus-ecological focus of an environmental ethic, Fritzell 
(1987) points out a paradox: If humans are equal members of the biotic community, 
their drive for self-survival is no more or less moral than wolves eating deer; if 
humans are natural, their behavior is natural. Callicott (1998) restates this paradox by 
asking whether ecocentrism is prudential or deontological. That is, is ecocentric ethics 
a matter of enlightened, collective human self-interest, or a genuine granting of true 
moral standing to non-human entities and ecosystems? 
The “deep ecologists” combine a modern return of the nature ecstatics with a 
clear displacement of anthropocentrism (Devall, 1988; Naess, 1989; Sessions, 1995). 
Deep ecologists believe “shallow ecology” (in which anthropocentrism remains firmly 
in place, but is reformed by political, economic, or technological means) is insufficient 
and that the problem is that nature should not be an instrument of human utility. 
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Sessions (1995) denounces “sustainable development” as “shallow environmentalism” 
and as just another improper instrumental use of nature. He claims that the use of biota 
for genetic exploitation particularly exemplifies anthropocentric instrumentalism. 
Deep ecologists find the profit-seeking exploitation of nature to be particularly 
immoral. Mander (1991) describes a corporate view of the world that is 
“megatechnological,” focused on consumerism and akin to a Disney theme park.  
Berry (1988) calls for a paradigm shift toward ecocentrism and away from the 
“economic-technological-consumerist-wonderworld” that is creating a “wasteworld.” 
He scorns the view of the industrial entrepreneur, as exemplified by Drucker,15 that 
human possession and use is what activates the true value of any natural object.  
Seabrook (1990) believes the market has ruined the traditional conception of 
nature and wonders if we are satisfied with the results of a solution provided by 
market forces. 
Instrumental values of wild biota reflect anthropocentric thinking. Do such 
values represent moral thinking, or are they value-free and based on scientific 
principles of market economics? 
“Deep ecologists” represent a most extreme non-anthropocentric 
environmental ethic. Naess (1989) initiated the movement in the late 1980s with 
several papers in which he rejected the “shallow ecology” of anthropocentric 
reformism for a profound veneration of nature. With roots in Thoreau’s ethic that “in 
wilderness is the preservation of the world” and that “all good things are wild and 
free,” Naess (1998) defined a deep-ecology ethic with the following tenets: A non-
human world, independent of human purposes, is invaluable; diversity of life is a 
value per se; humans have no right to reduce biodiversity except to satisfy “vital” 
needs; smaller human populations are preferred over larger ones; present human 
                                                 
15 “Before it is possessed and used, every plant is a weed and every mineral is just another rock” 
(Drucker, 1985, p. 30). 
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interference in the natural world is excessive, and policies that produce such 
interference should be changed; and life quality is preferable to a material-quantity 
standard of living. Deep ecologists believe humans are the primary cause of 
environmental destruction and lay the cause on humanity’s failure to venerate non-
human nature or to set limits on population, technology use, human appetites, and 
greed (Devall, 1988; Sessions, 1995; Worster, 1995). The facilitation of human-
centered manipulation of nature is criticized by deep ecologists, and rejection of wild-
biota property would obviously follow, although one can imagine wildlife property 
used to protect nature as a deep-ecology good.  
Some critics of deep ecology consider the ideology dangerously misanthropic 
(Bookchin, 1988). The militant ecocentrics (Foreman, 1991) are of particular concern. 
Ecofeminists accept human destruction of the environment as a moral bad but view the 
problem as andropocentrism (Diamond and Orenstein, 1990) and consider deep 
ecology as disguised male dominance (Saleh, 1984).  
Social ecologists reject ecocentrism and biocentrism and consider the 
inequitable intra-generational allocation of power and resources to be the critical issue 
(Zimmerman, 1998). Clark (1998) describes the wide range of ideologies that 
comprise social ecology.  
Liberal environmentalists espouse an expansion of government regulation 
(WorldWatch Institute; Paehlke, 1989), while free-market environmentalists 
(Andersen and Leal, 1991) promote the decentralization of private property and 
unfettered market forces as solutions. Both of these groups would see wild-biota 
property rights as useful tools. However, liberals would put those rights in the hands 
of the state, and the free-marketeers would argue for privately held rights.  
Socialist environmentalists reject both liberal and free-market regimes, 
believing that capitalism is inherently flawed with regard to the environment 
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(O’Connor, 1988). Neo-Marxist analysts point to the globalization of the capitalist 
economy as a cause of environmental destruction (Harvey, 1993; Pepper, 1993; 
Foster, 1995). These critics view socialism and its strong, centralized state control as 
essential, and wild-biota property rights completely held by the state suit this model. 
Social ecologists view social inequity as caused by the dominant paradigm of 
state and corporate control, concentrated economic power, patriarchy, the 
technological–industrial complex, and a variety of authoritarian and repressive 
ideologies. Social ecologists would view private and public wild-biota property rights 
with suspicion. Although such rights could conceivably be used to counter repression, 
authoritarianism, and social injustice, the history of wealth concentration and the use 
of property rights in the service of oppressive or corrupt corporate and state interests 
would be cause for rejections. 
Fox (1998) believes social ecologists (Merchant, 1992) are firm 
anthropocentrics who focus on socio-political agendas rather than on the core 
environmental problem, which is ecological.  
Some liberal environmentalists center their ethic on the ideal of sustainable 
development (Attfield, 1991), which rests on the premise that the conservation of 
nature is dependent on the generation of economic capital (Golliher, 1999). Within the 
liberal paradigm, environmentalists have sought to correct the traditional economic 
equation, which is skewed by the inadequate valuation of nature, by establishing novel 
methods of assessing the true economic value of the environment and its components 
(Costanza, 1991). This approach has been criticized as inappropriately requiring the 
commodification of all value and as being particularly unsuited for the valuation of 
biodiversity (O’Neill and Holland, 1999). Sagoff (1999) critiques the utilitarian model 
of liberal economics and argues for a deontological (Kantian) framework. Sagoff 
describes conceptual weaknesses of the willingness-to-pay basis of individual welfare 
344 
that underlies the liberal utilitarian model. He posits that the utilitarian model, 
expressed by free-exchange markets, can produce obnoxious social outcomes such as 
prostitution, child labor, pornography, and the narcotics trade. Therefore, although it 
would be efficient to have a market in human organs, our society prohibits such 
mercantilism as morally abhorrent. Sagoff also questions the fundamental premise of 
free-market liberalism, the satisfaction of personal preference, as highly manipulatable 
(through advertising, for example) and capable of producing personal and social bads. 
Sagoff believes that utilitarianism is insufficient to accommodate those social 
decisions that require a collective ethical decision. He prescribes a deontological 
approach to the conservation of natural resources, including biodiversity, in which 
citizens arrive at mutual goals and characteristics of the society they aspire to and in 
which such goals may have little connection with any particular individual’s 
preference. Weiskel (1999) also rejects the idea that monetary value is the only 
rational valuation and argues that society cannot solve a collective problem by 
multiplying private solutions. He describes how individuals are urged to think only as 
consumers and that market mechanisms are the one viable solution to social/economic 
problems. But Weiskel points out that individuals have alternate identities—as 
parents, citizens, and members of religions—and that these are often ignored in the 
public-policy formulation of liberal economics, which protect “the rights of the 
consumer.” Finally, Weiskel believes that the justification of the public good in terms 
of private gain is a fundamental mistake in moral reasoning. 
Sagoff (1999) has argued for a deontological approach to decision making by 
the body politic on questions of environmental ethics. Complex questions of what is 
right and good in environmental decision making are not appropriately addressed by 
simple utilitarian and efficiency models. Rather, such decision making must include 
non-monetizable values that are woven into the social fabric. Sagoff suggests that 
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narrowly construed utilitarian models provide part of the framework for determining 
the appropriateness of wild-biota property rights, but the complete picture requires 
public decision making through a political process that includes utilitarian, aesthetic, 
and other values. 
An organizing principle of most environmental ethics is the displacement of 
humans from the absolute zenith of all ethical determinations. This dislodging has 
spawned a great deal of discussion about the intrinsic worth of non-human life and 
abiotic support compared with human-centered value. These arguments have produced 
debate about differences in value between species and have yielded ethical arguments 
that are logically crafted but practically irrelevant or ludicrous. For example, Hettinger 
(1995) develops an argument against intellectual property from biota by basing it on 
the ethical premise that no human should have the right to own any other organism, 
even a bacterium! Obviously, such a position is useless in guiding any practical 
decision making. Norton (1995) makes this point by rejecting non-anthropocentric 
ethics as politically impractical and counterproductive. Norton’s thesis accepts the 
intellectual value of a shift away from a purely anthropocentric value framework but, 
if the goal is ethical guidance for a useful praxis, such constructs are not relevant. So, 
for Norton, the ethical question of the rightness of a wild-biota property right rests on 
something more than theoretical rights and values. The question is whether, in 
practice, wild-biota property rights produce an environmental good. This leads to the 
question of practical ethics of wild-biota property. 
8.11 A Practical Ethics of Wildlife Property 
Is a property right in wild biota right or wrong, a necessary evil or a great 
good, or something in between? Ethical theorists present a wide spectrum. Regan 
(1983) and Jamieson (1994) hold that animals have intrinsic right of liberty and 
freedom from human domination. Hettinger (1995) argues that a property right in any 
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organism is immoral. Conversely, Buchanan (1993) believes private-property rights 
are essential for the human right of freedom. (McCauley, 2006) believes that any steps 
that aid in the commodification of wildlife are dangerously misguided. Anderson and 
Leal (1991) and Stroup and Baden (1983) make compelling arguments that private-
property rights are required for the proper allocation of natural resources among all 
members of a society. But where in the polarized theoretical debate can we find 
guidance in practical matters?  
In reality, property rights in biota are a custom of thousands of years, and 
arguing against them is largely an academic exercise. But property rights are also used 
to degrade biodiversity for profit, and a lack of property structure produces a tragedy 
of the commons. The practical rightness of property in wildlife is confusing and 
complex. Is there a way to cut this Gordian knot and solve this problem practically and 
ethically? Norton (1995) points out that ethics theory is monistic, based on absolutes, 
and divorced from real management issues; that theoretical, ethical arguments do not 
inform practical decision making. Norton suggests that the good of property in non-
human life rests on the intent and purpose of such property. So, for example, Regan 
(1983) and Jamieson (1994) argue that zoos are immoral regardless of their purpose. 
For Norton, if the purpose is pure profit-making, with no regard for education or 
animal welfare, imprisoning animals is bad. But if the purpose is research, education, 
and captive breeding for species survival, imprisonment is justified. Similarly, a 
property right in biota solely for profit is ethically different from the use of such right 
for conservation. A fur company owning caged foxes presents biota property in a 
different light from the Nature Conservancy asserting rights to protect biota on its 
lands. But if the fur company dedicates some portion of pelt-sale profits for wild-fox 
conservation, the ethics of its property right is modified.  
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Does the use of property rights for a morally good purpose render such rights 
per se a moral good? Conversely, does the use of property in biota to accomplish a 
moral bad make the rights unethical? In both cases, morally good and bad outcomes 
result from property rights. Thus, such rights can be ethically good or bad, depending 
on their result. Is the absence of such rights a moral good or bad? The “tragedy of the 
commons” destruction of the environment is a widely perceived to be bad, but a 
private right that impairs a common good is also bad. Property in wild biota is a 
fulcrum on which the seesaw of ethical goodness or badness tips according to the 
application and outcomes of such rights. 
Owning biota property to accomplish the goals of ecocentric land management 
would satisfy Leopold. Holding biota property in order to exclude anthropocentric use 
would satisfy the biocentrics and deep ecologists. Various types of biota-property 
rights uses can be configured that would satisfy the goals of any one of the several 
branches of environmental ethics, although perhaps not simultaneously. 
Thus, in practice, wild-biota property rights are amoral. As in the case of 
money, the question is not whether it is bad or good but, rather, is a particular use bad 
or good? And while wild-biota property rights are neither bad nor good, their intent 
and use is likely to be one or the other, or a complex mix of both. 
A practical ethics requires the appreciation of a “nuance of ethical obligations” 
in the context of a community and will provide guidance in practical decision making 
when it is pluralistic and pragmatic (Norton, 1995). In this vein, property rights in wild 
biota may be used to effect biodiversity protection and mercantilistic exploitation. The 
challenge for those who seek the former rather than the latter is to understand these 
property rights and how to use them like civil rights, in which proponents learned to 
use the political and legal system to achieve their noble goals. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 Summary 
As I have studied the law underlying patents and wildlife conservation, it has 
become clear that the concept of property is fundamental to understanding the 
relationship between people and institutions to things, and to the relation of patent and 
wildlife law. My analyses have shown that tangible biological property and the rights 
surrounding that property are the critical link between patents and wildlife 
conservation law. While others have noted the distinction between patents and 
tangible property in wildlife (Koopman, 2005), I characterized that distinction and 
have shown that the nexus of patent and wildlife law is the possession of tangible 
biological property. This nexus forms the orthogonal relationship between these 
bodies of law and is the basic link between wildlife in their habitat, patentable 
inventions, and the benefits that result from such patents (Farrier and Tucker, 2001). 
In Chapter 1 I described issues raised by the existence of patents on inventions 
from wildlife and presented this basic premise: patent law and wildlife conservation 
law are orthogonal. That is, they are entirely independent “planes” of jurisprudence 
and social engineering, having no relation to one another other than along a line of 
intersection—the intersection of tangible property. And, after stating this premise, I 
wondered about the implications of orthogonality and the tangible property 
intersection of these laws. 
As a first step in evaluating the premise of orthogonality, in Chapter 2 I 
explained the scope of patentability of biological subject matter in the United States—
arriving at a point at which “everything under the sun made by man” is potentially 
patentable regardless of whether the source of the invention is covered by wildlife 
conservation law or not. In this chapter, I described an important point about species 
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and patents, and a curious exception: wildlife species per se are not patentable under 
United States patent law but microbial species, if isolated in pure culture, are.  
In an important step in the analyses, I described the historical evolution of 
federal, state, and private control over wildlife in the United States in Chapters 3 and 
4. This evolution has led to a situation in which the federal government has ultimate 
authority over wildlife but the states remain in control of most wildlife species. And, 
despite this level of governmental control, government has no control over thousands 
of wildlife species, particularly arthropods. 
The relation of intellectual property in biological subject matter and the laws 
that define the control of wildlife are analyzed in the pivotal Chapter 5. In this chapter, 
I have demonstrated that there is no explicit connection between the bodies of patent 
and wildlife conservation law in the United States. This chapter also describes the 
implicit nexus between these laws: the physical possession and use of tangible 
biological property—the domain of personal-property law. Although I have pointed 
out how connections could be made between patents and wildlife conservation law 
through the use of personal-property mechanisms, I have stated the conclusion clearly: 
patent and wildlife conservation laws are orthogonal, and their intersection is the 
physical possession of specimens. 
Based on the earlier results described in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, I have defined, 
in Chapter 6, a political economy of a “new” natural resource: patentable discoveries 
from wildlife in the context of the legal orthogonality I have shown. I have also 
described some implications of this political economy. These important implications 
include a market failure in patentable inventions from wildlife and a “tragedy of the 
commons” in the wildlife resources that are the sources of these patents. Historically, a 
market failure in a wildlife resource has often resulted in governmental intervention to 
stop or regulate that failure. I have defined such potential governmental interventions 
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in Chapter 6 but have also described possible market failure solutions that include 
private-property approaches. 
I have tested the findings of orthogonality and market failure in the natural 
resource of wildlife inventions by evaluating two case studies in Chapter 7. In both 
cases, orthogonality is the rule. However, in one case such orthogonality has been 
used to make an effective link between patents, their value, and the wildlife resource. 
In the other case, orthogonality has worked against such linkage. In both cases, the 
underlying orthogonality works either for or against the patent-wildlife resource link 
by use or failure to use the tool of personal-property mechanisms in tangible wildlife 
specimens.  
9.2 Conclusions 
The evidence presented here, including detailed analyses of patent law and 
wildlife conservation law in the United States, substantiates the premise of 
orthogonality. These bodies of law are entirely separate in their societal intent, 
jurisprudence, rules, and outcomes. For example, the intent of patent law is to 
encourage inventors to create technical advancement, whereas the intent of wildlife 
law is to conserve this natural resource. There is nothing in U.S. patent law that has 
any impact on any provision of any federal or state wildlife law. Symmetrically, there 
is nothing in wildlife law that affects any portion of patent law. Evidence for this 
includes the fact that a legally valid patent may be obtained on an invention made 
while breaking a wildlife-conservation law. Also symmetrically, holding a valid U.S. 
patent on an invention obtained from a specimen covered by wildlife law gives the 
patent holder no standing in the eyes of that wildlife law nor any power to affect any 
processions of that law. Further evidence of the mutual insularity of these laws is the 
fact that with one special exception for microbes discussed below, it is not possible to 
patent a wildlife species under the requirements of patent law. The implications of this 
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mutual insularity are several; however, the most salient is the failure to link the 
economic value of patentable inventions from wildlife to the sustainable conservation 
of that natural resource. 
But orthogonality also requires an intersection. Chapter 1 presented the most 
obvious evidence of this intersection: the existence of issued U.S. patents on 
inventions made through the possession of wildlife. It is the possession of specimens 
that provides the intersection of these bodies of law. Specimen possession is the 
domain of wildlife-conservation law. Where a species is covered by law, the controls 
on possession do not impact the act of inventing and obtaining a personal-property 
right in a patent. And, where a species is not covered by wildlife law, such as with 
most arthropods, wildlife law is wholly independent of the possession-invention-
patent chain. 
The orthogonality of these laws is also shown by the unique intersection of 
patents on microbial species. In every other wildlife domain, a patent is not possible 
on a species per se. Furthermore, a patent on any invention made using a wildlife 
specimen gives the patent holder no rights in that specimen or in the species. 
However, microbes provide a unique intersection in otherwise unrelated domains. As 
described in Chapter 2, by virtue of the Bergy cases, the Supreme Court opened the 
door to patents on microbial species. Such patents present a critically close 
intersection of patent law, possession, and wildlife law. Although the collision of 
patent-law rights, personal-property rights, and ethical questions of private species 
ownership is raised in such microbial patents, a true intersection with wildlife law 
does not exist because microbes are not explicitly controlled by wildlife law. 
However, the intersection is critically close because some federal and state laws 
govern the collection of microbe-containing samples. 
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The implications of these intersections are important to linking the economic 
value of invention from wildlife to sustainable conservation (Farrier and Tucker, 
2001). The failure to make this linkage can mean the loss of significant benefit that 
could be used for conservation (Svarstad et al., 2000). The intersection of specimen 
possession provides a focal point for designing policy solutions. And, most important, 
this focal point can be used to design policy solutions that provide a balance between 
the two different intentions of these bodies of law: technical advancement and wildlife 
conservation. 
The policy balance could be shifted to favor either one or, optimally, both of 
these goals. For example, policy could be designed to maximize the pursuit of 
patentable inventions from wildlife with no regard to conservation issues. Regulations 
could be modified to encourage the possession and use of wildlife for this purpose, 
and conservation protocols could be streamlined or even avoided. Conversely, policy 
could prohibit all inventive possession and stop this form of technical advancement, 
while maximizing wildlife protection. While these opposed policy goals might appeal 
to some, it seems intuitively obvious that a balance is the preferred policy design. 
A certain type of balance has accidentally developed between these bodies of 
law. Currently, patents are obtainable on inventions from wildlife and, simultaneously, 
conservation law acts to protect certain wildlife in various ways. However, a more 
proactive balancing act could enhance the goals of each body of law. Done right, this 
policy balance would encourage technology and invention while also improving 
wildlife-conservation mechanisms and resources. Most important, this proactive 
balance would provide that critical linkage between the potential economic value of 
inventions from wildlife and the cost of wildlife conservation. 
The balance point is the orthogonal intersection of possession. Using 
possession as a focal point, existing federal and state law should be analyzed to 
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determine how best to foster non-destructive possession for inventive purposes and to 
make firm links between their commercial use and the flow of financial benefit for 
conservation purposes. Beyond a review of existing law, the balance point of 
possession should be used to analyze the situation of non-protected wildlife and to 
develop strategies to make the patent–conservation linkage. 
The two cases described in Chapter 7 demonstrate several key points. The 
Yellowstone–PCR case confirms the fundamental premise of this work: Patent law 
and wildlife conservation law are orthogonal. This orthogonality acted to sever the 
financial benefits of patented discoveries from the wildlife steward. In the FLLT case, 
this orthogonality was made irrelevant through assertions of personal-property law and 
contracts. Of course, the second case is an example of how private-property rights can 
be used to create the kinds of linkages that are naturally missing in the orthogonality 
of patent and conservation law. Indeed, the outcome of the second case could have 
been quite different if public property in wildlife specimens were involved. 
9.3 Implications of Wildlife Property and the Management of Biological 
Conservation 
What are the implications of property in wildlife for biological conservation 
management concepts and practices? Does the complex mix of existing and potential, 
traditional and novel property rights in wildlife affect the design or implementation of 
such management? 
Considering wildlife property as a distinct institutional realm provides an 
organizing principle that ranges from traditional to innovative in application. Familiar 
situations include the participation of state or federal government, in their parens 
patriae role, in conservation programs for free-roaming, res publicae wild animals. 
The assertion of property rights in obscure biota or in intellectual property derived 
from wildlife is a new arena in which novel biological conservation management 
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schemes may be developed. However, developing such biota-property-based 
management schemes presents unique challenges, particularly in the integration of 
wildlife-property structures with the ecological and biological maxims of conservation 
biology. 
Very different sets of institutional problems arise in the application of wildlife-
property mechanisms in habitat-based versus species-based conservation schemes. The 
patchwork of uncoordinated and often disconnected wildlife laws and plans makes the 
ecosystem approach to conservation particularly challenging. And the traditional rule 
of capture as the basis for property rights in wildlife presents complications for 
designing sustainable resource use (McLaughlin, 2003). The integration of wildlife 
property mechanisms and habitat conservation strategies is complicated by biota 
automobility and mosaics of res privatae, res publicae, and res nullius wildlife in the 
same habitat. Applying wildlife-property approaches in species conservation schemes 
produces another set of problems related to wildlife mobility and multiple landowners. 
Figure 9.1 depicts a hypothetical wildlife-property landscape of biota units1 on a 
parcel of private property. The solid background matrix of res privatae rights results 
from the largest number of species being microbiota, which are res privatae by ratione 
soli. Superimposed on the background of res privatae microbiota are individual res 
privatae biota units representing plants. Also superimposed on the res privatae 
background are units of res nullius species that are transient and not government-
controlled, a genre typified by arthropods. A smaller number of biota units are state-
controlled res publicae, including primarily fish, game, and endangered species. The 
smallest number of biota units are federal-controlled res publicae including migratory 
birds, eagles, and endangered species. A systematic and coherent wildlife property–
based management plan would require integration of the various institutional property 
                                                 
1 Biota units = individual whole organisms of a species. 
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interests. Note that state and federal res publicae biota remain in that domain despite 
wildlife transience across property boundaries. This factor may be exploited in a 
management plan that incorporates participation by relevant governmental entities. 
Also, note that res nullius wildlife remain in that status unless and until captured. In 
order to create a continuum of coherent rights in res nullius wildlife, coordination with 
land owners would be required. Finally, although res privatae wildlife is unlikely to be 
transient, coherence will depend on coordination with other landowners to the extent 
of such transience. A new level and type of coordination and cooperation between 
property-right holders will likely be necessary to achieve optimal wildlife 
conservation. (McLaughlin, 2003).  
Figure 9.2 shows the wildlife-property framework in a species-based 
conservation management strategy. If the species are not transient, the system is 
considerably simplified. The figure summarizes in situ biota property in transient 
wildlife and shows that the property status of a transient wildlife specimen may 
change depending on the ownership status of the land it is on. Although federal res 
publicae wildlife remain under federal control whether on federal or state land, when 
that biota is on private land, trespass law mitigates assertion of the government’s 
property right. That is similarly true of state res publicae wildlife on private land. 
Although federal law requires federal-land managers to cooperate and coordinate with 
state wildlife agencies on issues of state res publicae on federal land, a state’s rights in 
res publicae–state wildlife on federal land is ultimately superseded by the supremacy 
of federal rights over wildlife on federal land. Note that res privatae wildlife is limited 
to the boundary of the private land.2 Res nullius wildlife units become de facto private 
or public property through trespass law.  
                                                 
2 This would be only fixed biota. 
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Figure 9.1. Wild Biota Property and Habitat Management for Conservation on Private 
Property. Note: Property area is shaded blue to denote res privatae status of 
soil microbiota. 
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Figure 9.2. Wild Biota Property and Species Management for Conservation. 
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A species-management approach that uses biota-property mechanisms depends 
heavily on the species selected. Federal wildlife are most readily managed in such 
schemes, although the factor of private land ownership presents a complex challenge. 
Similarly, managing property rights in state res publicae wildlife requires coordination 
with federal and private land holders. Managing ownable-on-capture res nullius 
wildlife requires management systems that integrate all participants that have the 
power to assert a relevant trespass right. 
The rules of biota property—some well established and others at the cutting 
edge of technology and law—provide a set of tools that may be used by participants in 
wildlife-management systems to further their own interests, the interests of clusters of 
participants, or the interests of the management scheme itself (Farrier and Tucker, 
2001). Understanding these rules, and obtaining facility with their practice, can 
provide property-right-based power to parties that may have been previously 
powerless. Holding wildlife property rights that have previously not existed or that 
have not been asserted can give stakeholders and actors new roles in such management 
schemes. Although there are cautionary concerns of an over-reliance on property 
rights in biodiversity conservation (Farrier and Tucker, 2001; McCauley, 2006), the 
exercise of wildlife-property rules has the potential to significantly alter the status quo 
of existing conservation-management systems and to enable the design of new ones. 
And such an approach could help close the gap between conservation biologists, 
environmental activists, and economists. 
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APPENDIX A: 
CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT OF PATENTABILITY OF 
BIOLOGICAL SUBJECT MATTER IN THE UNITED STATES 
Year Event 
1787 U.S. Constitution signed 
Article 1, Section 8 (General Powers of Congress) To promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings 
and discoveries. 
1790 U.S. Patent Act enacted 
1793 U.S. Patent Act amended 
Establishes the four great distinct classes of inventions: process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter 
1873 1st patent issued on animate matter 
U.S. Patent No. 141,072 to L. Pasteur on a pure yeast culture for 
fermentation 
1874 U.S. Supreme Court rejects patentability of “purified cellulase” 
American Wood Paper Co. v. Fiber Disintegrating Co.  
1877 1st U.S. patent on a vaccine of biological matter 
U.S. Patent No. 197,612 issued to Cutter on vaccine comprising 
“pulverized pustules and lymph.” 
1884 U.S. Supreme Court rejects patentability of “natural products” per se 
In Cochrane v. Badische Aniline & Soda Fabrik, Supreme Court finds 
that natural products (i.e., the dye, alizarine from the madder plant) are 
not patentable even if made synthetically. 
Vaccine patent issued 
U.S. Patent No. 273,390  
1889 Patent Commissioner rejects patentability of isolated pine fibers 
plant parts are products of nature (Ex Parte Latimer) 
1894 1st patent issued on a fungal fermentation 
U.S. Patent No. 525,824 claims fungal food fermentation 
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Year Event 
1899 Biological process patent issued on “Septic Tank” invention 
U.S. Patent No. 6 34,423 
1904 1st U.S. patent on bacterial vaccine 
U.S. Patent No. 778,767 issued to Houghton for attenuated blackleg 
anthrax bacillus 
1908 Biological process (“Septic Tank”) patent upheld 
Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs (2d Circuit 
Court) “the use of one of the agencies of nature for a practical purpose” 
is patentable subject matter 
1909 Purified natural product (“Aspirin”) patentable 
Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. v. Kuehmsted (N.D. Ill.)  
(pure, acetylized salicylic acid is not obvious over prior natural 
compound) 
1910 U.S. patent issued on “Mixed Microbial Culture” 
U.S. Patent No. 952,418 
1911 Pure adrenaline patentable 
Parke Davis v. E.K. Mulford Co. (S.D.N.Y.) 
1916 1st U.S. patent on viral vaccine issued 
U.S. Patent No. 1,210,053 for attenuated hog cholera virus 
1921 Patent on bacterial vaccine issued 
U.S. Patent No. 1,391,599 for swine pneumonia bacillus vaccine 
1927 Vaccine patent issued 
U.S. Patent No. 4,636,446 for attenuated rheumatic fever bacillus 
1928 Purified tungsten not patentable 
General Electric Co. v. DeForest Radio Co., (3rd Cir.)  
Obviousness of natural qualities 
1930 U.S. Plant Patent Act enacted 
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Year Event 
1931 U.S. Supreme Court rejects patentability of altered “natural products” 
but opens door for animate products as patentable subject matter 
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co. “altered” oranges (whole 
oranges with borax-impregnated rinds) not patentable; however, Court 
does not reject patenting “living matter” per se. 
Pure vanadium not patentable 
In re Marden (CCPA) 
1932 Biological process patentable but not organisms 
“Acetone” case of Guaranty Trust v. Union Solvents Corp. (3d. Cir.) 
Biological process and microbes patentable 
Ex parte Prescott (POBA) fermentation and isolated bacterium 
“Altered” furs are patentable  
Steinfur v. W. Beyer (2d Cir.)  
1933 U.S. Patent No. 1,980,083 issued on lactobacilli/yeast mix 
1934 Biological process patentable 
“Activated Sludge” case - City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc. 
(7th Cir.)  
1935 Pure alpha-alumina not patentable 
purity per se does not confer patentability 
In re Ridgeway (CCPA) 
1936 Purified dextrose hydrate is patentable  
International Patents Dev. Co. v. Penick & Ford Ltd .(D. Del)  
1938 Artificial ultramarine not patentable 
In re Merz (CCPA) 
1939 Pure Vitamin C not patentable 
In re King (CCPA)  
Ground plant root insecticide patentable 
Dennis v. Pitner (7th Cir.) the natural product has new properties, i.e., 
it’s patentable 
1940 Bacteria not patentable under Plant Patent Act  
In re Arzberger (CCPA)  
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Year Event 
1941 Beheaded, deveined shrimp unpatentable product of nature 
Ex parte Grayson (POBA)  
1944 Muskrat gland secretion not patentable 
In re Sparhawk (POBA) extract obvious vis a vis natural state 
1947 Microbial species mixture is patentable 
Kalo Inoculant v. Funk Bros. (7th Cir.)  
1948  Mixture of isolated bacterial species not patentable 
Funk v. Kalo Inoculant (Supreme Court) 
Obviousness rejection but organisms suitable subject matter.  
1950 Pure antibiotic extracted from garlic not patentable 
In re Cavallito (POBA); extract obvious vis a vis natural state 
1955 Natural substance purified from racemic mixture is patentable 
Sterling Drug v. Watson (D.D.C.); Pure compound not obviou 
1958 Pure vitamin B-12 from fermentation is patentable 
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chem Corp (4th Cir.) 
1961 Patent issues on fungal species  
“Lumb” patent 3, 103, 946; fungal species control “eelworms” 
Pure alpha-lipoic acid obvious/non patentable 
Ex parte Reed (POBA, 7/61) 
Pure alpha-lipoic acid not obvious/patentable 
Ex parte Reed (POBA, 10/61) 
1962 Streptimidone in a fermentation broth not patentable 
Ex parte Frohardt (POBA) 
1963 1st patent on bacterial insecticide  
U.S. Patent No. 3,113,064 B. thuringiensis suspension 
1964 “Substantially-pure” natural product (6-aminopenicillanic acid) 
patentable  
In re Doyle (CCPA)  
Elements 95, (Americium) and 96 (Curium) patentable 
In re Seaborg (CCPA) 
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Year Event 
1965 Tetracycline concentrates patentable 
Charles-Pfizer & Co., Inc. v. Barry Martin Pharm., (S.D. Fla.)  
Pure substance not obvious in light of known substance 
1967 Vitamin B-12 patent upheld  
Merck & Co. v. Chase Chemical (D.N.J.) 
Purified, crystalline B-12 did not exist in nature 
1970 Purified (but previously known) natural compound is novel 
In re Bergstrom (CCPA): prostaglandins 
Deposit of microbial culture satisfies enablement 
In re Argoudelis (CCPA) 
1972 Chakrabarty files patent application on bacterium with human-made  
inclusions 
1974 Bergy et al file patent application on microbial strain 
“a biologically pure culture of the microorganism Streptomyces 
vellosus . . .” 
1976 Patent on microbial strain rejected as unpatentable “products of nature” 
Ex parte Bergy (POBA) 
1977  Microbial strains patentable,  
In re Bergy I (CCPA)  
U.S. Patent Act does not exclude living organisms as patentable subject 
matter. 
1978  1st animal cell line patent  
“Porcine cell line” U.S. Patent No. 4,070,453 (non transgenic) 
pure culture of a fungus patentable under Plant Patent Act 
In re Solomons (POBA) 
1979 Pure strawberry flavor molecule patentable 
In re Katz (CCPA) 
Pure microbial strain patentable. 
In re Bergy II (CCPA) 
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Year Event 
1980 Supreme Court: “everything under the sun made by man” is  
patentable 
Chakrabarty v. Diamond 
Patent issued on “Molecular Chimera Method”  
(Cohen-Boyer) U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224  
1985 Higher plants patentable 
Ex parte Hibberd 
1987 Non-transgenic oysters made by manufacturing process are patentable 
Ex parte Allen 
1988 1st patent issued on transgenic animal 
“Harvard Mouse” (No. 4,736,866) 
Note. CCPA = Circuit Court of Patent Appeals; POBA = Patent Office Board of 
Appeals 
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